

THE HISTORY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

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THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR

*(From the beginning of the War
to the beginning of October 1917)*

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

This book is a reprint of *The History of the Civil War in the U. S. S. R.*, Vol. I, first published in English by Messrs Lawrence and Wishart of London, England. Edited by a board which included leaders of the Russian Revolution like Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, this history covers the important period from the eve of the February Revolution to the out-break of the November Revolution. Beginning with a review of the grouping of forces on the eve of the February Revolution which resulted in the overthrow of Tsarism and the coming to power of the bourgeois Provisional Government, it traces in detail the swing-over of forces in the Soviets and in the Army in favour of the Bolsheviks and the corresponding manoeuvres of the counter-revolutionary elements. It carries the narrative down to the out-break of the November, Socialist Revolution. An invaluable companion volume to the better-known *History of the C. P. S. U. (B)*.

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THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I

THE EVE OF THE BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

1

WAR

ON July 20, 1914,¹ Tsar Nicholas II declared war. Choked by the dust of the primitive country roads, marching past fields of ungarnered grain, the Russian regiments hastened to the German frontier. Mobilisation had not yet been completed. Guns stood in the arsenal yards in disordered array. Transport facilities for the artillery were lacking. In village and hamlet, at the very height of the harvest season, the young men were driven from the fields straight to the recruiting stations. For the tsar was bound by his treaties with France. He had borrowed billions of francs from the Paris bankers.

The military treaties stipulated that Nicholas was to launch his armies against Germany fourteen days after war was declared.

In the West, the German army corps were driving irresistibly through Belgium and rapidly approaching Paris. From Paris came panicky calls to Petrograd urging the Russians to take the offensive against Germany without delay.

On July 30, the Russian Military agent in Paris sent an urgent report to General Headquarters:

"It is now hardly likely that the French army can assume the offensive in the very near future. The most I expect is a slow retreat. . . . The success of the war will entirely depend on our movements in the next few weeks and on the diversion of German army corps to the Russian front."²

¹ August 2, 1914. All dates in this volume are old style, unless otherwise stated.
— "Trans."

² S. Lukirsky, "Authoritative Opinions in Foreign Military Literature on the Influence of the Movements of the Russian Army on the Course of Events in the World War of 1914-1918," "Who Is The Debtor?" Moscow, 1926, p. 102.

In vain did General Zhilinsky, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front, declare that the invasion of East Prussia was doomed to certain failure. In vain did General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff, plead against an immediate attack. Paris was insistent. The French Ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, haunted the Foreign Ministry, demanding that the Russian armies should attack. And on July 31 the Supreme Commander, Grand Duke Nicholas, the tsar's uncle, nicknamed "Big Nicholas," informed Paléologue that the Vilna and Warsaw armies would take the offensive "to-morrow at dawn."¹

Unprepared for war, the Russian armies invaded Germany.

Not expecting such precipitate action on the part of the Russian generals, Kaiser Wilhelm was obliged to retard the advance on Paris. The German High Command transferred the Reserve Corps of the Guards, the Eleventh Infantry Corps and the Second Cavalry Division to the Eastern Front. But even before these reinforcements arrived, the German regiments had already assumed the offensive and repulsed the Russians. Five divisions transferred from the Western Front subsequently participated in the complete rout of the Russian army in East Prussia. Twenty thousand Russians were killed and 90,000 taken prisoner. The tsar's army lost all its artillery. Two army corps—the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth—were surrounded and captured to a man. But Paris was saved. Even before the battle in East Prussia was decided, Paléologue made the following entry in his diary:

"The fighting . . . continues with unabated vigour. Whatever the final result may be, the mere fact that fighting is continuing is enough to give the British and French troops time to re-form in the rear for an advance."²

The "final result" was the destruction of the Russian armies. But the tsar had fulfilled his engagement—he had repaid the French gold with the lives and blood of the toilers. On August 30, the day the Russian troops were routed, Sazonov, the Foreign Minister, said to Paléologue:

"Samsonov's army is annihilated. . . . We had to make this sacrifice for France."³

In the war of 1914 Russian tsarism acted as the hireling of British and French capital. Russia was in reality a

¹ Maurice Paleologue, "La Russie des Tzars pendant la Grande Guerre (Tsarist Russia in the Great War)," 22 ed., Paris, Librairie Plon, Vol. I, p. 77.

² Ibid, p. 122.

³ Ibid, p. 123.

semi-colony of the West European countries. Even the intellectual leader of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie, the Constitutional-Democrat Milyukov, subsequently admitted that in the war against Germany Russia was a tool of the British and French capitalists. Milyukov wrote in an émigré newspaper on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the war:

"I did not expect at the time that Russia, without having mustered her forces, would send millions of her sons into the trenches in a foreign cause."¹

The autocratic government and the bourgeoisie and landlords who stood behind it were the more ready to obey the wishes of the foreign capitalists for the fact that a revolutionary movement was rapidly developing at home. The shooting down of the workers in the Lena goldfields in 1912, and the ominous response it awakened all over the country were harbingers of the revolutionary storm. The strikes that broke out in Baku on the eve of the war and the St. Petersburg strike of 1914, when barricades once again appeared in the streets of the cities, marked the break of the storm itself. From these barricades, the spectre of the 1905 Revolution stared tsarism in the face. Many tsarist dignitaries fearfully prophesied that the impending revolution would go incomparably farther than the Revolution of 1905. P. N. Durnovo, former Minister of the Interior, wrote to Nicholas II on the very eve of the war:

"A political revolution in Russia is inevitable, and every revolutionary movement is bound to develop into a socialist movement."²

In sending the Russian people to die for "a foreign cause," the tsarist autocracy hoped to drain their lifeblood and restrain the growing forces of revolution.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the ruling classes of Russia involved themselves in the world slaughter solely in the interests of British and French capital, or that in doing so the Russian bourgeoisie was not pursuing its own imperialist aims. It was to the interest of the ruling classes of tsarist Russia to take part in the war. The stage of capitalism known as imperialism had begun in Russia before the war, and monopoly capital had already become a leading factor in Russian economic life. But while ruling the country economically, the bourgeoisie did not govern it politically: the country was governed by an autocracy representing the feudal landlords.

The bourgeoisie was in no great hurry to remove the discrepancy between its economic might and its political

¹ P. Milyukov, "My Attitude to the Late War," "Posledniye Novosti" ("Latest News)," No. 1809, August 1, 1924, Paris.

² "Durnovo's Memorandum," "Krasnaya Nov (Red Soil)," 1922, No. 6, p. 196.

impotence. It was not to its interest to wage a determined struggle against the autocracy, for there was the proletariat, which had already taken definite shape as a class. Enriched by the experience of the 1905 Revolution, the proletariat was entering on a new struggle under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin's party. If the Russian bourgeoisie were to seize power by removing the autocracy, it would be left to confront the working class single-handed. The 1905 Revolution had already shown what the result of such a duel might be. The autocracy, with its army and police, served the bourgeoisie as a reliable shield against the attacks of the proletariat. As Lenin wrote:

"They are too much in need of tsarism, with its police, bureaucratic and military forces, in their struggle against the proletariat and the peasantry for them to strive for the destruction of tsarism."¹

Furthermore, Russian capitalism had begun to take shape at a time when capitalism in Western Europe had long been fully developed and had managed to secure all the best places in the sun. The young marauder was unable to compete with such inveterate bandits as the imperialists of Great Britain and Germany. Strong elbows and heavy fists were required to force a way into the profitable markets. These heavy fists the autocracy possessed. With the help of its armies it was clearing the way to new markets for the bourgeoisie. The Russian imperialists were reaching out for Galicia. The Russian capitalists were striving to subjugate the countries of the Near East. They wanted Constantinople.

Promyshlennost i Torgovlya, a Russian imperialist periodical, had said in December 1912 that "mercantile freedom" through the Dardanelles was essential for international trade.

"The country cannot live in constant fear that the 'front-door key' to our house, falling from the feeble hands of the Turks, may find its way in to the strong hands of others, who will be in a position to punish us or pardon us at discretion."²

The autocracy and the bourgeoisie were united in the struggle for new markets and new colonies, for the "front-door key." If it could succeed in securing a firm foothold in the Dardanelles, Russian imperialism would command the Danubian countries—Bulgaria and Rumania. Writing of the aims of the struggle between Russia and Germany, Lenin said:

¹ Lenin, "The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," "Collected Works," Vol. VIII.
² V. Savitsky, "The Dardanelles and Their Importance to Trade," "Promyshlennost i torgovlya (Industry and Commerce)," 1912, No. 24, p. 531.

"The aims of Russian imperialist policy . . . may be briefly described as follows: to smash Germany in Europe with the aid of Britain and France in order to plunder Austria (annex Galicia) and Turkey (annex Armenia and especially Constantinople)."¹

The tsar's Manifesto proclaiming war was greeted by the bourgeoisie with enthusiasm. Patriotic processions marched to the tsar's palace. Bourgeois organisations deluged the throne with messages of loyalty. The newspapers trumpeted loudly about the "unity of the tsar and the people." Students kneeled in the streets, singing "God Save the Tsar!"

On July 30 an organisation called the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos was formed in Moscow, followed a week later by the All-Russian Union of Cities—the purpose of both of which was to help the autocracy win the war against Germany.

Tsarism entered the war amid the pealing of bells and the enthusiastic plaudits of the landlords and the bourgeoisie.

But the enthusiasm was soon dampened by the progress of the war. As long as Germany's main forces were being diverted by the operations on the Western Front, the Russian armies were able to make good their first defeats in East Prussia. In Galicia, they succeeded in capturing the city of Lvov on August 21, 1914, and Przemyśl, one of the most important Austrian fortresses, on March 9, 1915. The Russian forces reached the Carpathians. In Transcaucasia they drove Germany's allies, the Turks, back to Erzerum. But the victorious fervour was short-lived. The rotten and corrupt machinery of war failed to provide shells. The inefficient generals were unable to bring up artillery and reserves in time. The German and Austrian troops rapidly recovered the territory they had lost. On April 25, 1915, the Germans seized Libau and threatened Riga. On May 20 the Austrians recaptured Przemyśl, and on July 9 the Russians evacuated Lvov. In the course of July the Germans seized all the Russian fortresses in Poland, and on July 23 Warsaw fell. Having lost Poland, the Russian troops also evacuated Lithuania.

Defeat at the front was accompanied by disintegration in the rear.

The patriotic fervour of the bourgeoisie gave way to "patriotic alarm," as Milyukov expressed it in the State Duma on July 19, 1915.² Defeat at the front shattered the "unity" between the tsar and the capitalists.

¹ Lenin, "A Separate Peace," "Collected Works," Vol. XIX.

² "The State Duma. Fourth Assembly, Fourth Session, Verbatim Report," Petrograd, 1915, column 92.

The imperialist war caused a marked alteration in the relative strength of the ruling classes. War profiteering increased the economic power and importance of the bourgeoisie. The official "Vestnik Finansov" estimated that the profits of the capitalist owners of 142 of the larger textile mills alone increased from 60,000,000 rubles in 1913 to 174,000,000 rubles in 1915. Profits in the linen industry in 1915 were three times larger than in any year prior to the war.¹

At the same time according to the *Vestnik Finansov*, taxation on capitalists steadily declined in proportion to gross profits.

The increased economic influence of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by the growth of its political importance. The autocracy was obliged to sanction the formation of a number of societies to help mobilise resources for the war, such as the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities. In the summer of 1915, War Industry Committees were set up to handle the distribution of orders for military supplies. This afforded the bourgeoisie wide opportunities to organise and strengthen itself politically. In the press and through its representatives the bourgeoisie declared with increasing persistence and openness that the autocracy was showing little concern for its interests. More and more frequently cautious references were made at ceremonial banquets to the "despotism" of the tsar. The influence of liquor even induced some to speak openly of the necessity of limiting the power of the monarch. At an extraordinary conference of representatives of the War Industry Committees held in August 1915, P. Ryabushinsky, a big industrialist, declared:

"It is time the country realised that we are powerless to do anything in face of the existing attitude towards us of the government, which is unequal to its task. We are entitled to demand that we be allowed to work, since this responsibility is being thrust upon us. ... We must draw attention to the very structure of the government power, because the government is not equal to its task."²

The bourgeoisie demanded the creation of a "Cabinet of Confidence," i.e. the appointment of Ministers trusted by the country. At an extraordinary meeting held on August 18, 1915, the Moscow City Duma passed a resolution demanding:

"the creation of a government which would be strong

1 N. Pokrovsky, "War Profits in the Principal Branches of the Textile Industry," "Vestnik Finansov, Promyshlennosti i Torgovli (Financial, Industrial and Commercial Messenger)," 1917, No. 21, p. 292.

2 "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy," Files of the Department of Police. Special Register, No. 843, Vol. I, 1915, folio 235.

by virtue of the confidence placed in it by society, and unanimous, headed by a man whom the country trusts.¹

The resolution of the Moscow City Duma was supported by the Moscow Merchants' Society, the merchants of Petrograd, the Council of Congress of Representatives of Commerce and Industry, the Petrograd City Duma and a number of other city dumas. "A Cabinet of Confidence" became the slogan of the whole bourgeoisie. Under the caption "A Defence Cabinet," Ryabushinsky's paper, *Utro Rossii*, printed the following list of persons whom it proposed as candidates for the "Cabinet of Confidence": Prime Minister, M. V. Rodzyanko; Minister of Internal Affairs, A. I. Guchkov; Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Milyukov; Minister of Finance, A. I. Shingaryov; Minister of Ways of Communications, N. V. Nekrasov; Minister of Commerce and Industry, A. I. Konovalov; Director of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs, A. V. Krivosheyin; Minister of War, A. A. Polivanov; Minister of Marine, N. V. Savich; Comptroller General, I. N. Efremov; Procurator-General of the Synod, V. N. Lvov; Minister of Justice, V. A. Maklakov; Minister of Education, Count P. N. Ignatyev.

Many of the persons enumerated did in fact join the government, only considerably later, after the revolution had placed the bourgeoisie in power.²

The alarm of the bourgeoisie was expressed not only in oppositionist resolutions. The bourgeois political parties in the State Duma decided to join forces against the tsar. On August 22, what was known as the Progressive Bloc was formed.

The Fourth State Duma, elected in 1912, represented a bloc of the feudal landlords and the upper bourgeoisie, in which the former greatly predominated. The largest group in the bloc consisted of the Rights: 170 of the 410 deputies in the State Duma were Rights (Nationalists, Progressive Nationalists, moderate Rights, etc.). They drew their support from the arch-reactionary Union of the Russian People, which had been formed in 1905 and was recruited from the most reactionary elements, such as landowners, houseowners, police officials and small traders. Armed squads were recruited from the lower middle classes and from the vagabond element. These squads were known as Black Hundreds. The programme of the Union of the Russian People was: a firm and absolute tsarist autocracy, a single and indivisible Russian Empire and no concessions to the oppressed nationalities. In order to win the sympathy

1 "Resolution of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Moscow City Duma," *Utro Rossii* (Russian Morning), No. 228, August 19, 1915.

2 "A Defence Cabinet," *Utro Rossii*, No. 222, August 13, 1915.

ties of the peasants and the backward elements among the working class, the Black Hundreds included a number of demagogic demands in their programme, e.g., larger land allotments for peasants possessing little land and equality of legal status for all labouring classes. The Union of the Russian People ran food kitchens and taverns, where monarchist propaganda was conducted, and distributed money, for which funds were provided in abundance by the government. The chief purpose of the Union of the Russian People was to combat revolution, and its principal methods of warfare were pogroms, organised with the aid of the authorities, secret assassination, Jew-baiting and persecution of the non-Russian nationalities inhabiting the Russian Empire. The Black Hundreds enjoyed the wholehearted support of the autocracy. Nicholas II received a delegation from the Union of the Russian People, joined the society himself and wore its badge. One of the leaders of the Union was a Bessarabian landowner, V. M. Purishkevich, who began his career as a special commissioner of one of the most brutal police chiefs Russia had ever known, V. K. Plehve. His advocacy of pogroms, his reactionary activities and his unrestrained campaign against the "aliens," i.e., the national minorities in Russia, made Purishkevich's name a symbol of obscurantism and feudal oppression. Another prominent figure in the Union of the Russian People was N. E. Markov 2nd, a landowner in the Kursk Province, and a representative of the extreme Rights, the "aurochs," as they were called. Markov 2nd was the centre of constant brawls and free-fights. Every disturbance in the Duma, even the hand-to-hand fracas in which the deputies sometimes indulged, was invariably associated with the name of Markov 2nd—a zealous defender of the autocracy.

After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution the importance of the Union of Russian People began to decline and the dominant rôle among the Rights passed to the Council of the United Nobility. But the reactionary Union of the Russian People continued to exist and to receive funds from the government. It reappeared on the political scene whenever the revolutionary movement began to gain strength in the country.

In addition to the extreme Rights, an important part in the Duma was played by V. V. Shulgin, a Nationalist. He was a deputy from the Volhynia Province, an active figure in the Zemstvos and the editor of a reactionary newspaper called the *Kievlyanin* (*Kiev Citizen*).

Closely connected with the Rights in the Duma were the Octobrists, or the Union of October 17, which consisted of about one hundred deputies representing the interests

of the big industrial capitalists and of large landowners who conducted their estates on capitalist lines. The only difference between the Octobrists and the Rights was that the former supported the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, in which the tsar had promised certain political liberties and the creation of a State Duma, or parliament. But as early as 1906 the Octobrists had explained that "the title of autocratic monarch" in no way conflicted with the Manifesto of October 17, or with a constitutional monarchy. The Octobrists wholeheartedly supported the home and foreign policy of the government. They servilely backed every step taken by the government. The Left press nicknamed them "the party of the latest government edict."

The Octobrists were a government party in the Duma, and only in the second year of the war, when the absolute inability of the tsar to fight the war to a victorious finish became apparent, did the Octobrists join the opposition. The leader and organiser of the Octobrists was A. I. Guchkov, a Moscow house-owner and a big industrialist. Mobile and energetic by nature, in his youth he fought as a volunteer on the side of the Boers against the British and took a hand in the insurrection of the Macedonians. In the Russo-Japanese War he served in a Red Cross unit. During the Revolution of 1905 he formed the Union of October 17 and was the leader of the reactionary wing of the bourgeoisie. As chairman of the Third Duma, he inspired the imperialist policy of the autocracy. During the war he was elected chairman of the Central War Industry Committee. Guchkov was an energetic advocate of fighting the war "to a victorious finish." On committees and at conferences, he frequently criticised the inefficiency and corruptness of the generals in charge of supplying the army with munitions. He demanded that the autocracy should confer greater independence on the bourgeois organisations working for defence. Guchkov frequently visited the front and established contacts with the higher commanding officers. In the eyes of Nicholas, who regarded everybody who stood more to the Left than the Octobrists as an "anarchist," Guchkov was almost a "revolutionary" because of his active interference in military affairs. The tsarina wrote to her husband, "Oh, could one but hang Guchkov!"¹ and she dreamed of a "strong railway accident"² which would put him out of the way.

Another leader of the Octobrists was M. V. Rodzyanko, who owned huge estates in the Ekaterinoslav Gubernia. As President of the Fourth Duma he supported the reactionary policy of the autocracy. On April 27, 1915, when

1 Letter of September 2, 1915.—"Trans."

2 Letter of September 11, 1915.—"Trans."

the Octobrists had begun to express dissatisfaction, after the first defeats of the tsarist armies in the war, N. A. Maklakov, Minister of Internal Affairs, wrote to Nicholas as follows:

"Rodzyanko, Your Imperial Majesty, is only an instrument—self-important and unintelligent—but behind him stand his leaders, people like Guchkov, Prince Lvov and others, who are systematically pursuing their purpose. What is this purpose? To tarnish your glory, Your Imperial Majesty, and to undermine the importance of the holy idea of the autocracy, which from time immemorial has always been a force of salvation in Russia."¹

The Constitutional-Democrats (or, abbreviated, the Cadets), constituted the next largest group in the Duma. It consisted of more than fifty deputies, or, if one adds the kindred group—the Progressivists, whom Lenin called "a mixture of Octobrists and Cadets"²—of about one hundred deputies. The Cadets were the political representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie. The party was organised in 1905, and was recruited from liberal members of the Zemstvos, bourgeois intellectuals, lawyers, professors and so forth. The Cadets had undergone a series of curious metamorphoses. In the first revolution, the Revolution of 1905, Lenin described the Cadets in the following terms:

"Not connected with any one definite class of bourgeois society, but entirely bourgeois in its composition, its character and its ideals, this party vacillates between the petty-bourgeois democrats and the counter-revolutionary elements among the big bourgeoisie. The social support of this party consists, on the one hand, of the urban lower middle classes...and, on the other, of the liberal landlords."³

With the defeat of the Revolution of 1905, the Cadets swung even more to the Right. At their Second Congress, in 1906, they inserted the following clause into their programme:

"Russia must be a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy."⁴

It would therefore be more correct to call the Constitutional-Democrats a constitutional-monarchist party. They were opposed to the confiscation of the landed estates

¹ V. P. Semennikov, "The Monarchy on the Eve of the Collapse," 1914-17. "Papers of Nicholas II and Other Documents, Moscow," 1927, pp. 95-6.

² Lenin, "Results of the Elections," "Collected Works," Vol. XVI.

³ Lenin, "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party," "Collected Works," Vol. IX.

⁴ "The Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of National Freedom)," "Resolutions of the Second Congress, January" 5-11, 1906, "and Programme," St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 7.

and favoured the "alienation of the land at a fair valuation." They were actually a bourgeois party and endeavoured only with the help of their name to retain the support of the masses by adopting at their Third Congress the title of National Freedom Party. In actual fact the Cadets wanted to share power with the tsar and the feudal landlords in such a way as not to disturb the foundations of the power of the latter and not to surrender the power to the people. The liberals feared the movement of the masses more than they feared reaction. This explains why, although they were a force economically, the liberals were impotent politically. In the end the Cadets became a party of the imperialist bourgeoisie which openly supported the predatory foreign policy of the autocracy. Only their more oppositionist phraseology distinguished them from the Octobrists. In the State Duma the Cadets worked in harmony with the Octoberists. An example of this was the unanimous election of A. I. Shingaryov, a Cadet, as Chairman of the Military and Naval Commission of the Duma. The Octobrists frankly explained their support of this candidature by the fact that the Cadets were more glib with their tongues. The Nationalist A. I. Savenko referred to the election of Shingaryov as follows:

"There are situations in which an independent opposition can perform the functions of control and criticism better than parties which in their time have sinned by excessive deference to the government. That is why A.I. Shingaryov may prove indispensable in his post."¹

Lenin had earlier foretold that the Cadets and the Octobrists would join forces:

"The Octobrist is a Cadet who applies his bourgeois theories to practical life. The Cadet is an Octobrist who in his hours of leisure, when he is not plundering the workers and peasants, dreams of an ideal bourgeois society. The Octobrist will learn a little more about parliamentary manners and the political humbug of playing at democracy. The Cadet will learn a little more about the business of bourgeois intrigue, and they will merge, they will merge inevitably and infallibly."²

The leader of the Cadet party was P. N. Milyukov, former professor of history in the University of Moscow. In the First State Duma the Cadets designed him as Prime Minister of a responsible cabinet. A capable orator and an authority on foreign affairs, Milyukov was a prominent intellectual leader of the imperialist bourgeoisie. His fre-

¹ A. Khrustchov, "A. I. Shingaryov, His Life and Activities," Moscow 1918, p. 71.

² Lenin, "An Experiment in Classifying the Russian Political Parties," "Collected Works," Vol. X.

quent articles and speeches advocating the seizure of Galicia, Armenia, and especially the Black Sea straits earned him the nickname of "Milyukov-Dardanelles." Other prominent leaders of the Cadets were V. A. Maklakov, a prominent Moscow lawyer, F. I. Rodichev, a district Marshal of Nobility in the Tver Province, and A. I. Shingaryov, a physician and an active figure in the Zemstvos.

These three big groups—the Rights, the Octobrists and the liberals—in fact made up the Duma, for the electoral system was so arranged as to give an overwhelming majority to the landlords and bourgeoisie. The proletariat had been represented by only five Bolshevik deputies in the Duma—G. I. Petrovsky, M. K. Muranov, A. E. Badayev, F. N. Samolyov and N. R. Shagov—but they had all been arrested in November 1914 and later exiled to Siberia.

The petty-bourgeoisie was represented by ten Trudoviki and six Mensheviks. The Trudoviki, or the Group of Toil ("Trudovaya gruppa"), aimed at uniting all the "toiling classes of the people—the peasants, the industrial workers and the working intellectuals,"¹ while preserving capitalism. The Trudoviki are known in Russian history as the authors of the agrarian Bill called the "Bill of the 104," which demanded that the land should be divided up among the peasantry on the basis of the amount of land each peasant household could cultivate by its own labour. The Trudoviki were opposed to the confiscation of the landed estates and proposed that the landlords should be compensated for land alienated, in which they were at one with the Cadets. In the Duma the Trudoviki vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, and when the Socialist-Revolutionaries formed their own fraction in the Duma and left the Group of Toil, the Trudoviki fell completely under the sway of the Cadets. The leader of the Trudoviki in the Fourth Duma was A. F. Kerensky. An exceptionally temperamental orator, mordant and impulsive, Kerensky acquired fame as a defence lawyer in a number of political trials. In the Duma he frequently made speeches criticising government measures. One could meet in the waiting-room of his law office peasant petitioners who had come to request him to act as defence lawyer in trials connected with agrarian disorders. After the arrest of the Bolshevik deputies, Kerensky seemed to be the most Left of the deputies in the Duma. He was regarded as a revolutionary by the Rights and the Octobrists, and also by the secret police. As a matter of fact, Kerensky was a petty-bourgeois democrat. He swore by the people, prated about the people and paraded his love of the

¹ L. M. Bramson, "History of the Trudovaya Party." "The Group of Toil in the First State Duma," Petrograd, 1917, p. 14.

people, but he did not regard the people as a motive force in history. Kerensky was of a nervous temperament and easily excitable; but he would subside even more easily and tend to lose his head. He had no firm political principles, but regarded himself as a Socialist-Revolutionary. Yet he was the chairman of the Trudoviki fraction, which not only did not call itself Socialist, but was not even opposed to the monarchy in its programme. Kerensky did not carry on any steady work among the masses. He was attracted to the liberal groups, which he regarded as the centre of the movement. He combined morbid vanity and ambition with a passion for histrionics and a love of pose and gesture. He openly supported the imperialist war, recognised the necessity for the military might of tsarist Russia and vigorously opposed the Bolsheviks. Kerensky frequently assumed the role of conciliator between the bourgeoisie and certain groups of workers. For example, in September 1915, when workers who were under the influence of the Mensheviks came to a congress of the Union of the Cities and requested to be allowed to take part in the deliberations of the congress, even without the right to vote, Kerensky came out and addressed them. He advised the workers to stop the strike, "which had no serious significance," and to "occupy themselves with their internal organisation," and then the "bourgeois liberals would not dare to refuse to allow them to participate in political conferences." Long before the revolution broke out, Kerensky was already rehearsing the role of compromiser and conciliator between the bourgeoisie and the working people in the interests of the bourgeoisie—the role which this political actor was to play in 1917.

The party to which Kerensky subsequently professed his adherence, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, was formed in 1902. In the spring of that year the first extensive peasant movement developed in the Ukraine and partly also in the Volga region after a long period of calm. The action of the peasants evoked a response among the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, who could see with their own eyes what the Narodniki of the 'seventies had not seen, namely, the masses in revolt. Narodniki ideas and hopes were revived. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who professed to follow the traditions of the Narodniki, regarded the peasantry as the mainstay of revolution. The village communities, which had been preserved by the autocracy¹ in order to facilitate the collection of taxes, were regarded by the Socialist-Revolutionaries as the germ of Socialism. The endeavour of the small property-owner to retain his

¹ i.e., after the Reform of 1861 which legally abolished serfdom in Russia.—
"Trans."

independent enterprise despite all hardships was regarded as a proof that the struggle against capitalism could be fought successfully. From this the conclusion was drawn that Russia could avoid capitalism and pass directly to Socialism. The remnants of the Narodniki groups joined to form a single party, which, unlike the Social-Democrats, called itself a party of "all the toilers"—workers, peasants and intellectuals.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries wanted to be primarily a party of the peasantry. Their activities were conducted mainly in the rural districts, where they agitated for the "Socialisation of the land," or, as they explained, for

"its withdrawal from the sphere of commercial transactions and its transformation from the private property of individual persons or groups into the property of the whole people."¹

With the object of retaining the support of the peasantry, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had always glossed over the existence of any class differentiation among the peasantry and had argued that there was no fundamental difference between the rural proletariat and the "independent husbandmen": "They must be classed under the single category of working peasantry." This was entirely in line with the interests of the rich peasants, the kulaks. The kulaks also professed to act in the interests of the "working agricultural population" and persistently denied that there was any differentiation of classes among the peasantry. This explains why the ranks of the Socialist Revolutionary Party were filled by kulaks during the 1917 Revolution.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries regarded individual terrorism as their chief method of warfare. In their early period of activity they succeeded in carrying out several terrorist acts: Stepan Balmashov assassinated Sipiyagin, Minister of Internal Affairs; Pyotr Karpovich assassinated Bogolyepov, Minister of Education; Yegor Sazonov assassinated Plehve, Minister of Internal Affairs; Ivan Kalyaev threw a bomb which killed the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich. This courageous single-handed fight of individuals against the hangmen of the tsar invested the party with a halo of glory in the eyes of the revolutionary intellectuals. But the futility of terrorism soon became apparent. An assassinated tyrant was immediately replaced by another tsarist hireling who was no better, and often even worse, than his predecessor. Terrorism enfeebled rather than fostered the mass movement, because the policy and practice of individual terrorism was based on

1 "Programme of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries," Moscow, 1917, p. 11.

the Narodnik theory that there were active "heroes" on the one hand, and the passive "crowd," on the other, which expected deeds of prowess from the heroes. But such a theory and practice precluded all possibility of rousing the masses to action, of creating a mass party and a mass revolutionary movement. Moreover, the police soon succeeded in placing their own man—E. F. Azef, an engineer and *agent provocateur*—at the head of the terrorist combatant organisation of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Thus the terrorist activities came under the control of the police. Azef became undisputed master in the party. He selected the members of the Central Committee. The exposure of Azef as an agent provocateur in 1908 completely disrupted the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party had revealed its bourgeois character already in the Revolution of 1905-07. Even at that time the Socialist-Revolutionaries betrayed a tendency to come to terms with the Cadets. They joined the Group of Toil in the First Duma. The tsarist Prime Minister, P. A. Stolypin, had the Social-Democratic fraction in the Second Duma brought to trial, but did not touch the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Already at its first congress in 1906, various currents made themselves manifest in the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Rights were opposed to terrorism and the agrarian programme. In the autumn of that year the Rights definitely broke away from the party and formed their own semi-Cadet party, called the Popular Socialist Toilers' Party. The "Popular Socialists" rejected the idea of a republic, insisted on the necessity of compensating the landlords for land that might be alienated in the interests of the peasants, and formed a bloc with the Cadets. The leader of this party was A. V. Peshekhonov, who became Minister of Food after the Revolution of February, 1917.

At this first congress of the party a Left Wing also separated off and formed its own semi-anarchist party, known as the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists. The Maximalists at that time, i.e., during the first bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1905, demanded not only the "socialisation of the land," but also the immediate "socialisation" of the mills and factories. But these demands served only to mask the essential bourgeois character of the Maximalists. They proposed to make terrorism their chief method of warfare. The Maximalists subsequently degenerated into an unprincipled group of bandits—"expropriators," as they were called—who enjoyed no support whatever among the masses.

The disintegration of the party did not stop there. During the war the Socialist-Revolutionaries again split into several groups. Some of them proclaimed their unreserved support of the war. To this group belonged Kerenisky and N. D. Avksentyev, one of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Avksentyev started a periodical in Paris called *Prizyv* (The Call), which agitated for the defence of tsarist Russia. Other Socialist-Revolutionaries regarded themselves as internationalists, ostensibly attacked the defencists, but continued to remain with them in one party. The ideological leader of these "internationalist" Socialist-Revolutionaries who endeavoured to sit between two stools was V. M. Chernov.

The Menshevik Social-Democrats at the time of the Fourth Duma did not constitute a single and united organisation. They were divided into a number of groups and sub-groups. On the extreme Right Wing stood G. V. Plekhanov, who acted in unison with the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, N. D. Avksentyev and I. I. Bunakov. At the beginning of the war Plekhanov addressed a letter to the Russian workers arguing that Russia was waging a war of defence and that it was therefore the duty of the workers to defend the fatherland. Plekhanov's action was enthusiastically greeted by the Cadets. Milyukov declared that "with his usual skill" Plekhanov had demonstrated the difference between British imperialism and German imperialism, between a defensive war and an offensive war.

Plekhanov was supported by the defencists K. A. Gvozdyev, P. P. Maslov and A. N. Potresov, who advocated open support of the imperialist bourgeoisie. They were in favour of the formation of workers' groups on the War Industry Committees and endeavoured to show that the workers of Russia approved a united front with the bourgeoisie and civil peace. Gvozdyev was the chairman of the workers' group on the Central War Industry Committee. He was strongly opposed to strikes, which in his opinion enfeebled the working class and disorganised the country, and worked in close harmony with Guchkov. "I entertain the greatest sympathy for and confidence in Gvozdyev,"¹ Guchkov said of the latter. During the Revolution of 1917 the Mensheviks proposed Gvozdyev as Minister of Labour.

Further to the "Left" stood the Menshevik "Centre," headed by F. I. Dan, I. G. Tsereteli and N. S. Chkhaidze, A. I. Chkhenskely and M. I. Skobelev, the last three being members of the Duma. The Centre made great play of

¹ "Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Stenographic Report of the Examination and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. VI, Leningrad, 1926, p. 286.

revolutionary phrases, but actually supported the defencists. On the Left Wing of the Mensheviks stood Martov and—just a little more to the Left—Trotsky. In the early period of the war Trotsky and Martov published a paper in Paris called "Nashe Slovo" ("Our Word"), criticised the tactics of the Bolsheviks, called the Bolsheviks "split-terers" and appealed for unity with the defencist supporters of the war.

The Centre and the Left Mensheviks were afraid to take up an open defencist position. In the Duma, Chkheidze, like Kerensky, abstained from voting in favour of granting war credits to the tsar. Lenin explained the conduct of the fraction by the fact that "otherwise they would have aroused a storm of indignation against themselves among the workers."¹

In spite of their criticism of the defencists, in their political practice both the Left Mensheviks and the Centre aided the overt agents of the Russian bourgeoisie. When Vandervelde, one of the leaders of the Second International, wrote a letter to the Menshevik fraction in the Duma persuading them to support the defence of tsarist Russia against Germany, Chkheidze and his friends replied:

"In this war your cause is the just cause of self-defence against the dangers offered to the democratic liberties and the struggle for liberation of the proletariat by the aggressive policy of the Prussian junkers... We do not resist the war, but we deem it necessary to draw your attention to the necessity of preparing immediately and energetically to counteract the annexationist policy of the Great Powers which is already in evidence."²

Despite their revolutionary phraseology, all these Left Narodnik-Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik-Social-Democratic groups—from the Chernov group and the Maximalists to the group of Martov and Trotsky—actually constituted the Left petty-bourgeois wing of the bourgeois democrats, who advocated preserving and "improving" capitalism; for they all denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in Russia, were opposed to the Socialist transformation of Russia, favoured unity with the defencists who supported the imperialist war, opposed the Bolshevik slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, carried on an active fight against the Bolshevik policy of bringing about the defeat of the tsarist government in the imperialist war, and formed a united front against Lenin's party, the Bolshevik Party.

1 Lenin, "Socialism and War," "Collected Works," Vol. XVIII.

2 "Sotsial-demokrat (Social-Democrat)," No. 34, December, 5, 1914, Geneva.

The only revolutionary, proletarian and socialist party in Russia was the Bolshevik Party. Although officially constituting a single Social-Democratic Party with the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks had actually been an independent party ever since 1905. In 1912 they officially broke with the Mensheviks, expelled their Right leaders from the party and formed a separate Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik Party was the only party which considered the hegemony of the proletariat a fundamental condition for the success of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and for its transition to a socialist revolution. It was the only party which believed it possible for Socialism to be victorious in Russia, and which had its own definite revolutionary platform for the transition period from the bourgeois revolution to the Socialist revolution. It was the only party which consistently fought the imperialist war, favoured the defeat of the tsarist government in the imperialist war, carried on a policy of fraternisation at the front, irreconcilably fought chauvinism and defencism in the name of proletarian internationalism and advocated the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war. The leader and founder of the Bolshevik Party was Lenin. The Bolshevik Party had its fraction in the Duma, consisting of workers elected by workers' electoral bodies. The Bolshevik members of the Duma had been arrested in November 1914 and subsequently exiled to Eastern Siberia.

The war of plunder continued unabated and unrestrained and foreign territory was being shamelessly seized, yet the Mensheviks spoke only of the necessity of "preparing" to fight "the annexationist policy... which was already in evidence." It was enough for Milyukov and Guchkov that the Mensheviks did "not resist the war." Sober bourgeois politicians knew that in practice "not resisting" was equivalent to "assisting."

And such was the case in fact when the Progressive Bloc was formed. It was joined by nearly all the bourgeois parties—the Octobrists, the Cadets, the Progressivists, a section of the moderate Rights, what was known as the Progressive Nationalist group and the fraction of the Centre. The only groups that did not join were the Trudoviki, the Mensheviks and the Extreme Rights. But the first two groups were very sympathetic towards the bloc, and Chkheidze promised to support all its "progressive" measures. The only thing Chkheidze demanded was that the bloc should "get closer to the people," but what exactly this meant the Menshevik leader did not explain.

The programme of the Progressive Bloc was "to create a united government consisting of persons enjoying the

confidence of the country," whose function it would be to pursue:

"a wise consistent policy aiming at the preservation of peace at home and the elimination of discord between the nationalities and classes."¹

The demands of the bourgeoisie were extremely modest. Not only did it not demand a share of the power, but did not even demand a responsible cabinet. All it requested was the appointment of several Ministers who enjoyed the confidence of the bourgeoisie and a more tolerant attitude towards bourgeois organisation. The programme of the bloc also demanded a partial amnesty for political and religious prisoners, the drafting of a Bill granting autonomy to Poland, a conciliatory policy towards Finland, initial measures for abolishing restrictions on Jews, restoration of the trade unions, and the legalisation of the labour press—all of which was obviously designed to win the support of the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities and at least the more backward section of the working population.

But even this empty talk of the bourgeoisie sounded like a challenge to the autocracy, which had long grown unaccustomed to "senseless dreams"—as in the early days of his reign Nicholas II had termed the attempts of the liberals to modify his regime. The autocracy accepted the challenge.

"Nobody needs their opinion, can't they see to their canalisation first."²

the irate tsarina wrote sarcastically to Nicholas in reference to the Moscow Duma, which had put forward the same demands as the Progressive Bloc. Somewhat earlier the tsarina had written:

"Russia, thank God, is not a constitutional country though those creatures try to play a part and meddle in affairs they dare not."²

The Progressive Bloc was opposed by the Rights, the feudal landlords. The Union of the Russian People addressed a violent appeal to the "Russian people" against "curtailing the rights of the autocratic monarch of all Russia."

The Black Hundred press appealed to the government not to yield to the majority in the Duma. The Rights in the Duma decided to set up an "Information Bureau" as a counterweight to the Progressive Bloc. But there

¹ "The Progressive Bloc in 1915-1917," "Krasny Arkhiv (Red Archives)," 1932 Vols. L-LI, pp. 133-4.

² Letter of August 28, 1915.—"Trans."

³ Letter of June 25, 1915.—"Trans."

were too few of them. Since they were not strong enough to combat the Bloc within the Duma, the Rights started a campaign for the dissolution of the Duma. A. P. Strukov, Chairman of the Council of the United Nobility, wrote a letter demanding the prorogation of the Duma. Monarchist organisations in a number of cities supported the demand of the United Nobility. They also appealed to the tsar to cease making concessions and to take urgent measures to strengthen the government power.

Nor was the government itself idle. First of all, Nicholas, under pressure of the tsarina, decided to dismiss "Big" Nicholas and to assume command of the army himself. The tsar's uncle could not be forgiven for his share in organising the Duma. Members of the court told Witte, who was Prime Minister in 1905, that in the stormy days of October 1905, "Big" Nicholas, who had been designed for the part of military dictator, seized a revolver and, threatening to shoot himself in the study of "Little" Nicholas, compelled the latter to sign the Manifesto proclaiming civil liberties and the convocation of the Duma.

"We are not ready for a constitutional government. N's (Nicholas') fault and Witte's it was that the Duma exists, and it has caused you more worry than joy,"¹ the tsarina recalled in 1915 when she insisted on the dismissal of "Big" Nicholas.

But the trouble was not the "old sins" of the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Grand Duke was not over-intelligent. Count Witte wrote of "Big" Nicholas that "he has long ago taken to spiritualism, and is not quite all there, so to speak."² And the tsar himself referred to him not very respectfully in one of his letters to the tsarina:

"We had a very good talk about several serious questions and, am glad, completely agreed upon those we have touched. I must say when he is alone and in a quiet mood he is sound—I mean he judges rightly."³

Perhaps the fact that the Grand Duke was not quite "sound" made him a suitable candidate for a constitutional monarch in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. Another consideration was the Grand Duke's share in the proclamation of the Manifesto of October 17. However that may be, in court circles it was considered that the bourgeoisie was setting up "Big" Nicholas against "Little" Nicholas. As the tsarina wrote to her husband:

"Nobody knows who is the Emperor now—you have to run to the General Headquarters and assemble your min-

¹ Letter of June 17, 1915.—"Trans."

² S. Y. Witte, "Reminiscences," Vol. II, Moscow, 1923, p. 33.

³ Letter of June 26, 1915.—"Trans."

isters there, as though you could not have them alone here like last Wednesday. It is as though ... (Nicholas) settles all, makes the choices and changes—it makes me utterly wretched.”¹

According to the tsarina, in court “some dare call” Grand Duke Nicholas, Nicholas III.²

The news of the proposed replacement of the Supreme Commander aroused great alarm in the bourgeois circles. The President of the Duma implored the tsar not to assume the post of Supreme Commander. On August 12, 1915, Rodzyanko submitted a report written in sharp and strident tones. The Moscow City Duma adopted a resolution on August 18 severely criticising the government, and at the same time addressed Grand Duke Nicholas expressing its “feelings of confidence” in him. But these pronouncements only served to confirm the suspicions of the court. On August 23 the tsar issued a manifesto dismissing Grand Duke Nicholas, and on September 3, he prorogued the State Duma. The dry minutes of the Duma describe the prorogation in the following terms:

“The session opened at 2.51 p.m., M. V. Rodzyanko presiding.

“**Chairman:** I hereby open the session of the State Duma. I call upon the State Duma to rise and hear a ukase of His Imperial Majesty. (*All rise.*)

“**Vice-Chairman of the State Duma, Protopopov:** ‘Ukase to the Government Senate. In accordance with Article 99 of the Fundamental State Laws we hereby command: the business of the State Duma shall be discontinued from September 3, 1915, and the date of its resumption shall be appointed, in accordance with our ukase to the Government Senate of January 11, 1915, not later than November 1915, depending on extraordinary circumstances. The Government Senate shall not fail to adopt the necessary measures in fulfilment of this. The original is signed in His Imperial Majesty’s own hand: “Nicholas.” Given at the General Headquarters of the Tsar, August 30, 1915.’

“**Chairman:** Hurrah for His Imperial Majesty! (*Prolonged cheers.*) I hereby declare the session of the State Duma closed. (The session closes at 2.53 p.m.)”³

In two minutes all was over. Only the day before the bourgeois deputies had demanded the resignation of the tsar’s Ministers, but now they themselves submissively cheer those who were driving them out.

¹ Letter of June 17, 1915.—“Trans”.

² Letter of September 16, 1915.—“Trans.”

³ “The State Duma Fourth Assembly, Fourth Session. Verbatim Report. Petrograd, 1915, columns 1207-8.

DISINTEGRATION

The bourgeoisie went no further than a "revolt on their knees." However, a distinct change in the situation took place in the second half of 1916, when the contradictions caused and accentuated by the war began to make themselves fully felt.

The blows of the war were particularly destructive to Russia. First of all, the country was inadequately prepared for a world war. The low technical development of Russia's munitions industry had made its influence felt in all recent wars. In the Crimean War of 1854, Nicholas I put up against the Anglo-French coalition an army which was largely armed with flintlocks. Only ten cartridges a year per soldier were allowed for firing practice, and even these were issued only nominally. The fortifications of Sevastopol crumbled from the mere concussion of the guns mounted on them. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the generals, acting in the belief that "firearms are for self-defence and cold steel for self-sacrifice," supplied a long-range rifle sighted for only six hundred paces. The generals justified their inefficiency by the old proverb: "A bullet is a fool, a bayonet a smart lad." The Russian troops suffered heavily from the Turkish fire, while the Russian fire occasioned little damage to the Turks. The same was true of the artillery. Even as late as the 'seventies the arsenals supplied the artillery with brass cannon of a small charge and a low muzzle velocity. The Turkish army was equipped with steel guns manufactured by Krupp. Confronted by an army of a far from modern country but trained and armed by modern countries, the Russia of Alexander II, like the Russia of Nicholas I, revealed the utter rottenness of her military might and of her social and economic system.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 completely exposed the sham of Russia's military might. Whereas in the Crimean War the Anglo-French coalition had required a year to capture the fortress of Sevastopol, little Japan captured Port Arthur, which was equal in strength to six Sevastopols, in eight months.

"A whitened sepulchre—that is what the autocracy has proved to be in the sphere of military defence."¹

Lenin wrote in January 1905.

Tsarist Russia was again unprepared when she entered the World War. The "far-sighted" heads of the

¹ Lenin, "The Fall of Port Arthur," "Collected Works," Vol. VII.

War Department believed that the war would last not more than five or six months. The Minister of War and the Director of the Ordnance Department, General Kuzmin-Karavayev, were of the opinion that after military supplies had been fully assembled and dispatched to the army "a certain lull in the work would supervene."¹ Supplies sufficed for only the first four months of war. The Russian army soon found itself without shells, rifles and cartridges, and with no hope of receiving any in the near future. There were not enough rifles for the training of new recruits. Reinforcements were dispatched to the front unarmed.

A short-sighted policy was not the only reason for this. The war could not be run on "stocks"; it required a steadily growing munitions industry. But the old tsarist bureaucrats, scared of any increase of power of the bourgeoisie, were loath to enlist industry in supplying the army. In the six years General Sukhomlinov had occupied the post of War Minister (1909-15), he had learnt nothing of military affairs. On the other hand, he had surrounded himself by a regular network of spies of the German General Staff. During five years of preparation for war and one year of actual war, the treachery that lay concealed in the very heart of the army remained undiscovered. Headed by such a Minister, the War Department could only contribute to the general disintegration. Sukhomlinov was nicknamed "General Defeat."

Only in the summer of 1915, when the poorly-equipped army retreated in disorder from the front, did the autocracy decide to mobilise industry. A law was passed on August 17, 1915, setting up Special Councils for defence, transport, fuel and food. At the first inaugural session of the Councils held on August 22, Nicholas II, inviting the representatives of the bourgeoisie to take part in the work of supplying the army, said:

"This task is henceforward entrusted to you, gentlemen."²

The Councils were headed by Ministers and were endowed with wide powers. The Defence Council was placed under the direct charge of the tsar.

"No government department or person could give it orders or demand account to it."³

The Council was empowered:

1 A. A. Manikovskiy, "The Supply of Munitions to the Russian Army in the World War," Vol. II, Moscow, 1930, p. 9.

2 "Meeting in the Winter Palace. Ceremonial Opening of the Special Council on Military Supplies," "Russkoye Slovo (Russian Word)," No. 194, August 28, 1915.

3 A. A. Polivanov, "Diary and Reminiscences as Minister and Assistant-Minister of War," Vol. I, Moscow, 1924, pp. 154-5.

"To sanction the production of war supplies in every possible way... and to any value."¹

But wide powers were not enough for the organisation of the munitions industry. According to General Manikovskiy, Director of the Ordnance Department in 1915:

"the work of supplying our army with munitions nevertheless did not advance at the rate anticipated at the time of its (i.e., the Council's—*Ed.*) inception, but, on the contrary, in many respects even deteriorated."²

Despite the fact that Prince Shakhovskiy, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and two of his predecessors were made members of the Defence Council, this "regulating" body displayed its complete ignorance of the munitions industry and of the way it should be mobilised. The representatives of the big bourgeoisie on the Council used their position to secure large orders and to engage in "organised profiteering."

"Three inch shrapnel was the choice titbit over which all the jackals licked their chops."³
wrote General Manikovskiy.

Equally sterile were the activities of the other Councils: the Fuel Council, the Food Council and the Transport Council. The representatives of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy on these bodies "assisted" the defence of the country by accusing each other of shady practices and by zealously taking bribes. The efforts to regulate production and consumption were obstructed by the rotten bureaucratic machine and its inefficient chiefs. In November 1915, A. F. Trepov, Minister of Ways of Communication, decided to make an effort to avert the impending famine by regulating railway traffic. A decision of the Ministerial Council suspended railway passenger traffic between Moscow and Petrograd for six days with the object of improving the supply of goods to the capital. But nobody took the trouble to organise the bringing of supplies to Moscow, with the result that, having suspended passenger traffic, the government kept rushing empty freight cars from Moscow to Petrograd. The attempt to organise the supply of the factories with fuel and raw materials met with no better success. The output of coal and oil was declining, and the dislocated transport system was unable to carry sufficient supplies of wood fuel. At the beginning of 1915 the munitions industry was already suffering from an acute fuel shortage. In October 1915 the Spe-

¹ "Ibid.," p. 155.

² A. A. Manikovskiy, "The Supply of Munitions to the Russian Army in the World War," Vol. II, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1930, p. 36.

³ Ibid., p. 32.

cial Fuel Council decided to requisition fuel stocks. This decision was vigorously resisted by the bourgeoisie. Incidentally, on the Council itself it was adopted by only fourteen votes to ten. In the region of the North-Western Front attempts were made to requisition fuel with the aid of the military authorities. In response to this action the Council of Congresses of the Timber Industry threatened to stop lumbering operations.

While the bourgeoisie was sabotaging every measure to regulate production and consumption, and especially the measures to regulate incomes, Nicholas's Ministers were looking for scapegoats, each department blaming the others for the economic dislocation. The shortcomings in the supply of coal, iron, and food to the army were discussed at a meeting of the Ministerial Council in June 1916, Sturmer, who was at that time Chairman of the Ministerial Council, testifies that at this meeting an altercation arose between Trepov, Minister of ways of Communication, and Shakhovskoi, Minister of Industry.

"Stocks of coal at the factories are inadequate," the Minister of Ways of Communication declared.

Coal was in charge of Shakhovskoi.

"Yes, I have the coal, but you are not giving us railway cars," Shakhovskoi retorted.

"I am not giving you cars because the Ministry of War has taken all my cars...and is not returning any."

And the Chairman of the Ministerial Council himself comments on this altercation:

"The railways were so jammed with cars that in order to forward cars newly arrived, others had to be tipped over the embankment."¹

The Ministers wandered through their departments like blind men, without the slightest conception of what was going on around them and of what must be done to cope with the general dislocation.

It was even more difficult to mobilise the backward agriculture and the agricultural population of the country to the extent that the advanced capitalist countries were able to do. Russian agriculture was semi-feudal in character and in general run on a small scale. It was largely need that drove the peasants to sell any of their produce. The muzhik required money to pay for land rented from the landlord. Money was also squeezed out of the muzhik by extortionate taxation. The marketable surplus of peasant agriculture sharply declined during the war. All able-bodied peasants were recruited for the army. Sixteen million men, or 47 per

1 "Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Stenographic Report of the Examination and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. I, Leningrad, 1924, p. 241.

cent of the adult male population of town and country, were drafted into the army. Bublikov, a bourgeois leader, declared that Russia was mainly fighting the war with the blood of its sons, and not with capital accumulated, or otherwise procured, for purposes of war. Agriculture lost a large part of its means of production with every year of the war. The government requisitioned horses, animals for slaughtering, and harness. The zealous officials managed to requisition supplies in such a way as to bring very little benefit to the army. The Governor of Orel reported at the beginning of 1916 that the government agents were requisitioning milch cows, while fat heifers were being used for profiteering puposes.

"They requisitioned whatever could be requisitioned most easily," declared V. Mikhailovsky at a conference on the high cost of living. "Supplies which were skilfully concealed and which belonged to the economically more powerful circles were, apparently, not requisitioned at all."¹

The general disruption also manifested itself in the collapse of the economic foundation of the tsarist régime—the semi-feudal system of land ownership. There was a decline in the amount of land rented to the peasants—which was the most outspoken form of this system. At the very beginning of the war rents already dropped by about one-third.

Farming on the landed estates also declined. It suffered from the constant mobilisations for the army which deprived it of labour power. The employment of refugees and prisoners-of-war compensated for not more than one-tenth of the labour power lost as a result of mobilisation. In European Russia there was a shortage of agricultural labourers in 1914 in fourteen of the forty-four provinces, i.e., in 32 per cent of the provinces of European Russia, and in 1915⁴ in thirty-six provinces, or 82 per cent, while in 1916 there was an acute shortage of labour power in all the forty-four provinces of European Russia. Before the war wages paid in the districts from which it was customary for members of peasant households to migrate in search of work were considerably lower than wages paid in the districts to which labour power flowed, but by 1915 they had almost reached the same level, which was indicative of a shortage of agricultural labour even in the districts from which peasants formerly used to migrate in search of employment. The shortage of labour power resulting from the general economic dislocation accelerated the decline of the

1 "Proceedings of the Conference on Economic Questions Connected with High Prices and Military Supplies," Moscow, 1915, p. 261.

semi-feudal system of land ownership which was even more rapid than the general decline of agriculture.

But it was not only the semi-feudal system of land ownership that suffered from the dislocation; the war also affected industry.

Capitalist economy on a war-time basis presented a very complex picture. The destructive influence of the war was for a time concealed by a deceptive boom. The war resulted in an expansion of the industries producing military supplies, and this created an illusion of prosperity. Gross production increased from 5,620,000,000 roubles in 1913 to 6,831,000,000 roubles in 1916. The expansion of the war industries tended to conceal the decline in the basic industries. In 1916 the output of the factories not engaged on war production decreased by 21.9 per cent. But very soon the expansion of the war industries also ceased, chiefly owing to the shortage of fuel and metal. Two years after the outbreak of the war the output of coal in the Donetz coalfield was being maintained only with difficulty at the pre-war level, despite the fact that the number of workers had increased from 168,000 in 1913 to 235,000 in 1916. Before the war the monthly output of coal per worker in the Donetz coalfield was 12.2 tons; in 1915 and in the early part of 1916 it had dropped to 11.3 tons and in the winter of 1916 to 9.26 tons. Minister Shakhovskoi was obliged to admit that the decline in the productivity of labour was due to:

... "the deterioration of the equipment of the mines, owing to the impossibility of carrying out timely repairs of the machinery and equipment required for the extraction of coal."¹

Factories came to a standstill owing to lack of fuel. Less bread was baked. The population used fences and furniture as fuel.

There was also a shortage of metal. Thirty-six blast furnaces were extinguished in 1916. Metal began to be rationed. Towards the end of 1916 the factories were supplying only half the metal required by the munitions industry.

The general dislocation of economic life was most vividly manifested on the railways. The railway crisis reflected the general development of militarised industry. There was a certain expansion at first, the amount of freight carried increasing. But this expansion was clearly insufficient to meet war demands. While the amount of freight carried increased, there was also a catastrophic increase in the amount of goods awaiting transportation, which at the beginning of 1914 already totalled 84,000

¹ Leningrad Branch of the Central Archives. Second Department of the Economic Section, VGAF, Folio 3.

carloads and in the first half of 1916 had further risen to 127,000 carloads. On July 15, 1916, General Alexeyev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, submitted a report to the tsar in which he stated:

"There is hardly a single branch of state and public life at present which is not suffering severe dislocation owing to the fact that demand for transport facilities is not being properly satisfied. . . . On an average, only 50 or 60 per cent of the transport requirements of the factories producing military supplies are being satisfied, and in the Petrograd District, according to the Minister of Ways of Communication, it is only possible to transport 8,000,000 poods of freight in place of the 18,500,000 poods required. In view of this, not only is any increase in the output of the factories unthinkable, but it will even be necessary to curtail the present scale of work."¹

The country was splitting economically into a number of more or less isolated regions. This counteracted the advantages of the social division of labour achieved by capitalist development and threw tsarist Russia back many decades. Thus, autumn prices for rye in the central industrial regions were on an average higher than the prices for rye in the neighbouring Central Black Earth Region by 19 per cent in 1914, 39 per cent in 1915 and 57 per cent in 1916.

By 1916, owing to the difficulty of transporting grain, the difference in prices had increased threefold.

The collapse of the transport system sharply aggravated the food crisis. The poor work of the railways had already created a food shortage at a time when the country still had stocks of grain from previous harvests. Nearly one billion poods of grain could not be dispatched to the consuming districts owing to lack of transport facilities. As a result, profiteering in grain rapidly spread. In the autumn of 1916, Rittich, Minister of Agriculture, even decided to adopt extreme measures, and instituted the compulsory requisition of grain. Rittich was a typical bureaucrat. He had received a first-class bureaucratic training, having been in charge of various agricultural and agrarian departments since the Revolution of 1905. However, his experience in carrying out Stolypin's agrarian policy was of no help to him in the matter of grain requisitions. The attempt failed. Grain could not be procured this way. Stocks in the consuming regions rapidly declined. In the autumn of 1915 the cities were on starvation rations. The army was receiving only one half the regulation food supply.

¹ A. A. Manikovsky, "The Supply of Munitions to the Russian Army in the World War," Vol. II, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1930, pp. 343-4.

The collapse of the market and the widespread profiteering helped to undermine the currency. Gold disappeared from circulation on the very outbreak of the war. Expenditures increased from year to year. State expenditures exceeded state revenues by 39 per cent in 1914, by 74 per cent in 1915, and by 76 per cent in 1916.

Paper money was printed in increasing amounts. The value of the ruble declined. Credit was thoroughly undermined, and the disturbance of credit in its turn hastened the collapse of the market.

Facts quoted by bourgeois economists show that by the end of the war (1919) the "national wealth" of Russia had declined by 60 per cent as compared with 1913, whereas in Great Britain the decline amounted to 15 per cent, in France to 31 per cent, in Germany to 33 per cent and in Austria-Hungary to 41 per cent. Japan and America alone increased their "national wealth," which, incidentally, in capitalist countries belongs just as little to the nation as the "national income" does.

Just as the destruction of wealth was greatest in Russia, so the dislocation of economic life proceeded much more rapidly in Russia than in any other country.

One consequence of the severe economic dislocation was a marked decline in the exchange value of currencies. The decline in the exchange value of the currencies of various countries in 1915 and 1918, compared with the U.S. dollar, was as follows:

	1915 per cent.	1918 per cent.
Japan	0	1
Great Britain	3	2
France	8	12
Italy	16	20
Germany	16	23
Austria-Hungary	27	33
Russia	29	40

The rate of decline of the currencies was different in various countries. The currency of Japan remained at gold parity, and the currency of Great Britain remained very near to gold parity. Devaluation of the currency was greatest in Russia and Austria-Hungary. It was far less in Germany, Italy and France.

America, Japan and England fought the war entirely on foreign territory. Practically no fighting took place on Italian territory. The extent of German territory occupied by the enemy far exceeded the territory occupied by enemy forces in Austria and France, both in absolute size and in their general importance to the country.

Russia was distinguished by the enormous extent of her

military front. Russia's front was several times longer than the fronts of any of the other belligerent Powers. The huge armies of Russia and Austria-Germany swept back and forth several times over a vast tract of territory in the Eastern theatre of war. Owing to the fact that the war in this region was a war of manoeuvres rather than of position, the destructive effects were considerable not only in the war area itself, but also in the adjacent regions, which suffered all the disastrous consequences of evacuation. Over 500,000 square kilometres of Russian territory, with a population of 25,000,000 persons, i.e., one-seventh of the population of the country, were at one time or another evacuated. Three million people were dislodged from their homes and transferred to the interior. The huge armies of refugees brought disorganisation, panic and disturbance of economic life in their train. Unlike France, where occupation and evacuation took place only once—in August 1914—and affected only a small area, Russia suffered continuously from the devastating effects of occupation and evacuation throughout the whole war.

Unable, owing to her technical backwardness, to mobilise the economic resources of the country for defence purposes, Russia was obliged to appeal for assistance to her allies.

The loans granted to Russia by her allies increased from month to month. Nearly 8,000,000,000 rubles flowed into the hands of the government. Russia's debt almost doubled during the war, reaching 7,745,900,000 rubles, as against 4,066,000,000 rubles before the war. The loans were much larger than the value of the orders placed by Russia with her allies. In addition to orders, the interest on the State debt had to be paid, as well as orders placed in neutral countries, Japan and America.

The loans served to increase Russia's dependence on her allies. England virtually determined how the loans were expended. The allies drew gold from Russia as security for the loans. In May 1916, Bark, the Minister of Finance, wrote:

"The very unfavourable terms of the credits now being offered by England show that with the development of military events it is becoming more and more difficult for Russia to obtain credits from the Allied Powers alone, and our complete financial dependence on the Allies is extremely burdensome."¹

Even this tsarist Minister was obliged to admit that Russia's semi-colonial dependence became accentuated during the war. The old tsarist bureaucrat saw only one

¹ "Essays on the History of the October Revolution," Vol. I, Moscow, 1927, p. 61.

alternative, viz., to secure loans elsewhere, to apply to the American imperialists.

War with the Central Powers severely affected Russia's foreign trade. Half of the goods Russia used to obtain from abroad were purchased in Central European countries and one-third of Russia's exports were consigned to these countries. The relations of other countries with Germany and Austria were much less extensive and it is natural that the termination of these relations was far less devastating for England, France and even Italy. But it was not only Russia's relations with the Central Powers that were disturbed; her relations with almost the entire world were suddenly broken off. Her European land frontiers, with the exception of the Norwegian and Swedish frontiers, and also the Rumanian frontier, which was of no commercial importance and which gave access only to Rumania, were closed. German submarines dominated the Baltic. A similar situation prevailed in the Black Sea after Turkey joined the war. In 1913 nine-tenths of Russia's exports and five-sixths of her imports had passed through these frontiers.

During the war Russia's contact with the external world depended on the thin thread of the Trans-Siberian Railway, five thousand miles long and with only one outlet to the sea—Vladivostok. The Murmansk Railway was not completed until the end of 1917. In addition, contacts were maintained in the summer months through Archangel, which was connected with Central Russia by a narrow-gauge railway, transformed into a wide-gauge railway only in 1916. Archangel could handle only a small quantity of goods. How limited the carrying capacity of this railway was is shown by the fact that horse cartage of goods was resumed, just as in the days of Ivan the Terrible. Goods were carted by road from Archangel to Vologda, and thence to Petrograd, a distance of about 800 miles. Rodzyanko wrote:

“Already at the beginning of the war the Duma had begun to receive reports to the effect that transport of goods from Archangel by the narrow-gauge railway was experiencing great difficulty, and that the port was swamped with goods. Merchandise arriving from America, England and France was piled mountain high and was not being consigned to the interior. On the very outbreak of the war, Litvinov-Falinsky warned us that the port of Archangel was in a terrible condition. Large shipments of coal for the Petrograd factories were being expected from England, but there was nowhere even to unload the coal. Despite the fact that Archangel was the only military port connecting us with the Allies, it received practically no attention. It was found necessary

to raise the question of Archangel at one of the very first meetings of the Special Council and to ask the Ministers what measures they proposed to take. The Ministers, in the persons of Sukhomlinov, Rukhlov and Shakhovskoi, either put us off with excuses, or made promises without actually doing anything. Meanwhile, the amount of goods that had accumulated by the end of the summer of 1915 was already so great that cases lying on the ground had been literally pressed deep into the soil from the weight of the goods above."¹

The whole clumsy edifice of Imperial Russia was collapsing. The costs of the war proved too burdensome for it. In the first three months of the war Russia's expenditure amounted to 167 per cent of her total revenues for the year 1913, whereas, in the same period France spent 105 per cent of her revenues in 1913, and England 130 per cent. Only in the case of Austria-Hungary were these expenditure as high as 160 per cent.

Russia suffered from war more than any other country. Thirty months of intense effort had resulted in the collapse of industry, the decline of agriculture, a transport crisis and famine.

"We in the rear," wrote Guchkov in August 1916 to General Alexeyev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, "are impotent, or almost impotent. Our methods of warfare are double-edged, and, in view of the excited mood of the people, especially the workers, may serve as the first spark to a conflagration the proportions of which nobody can foresee and which nobody will be able to localize."²

It was the workers and peasants who bore the whole brunt of the war. The masses became increasingly affected by revolutionary unrest. The country was on the verge of an explosion. The imperialist war proved a powerful accelerator of the revolution.

1 M. V. Rodzyanko, "The Collapse of the Empire," "Archives of the Russian Revolution," Vol. XVII, Berlin, 1926, p. 100.

2 V. P. Semennikov, "The Monarchy on the Eve of Collapse." "Papers of Nicholas II and other Documents," Moscow, 1927, p. 282.

DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMY

The army was passing through a similar school of privation and revolutionary training. The war shambles and the frightful loss of human life, were opening the eyes of the deceived soldiers. The killing and maiming of millions of people ruthlessly revealed the true purpose of the war, its predatory character.

The nightmare of the war shambles was accompanied by material privations too great to be borne. Trenches full of mire and filth, lice, the absence of warm food, a shortage even of bread—such was the life of the soldier at the front.

"Do you know what things are like at the front?"—we read in one of many typical letters from soldiers. "We stand in the trenches. Cold, mud and vermin; food once a day at ten o'clock at night, and that lentils so black that pigs would not eat it. We are simply starving to death..."¹

Badly armed, commanded by inefficient generals, robbed by corrupt commissaries, the army suffered defeat after defeat. Without faith in itself or confidence in its commanders, not knowing why the millions were perishing, untrained, hungry and barefoot, it abandoned towns, whole regions and tens of thousands of men to the enemy.

The severe defeats enraged the soldiers. Discontent seethed in the ranks, passing into suppressed unrest and then into open outbreaks. Cursing the incompetence and confusion, the soldiers refused to obey orders, declined to attack and avoided fighting.

"There is great unrest in the army here," we read in a letter from the Northern Front. "We are sick and tired of fighting. Several times already orders have been given to attack, but the soldiers simply refuse point-blank to leave the trenches, and so the attack has to be abandoned."²

Another soldier, serving in the 408th Kuznetsk Infantry Regiment on the same front, wrote:

"I went into attack four times, but nothing came of it: our regiments refused to advance. Some went, but others did not leave the trenches, so I too did not crawl out of the trench."³

¹ "Central Archives of Military History," Records of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front. File No. 25-945, folio 107.

² Ibid., folio 281.

³ Ibid., folio 245.

According to reports of the tsarist censors who opened the soldiers' letters, over 60 per cent of the soldiers referred to the steady spread of the defeatist mood. The soldiers fled from the front, surrendered to the enemy, or shot themselves in the arm or leg so as to be sent to hospital.

The frightful horrors of the war drove the soldiers to desert. The deserters were constantly hounded, they lived in fear of being betrayed to the police at any minute. Yet they preferred the life of half-starved deserters, hunted like wild beasts by the military police, to life at the front.

In 1916 there were already over one and a half million deserters from the Russian army.

The hard lot of the soldiers was rendered still more intolerable by the brutality of the officers, who would beat and bully the soldiers without the slightest provocation. They were punished for the most trifling misdemeanours. They were beaten for mistakes in military exercises, they were thrashed for not saluting smartly enough, or for not procuring vodka for the officers. Officers while drunk would cripple their men, and while sober would punch their faces, venting their spleen on the soldiers for their own mistakes. "A soldier's face is like a tambourine: the harder you strike it the happier you feel," the soldiers used to say in bitter irony, in reference to the face-punching proclivities of their officers.

Thousands of letters confiscated by the tsarist police describe the horrors and privations of the soldier's life:

"The longer it goes on, the worse it is. Our officers are throttling us, draining our last drop of blood, of which we have little as it is. Will we ever see the end of this?"¹

Here are a few lines from another letter, for which a heart-broken mother waited in vain:

"Darling mother, it would have been better if you had never brought me into the world or if I had been drowned as a baby than for me to suffer as I do now."²

Cases of vengeance wreaked by the soldiers on their brutal commanders became more and more frequent. Detested officers were shot in action by their own men.

The author L. Voitlovsky, who observed the life of the army, recorded a song sung by soldiers which vividly expressed their hatred of the officers:

"Oh, orphan me,
To the woods I'll go,
The woods deep and black,
With my rifle on my back,

1 "Central Archives of Military History, etc." folio 5.

2 Ibid., folio 27.

I'll go hunting.
Three deeds I'll do:
The first black deed,
The captain off I'll lead.
The second black deed,
Put my rifle to his head.
The third black deed,
Right there I'll shoot him dead.
Cursed son of a bitch,
My captain!"¹

The avenger as a rule went undiscovered. Officers were killed not only at the front, but also in the rear, in the depot battalions. The foundation of the old discipline—fear of superior—was disappearing. Open attacks by men on their officers, not only by individuals but also by groups, became more and more frequent. Instead of the futile, individual outbursts of indignation and protest, which usually ended disastrously, the soldiers began to act in concert. "Strikes" involving whole regiments and divisions had occurred several times already. One such strike is described in a letter written by a soldier from the front in 1916:

"The divisional commander got to know about this strike. He came to the regiment and did not find a single officer. They were somewhere in hiding. He found only one sub-lieutenant, compelled him to take charge of the regiment and ordered him to attack immediately. But all the companies again refused to move, shouting: 'Give us food, clothes and shoes, otherwise we won't fight, or we'll all surrender to the enemy!' The situation was serious, even critical. If the enemy had got to know about it, he could have captured us to a man without firing a shot. The strike in our regiment was followed by a strike in the Tsarevsky Regiment and in other regiments of our division. Two whole battalions of one regiment of our division surrendered to the enemy voluntarily... They wanted to shoot all the soldiers, they wanted to take away their rifles, bombs and other weapons, but the soldiers refused to give them up, and besides, other divisions went on strike, so that there was nobody to do the shooting: everybody is on strike..... And how can they avoid striking—they are almost barefoot, hungry and cold, it is heartrending to see them."²

A factor which contributed very largely to the disintegration of the army was the change that had taken place in the class character of the commanding ranks. The

¹ L. Voitlovsky, "In the Track of the War. Campaign Notes," 1916-17, Vol I-II, Leningrad, 1926, p. 251.

² Ibid., p. 152.

regular officers constituted a carefully-selected, militant caste, closely-knit by class, drawn mainly from the landed aristocracy and blindly devoted to the throne. The tsarist government carefully protected the officer ranks from adulteration by plebians. The officers themselves resisted the admission of members of the lower classes to their ranks. But the war undermined the foundation of this closed caste. The regular officers had suffered heavy losses in the very first months of the war. They were gradually replaced by members of other social strata. The old caste became submerged by plebeian junior officers. The commanding ranks were reinforced by lawyers, teachers, officials, seminarists, high-school students and mobilised university students. The old officers greeted the newcomers with undisguised contempt and hostility. The democratisation of the corps of officers accentuated the disunity in the commanding ranks, which, in its turn, increased the discord in the army.

The meaningless destruction of human life, the brutality of the officers, the inefficient commandship, the chaos and the severe conditions of life aroused even the most backward of the soldiers. The war provoked horror and despair in some, and in others a desire to find a way of escape and to discover those who were responsible for the senseless bloodshed.

The yellow patriotic newspapers with which the army was flooded succeeded at first in diverting the suppressed rage of the soldiers into the usual channel—hatred of the “enemy.” Every defeat, every slightest set-back, was attributed to the machinations of the external foe—the Germans, and the “internal foe”—the Jews. A wave of pogroms destroyed hundreds of Jewish towns in the war area and drove tens of thousands of refugees to distant, unknown parts. The soldiers even had a saying: “Jewish spies are again mentioned in the day’s orders—that means we are going to retreat.”

Among other soldiers the war provoked hatred for the bourgeoisie and the government. The longer the war lasted the more detested the ruling classes became. The Bolshevik Party introduced the factor of organisation into this spontaneous process.

Outlawed by the tsarist government, the Bolsheviks carried on their work in the army with supreme self-sacrifice. When a soldier spasmodically gripped his rifle, not knowing on whom to vent his rage, the Bolsheviks would skillfully turn his indignation against the government and the bourgeoisie. When the soldiers, driven to fury, tried to find an outlet for their feelings in aimless acts of violence against the “aliens”—the national minorities—the

Bolsheviks would carry on internationalist propaganda in opposition to the reactionary policy of the tsarist government and the nationalists. By working persistently, the Bolsheviks transformed the spontaneous expressions of despair into an organised movement against the government. Persecuted by the secret police, liable to court-martial merely for being members of the Party, the Bolsheviks unswervingly discharged their duty as fighters.

The tsarist government widely resorted to the drafting of "malcontents" to the front as a means of combating "subversion." A worker had only to grumble at the hard conditions in the factories to be singled out by the boss or the foreman, and on the following day he would be called before the military authorities and drafted to the front. People suspected of sympathy with the Bolsheviks were the first to be classed as "malcontents." The short-sighted tsarist government mobilised not less than 40 per cent of the industrial workers for the army on the very outbreak of the war. Furthermore, the ranks of the army and navy contained quite a number of men who had taken an active part in the 1905 Revolution, as well as a number of former readers of the Bolshevik paper "Pravda" ("Truth"), which had been closed down by the government on the outbreak of the war. The Bolshevik Party found devoted propagandists among these people, who helped to spread its influence among the soldiers.

Despite the terrorism of the government, the Bolshevik Party managed to create organisations in a number of the regiments in the rear, where its activities were facilitated by the influence of the local proletarians. Intense work was carried on everywhere—in Petrograd, Moscow, Smolensk, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Saratov, Nizhni Novgorod, Samara, Tsaritsyn, Ekaterinburg, Tver, Baku, Batum, Tiflis, Kutais and in the province of Lettland. The fact that the Bolsheviks exiled to Naryn, in Siberia, had been summoned to the colours made it possible to form a fairly strong Bolshevik organisation in the army in Tomsk. Another important channel of influence on the army in the rear was the contacts between the soldiers and the local Bolsheviks and Bolshevik sympathisers among the workers. The strikes of the workers opened the eyes of the soldiers to the possibility of a revolutionary escape from the war. Here is a typical description of the influence exerted by the revolutionary struggle of the workers on the soldiers:

"During the numerous demonstrations on January 9 (1916—*Ed.*) many meetings took place between the demonstrators and the soldiers. For example, the workers met lines of automobiles carrying soldiers on the

Vyborg Chaussee. Friendly greetings were exchanged. Seeing the red banners, the soldiers bared their heads and shouted 'Hurrah!' 'Down with the war!' etc. On the evening of January 10 a large column of working women, working men and soldiers paraded along the Bolshoi Sampsonievsky Prospect.... The police all the time kept in the background... The presence of three or four hundred soldiers in a crowd of over a thousand people had a 'soothing' effect on the police... The demonstration lasted more than an hour."¹

How much energy and self-sacrifice was displayed by the Bolshevik Party in its efforts to revolutionise the army can be judged from one of the numerous reports of the tsarist police, who tried in vain to exterminate the revolutionary organisation:

"The Leninists, who have acquired a dominating influence in the party and who have the support of the overwhelming majority of the underground Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, on the outbreak of the war issued a large number of revolutionary appeals in their largest centres (Petrograd, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Tula, Kostroma the Vladimir Province and Samara) demanding the cessation of the war, the overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of a republic, and this work of the Leninists produced tangible results in the form of workers' strikes and disorders."²

The Bolsheviks laid before the soldiers a clear programme, which had been drawn up by Lenin, with precise and comprehensive demands on the most urgent questions of the day. Relying on the discontent of the soldiers and their passionate desire for peace, and exposing the brutal treatment of the soldiers by their officers and the treachery and inefficiency of the commanders, the Bolsheviks cautiously but persistently led the awakening soldiers to accept a programme of revolutionary action.

"The transformation of modern imperialist war into civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan,"³

is the way a manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, issued on November 4, 1914, described the programme of revolutionary action. This was the only way by which the proletariat and the toiling population generally could escape from the fatal clutches of war. This was the only way of escape from the impasse into which

1 "A Demonstration of Soldiers and Workers," "Sotsial-Demokrat," No. 53 April 13, 1916, Geneva.

2 "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy." Files of the Department of Police. Special Register A6, 1915, folio 193.

3 Lenin, "War and Russian Social-Democracy," "Collected Works," "Vol. XVIII."

the bourgeoisie and its lackeys—the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries—had led the country.

But this programme demanded definite revolutionary action, and Lenin showed precisely what must be done:

“Revolution in time of war is civil war, and the **transformation** of war of governments into a civil war, on the one hand, is facilitated by the military failures (‘defeat’) of the governments, while, on the other hand, it is **impossible** in practice to strive for such a transformation without contributing to defeat.”¹

Lenin further said:

“The only policy of real, and not verbal, termination of the ‘civil peace’ and recognition of the class struggle, is the policy that the proletariat should **take advantage of the difficulties** of its government and its bourgeoisie **to bring about their overthrow**. And one cannot achieve this, one **cannot strive** for this, unless one desires the defeat of one’s government, unless one contributes to this defeat.”²

The slogan calling for the defeat of one one’s own government was the guiding slogan of Bolshevik tactics during the imperialist war. It was the aim of the Bolsheviks to take the fullest possible advantage of the decline of military discipline and the spread of defeatist views in the army and in the country in order to stimulate the activity of the workers and soldiers. The soldiers must be made to realise that the interests of the imperialist “fatherland” were incompatible with the interests of the working people, and that the imperialist war must be transformed into a civil war. That, of course, did not mean, as the Trotskyites tried to make out, aiding German imperialism, blowing up bridges in Russia, and so on. It meant undermining the strength of the tsarist monarchy, that most barbaric of governments, which was oppressing vast numbers of people in Europe and Asia. It meant persistently working for the revolutionary disintegration of the army, for the revolutionary awakening of the masses; it meant continuing and intensifying the revolutionary struggle under the conditions of imperialist war. That is why this slogan was so vigorously opposed by all the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties in Russia—the Cadets, the Trudoviki, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and all the varieties of Mensheviks, including Trotsky. Plekhanov wrote of this Bolshevik slogan:

¹ Lenin, “The Defeat of One’s Government in the Imperialist War,” “Collected Works,” Vol. XVIII.

² Ibid.,

"The defeat of Russia... will retard her economic development and, consequently, the growth of her working-class movement."¹

Trotsky, on the other hand, declared that the defeat of Russia would mean victory for Germany. He thereby grossly distorted Lenin's slogan, concealing the fact that Lenin advanced this slogan not only for the Russian revolutionaries but also for the working-class revolutionary parties of all countries.

It was not only frank social-traitors and Centrists of the Trotsky type who opposed the slogan of defeat for one's own government; it was also rejected by the Rights and the "Leftists" within the Bolshevik Party itself. Thus, at a conference of the Bolshevik fraction in the State Duma and representatives of the larger organisations of the Bolshevik Party held in Ozerki at the beginning of the war, Kamenev criticised Lenin's defeatist slogan. Kamenev tried to show that a defeat for Russia in the war would be undesirable in the interests of the working-class movement.

When he was brought to trial before the tsarist court, together with the Bolshevik members of the Duma, Kamenev again attempted to dissociate himself from the Party on the question of defeatism.

Similarly, a group of Russian political emigres led by Bukharin, who criticised Lenin "from the Left," stated in their theses that they categorically rejected "what was called 'the defeat of Russia' as a slogan for Russia" and spoke of "the absolute impossibility of carrying on practical agitation along these lines."²

The slogan calling for the defeat of one's own government was closely associated with the Bolshevik slogan calling for **fraternisation** between the soldiers of the hostile imperialist armies. Lenin observed that fraternisation was taking place spontaneously, and he attentively followed this revolutionary initiative of the masses. Lenin wrote an article dealing with a number of cases of fraternisation on the Franco-German front which were reported in German, British and Swiss newspapers.

Increasing cases of fraternisation also on the Russian front enabled the Bolshevik Party to advocate **fraternisation** as a practical slogan in the fight to transform the imperialist war into a civil war.

A conference of generals was held in December 1916 at which commanders of armies spoke of scores of inci-

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, "The Socialists and the Voting of War Credits" "Prizyv" "(The Call)," Paris, 1916, No. 17, p. 8.

² "The Berne Conference," 1915, Appendix No. 2, Resolution of the Baugy Group, "Proletarskaya Revolyutsia (Proletarian Revolution)," 1925, No. 5 (40), p. 172.

dents testifying to the disintegration and demoralisation of the troops. Desertion, cases of whole regiments abandoning their positions, refusal to attack, vengeance wreaked on officers and, in particular, fraternisation, were all in full evidence at the end of 1916. The picture drawn by the generals fully corresponded with what was related of the situation on the Austrian front by a former tsarist soldier, P. A. Karnaukhov:

"All was quiet on the front in the winter of 1916. In the front trenches it sometimes happened that the soldiers, on seeing the enemy, would not shoot. The Austrians responded in the same way. Sometimes the Austrians would shout: 'Stop the war.' And they invited the Russians into their trenches, while the Russians invited the Austrians. In our sector fraternisation with the enemy began as early as October 1916, for which, of course, the officers came down on us heavily. But by January fraternisation in our sector had become a common occurrence. It went so far that the soldiers would exchange various articles, offering bread and sugar in return for pocket-knives and razors."¹

The revolutionary significance of fraternisation consisted in the fact that it helped to confirm the realisation of the international unity of the toilers in the trenches on both sides, led to a marked class differentiation between the officers and the soldiers, undermined the imperialist armies and stimulated the desire for peace.

The self-sacrificing activity of the Bolshevik Party, coupled with the disintegration of the army, rapidly yielded results.

¹ P. A. Karnaukhov, "Reminiscences of Service in the Old Army and the Red Army," MSS. Records of the "History of the Civil War," No. 452.

TSARIST RUSSIA—A PRISON OF NATIONS

The war severely affected the oppressed nationalities in Russia.

Lenin called tsarist Russia "a prison of nations," and this phrase aptly describes the plight of the numerous national minorities in Imperial Russia.

Under the tsarist autocracy the whole toiling population suffered lives of hardship, but the lot of the working people of the non-Russian nationalities, the *inorodtsi*, or "aliens," as they were contemptuously called, was particularly intolerable. Economic exploitation in their case was aggravated by brutal national oppression. Even the few wretched rights enjoyed by the Russian working population were curtailed to a minimum in the case of the oppressed nationalities. Political inequality, arbitrary rule and cultural oppression were the blessings conferred by the autocracy on the enslaved peoples.

The policy of the Russian tsars was definitely a policy of conquest.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the tsarist government undertook extensive military campaigns in the East in the interests of the ruling classes. It laid its greedy paw on the lands of the Middle and Lower Volga, subjugated Siberia as far as the Pacific coast and invaded the steppe regions of the Ukraine east of the Dnieper. The interests of the nobility, the merchant capitalists, and the growing class of industrial capitalists were reflected even more definitely in the military plans of Peter I, who endeavoured to gain a firm foothold on the shores of the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian. It was under Peter I that the region now known as Esthonia, a part of Latvia and Finland, and the Caucasian coast of the Caspian Sea were seized. Catherine II annexed the northern coast of the Black Sea, the Crimea, the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, White Russia, Lithuania and Courland. Alexander I seized Finland from the Swedes and Bessarabia from the Turks and, after the war with Napoleon, secured part of Poland, including Warsaw. Under Alexander I, too, Russia entrenched herself in Georgia and began a prolonged war for the enslavement of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus. This war continued throughout the reign of Nicholas I. Alexander II completed the subjugation of the Caucasus, deprived China of the Amur and the Ussur regions and annexed vast territories in Central Asia. Nicholas II, the last of the Russian tsars, continued the policy of his

fathers and at first attempted to annex Manchuria and Korea. He then entered the World War, aiming at the seizure of Constantinople, Turkish Armenia, Northern Persia and Galicia...

The double-headed eagle cast its sinister shadow over the vast territories of the Russian Empire, stretching from the shores of the Baltic to the mountains of the Caucasus, and from the sunlit steppe of the Ukraine to the sands of Central Asia and the hills of the Far East.

Every step of the Russian tsars, like every step of the bourgeois governments of Europe, was marked by fire, bloodshed and violence. The triumphant advance of capitalism into the *auls* of the Caucasus, the *kishlaks* of Turkestan and the Finno-Turkic villages of the Volga region brought poverty and hopeless misery in its train.

When resistance was offered, the tsarist government did not hesitate to exterminate or deport the whole population of the conquered districts. Scores of flourishing villages of mountain peoples were reduced to ashes. Mountain gorges were filled with the smoke of burning dwellings. Forests were cut down, *auls* razed to the ground, crops trampled underfoot, and the property of the mountain tribes, even their household effects, pillaged.

The land seized from the native population was distributed among Russian officers, landlords and kulaks. Thousands of wealthy manors were created on lands plundered from the Bashkirs of the Volga; huge, luxurious estates, belonging to tsar and princes, were founded in the Caucasus, the Crimea and Central Asia. The introduction of this "agrarian reform" in the conquered territories was accompanied by the institution of serfdom. Peter I introduced serfdom in the Baltic provinces. Catherine II in the Ukraine and Nicholas I did his best to consolidate it in the Caucasus.

Following the tsarist generals, Russian landlords, manufacturers and merchants flocked to the conquered regions. The territories of the various nationalities were incunated by Russian soldiers, gendarmes and officials. With them came the priests of the Orthodox Church, who sanctified the right of bayonet and gold by the grace of the holy cross.

Military violence and brigandage were followed by even more frightful economic oppression. The annexed regions were transformed into capitalist colonies and became the chief sources of supply of raw materials and fuel for the growing industries of Russia. The Ukraine supplied coal from the Donbas and iron ore from Krivoi Rog, the Caucasus supplied oil and Central Asia cotton.

The antique fortifications, with their bastions and

cannon, were replaced by manors, kulak farms and capitalist factories. And side by side with these sprang up thousands and tens of thousands of holy churches and tsar-owned drink shops. The tsar's vodka shops debauched the local population, while the churches burnt incense and offered prayers for the success of the colonial policy of the "White Tsar." A vast army of priests worked zealously to inculcate in the "savages" the principles of Orthodox religion and autocratic government.

The newly-built churches served as instruments for the further plunder of the small nationalities. Converted "aliens" were initiated into the mysteries of Orthodox religion with the aid of fines inflicted for failing to attend confession, for ignorance of prayers, for non-observance of ritual and so on.

Christianity was propagated among the oppressed nationalities in the most unbridled and cynical fashion. The methods the missionaries adopted to spread religious enlightenment among the semi-savage peoples of Siberia were often of a deliberately provocative character.

On arriving at a village, a missionary would begin by ingratiating himself into the good graces of the inhabitants. He would distribute small gifts, such as crosses, icons and tobacco. If this did not achieve its purpose, he would make a prolonged stay in the refractory village and adopt more "vigorous" measures. In the end, the missionary would work the population up to such a pitch that they would begin to threaten him, whereupon the culprits would be arrested and imprisoned and their property confiscated.

The first to bring Christian enlightenment to the Siberian tribes were fugitive and vagabond monks who together with prayer and holy water brought vodka and syphilis to the Siberian tundra.

This same system of debauching the native trappers with the aid of vodka was practised later, when the Orthodox Missionary Society—a huge enterprise with a capital of 200,000 roubles—was active. The result of this "Christian" solitude was that at the time the World War broke out the Siberian tribes were dying out with appalling rapidity.

The yoke of the Orthodox Church had weighed heavily on the Mohammedan peoples of Russia for three and a half centuries. Religious persecution and the closing of mosques (between 1738 and 1755, Luke, Bishop of Kazan, alone destroyed 418 of the 536 mosques in Tataria) were accompanied by measures to compel Mohammedan children to attend the parish schools of the Orthodox Church.

The spread of Russian enlightenment among the Finno-Turkic tribes of the Volga began with the founding of a theological academy in Kazan. Missionaries of the Orthodox Church were also trained at the Oriental Faculty of the Kazan University.

One of the most striking acts of Russification in recent times was the "Regulations of March 31, 1906," issued by Count I. I. Tolstoy, Minister of Education. Speaking of the necessity of enlisting the aid of "science" to instil "love of the common fatherland" in the oppressed peoples, these regulations made the teaching of the Russian language compulsory in all schools for "aliens."¹ But the Russian State schools had been scrupulously performing this duty even before Tolstoy issued his regulations. In Poland, after the insurrection of 1836, all the national universities and high schools were closed and replaced by Russian schools, and it was forbidden to speak Polish aloud in public places, such as government offices and shops and in the streets.

The Ukraine was similarly persecuted. The very word "Ukraine" was declared to be subversive and was replaced by "Little Russia." Books and newspapers were forbidden to be printed in the Ukrainian language, the native tongues could not be taught even in private schools and its use in public statements was prohibited. The effects of oppression on the culture of the Ukrainian people were devastating. The level of culture in the Ukraine before it was annexed to Russia was higher than in Great Russia, but by the end of the nineteenth century the percentage of illiteracy in the Ukrainian provinces was astonishingly high even for tsarist Russia.

With the aid of the army and the state machine—the Russian state schools and the Orthodox Church—the tsarist government ruthlessly pursued its policy of universal Russification. This was facilitated by the fact that the cultural level of the majority of the oppressed nations was a low one. But even when Russian imperialism encountered nationalities which in their economic and cultural development were not lower, and sometimes even higher, than the Great Russians, e.g., the Poles, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, and, in part the Georgians, Armenians and Ukrainians, this did not prevent it from pursuing its policy of Russification with undiminished ruthlessness and relentlessness. When Alexander I seized Finland he promised to preserve the form of autonomy she had enjoyed under the Swedes. But the Russian government gradually encroached on Finland's autonomy and decided to reduce her to the unfranchised condition of the rest of the country. Poland had long lain

1 "Statutes, Circular and Information on Public Education in the Interim Period," Moscow, 1908, p. 155.

prostrate under the jackboot of the tsarist gendarmes. Even the spurious reform which introduced what were known as local government bodies (the Zemstvos and City Dumas) was not extended to Poland. Nor was the system of trial by jury introduced in Poland. Poles employed in the government service or serving in the Army suffered from numerous civil disabilities.

But the most disfranchised people of all in tsarist Russia were the Jews. Their freedom of domicile and movement were extremely restricted. Exceptions were made only in the case of rich Jews—the wealthy merchants—and Jews with university education. The class policy of the tsarist government was reflected even in the national question, certain relative ameliorations being granted to the wealthy strata of the population. Nevertheless, as compared with a bourgeois or landlord of the dominant Russian nation, the Jewish or Armenian merchant did not feel that he had any rights at all. A quota was established for Jews in the schools, and they were not accepted at all in the government service, on the railways and so forth. Jews were obliged to live within the Pale. Cooped within the congested towns and hamlets of Poland, Lithuania, White Russia and certain parts of the Ukraine, the mass of the Jews were condemned to hopeless poverty.

The non-Russian population was shamelessly robbed by the tsarist authorities. Bribery, which was widely prevalent in tsarist Russia generally, assumed incredible proportions in the remote border regions. Swarms of gluttonous officials devoured like locusts the last crumbs of the toiling members of the oppressed nationalities. With the coming of the Russian colonisers, taxation on the population of Central Asia increased three-fold and four-fold, and in some cases as much as fifteen-fold. The population was steadily dying out. Travellers who visited the regions inhabited by the Uzbeks at the end of the nineteenth century relate that where there were formerly forty-five villages with 956 houses, after twenty years of Russian colonisation there remained only thirty-six villages with 817 houses, 225 of which were uninhabited. The picture painted by the travellers of the horrors perpetrated in the tsarist colonies is obviously far from complete; the censorship would not have passed a more faithful account. But they too speak of the ruthless and bloody vengeance which was wreaked on the native population for the least attempt at protest. Whole villages were burnt to the ground because the dead body of a Russian had been found in the vicinity.

An order issued by the Russian officer who suppressed an uprising in Katta-Kurgan in 1910 arrogantly declared that "the sole of a Russian soldier's boot is worth more

than the heads of a thousand wretched Sarts [Uzbeks]."¹

And orders like this were not empty phrases, as is shown by the brutal vengeance wreaked on the inhabitants of Andizhan.

In 1898 an insurrection broke out among the Uzbeks of the region then known as Ferghana. It was led by a local religious leader, Dukchi Ishan, who enjoyed great popularity. On the night of May 17 a band of local inhabitants, armed with knives, crowbars and sticks, attacked the barracks of Andizhan. Nineteen soldiers were killed, but the tsarist troops soon succeeded in suppressing the revolt. Hundreds of Uzbeks, even persons who had taken no part in the outbreak, were massacred. All the villages where the leaders of the revolt had lived were razed to the ground and Russian settlements built in their place. In compensation for the losses incurred, estimated at 130,000 roubles, the property not only of those sentenced but also of their relatives was sold by auction. Eighteen persons were hanged and 362 condemned to penal servitude for terms of from four to twenty years.

It is therefore not surprising that the nations of Central Asia, as of the other tsarist colonies, trembled with fear at the mere name "Russian." Every tsarist official, however insignificant, even a policeman, regarded himself as the master of the bodies and souls of the "savages" under his charge. The whole system of government was designed to maintain the conditions of national oppression. Both government and church enjoined the Russian population that the "unchristened aliens" were not to be regarded as human beings.

In its efforts to avert an agrarian revolution, the tsarist government tried to satisfy the land hunger of a part of the Russian peasants at the expense of the oppressed nations. The colonies were turned over to kulaks and Cossacks for exploitation and spoliation. At the same time the autocracy used the peasants and Cossacks settled in the border territories as a weapon in its war on the native population.

The landed aristocracy, represented by the Union of the Russian People, the Nationalist Party and other parties, together with the military, the bureaucracy and the monarchist press, carried on a savage nationalist campaign against the "aliens," skilfully fostered anti-semitism and organised Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine and mutual massacres of Armenians and Tyurks in Transcaucasia. The government for its part fostered national enmity among the various peoples. Tsarism consolidated its rule over the oppressed nationalities by inciting one nation against an-

¹ S. Dimanstein, "Past and Present." "Life of the Nations of the U.S.S.R.," Moscow, 1924, pp. 20-21.

other, thus preventing them from uniting and forming a common front of the oppressed nations against the Russian autocracy.

The policy of the tsarist government towards the oppressed nationalities can be expressed in the ancient Roman maxim: "Divide and rule."

The population of the Russian Empire was divided into two distinct camps: on the one hand, there were the Great Russians, who were encouraged in every way to regard themselves as a privileged, ruling nation; and, on the other, the dependent, non-sovereign peoples.

One of the leaders of the party known as the All-Russian National Alliance wrote in the "Novoye Vremya"—a paper published by Suvorin and distinguished even among the Black Hundred press by its fanatical incitement to national enmity and its advocacy of the supremacy of the Great Russians—as follows:

"We, by the grace of God, the Russian nation, possessors of Great Russia, Little Russia and White Russia, accept this possession as an exclusive expression of the Divine Mercy which we must treasure and which it is our mission to preserve at all costs. It is not for nothing that this rule has been conferred on us, the Russians. . . . Pray, what is the sense without rhyme or reason of sharing with the subjugated breeds the right to rule what we have won? On the contrary, it would be the height of political folly and a piece of historical prodigality, like that of a merchant's 'darling son' who, having inherited a million, begins to lavish it on lackeys and fallen women. Nature itself has distinguished the Russian race from many others as the strongest and most gifted. History itself has proved that the small tribes are not our equals."¹

The Great Russian nationalist policy was reflected most clearly in the programme of the arch-reactionary Union of the Russian People, which stated:

"The Russian nation, which assembled the Russian land and created the great and mighty State, must hold prime place in the life and development of the State. . . . All the institutions of the Russian State unite in a determined effort unswervingly to preserve the greatness of Russia and the privileges of the Russian nation, although on the firm basis of law, so that the numerous aliens inhabiting our fatherland should count it an honour and privilege to belong to the Russian Empire and should not resent their dependence. . . ."²

¹ "The National Alliance," "Novoye Vremya (New Times)," No. 11576, June 5, 1908.

² V. I. Charnolussky, "Russian Parties, Alliances and Leagues." "Collection of Programmes," St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 119.

The national policy of the Black Hundreds met with the full approval of the Octobrists and "Nationalists." The first item in the programme of the "Nationalists" spoke of "consolidating the Russian state on the basis of the autocratic government."¹

The more moderate of the bourgeois parties, such as the Cadets, who called themselves the Party of National Freedom, and other parties which reflected the interests of the capitalist landlords and industrial capital, especially the light industries, i.e., the groups which more than others needed the home market, strove to achieve their nationalist aims by making certain superficial concessions to the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities. But even these parties, of course, would tolerate no vacillation where the unity of the Russian State and the conquest of foreign territory were concerned. The slogan "Russia united and indivisible," met with the support of the entire bourgeoisie.

Lenin asked in what way the position of the Cadets on the national question differed from the nationalism and chauvinism of papers like the "Novoye Vremya," and replied:

"Only by white gloves and by more diplomatically cautious language. But chauvinism, even in white gloves and using the most refined language, is disgusting."²

The so-called Socialist parties, although they paid lip-service to the right of the oppressed nationalities to self-determination, also in practice defended the integrity of the Russian State. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party advocated a state built on federal principles, but at the same time would not concede the right of the nations to secede, and confined its solution of the national question to the sphere of culture and language.

The nationalist parties in the Russian Empire—the Polish Socialist Party among the Poles, the Dashnaksutyun among the Armenians, the Bund among the Jews, etc.—in the main treated the national question from the bourgeois standpoint and advocated the division of the organisations of the workers according to nationality. They confined the national question to the narrow circle of problems that affected their own particular nationality, expressed the views of the petty-bourgeoisie and distorted the international proletarian line. One "solution" proposed for the national question was "national cultural autonomy." Advanced by the Austrian Social-Democrats, supported by the Jewish Bund, and meeting with approval among the Mensheviks, including the Caucasian Mensheviks, it substituted for the

1 "Rules of the All-Russian National Alliance, "Novoye Vremya," No. 11877, June 6, 1908.

2 Lenin, "Cadets and Nationalists," "Collected Works," Vol. XVI.

Bolshevik demand for the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secession, the petty-bourgeois nationalist demand for the creation of national alliance within the State for the control of education, culture and other affairs of the various nationalities.

Stalin has pointed out that the result of "national cultural autonomy" is that "a united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets" and that it spreads "noxious ideas of mutual distrust and aloofness among the workers of different nationalities."¹

At the same time, advocating "national cultural autonomy" was equivalent to advocating inter-class unity. Thus the Mensheviks departed from the international position of the proletariat on the national question as well.

In drawing up their national policy under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin, the Bolsheviks realised the tremendous importance of the national question for the proletarian revolution, especially in Russia, where the non-Russian nationalities constituted the majority of the population (56.7 per cent) and the Great Russians the minority (43.3 per cent). The Bolshevik Party bent every effort to prevent a split between the Russian proletariat and the workers of other nationalities.

Lenin and Stalin subjected the programmes of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties on the national question to exhaustive criticism. A Bolshevik Party conference held in September 1913—known as the "August, or Summer, Conference of the Central Committee"—confirmed the basic line of the Party on the national question, viz., the international unity of the toilers, and stated that:

"The interests of the working class demand that the workers of all the nationalities of a given State shall be joined in united proletarian organisations—political, trade union, co-operative, educational, etc.

"As regards the right of the nations oppressed by the tsarist monarchy to self-determination, i.e., to secede and form independent States, the Social-Democratic Party must unquestionably defend this right. . . . This is demanded . . . by the cause of freedom of the Great Russian population itself, which cannot create a democratic State if reactionary Great Russian nationalism is not eradicated, a nationalism which is backed by the traditions of a number of blood-thirsty acts of vengeance against the national movements and which is systematically fostered not only by the tsarist monarchy and by the reactionary parties, but also, in their servility to the

¹ J. Stalin, "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question," Eng. ed., 1935 p. 34.

monarchy, by the Great Russian bourgeois liberals, especially in the period of counter-revolution.”¹

Such was the policy of Lenin and Stalin on the national question.

Before the imperialist war, the bourgeois movements for national liberation did not make the separation of their nations from Russia their direct aim.

When the prospective defeat of Russia in the war became unmistakable, strong separatist tendencies arose within the bourgeois nationalist groups. Centrifugal forces began to predominate. On the one hand, the cup of patience of the oppressed nationalities was filled to overflowing; on the other hand, it was felt that the locks on the “prison of the nations” were becoming insecure and that with sufficient pressure they could be smashed once and for all.

A spirit of revolt against Russian tsarism began to spread in the regions of the national minorities. In Central Asia, in 1916, it took the form of a widespread revolt, embracing not only the Kazakhs, who before the revolution were called Kirghiz, but nearly all the peoples inhabiting the steppe region (present-day Kazakhstan) and Turkestan.

The bourgeois separatists grew more active among the Poles, Finns and Ukrainians and drew up a nationalist programme of action. The movement for national liberation also became more active among the Lithuanians and the nationalities of Transcaucasia and other parts of the Russian Empire. General national demands also assumed an extreme form, especially since the bourgeoisie had declared the imperialist war to be a war in defence of small nationalities.

The tendency to secession from Russia was reflected in the congresses of nationalist-separatists held abroad. A League of the Nations of Russia was formed, which in May 1916 addressed a joint complaint to United States President Wilson describing the hard lot of the national minorities in Russia.

The spread of separatist tendencies among the national minorities in Russia was not overlooked by the belligerents on either side. Both sides strove to use this movement for their own ends. This is what Pierre Chantrel, a prominent Frenchman, wrote to Premier Clemenceau during the war:

“Berlin is encouraging the separatist movements all it can in order to create for itself new political and economic clients in the East. The Entente has every reason to act parallel with Germany in order to deprive her of the fruits of her labours. Russia, united and in-

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Resolution of the Summer (1913) Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party Workers,” “Collected Works,” Vol. XVII.

divisible, is a thing of the past. France must intervene so as to reshape her into a federation based on the voluntary agreement of the contracting parts. The Entente statesmen should realise that Germany would find it more difficult to deal with three or four capitals than with the one St. Petersburg.”¹

The oppressed nationalities served as an important source of man-power for the army on active service. They were down-trodden slaves of the war whom the bourgeois themselves, with cynical frankness, referred to as “cannon fodder.”

The bourgeoisie of the belligerent countries were obliged hypocritically to proclaim the imperialist shambles a sacred war for the liberation of weak nations in order to secure the support of the oppressed nationalities and the colonial populations, and in order to undermine the prestige of the enemy among these peoples. Germany, for example, endeavoured to stir up revolt in Ireland and in the colonies of the Entente Powers. The Entente, on the other hand, incited the Czechs, Poles, and other peoples against the Germans.

Against the background of growing imperialist antagonisms, all this served as a powerful stimulus to the movement for national liberation. The latter became a very important political and, in places, revolutionary factor.

One of the principal ideological foundations of the monarchy—“Russia, united and indivisible”—had by this time become severely shaken by the events of the war, which were preparing the ground for revolution.

¹ “Revolution and the National Question. Documents and Materials on the History of the National Question in Russia and the U.S.S.R. in the 2th Century,” Vol. III (1917), Moscow, 1930, p. 22.

TWO CONSPIRACIES

The disintegration of the army was only the most vivid expression of the general collapse of the corrupt, police-ridden régime. The tsarist court, which under the rule of the Romanovs had always been a hotbed of intrigue, corruption and secret assassination, now openly became an asylum for rogues and swindlers. Great influence was wielded at court by Grigori Rasputin. A peasant from the village of Pokrovskoye, the district of Tyumen (Siberia), Rasputin in his youth had wandered from monastery to monastery, frequenting the company of religious impostors, pilgrims and beggars. He soon began to "prophecy" himself and to gather hysterical subjects and epileptics around him. In his native village he was nicknamed "Grisha the Seer." Talk of the new "holy man" reached Petrograd, where religious superstition was rife in fashionable circles. Rasputin was invited to the capital. Not without intelligence, this crafty muzhik soon adapted himself to the hypocritical atmosphere of court circles.

Aristocratic hosts vied in inviting Rasputin to their houses. He made a powerful impression on hysterical old women and jaded and bored ladies. S. P. Beletsky, Chief of the Department of Police, whose duty it was to keep an eye on the "holy man," and who at the same time used his influence to further his own career, admitted after the Revolution that Rasputin took lessons in mesmerism. Stories of Rasputin's "holy acts" circulated in fashionable circles. He was credited with the miraculous gift of healing. Rasputin was invited to the palace. Alexei, the heir to the throne, suffered from haemophilia—a spontaneous bleeding—a malady against which medicine was still powerless. The superstitious tsarina resorted to the aid of pilgrims and mesmerists and would take her son to kiss holy relics. Rasputin played on the morbidity of the hysterical mother and inspired the tsarina with the belief that without his prayers the Crown Prince would die. Rasputin acquired tremendous influence at court. The Empress wrote to her husband:

"To follow our Friend's counsel, lovey—I assure you is right. He prays so hard day and night for you—and He has kept you where you are. . . . Only one must listen, trust and ask advice—not think that he does not know. God opens everything to him."¹

1 Letter of December 5, 1916.—"Trans."

Rasputin became an intimate at court. His apartment was always crowded with swindlers and shady businessmen. Rasputin would write illiterate requests to the Ministers to grant concessions or posts to his various acquaintances. "The tsar's keeper of the holy lamp," as Rasputin was nicknamed, had a finger in every appointment. When a new Minister of the Interior had to be appointed, the tsarina wrote to Nicholas:

"Beloved, A. [Vyrubova, a favourite of the tsarina and one of Rasputin's most ardent followers.—*Ed.*] just saw **Andronikov** and **Khvostov** and the latter made on her an excellent impression. (. . . I not knowing him, don't know what to say.) He is **most** devoted to you, spoke quietly and well about our Friend to her."¹

It was enough for A. N. Khvostov to praise "our Friend," for him to be appointed to the post of Minister of the Interior.

Rasputinism gnawed at the tsarist régime like a malignant disease. But Rasputin was not the only one of his type at court. He has been given undue prominence by bourgeois historians with the object of concealing the monstrous decadence and corruption of the whole court, where flourished such types as Prince M. M. Andronikov, a speculator and promoter of all sorts of spurious enterprises and big money-making operations, such as the purchase, with the aid of Sukhomlinov, Minister of War, of irrigated lands in Central Asia. One of Rasputin's secretaries, Manesevich-Manuylov, a secret police agent and a contributor to the reactionary newspaper the "Novoye Vremya," carried on his swindling and corrupt practices with such utter shamelessness that even the police were at length obliged to interfere and arrest him. But the tsarina intervened. She wrote to Nicholas:

"On Manuylov's paper I beg you to write '**stop proceedings**' and send it to the Minister of Justice. **Batyushin**, who had to do with the whole thing, now himself comes to A. [Vyrubova.—*Ed.*] to beg one should stop it, as he at last understood it was an ugly story got up by others to harm our Friend."²

It was not Rasputin that was characteristic of the Romanov regime, but Rasputinism—superstition, fanaticism, intellectual poverty and moral corruption, of which Rasputin was only the most vivid expression.

The only way the tsarist government could think of counteracting the approaching catastrophe was to adopt new measures of repression and to intensify the already

¹ Letter of August 29, 1915.—"Trans."

² Letter of December 10, 1916.—"Trans."

intolerably oppressive régime. The last remnants of trade union organisation were destroyed. The industrial cities were ruthlessly cleared of revolutionary "suspects." The prisons were filled to overcrowding. But the Ministers were unable to cope with the general disruption. A constant change of Ministers began—a sort of ministerial leap-frog. In the first two years of the war there were four Presidents of the Council—I. L. Goremykin, B. V. Stürmer, A. F. Trepov and N. D. Golitsyn—six Ministers of the Interior, three Ministers of War and three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They rose to the surface, splashed about for a while, and then disappeared. "Ministerial leapfrog," this was called. The distribution of ministerial portfolios depended on the recommendations of adventurers, on the opinion of the "Star Chamber," as Rasputin's circle was nicknamed. Other motives frequently operated. The tsarina wrote to Nicholas requesting him to appoint Stürmer President of the Council and said of the new candidate that "his head is plenty fresh enough."¹ N. A. Maklakov, according to his own admission, was appointed Minister of the Interior for the following reason; after the assassination of Stolypin, Nicholas left Kiev for Chernigov, where Maklakov was governor; "the weather was splendid and he was in an excellent and cheerful mood."² The governor earned the good graces of the tsar. Maklakov became an indispensable figure in court circles. He could crow like a cock and imitate a "lovesick panther" and other animals. These clownish propensities were sufficient to earn him a ministerial portfolio.

Neither the frequent changes of Ministers, nor the "night and day" prayers of "our Friend" were of any avail. The spirit of revolution steadily spread among the population and the army. The old contradictions flared up with new vigour, creating and multiplying the elements of a revolutionary situation.

The general disruption was strongly reflected in the food crisis of the autumn of 1916. Consignments of grain rapidly declined. Petrograd received only one-third of the daily number of carloads of grain to which it was entitled. Huge lines formed at the food shops. People would line up long before daybreak, or wait the whole night through; but in the morning only a part of the line would be fortunate enough to secure a miserable starvation ration. The endless food lines served as mass meetings and acted as a substitute for revolutionary handbills. In the food lines the news of the day would be exchanged. Agitators would

¹ Letter of January 7, 1916—"Trans."

² "Fall of the Tsarist Regime." "Stenographic Report of the Interrogation and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. III, Leningrad, 1925, p. 85.

frequently come forward and explain where the responsibility for the food shortage lay. Unrest spread rapidly among the masses. On October 18, 1916, the Chief of Gendarmes of the City of Perm reported:

"Minds have become alarmed: it requires only a jolt for the population, indignant at the high prices, to pass to open expressions of indignation."¹

The Moscow Chief of Secret Police reported on October 20:

"In the days of crisis the intensity of feeling among the masses in Moscow is reaching such a pitch that one may expect it to lead to a series of grave excesses."²

The government made an attempt to appease the people. Count A. A. Bobrinsky, Minister of Agriculture, published an explanation; but the interview he gave the newspapers only served to stimulate further unrest. The people learnt that the food policy was being determined by a big landowner, a sugar refiner, a millionaire, a man alien and hostile to the people.

By the autumn of 1916 the Bolshevik party, despite a number of arrests that deprived it of some of its most prominent leaders (thirty persons, among them members of the Petrograd Committee, had been arrested quite recently, on the night of July 20, 1916), had succeeded in reforming its organisations and developing widespread activity. Bolshevik groups revived in the factories. Individual groups combined to form district organisations. Revolutionary literature was distributed more widely. In the middle of October a leaflet entitled "To the Proletariat of St. Petersburg" appeared in the capital. In this leaflet the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party stated:

"Life is becoming harder every day. . . . The criminal war . . . apart from the millions of killed, and mutilated . . . is the cause of other misfortunes as well . . . the food shortage and the resulting high prices. The frightful spectre of 'King Hunger' . . . is again menacing Europe. . . . Enough of suffering in patience and silence! . . . If you want to stop the high prices and to escape the impending famine you must fight the war, you must fight the whole system of violence and plunder."³

The Party's appeal fell on receptive soil. On October 17 a strike broke out in the Renault Works on the Vyborg

¹ "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy." Files of the Department of Police, Special Register, No. 167, Part 56, folio 80.

² *Ibid.*, No. 167, Part 46, folio 71.

³ "Leaflet of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," St. Petersburg Committee, "To the Proletariat of St. Petersburg," 1916.

Side. The Workers marched to other factories. Very soon the Sampsonievsky Prospect was filled with demonstrators. Outside the barracks of the 181st Regiment the police wanted to arrest an agitator, but were prevented by the crowd. Soldiers ran out of the barracks and began to hurl stones at the police. The colonel of the regiment was summoned. The excited workers and soldiers smashed his automobile and injured the colonel. Late that night the officers called out the non-commissioned officers' training corps of the regiment. It barred the barracks off from the demonstrators, but refused to fire on the crowd although it was three times commanded to shoot. Mounted Cossacks arrived, but they were apparently afraid of the armed soldiers. The workers went to call out other factories. On the following days the strike had spread to the majority of the factories on the Vyborg Side. The strike lasted about four days.

A trial of sailors arrested on a charge of forming a Bolshevik organisation in the Baltic Fleet was due to be held on October 25 or 26. The Bolsheviks called upon the proletarians of Petrograd to protest against this tsarist trial. On October 25 thousands of workers came out on to the streets of the capital singing songs and carrying placards demanding, "Down with the War!" "No Death Penalty!" The police were unable to break up the demonstration. All that day meetings were held in various parts of the city. A total of about 187,000 workers went on strike in October in various parts of the country, which was four times more than in the previous month (47,000), and several times more than in any earlier month of the war. But the point was not merely that the strike movement was growing. The October strikes bore a marked political character and were led by the Bolshevik Party, the party which the police thought had been completely smashed. The Chief of the Department of Police bragged that the Bolshevik Party had been destroyed in a belated report to the Minister of the Interior. On October 30, while the Minister was reading the report that the Bolshevik Party had been smashed, there lay before him an account of a new strike and demonstration of a size unknown since 1914. What particularly alarmed the ruling classes was that the workers had begun to draw the soldiers into the movement.

The bourgeoisie sensed the approaching storm and began to make urgent appeals to the autocracy. The bourgeoisie now needed the autocracy not only to wage the war to a victorious finish, but also to combat revolution. The Cadets witnessed the rapid development of the revolution with alarm. A meeting of the Moscow Committee of the Cadet Party was held on September 23, at which Kishkin, a prominent Cadet leader, argued that the inefficient

government had driven the country to revolution. Kishkin hoped that this would force the government into the arms of the Cadets and compel the autocracy to make concessions. A conference of the Cadet Party was held in Moscow on October 23 and 24, 1916. Even the secret police agents present at the conference testified to its "inordinate fear of the revolution." Milyukov warned against encouraging "revolutionary instincts."

"Our task will be not to finish off the government, which would mean encouraging anarchy, but to give it an entirely new content, that is, establish a firm, legal, constitutional system. That is why in spite of everything a sense of proportion is essential in fighting the government."¹

This was the way the Cadets spoke, and the entire Progressive Bloc in the Duma adopted a similar position. These recent oppositionists now talked not of fighting the government in the interests of the war, but of helping the government to fight the revolution. But the monarchy could no longer cope with either task. The severe defeats at the front showed that tsarism was incapable of waging a successful war. The growing disintegration showed that it was incapable of leading the country out of the impasse. As soon as the extent and character of the Petrograd strike of October 25 and 26 became known the bourgeoisie adopted a firmer tone. Shulgin, a Right deputy, said in the State Duma on November 3:

"We would, so to speak, have preserved patience to the very limit. And the only reason we are now severely condemning this government quite frankly and openly, the only reason why we are raising the standard of battle against it, is because we have indeed reached the limit, because things have occurred which it is impossible to tolerate any longer."²

At this same session of the Duma, the Cadet Maklakov declared:

"Gentlemen, we cannot co-operate with this government any longer; we can only hinder it, as it will hinder us. But co-operation has become absolutely impossible, and let them choose between us and this government."³

Somewhat earlier—on November 1—Milyukov had spoken in the Duma. Citing a number of facts in illustration of the inefficient and corrupt practices of the govern-

1 "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy." Files of the Secret Police, No. 27, 1916, folio 73.

2 "The State Duma. Fourth Assembly. Fifth Session. Stenographic Report," Petrograd, 1916, column 68.

3 Ibid., column 134.

ment, Milyukov each time asked: "What is this— stupidity or treason?"¹ The leader of the Cadets sharply criticised Stürmer, the President of the Council, and accused him of betraying Russia's interests. Milyukov spoke of the "dark forces" surrounding the throne.² He referred in very cautious terms to treason in high spheres, hinting at the Empress, whom rumour accused of sympathy with the Germans. The burden of Milyukov's speech was that the government was not in a condition to fight the war to a victorious finish. S. Shidlovsky made an official statement in the name of the entire Progressive Bloc:

"We are today again raising our voices, but this time not to warn of the impending danger, but to say that the government as at present constituted is not in a position to cope with this danger . . . and must make way for persons united by a common conception of the tasks of the present moment and prepared to look for support in their activities to the majority in the State Duma and to carry out its programme."³

The bourgeoisie now demanded not a "Cabinet of Confidence," but a cabinet fully responsible to the Duma. In the opinion of the leaders of the opposition, such a government would be able to crush the revolution and prosecute the war.

However sharply the bourgeoisie attacked the autocracy, it nevertheless stressed the point that the acuteness of the conflict was due to the menace of revolution. That is what Shulgin said in the Duma:

"Such a conflict is the only way of avoiding what is perhaps most to be feared, the only way of avoiding anarchy and governmental chaos."⁴

The action of the Progressive Bloc met with support even among the extreme Rights. Purishkevich severely criticised the government and the "dark forces" governing the country.⁵ Even the Privy Council, which was recruited from persons thoroughly devoted to the throne—even this chamber of reactionary dignitaries adopted a resolution on November 22 advocating the formation of a new cabinet.⁶ Even the Congress of the United Nobility began to speak of the "dark forces" and of the necessity for a new government. True, the nobles state that the new cabinet should

1 Ibid., column 38.

2 Ibid., column 38.

3 Ibid., columns 12-13.

4 Ibid., column 69.

5 Ibid., column 286.

6 "The Privy Council, Meeting of November 22," "Russkoye Slovo (Russian Word)" No. 270, November 23, and No. 274, November 27, 1916.

be responsible only to the monarch,¹ but even in this form the resolution of the congress was indicative of a split between the ruling circles and a section of their class. In the autumn of 1915 the Progressive Bloc had been greeted with violent hostility by people who now, in the autumn of 1916, were seconding its demands—so shaky had the ground beneath the feet of the ruling classes of the country become.

The autocracy was faced with a dilemma: either to continue the war and face a revolt of the workers and peasants, or to make peace with the Germans and thus mitigate the revolutionary discontent. In the latter case, the tsarist government would encounter the resistance of the bourgeoisie, for which the war was an inexhaustible source of profit and a means of conquering new markets. The tsar and his entourage decided to end the war, on the assumption that after all it would be easier to cope with the revolt of the masses.

But they thought it too risky to announce their intentions openly: bourgeois circles were in too excited a state, and, what is more, the Allies had for a long time been watching the policy of the autocracy with growing distrust.

The Russian bourgeoisie had attempted several times during the course of the war to complain to the British and French imperialists of the restrictions placed on "patriotic" work. Foreign capitalists, of course, were interested in the Russian army, without which there could be no question of a victory over Germany, but they were not interested in the army alone. A number of branches of Russian industry—such as iron and steel and chemicals—to a large extent belonged to foreign capitalists. It was in the interest of the British and French bourgeoisie that the profitable "work for defence purposes" should proceed uninterrupted. At the end of March 1916 Rodzyanko was invited by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to send a delegation of Duma deputies to study the munitions industry in foreign countries. A number of Duma deputies, including Milyukov and Protopopov, went abroad in the spring of 1916. On the other hand, representatives of foreign governments visited Russia in April 1916. Among them were Albert Thomas, a prominent figure in the Second International, and Viviani—both "Socialists" and members of the French cabinet. Nicholas was carefully coached for the meeting with these delegations. He was assured that although they were "Socialists" they were devoting all their energies to the defence of their imperialist fatherland. Here is a description of one of them given by Poincaré, the French Premier who, because

¹ "Congress of the United Nobility," "Russkoye Slovo," No. 275, November 29, 1916.

of his extreme imperialist policy was nicknamed **Poincare la guerre**, "War Poincare":

..M. Albert Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State and Minister of Munitions, has supervised in France with remarkable ability and indefatigable zeal the manufacture of artillery and shells...He has contributed to the development in France of an industry which, unfortunately, was and still is much too limited in all the Allied countries. He has for this purpose united in a common effort the initiative of the State and private industry: he has secured the loyal support of the employers and workers; and for several months now all the productive forces of the country have been working to increase our military supplies..."¹

This was a certificate of faithful service to imperialism granted to the whole Second International.

Albert Thomas came to Russia to secure an improvement in the munitions industry and the dispatch of 400,000 Russian soldiers to France. Thomas and Viviani remained in Russia until May 17, 1916. They visited munitions factories, conversed with big capitalists and generals and with the Emperor, and strove for the removal of all obstacles in the work of the war industries. The French "Socialists" attempted also to appeal to the workers, but such was the reception they met with that Thomas considered it expedient to advise the tsar to take special measures against the workers. According to Paléologue, Albert Thomas said to B. Stürmer, President of the Council:

"Your factories are not working enough; they could produce ten times as much. You should militarise your workers."²

The leaders of the Second International advised the Russian tsar, who was already notorious for his savage exploitation of the proletariat, to turn the workers into military slaves.

Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia, spoke several times to Nicholas of the serious state of the country. The more defeats Russia suffered, the more insistent became the "advice" of the British Ambassador. Buchanan literally harassed the tsar, drawing his attention to every minute fact that might be interpreted as prejudicial to England. The conduct of the British Ambassador in Russia differed very little from the conduct of his colleague in a country like Siam. These constant admonitions

¹ V. P. Semennikov, "The Monarchy on the Eve of the Collapse. Papers of Nicholas II and Other Documents," Moscow, 1927, p. 9.

² Maurice Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre," 21 ed., Paris, Librairie Plon, Vol. II, p. 264.

finally exhausted Nicholas' patience. He had been accustomed to receive the Ambassador without formality, but now he received him in full-dress uniform, a hint to Buchanan that he must observe a strictly official tone and refrain from giving "advice." The hint was unavailing. Quite the contrary Buchanan now began to resort to open threats. When Nicholas replaced S. D. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister, by B. V. Stürmer, who was reputed to favour peace with Germany, Buchanan telegraphed to London:

"He [Stürmer—*Ed.*] is, according to all accounts, a Germanophile at heart. As a pronounced reactionary, he is, moreover, at one with the Empress in wishing to maintain the autocracy intact... If the Emperor continues to uphold his present reactionary advisers a revolution is, I fear, inevitable."¹

Buchanan's French colleague expressed himself even more sharply on the subject of Nicholas' policy. Maurice Paléologue, often compares himself in his memoirs, to Chetardi, the French Ambassador, who in the eighteenth century helped Elizabeth to take the Russian throne from Anna. Sazonov's dismissal moved Paléologue to another historical comparison. The French Ambassador records in his diary a conversation he had with the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna:

"What is to be done?... For fifteen days we have all been making every effort to prove to him [i.e., Nicholas II—*Ed.*] that he is ruining the dynasty, that he is ruining Russia, that his reign... is about to end in a catastrophe. He will not listen. It is tragical!... We shall, however, attempt a collective appeal by the Imperial Family...'

"Will it be confined to a... platonic appeal?"

"We gaze at each other in silence. She divines that I am referring to the drama of Paul I, because she replies with a gesture of horrors:

'My God! What is going to happen?...'

The Ambassador did not balk at the idea of regicide when it seemed to him that Nicholas was not staunch enough in his loyalty to the Allies.

Under such circumstances the autocracy had to pursue its plans with the greatest caution. On November 10 the tsar dismissed Stürmer, who was being accused of treason, and appointed A. F. Trepov President of the Council. Trepov was a brother of the Governor-General of St. Petersburg who in the 1905 Revolution had issued the notorious

¹ Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassel & Co., 1923, Vol. II, pp. 18-19.

² Maurice Paléologue, "La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre," 20 ed., Paris, Librairie Plon, Vol. III, p. 159.

order: "Spare no bullets!" He was the son of the Governor of the City of St. Petersburg who was fired on by Vera Zasulich on January 24, 1878. Trepov was a large land-owner in the province of Poltava. He had been connected with certain members of the Duma in his earlier work in the government. On November 19 the new Prime Minister presented himself to the Duma and at once announced that the Allies would hand over Constantinople to Russia. He added:

"The Russian people ought to know for what they are shedding their blood."¹

This was pleasant news to the landlords and the bourgeois.

It was thought that such concessions would temporarily appease the excited deputies and that subsequently a different course could be adopted. When appointing Trepov, who was distrusted at the court, Nicholas reassured the tsarina:

"It is a rotten business to have to do with a man whom one dislikes and mistrusts... But first of all one must choose a new successor and then kick him out, after he has done the dirty business. I mean—send him away, when he has shut up the Duma. Let all the responsibility and difficulty fall on his shoulders and not on those of the newcomer."²

The conspiracy of the tsarist clique was as follows. It was proposed to prohibit the "Unions," as the bourgeois organisations were called in government circles, to disperse the Duma and to elect a new, "tame" Duma, to concentrate the whole power of government in the hands of one "plenipotentiary person," to conclude a separate peace with Germany and then to tackle the revolution.

Tentative efforts to arrive at a peace with Germany had been undertaken long before. As early as 1915, when the Russian armies were in full flight from Galicia, letters were received in Petrograd from M. A. Vassilchikova, a lady-in-waiting to the Russian Empress, writing from Austria, where she had taken up permanent residence on her estate. Like many other members of Russian upper circles, Vassilchikova was related to a number of German aristocrats and Russian dignitaries. She was also known at court. Vassilchikova wrote three letters to Nicholas proposing peace in the name of Wilhelm II, and in December she herself made her way to the Russian capital with the object of obtaining an audience from the tsar. Rumours of a separate peace began to spread in society, and Vassilchikova had to be sent out of the capital. In April 1915 the tsarina received a letter

¹ "The State Duma. Fourth Assembly. Fifth session. Stenographic Report," Petrograd, 1916, Column 258.

² Letter of December 14, 1916.—"Trans."

from her brother, the Duke of Hesse, proposing that peace negotiations be started. Without awaiting a reply, the Duke sent a confidential agent to Stockholm to meet any representatives the tsar might send. The tsarina wrote to Nicholas about her brother as follows:

"So he had an idea of quite privately sending a man of confidence to Stockholm, who should meet a gentleman sent by you (privately) that they could help disperse many momentary difficulties. So he sent a gentleman to be there on the 28th (that is two days ago, and I only heard to-day), and can only spare him a week. So I at once wrote an answer... and sent it to the gentleman telling him you are not yet back, so he had better not wait, and that though one longs for peace the time has not yet come."¹

The fate of nations was decided by the tsar's relatives in this domestic way.

In 1916 several other attempts were made to start peace negotiations with Germany. In July a meeting was held in Stockholm between Warburg, a German representative, and Protopopov, Vice-President of the Duma, while the latter was abroad with a delegation of Duma deputies. At this meeting Warburg outlined the terms on which Germany would be willing to conclude peace.

On his return to Russia, Protopopov made a report on the meeting to members of the Duma. Nicholas learnt of Protopopov's meeting in Stockholm and immediately summoned him to the palace. As Milyukov admitted, it was greatly feared in the Duma "that this proposal [i.e., Warburg's—*Ed.*] might be taken seriously." Milyukov requested Protopopov to regard the whole incident "as the chance episode of a tourist and to put it in this way" to Nicholas.² But evidently, Protopopov knew how to curry favour with the tsar. "I felt that he was very pleased with my report,"³ Protopopov related in the course of the interrogation after the 1917 Revolution. He was not mistaken. On September 18, on Rasputin's recommendation, Protopopov was appointed Acting Minister of the Interior. Nicholas had a two-fold purpose in making this appointment. Protopopov, an Octobrist, and Vice-President of the Duma, was the Chairman of the Council of the Congresses of the Metallurgical Industry, which meant that he had close contacts with industrial circles. He was a big landowner—he owned about 13,000 acres of land in the province of Simbirsk. The tsar

1 Letter of April 17, 1915.—"Trans."

2 "Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Stenographic Report of the Interrogation and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. VI, Leningrad, 1926, pp. 341-2.

3 Ibid, Vol. IV, Leningrad, 1925, p. 61.

believed that by appointing Protopopov Minister he was erecting a bridge to the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, Protopopov—a protégé of Rasputin's—had shown that he favoured a separate peace, which made him a convenient instrument of the tsar's policy.

Protopopov's appointment earned him the hatred of his former friends in the Duma. Protopopov was abused and slandered and spoken of with greater contempt than the other Ministers. This was not because of his personal qualities—Protopopov was no worse than the other creatures of the tsarist clique—but because he had consented to become a Minister at a time when the Duma was in conflict with Nicholas, and especially because of his views on peace.

Having freed its hands in the sphere of foreign policy the autocracy rapidly began to carry out its plans within the country itself. On December 9 the Congresses of the Union of the Cities and of the Union of the Zemstvos were closed down. The most innocent meetings, politically, were prohibited; on December 11 a meeting of the Society of Journalists, and later a meeting of the Society of Children's Doctors were forbidden.

Bourgeois organisations inundated the Duma with protests; but on December 17 the tsar suspended the meetings of the Duma until January 12. It was hoped in the interval to complete the preparations for the election of a new Duma. The details of the plan had been drawn up as early as October 1915 by A. N. Khvostov, a former Minister of the Interior. Khvostov had been Governor of Vologda and Nizhni Novgorod, where he succeeded in getting Rights elected to the Duma. It was to this "election expert" that the task of drawing up a plan was entrusted. Eight million rubles were placed at the disposal of the Minister for the purpose of bribing the press, issuing literature, hiring printshops and organising street displays and cinema shows. Khvostov managed to receive about 1,50,000 rubles, for the disbursement of which he was unable after the Revolution to produce any vouchers. A large part of this sum found its way into the pocket of the Minister himself. Khvostov drew up a memorandum on the probable outcome of the elections in each province. In respect to the composition of the future Duma, the memorandum stated:

"Right Octobrists are permissible groups and more conservative are desirable."¹

Deputies of the type of Rodzyanko were to be allowed into the new Duma, but Markov 2nd and similar members of the Union of the Russian People were deemed desirable.

¹ V. P. Semennikov, "The Monarchy on the Eve of the Collapse, 1914-17." "Paper of Nicholas II and Other Documents," Moscow, 1927, p. 228.

It was hoped to achieve these results with the aid of the landed nobility and the priests. For example, in reference to the province of Tver the memorandum stated:

"Definite Rights, in alliance with the clergy, should be set up against the Lefts and the Octobrists."¹

Of the Tambov Province it was stated:

"The Left groups can be rendered harmless only with the aid of the clergy. They are not very reliable, but they could be taken in hand by the bishop, who must instruct them not to allow the election of Lefts."²

When it came to putting the plan into practical effect, N. A. Maklakov, the man who could give such a good imitation of a "lovesick panther," was called to mind. Nicholas II instructed him, in conjunction with Protopopov, who in December had been endorsed as Minister of the Interior, to draw up a manifesto proroguing the Duma. Rejoicing at the fact that he had been summoned from imitating a panther to more "useful" work, Maklakov wrote a letter of gratitude to the tsar, from which we learn how extensive the tsar's plan was. Maklakov wrote:

"This should be a matter for the Ministerial Council as a whole, and the Minister of the Interior must not be left to fight single-handed the whole of Russia, which has been led astray. The government, more than ever before, must be concentrated, convinced, knit by a single purpose, namely, to restore order in the state at all costs, and it must be convinced of victory over the internal enemy, who has for a long time been growing more dangerous, more savage and more arrogant than the foreign enemy."³

This idea that the internal enemy, i.e., their subjects, was more dangerous than the foreign enemy, dominated all the activities of the court clique.

The conspiracy of the autocracy was ready for execution.

It is important to note that Maklakov wrote his letter on February 9, and that on February 13 Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, had already received peace proposals from Russia. This is what Count Czernin writes:

"On February 26 [new style—*Ed.*] a person came to see me who produced proof that he was the appointed representative of a certain neutral Power, and informed me, at the request of his government, that he was instructed to let me know that the enemy Powers, or at

¹ Ibid., p. 238.

² Ibid., p. 239.

³ Ibid., p. 98.

least one of them, were prepared to conclude peace with us and that the terms of the peace would be favourable to us. . . . I did not doubt for a moment that Russia was in question, and my interlocutor confirmed my assumption."¹

The autocracy persisted in its adopted course.

The first vague news of a change in the foreign policy of the tsarist court roused the bourgeoisie to fury. The bourgeoisie had the full support of Russia's imperialist allies. If Russia were to conclude a separate peace, victory over Germany would be placed in doubt. The Russian army engaged the attention of tremendous forces of the enemy, and if it were to quit the war the plans of the Allied imperialists would be completely upset.

Supported by the Allies, the Russian bourgeoisie decided to infuse new blood into the decrepit autocracy by means of a palace revolution—to depose the incompetent tsar and to replace him by a creature of the bourgeoisie. The whole plan was designed with the purpose of intensifying resistance to the growing revolution without stopping the war. Two secret circles were formed in the capital. The first consisted mostly of military men, officers of the Guard. A prominent part in this circle was played by General Krymov, who after the Revolution was to gain notoriety for his part in the revolt of General Kornilov.

In his reminiscences of General Krymov, Tereshchenko, who became a Minister in the first government formed after the Revolution of February 1917, wrote:

"He and his friends realised that if they did not assume the leadership of the *coup d'état*, it would be carried out by the people themselves, and they were fully cognizant of the consequences and the fatal anarchy this might involve.

"But more cautious persons argued that the hour had not yet arrived. January passed, and the first half of February. At length, the wise words of the skilled politician failed to convince us and, in the code we used for communicating with each other, General Krymov was called to Petrograd from Rumania in the early days of March. But it was already too late."²

Rodzyanko states in his memoirs that the negotiations took place in the home of Guchkov. The financial and industrial magnates knew that the conspiracy had the approval of Generals Alexeyev, Ruzsky and Brussilov. Similar work was being carried on simultaneously by offi-

1 O. Czernin, "Im Weltkrieg (In the World War)," Berlin, Ullstein, 1919, p. 192.

2 "The Liquidation of a Conspiracy. M. I. Tereshchenko on General Krymov," "Russkiye Vedomosti (Russian Bulletin)," No. 202, September 3, 1917.

cers of the Petrograd regiments of the Guards. Purishkevich also had contacts with the officers.

The second circle consisted of members of the Duma. After the Revolution of February 1917 Milyukov admitted that:

"A large number of the members of the First Provisional Government took part in the conference of this second circle, while some of them . . . also knew of the existence of the first circle."¹

The intention of the conspirators was to depose Nicholas, consign the tsarina to a convent, to crown Alexei (who was still a minor) tsar and to appoint Grand Duke Michael, the tsar's brother, regent until Alexei came of age. The first step in the palace revolution was to be the assassination of Rasputin. On the night of December 17 Rasputin was invited to the apartment of Prince Felix Yusupov, where Purishkevich, Yusupov and the Grand Duke Dmitri fired six shots at the "holy man" and killed him.

The high-placed conspirators, who belonged to the same circle that created and fostered Rasputinism, cherished the secret hope that after this assassination the court would come to its senses. Nicholas' relatives appealed to him, pointing out that he was driving to his own ruin and to the ruin of his family. But the tsar left General Headquarters and hastened to the capital, where it was decided to proceed with the execution of the plan. Only one amendment was introduced at Protopopov's suggestion, namely, that the Duma should not be prorogued for the present. On January 6 Nicholas issued a ukase postponing the resumption of the sessions of the Duma and of the Privy Council until February 14. What they feared was not so much the indignation of the upper bourgeoisie as the rapid spread of revolutionary feeling among the masses. In Protopopov's opinion the dispersion of the Duma might serve as a legitimate pretext for action on the part of the masses.

According to the chief organ of the Cadet Party, *Ryech*, the Duma members interpreted the new postponement as the culmination of the government's campaign against the Duma. The bourgeois conspirators, for their part, again expedited their preparations. Rodzyanko learnt from a private conversation with the President of the Council that Nicholas had already signed three ukases, without, however, setting a date for their promulgation: the first definitely proroguing the Duma, the second postponing its sessions until the end of the war, and the third postponing

¹ P. N. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book 1, Sofia, 1921, p. 36.

its labours for an indefinite period. The Chairman of the Duma sent telegrams to Bazilyesky, the Marshal of Nobility of the Moscow Province, A. D. Samarin, Chairman of the Congress of the United Nobility, and Somov, Marshal of Nobility of the Petrograd Province, summoning them to Petrograd. A message was sent summoning to Moscow Prince G. E. Lvov, of the Union of Zemstvos, who more than anybody else was being mentioned as probable Prime Minister of the new government, M. V. Chelnokov of the Union of Cities and A. J. Konovalov of the Congress of Industrialists and Manufacturers. It was decided that Samarin should request an audience of the tsar in the name of the nobility and endeavour to open his eyes to the true state of affairs. It was proposed to summon the Congress of the United Nobility on January 19. Furthermore, as Guchkov subsequently stated during his examination by the Investigation Commission after the February Revolution, the secret circle decided in February 1917—

“to seize the imperial train on its way from General Headquarters to Tsarskoye Selo, force the tsar to abdicate, at the same time to arrest the existing government with the aid of troops, which here in Petrograd could be relied upon, and then to announce both the *coup d'etat* and the names of the persons who would head the government. Thus . . . not the whole army would have to be dealt with, but only a very small part of it.”¹

The allied diplomats, like the leaders of the Russian bourgeoisie, believed that only a *coup d'etat* could prevent a revolution and “save” Russia. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, admits in his memoirs that the conspirators discussed the coup at his Embassy.

“A Palace revolution,” he writes in his memoirs, “was openly spoken of, and at a dinner at the Embassy a Russian friend of mine, who had occupied a high position in the government, declared that it was a mere question whether both the Emperor and Empress or only the latter would be killed.”²

Such was the conspiracy of the nobility and the upper bourgeoisie.

This admission may be regarded as proof not only that Buchanan was aware of the conspiracy but that he himself had a hand in it. It cannot be questioned that the Ambassador of an allied Power who was informed of the

1 “Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Stenographic Report of Interrogation and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government,” Vol. VI, Leningrad, 1926, p. 278.

2 Sir George Buchanan, “My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs,” London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 41.

likelihood of the assassination of the Emperor to whom he was accredited and yet did not make the conspirator known, had a hand in the conspiracy. Sir George Buchanan frankly relates that—

“a Russian friend of mine, who was afterwards a member of the Provisional Government, sent me a message . . . to say that there would be a revolution before Easter.”¹

The two conspiracies—both designed to prevent revolution—were now ripe. The conspirators hastened to carry out their plans without the aid of the masses and before the people could detect their policy. But the revolution forestalled both the blow of the autocracy and the palace revolution: while the bourgeoisie and the autocracy were engrossed with each other, the workers and peasants, who hated both the bourgeoisie and tsarism, came out on to the streets in open action.

The strike wave of October 1916 was succeeded by a relative calm in the working-class movement, but neither in November nor in December did the number of strikes fall below 40,000. A rapid upward movement began in 1917. The severe winter had entailed fresh hardships on the working population. Deliveries of grain to Petrograd and Moscow had almost entirely ceased. Prices of articles of general consumption rose rapidly. Voices of protest were more and more frequently heard in the food lines.

Several baker shops had already been wrecked. The women were particularly active. In January reports of the secret police to the Minister of the Interior stated:

“Mothers of families, exhausted by endless waiting in the lines at the shops and suffering at the sight of their half-starved and sick children, are perhaps nearer to revolution than Messrs. Milyukov, Rodichev and Co., and are, of course, much more dangerous, because they represent a powder magazine which requires only a spark to explode.”²

Strikes in January began on the 9th, the anniversary of the shooting down of the demonstrating workers in 1905. The day before the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party had appealed to the workers to demonstrate against the war. The Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee gave similar instructions in Moscow. On January 9 meetings were organised by the workers in many factories. They appeared in the streets with red flags. In the Vyborg and Narva Districts of Petrograd nearly all the factories were

¹ Ibid., p. 51.

² “Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy.” Files of the Petrograd Secret Police, No. 525, 1917, folio 36.

at a standstill. Demonstrations of workers were held in Petrograd, Moscow, Baku and Nizhni Novgorod. In Moscow one-third of the workers went on strike. The Moscow Bolshevik Committee organised a demonstration on Tverskoi Boulevard which was attended by about 2,000 persons and which was broken up by mounted police. Towards 3 p.m. a group of workers appeared on Theatre Square with red banners bearing the slogan: "Down with the War!" The number of demonstrators rapidly grew to about a thousand. They marched towards the Okhotny Ryad. Mounted police arrived and rode into the crowd with unsheathed sabres. Everywhere the police dealt brutally with the strikers. Arrests were made. Many workers were handed over to the military authorities. But a few days later the strikes broke out afresh. In January a total of over 200,000 workers went on strike in various parts of the country. Strikes of this magnitude had been unknown since the outbreak of the war. The situation in Petrograd and Moscow became extremely tense. The cities were rife with rumours. The townsfolk hoarded food in the event of traffic coming to a standstill.

"The idea of a general strike," the police reported, "is acquiring more supporters every day and is becoming as popular as it was in 1905."¹

The movement in the towns was joined by a movement among the poor peasants in the countryside. Continuous mobilisation and perpetual requisitions of cattle had completely ruined large numbers of the working peasants. The industrial crisis had deprived the villages of matches, kerosene and salt. The peasants had barely enough grain to last even to mid-winter. Hatred of the landowner and the kulak grew more intense than ever. News of a vigorous movement against the war was received from a number of districts.

"The government cannot hang all of us, but the Germans can kill or cripple everybody,"² it was said in the villages as an argument in favour of not appearing when called up for the army. The police reports on the state of feeling among the peasants contained frequent comparisons with the state of feeling that prevailed in 1905 and 1906.

The tsarist government definitely refused to make any concessions either to the liberal bourgeoisie or to those court cliques who were prepared to affect liberalism at a moment of danger. Tsarism mobilised all its forces. The

1 "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy," etc., folio 28.

2 "Archives of the Revolution and Foreign Policy." Files of the Department of Police, Special Register, No. 167, Part 13, folio 29.

police were armed with machine guns taken from the garrison and the secret police were set in motion to arrest "all suspicious persons." Arrests were made frequently without discriminating between friend and foe. On the night of January 27 the members of the Labour Group of the Central War Industry Committee—the Mensheviks Gvozdyev, Broydo and others, eleven persons in all—were arrested. They were accused of making preparations for a workers' demonstration on February 14 "with the object of converting Russia into a Social-Democratic republic."¹

On February 5 an order was issued separating the Petrograd Military Area from the Northern Front. Lieut.-General S. S. Khabalov, the Commander of the Area, was endowed with wide powers. The government decided to fight the revolution ruthlessly.

The first signs of the revolutionary storm caused utter dismay in the ranks of the liberal bourgeoisie. All talk of a palace revolution ceased. The "revolutionaries despite themselves" had been prepared to make a chamber revolution without the masses, but the masses suddenly appeared on the streets. The Duma chatterers refused to hear of any further pressure being brought to bear on the autocracy. These recent conspirators betrayed even their nearest allies. The day following the arrest of the Labour Group, a meeting of the Bureau of the Central War Industry Committee was held at which A. I. Guchkov and A. I. Konovalov were instructed to request the government to mitigate the lot of the arrested persons. An excellent testimonial was given to the Mensheviks:

"There are a number of facts which show that, thanks to the influence exercised by the Labour Group, acute conflicts between the workers and the managements were averted in a number of factories in various districts."²

But no decisive measures were taken. On the contrary, at the following meeting of the Bureau of the Committee, held on January 29, at which leaders of the Duma opposition were present, Milyukov cynically dissociated himself from the activities of the Labour Group and spoke against "giving rein to the instincts of the masses." Professor Milyukov pleaded with the workers not to come out on to the streets and not to give way to "provocation." He even appealed to them to refrain from taking part in the demonstration which the Mensheviks were preparing to organise on the day of the opening of the Duma—February 14. While dissuading the workers from action, the bourgeoisie implor-

1 "Arrest of the Labour Group," "Russkiye Vedomosti," Special Supplement No. 24, January 30, 1917.

2 "The Public Organizations," "Utro Rossii," No. 28, January 28, 1917.

ed the tsar to meet the State Duma half-way; they hoped by small concessions to forestall more radical demands on the part of the people.

The manoeuvres of the scared bourgeoisie were screened by the petty-bourgeois parties. In the opinion of the Mensheviks the bourgeoisie was the only class that could lead the bourgeois revolution. The bourgeoisie had to be slightly jolted all the time to make it do so. The Mensheviks called upon the workers to demonstrate in the streets on February 14 in defence of the Duma. The demonstrators were advised to assemble at the Taurida Palace, where the Duma held its sessions. At the conference on January 29 at which Milyukov was present, Chkheidze also spoke. The Menshevik leader reproached the bourgeois leader for lagging in the tail of events.

"This is a blow at the working class, but bear in mind that the doom of the workers will be followed by your own doom."¹

Chkheidze said, trying to scare the bourgeoisie and urging it to wage a more determined fight against the tsar. The legal central organisations of the Mensheviks, as represented by the Labour Group and the Menshevik fraction in the state Duma, endeavoured to extinguish the revolutionary conflagration. When it became clear that the strike was assuming the form of an armed insurrection the Mensheviks appealed to the workers to refrain not only from resorting to arms but also from holding demonstrations.

The Socialist-Revolutionary groups also played the part of traitors to the revolution. Kerensky appealed to the bourgeoisie to display greater boldness. After the Duma was opened, he said:

"If you are with the country, if you realise that the old power and its servitors cannot save Russia from the present crisis, you must definitely declare and prove yourselves to be in favour of the immediate emancipation of the State, and you must proceed at once from words to deeds."²

Like Chkheidze, Kerensky believed that the bourgeoisie was really capable of fighting the autocracy. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, like the Mensheviks, pleaded with the bourgeoisie to take charge of the movement and thereby avert a revolutionary storm.

The February Revolution found the Bolshevik Party weakened organisationally. Many of its organisations had

¹ Central Archives. "The Bourgeoisie on the Eve of the February Revolution," Moscow, 1927, p. 183.

² "Speech by A. F. Kerensky," "Ryech (Speech)," No. 47, February 19, 1917.

been destroyed by the police. Its most prominent and active members were in exile or prison, or obliged to live abroad. Lenin was forced to bide his time in Switzerland. Stalin was in exile in a distant part of Siberia, in Turukhansk in the Yenisei region, where Sverdlov had also been banished.

But the autocracy had not succeeded in smashing the Bolshevik Party. Nor had it succeeded in severing its contacts with the masses. Faithful to the fundamental principle of Marxism—always with the masses and at the head of the masses—the Bolsheviks self-sacrificingly led the fight of the proletariat, whether at the front or in the rear, in the capital or in the provinces. New comrades, new reinforcements, took the place of the Bolsheviks condemned to prison or to exile, and penal servitude. The Bolsheviks even managed to preserve their central organisation in Russia—the Bureau of the Central Committee, one of the leaders of which was V. M. Molotov. The heroic work of the Bolshevik Party bore fruit, despite the unprecedented fury of the terror. Advanced workers, trained in the spirit of Bolshevism, brought a passionate revolutionary spirit to the day-to-day political struggle. Bolshevik ideas were a potent influence among the working class and stimulated the people to wage an irreconcilable fight against the class enemies. The Bolsheviks alone called upon the masses to overthrow tsarism by means of an armed struggle.

In opposition to the Mensheviks, who invited the workers to demonstrate in defence of the Duma on the day of its opening, the Bolsheviks made preparations for a demonstration on February 10, the anniversary of the trial of the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma. The Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party had distributed leaflets on February 6 calling on the workers to demonstrate. On February 10 some of the factories were idle and some worked only until the dinner hour. Meetings were held; the Party distributed 10,000 leaflets. The Bolsheviks decided to take part in the strike of February 14 and to run it under their own slogans. On that day sixty Petrograd factories, employing scores of thousands of workers, went on strike. The workers of the Putilov Works came out with red flags inscribed with the words: "Down with the Autocracy! Down with the War!" The workers from the Vyborg District marched along the Liteiny Prospect singing revolutionary songs. Police who tried to interfere were repulsed. Meetings were held at factories.

None of the banners in the demonstration bore the slogan "Defend the Duma!" The Bolsheviks led both the strike and the demonstration.

CHAPTER II

THE FEBRUARY BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

1

REVOLT IN THE CAPITAL

THE strike assumed wide dimensions. But it did not accomplish the fundamental purpose of the Bourgeois-democratic revolution, namely, the overthrow of the autocracy. It aroused and prepared the masses for a higher form of struggle—armed insurrection—and it also indicated how ripe the revolution was. It was not the strike that dealt the blow at the old regime. The autocracy was overthrown by the combined action of the workers and the soldiers who joined them.

The decisive part in the overthrow of the autocracy was played by Petrograd, with its proletarian population of over half a million. On February 18, 1917, one of the shops of the Putilov Works went on strike. Meetings were held in all departments. The workers elected a delegation to present their demands to the management. The manager threatened dismissals. On February 22 the factory was closed. The following day 20,000 Putilov workers marched to the city. Serious food riots had taken place in Petrograd the day before. The appearance of the Putilov workers added fuel to the flames. February 23¹ was International Women's Day. The Bolshevik Party called on the workers to come out on strike. About 90,000 workers downed tools. During the day the outskirts of Petrograd were in the hands of the demonstrators. Women predominated in the crowd. They abandoned the bread lines, where they had been standing for hours, and joined the strikers. The demonstrators not only struck work themselves, but went to bring out others. A huge crowd of workers surrounded the Cartridge Factory, where 5,000 workers were persuaded to down tools. The demonstrators demanded bread. Quite a number of red flags bearing revolutionary slogans had already appeared, especially in the Vyborg District where the Bolshevik Committee was

1 March 8, New Style.—“Trans.”

very active. According to a police report, at about 3 p.m. some 4,000 people broke across the Sampsonyevsky Bridge from the Vyborg Side and flocked into Troitsky Square. Speakers appeared in the crowd. Mounted and foot police broke up the demonstrations. Still not strong enough to repulse the police, the workers retaliated by raiding bakeries and beating up the more zealous policemen.

The Bolshevik Committee of the Vyborg District met that evening. It decided to continue the strike and to convert it into a general strike.

On the following day, February 24, the demonstrations were resumed with redoubled vigour. The strike spread. About 200,000 workers had already downed tools. Military pickets were stationed on the bridges, but the workers crossed on the ice. Demonstrations from the outskirts of the city, bearing red banners, endeavoured to reach the centre, the Nevsky Prospect. Dispersed by the police in one place, they immediately reassembled in another. Revolutionary songs and cries of "Down with the tsar!" and "Give us bread!" were continuously heard on the Nevsky Prospect.

The reliability of the troops had not yet been tested, and they were therefore brought into action with caution. Several incidents seemed to indicate that they were on the verge of insubordination. On Vassilyevsky Island a Cossack patrol refused to come to the aid of an assistant inspector of police who had been surrounded by the crowd; on Znamenskaya Square the Cossacks held aloof while the crowd drove off the mounted police.

The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party resolved to enlist the active support of the soldiers.

On February 25 the events of the previous day were repeated on the streets of Petrograd in an even more marked form. The isolated strikes were transformed into a general strike. The collisions between the workers and the police became more and more fierce. The workers passed from the defensive to the offensive. They killed or wounded a number of commanders of police detachments. The demonstrators, however, lacked arms, and the police gained the upper hand. By the evening the police even succeeded in clearing the streets and restoring a certain degree of "order." Khabalov, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, announced that the workers must return to work on Tuesday, February 28, otherwise all recruits whose call to active service had been postponed would be dispatched to the front.

It seemed as if the power of the autocracy had not yet been shaken, but serious symptoms of its impending collapse were already in evidence. Such were the cases of

refusal to assist the police, and even of direct attacks on the police, by the troops. Near the Kazan Cathedral a platoon of the Fourth Don Cossack Regiment released certain arrested citizens and beat up the police who were defending the courtyard where the prisoners were detained. On the Vyborg Side Cossacks belonging to the First Don Cossack Regiment retreated, leaving Colonel Shalfeyev, the commander of a mixed detachment, and the police to face the crowd alone. On Znamenskaya Square Cossacks repulsed police who tried to break up the meeting, and in the collision Krylov, a police inspector, was killed. It was the Cossacks—whom the tsar's intimates, against the wishes of General Headquarters, had endeavoured to retain in Petrograd—that were the first to give way.

An account of the first outbreaks of insubordination in the army is given by P. D. Skuratov, a worker at the Putilov Works, later a Red Guard:

"At the end of Bogomolovskaya Street we organised a small group of 300 or 400 people, who later, when we reached the Peterh of Chaussee, were joined by a large mass of workers. We tied red kerchiefs to sticks—a red banner appeared, and, singing the 'Marseillaise,' we proceeded towards the Narva Gate. When we reached Ushakovskaya Street, we were charged head-on by a column of mounted police who began to strike right and left, so that we were forced to disperse... Thousands of Putilov workers and workers from the chemical plant re-assembled at the Narva Gate. It was decided to lend the march an organised character. The front ranks joined hands and advanced in this way... We had just turned from Sadovaya Street on to the Nevsky Prospect when a squadron of cavalry with drawn sabres came galloping towards us from the Anichkov Palace. We divided, and they rode through our ranks. We set up a concerted cheer, but they made no reply.

"On reaching the Liteiny Prospect we were met by workers from the Vyborg District and together with him continued our march to Znamenskaya Square. There a general meeting was held. At this moment a squad of mounted police dashed out from behind the Balabinskaya Hotel, and the inspector who rode at their head struck with his sword at a woman—she worked in the sick benefit society of our factory—who was carrying a flag. We did not get away. We dragged him from his horse, carried him to the Fontanka and threw him into the water. Cossacks came galloping along Ligovka Street from the Central Hotel, whereupon the police turned tail and rode back along the Suvorov Prospect, while the Cossacks followed us.

"We discussed among ourselves what the disharmony that had appeared among the troops could mean, and the conclusion we came to was that the revolution had won."¹

But this conclusion was premature. The troops were still acting in conjunction with the police. Towards the end of the day, General Khabalov, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, informed the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander that "the crowd has been dispersed." That evening Khabalov received the following order from General Headquarters:

"I command you, not later than to-morrow, to put a stop to the disorders in the capital, which are intolerable in this grave time of war with Germany and Austria. Nicholas II."²

Khabalov was disturbed by the tsar's orders. When questioned by the Investigation Committee after the February Revolution, he admitted,

"This telegram—how shall I put it?—to tell the frank and honest truth, it was like a thunderbolt to me...How was I to put a stop to the disorders not later than to-morrow? That is what it said: 'not later than to-morrow'...What was I to do? How was I to put a stop to the disorders? When they said, 'Give us bread!' we gave them bread—and that was the end of it. But when the flags said, 'Down with the autocracy!'—how could you appease them with bread? But what was to be done? The tsar had given his orders. We had to shoot."³

Khabalov ordered the regimental commanders and the chief of police to open fire after a triple warning. General Alexeyev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern and Western Fronts immediately to prepare to dispatch one brigade of cavalry each to Petrograd. He got into communication by direct wire with the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front and said:

"The hour is a grave one, and everything must be done to expedite the arrival of reliable troops. On this our future depends."⁴

¹ P. D. Skuratov, "October in Petrograd," "History of the Proletariat in the U.S.S.R.," 1932, No. 11, pp. 110-11.

² "Fall of the Tsarist Regime. Stenographic Report of the Interrogation and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. I, Leningrad, 1926, p. 220.

³ Ibid., p. 220.

⁴ "The Revolution of February 1917," "Krassny Arkhiv (Red Archives)," 1927 No. 2 (21), p. 10.

Not content with this, on the night of February 25 the Secret Police Department crowded all the Petrograd prisons, arresting everybody who was in the least suspect. Among the arrested were five members of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The leadership of the struggle passed to the Vyborg District Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The tsarist government prepared to meet the revolution by mass arrests and by summoning armed reinforcements from the front.

On the morning of February 26 the atmosphere seemed much calmer than the previous day. It was Sunday, and the workers came into the city at a later hour than the day before. The streets wore a holiday appearance. Deceived by the superficial calm, Khabalov sent a jubilant report to General Headquarters:

"To-day, February 26, all has been quiet in the city since morning."¹

The government troops were concentrated in the centre of the city. Machine guns were posted on the roofs of high buildings and at the police stations. The plan of the tsarist authorities was to meet the workers with rifle and machine-gun fire. The River Neva was cut off from the working-class districts by police and military pickets. Towards midday numerous demonstrations, led by Bolsheviks, began to make their way towards the centre of the city—the Nevsky Prospect.

The factory workers marched to the Nevsky Prospect with the idea of encountering the enemy in the very heart of the capital. They were met by a merciless hail of lead. It was impossible to reach the Nevsky. Firing continued all day.

A soldier belonging to the non-commissioned officers' training company of the Volhynia Regiment relates the part played by his regiment in the firing on the workers as follows:

"Now the company had taken up its position. The whole square in front of the Nikolayevsky Station was filled with workers. The soldiers still cherished the hope that they had been called out only for effect, in order to inspire fear. But as the hands on the station clock neared the hour of twelve, the soldiers' doubts were dispelled—the order was given to shoot. A volley was fired. The workers started running in all directions. There were practically no casualties from the first volleys: the soldiers, as though by common consent, fired in the air. But now a machine gun, turned on the crowd by officers, began to rattle, and the snow-covered square became stained with the blood of workers. The crowd

¹ "The Revolution of February 1917," etc., p. 5.

made in disorder for the courtyards of the surrounding houses, crushing one another in their haste. The mounted gendarmes began to pursue the 'enemy' thus driven from his position, and the pursuit lasted late into the night. Only then were the troops returned to barracks. Our company, commanded by Vice-Captain Laskhevich, returned to barracks exactly at 1 a.m."¹

According to information supplied by the secret police, that day about forty killed and approximately as many wounded were gathered up by the police on Znamenskaya Square alone, not counting those the demonstrators had carried away with them.

February 26, which had begun so calmly, ended in open civil war. It is characteristic that the Fourth Company of the Reserve Battalion of the Pavlovsky Regiment, indignant that the non-commissioned officers' training company of this regiment had taken part in shooting down the workers, opened fire on a detachment of mounted police. Unsupported by other companies, they were overcome, and surrendered their weapons—only twenty-one men went over to the insurrectionary people with their rifles. The officers picked out nineteen ringleaders. They were imprisoned under menace of death in the Trubetskoi Bastion of the Fortress of Peter and Paul.

The first day of civil war ended in a victory for the tsarist government.

By the evening the city was cleared of demonstrators. One more "command of His Imperial Majesty" had been executed.

But the protectors of the autocracy failed to observe the influence exercised by the workers on the soldiers who fired on the demonstrators. The revolutionary influence of the proletariat outweighed the victory gained by the autocracy. With every volley fired, the rage of the soldiers against their officers mounted. This the "victors" failed to notice, so accustomed were they to being hated by the soldiers.

The proletariat drew widely on the chief lesson of the 1905 Revolution—the necessity of winning over the troops. Workers, and especially working women, would form a close ring around the soldiers. They would seize the latters' bayonets with their hands and plead with the soldiers not to drown the revolution in the blood of their brothers, the workers. The soldiers would slip from their ranks individually and in small groups. The insurrectionaries would fervently plead with them. The soldiers who had been recently mobilised—a large part of the Petrograd garrison

1 K. I. Pazhetnykh, "The Volhynia Regiment in the February Revolution. Reminiscences." Manuscript records of the History of the Civil War, No. 488.

consisted of second category reserves or of young recruits who had just been called up—would be profoundly affected by the excited workers. The soldiers would maintain a gloomy silence, turn away in vexation from the importunate crowd, but it would be clear that they were being affected by the revolutionary atmosphere. Some of the soldiers would defend themselves against the criticisms and accusations. Others would angrily accuse the officers of responsibility for the firing on the defenceless crowd. Others still, showing that their rifles were unloaded, would openly recommend the people to attack with greater determination.

The resolution and self-sacrificing spirit of the proletarians caused vacillation in the ranks of the army and aroused the sympathy of the soldiers.

The ease with which the soldiers of the Pavlovsky Regiment had been dealt with inspired the tsarist authorities with confidence. Protopopov, Minister of the Interior, wrote to the tsar in evident relief:

"The troops acted zealously, the only exception being the independent action of the 4th Evacuated Company of the Pavlovsky Regiment."¹

And he concluded with the brazen falsehood:

"A part of the workers intend to resume work on February 27."²

This confident lie showed how little the obtuse gendarmes understood what was going on.

Growing arrogant, the tsarist satraps hastened to withdraw the few insignificant concessions that had recently been made. The Governor of the City of Petrograd rescinded his decision to hand over the charge of food affairs to the City Duma. The State Duma, in which it was expected that an interpellation would be made on the shooting of February 26, was dissolved by a ukase of the tsar. This ukase had been prepared as far back as November 1916. When handing it to Golitsyn, the Prime Minister, the tsar had said:

'Keep it, and when necessary use it.'³

But the ministers need not have been in such a hurry. In those unquiet days the State Duma relieved its feelings by questioning the government, not about the shootings, but about the food situation in Petrograd. The sacred re-

1 A. Blok, "The Last Days of the Imperial Power. Unpublished Documents", Petrograd, 1921, pp. 66-67.

2 Ibid, p. 67.

3 "Fall of the Tsarist Regime, Stenographic Report of the Interrogation and Evidence Heard in 1917 by the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Provisional Government," Vol. II, Leningrad, 1925, p. 265.

representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie—the Cadet Rodichev, the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky, and the Menshevik Chkheidze—stuffing their fingers into their ears and pretending not to hear the shooting in the streets, continued to implore the tsar in the old way. The intellectual dabblers in politics rushed in confusion from one apartment to another in pursuit of the latest “news.”

Rodzyanko, President of the State Duma, realised the grave and tragic nature of the events a little better than the rest. Being in close contact with the monarchy, Rodzyanko sensed that the hour of its utter collapse was at hand. He implored Nicholas II to form a new government, a government which would enjoy the “confidence” of the country.

“Procrastination is fatal,” he wired the tsar. “I pray God that responsibility should not fall on the crowned head at this hour.”¹

But the tsar was impatient of his over-faithful servitor. Nicholas wrote to Fredericks, the Court Councillor, in reference to Rodzyanko’s telegram:

“Fat Rodzyanko has again written me a lot of nonsense to which I shall not even reply.”²

¹ M. V. Rodzyanko, “The State Duma and Revolution of February 1917,” Rostov-on-Don, 1919, p. 42.

² A. Blok, “The Last Days of the Imperial Power. Unpublished Documents,” Petrograd, 1921, p. 64.

SUCCESS OF THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

While the victors up above were rejoicing over their success, counting up the losses of the revolution and mobilising their forces for a new blow, feverish activity was proceeding down below. Workers went from factory to factory recounting the bloody events of the day. Eye-witnesses, of the shooting told of the savage brutality of the gendarmes, inspiring their hearers with hatred of the butchers and a passionate desire for vengeance. Working women who had seen the demonstration broken up urged their brothers and husbands to continue the struggle.

Profound unrest prevailed in the barracks that night. The soldiers discussed their impressions of the day's events, and their meaning became more and more clear.

In these tense days of revolutionary struggle the Bolsheviks were everywhere—in the factories and workshops, in the barracks and on the streets—carrying on ceaseless agitation, sounding the call to battle and uniting the workers and soldiers. Severed from their leading bodies, which had been smashed by the secret police, the Bolsheviks created local committees in the factories, rapidly established contacts and infected the workers with their courage and their firm belief in victory.

"I took an active part on the eve of open action, i.e. on the night of February 24," recounts a Petrograd worker, who had been mobilised for the army for having gone on strike. "At a conference of soldiers it was resolved to join the workers together with the First Semyonovsky Regiment, and in this way to correct the mistake made in 1905. But the next day it was found that gendarmes had disguised themselves in the uniform of the Semyonovsky Regiment, while the regiment had been confined to barracks."¹

That same day, February 26, a meeting was held of the Bolshevik Committee of the Vyborg District, which had assumed the leadership after the arrest of the Petrograd Committee. Comrades reporting from the localities told of the growing revolutionary spirit and the eagerness to continue the fight. The Vyborg District Committee resolved to extend the armed struggle, to seize depots of arms and to disarm the police.

The persistent demonstrations of the proletariat, which were fired on point-blank, the fraternisation between the workers and the soldiers, and, finally, the

¹ I. S. Chumakov, "Reminiscences," Manuscript Records of the "History of the Civil War," No. 1284.

direct influence of the Bolsheviks, who frequently penetrated into the very barracks, resulted in the cases of insubordination among the soldiers assuming the character of open mutiny. The soldiers began to act against their commanders as peasants against landlords. On the night of February 26, the non-commissioned officers' training Company of the Volhynia Regiment, which had fired on the workers on Znamenskaya Square, resolved to refuse to use arms against the demonstrators. But this seemingly passive resistance suddenly assumed the form of an active offensive. When the commander of the training company, accompanied by a junior officer, appeared at the barracks early that morning, they were fired on from rifles and killed, amidst the cheering of the soldiers—so deeply had the influence of the revolution already penetrated. The age-old hatred of the peasant for the feudal landlord, now clad in officer's uniform, burst forth in relentless fury.

One of the soldiers who took part in the mutiny of the Volhynia Regiment relates his outstanding incident of the revolution in the following terms:

"Sergeant Kirpichnikov read us an order to form company again the next day at 7 a.m. At this time eighteen men—the more active rank-and-file soldiers and several squad and platoon commanders promoted from the ranks—got together in a dark, out-of-the-way corner of the barracks and earnestly discussed the situation. And the whole eighteen of them firmly resolved: 'To-morrow we shall turn matters our own way!' They drew up a programme of action: the company was to form not at 7 a.m., as Vice-Captain Lashkevich had ordered, but at 6 a.m., and in the meanwhile efforts were to be made to win over the whole company. . . .

"Dawn was already breaking when the eighteen quietly and swiftly dispersed to their places.

"At 6 a.m. on February 27, the company, consisting of 350 men, already stood at attentoin. Kirpichnikov spoke: he described the general situation and explained how we were to act and what was to be done.

"Hardly any agitation was required. The minds of the soldiers were already made up. It seemed that they had only been waiting for this, and all the men expressed their firm determination to support the workers.

"'Even if we have to die for it,' they said, 'we will not fire on our own people.'

"At this moment the jingling of spurs was heard in the corridor.

"The men pricked up their ears and for a moment fell tensely silent.

"It was Ensign Kolokolov entered. He was a former student and had only recently joined the regiment. The company replied to his greeting in the usual manner. He was followed by the commander, Lashkevich. The men became tense. Silence ensued.

"In reply to his greeting, we all shouted 'Hurrah!' [which was not the prescribed response to the greeting of a superior officer—*Trans.*]—as we had previously agreed among ourselves.

"When the cheer died down, Lashkevich seemed to sense that something was wrong, but he repeated his greeting. And again the response was a loud and menacing 'Hurrah!'

"Lashkevich turned to Sergeant Markov and angrily demanded what this meant.

"Markov, taking his rifle in his hand, replied in a firm voice: 'The cheer was a signal not to obey your orders!'

"Rifle butts resounded on the asphalt floor, there was a rattle of rifle locks. 'Get out while you are still alive!' the soldiers cried.

"Lashkevich tried to cry 'Attention!' But no one would listen to his command. Lashkevich begged for silence so that he could read a telegram received through General Khabalov from 'His Majesty Nicholas II,' but this had no effect whatever on the soldiers.

"Losing all hope of pacifying the company, Lashkevich and Kolokolov made for the door. In the corridor they met Ensign Vorontsov-Velyaminov, and all three began to run. Markov and Orlov threw open the ventilating pane in the window, raised their rifles, and as the three officers came up level with the window, two reports rang out.

"Lashkevich fell at the gate. The other officers dashed through the gate and immediately reported the mutiny to regimental headquarters.

"Seizing the regimental chest and the standard, all the officers left the barracks immediately.

"The road was clear. The whole company, under the command of Kirpichnikov, emerged into the courtyard.

"A volley fired into the air served as an alarm signal. Prisoners were released from the guardroom. Delegates were immediately dispatched to nearby companies to call upon them to join our mutiny. The first to respond without hesitation was a company of evacuated soldiers, consisting of 1,000 men, who joined us. Soon afterwards we were joined by the preparatory training company."¹

¹ K. I. Pazhetnykh, "The Volhynia Regiment in the February Revolution Reminiscences," Manuscript Records of the "History of the Civil War," No. 488.

Workers appeared among the soldiers.

The men of the Volhynia Regiment flocked into the street. Cheering and firing into the air, they proceeded to the nearby quarters of the Preobrazhensky and Lithuania Regiments. At the barracks of these regiments they immediately stirred up the hatred of the soldier-peasant for the landlord. Here, too, the regimental commanders were killed. The men of the Preobrazhensky and Lithuania Regiments joined the Volhynia men and proceeded in an armed body to the Vyborg District, the centre of the revolutionary movement in Petrograd. Ever since the morning the workers from the Vyborg Side had been swarming across the ice of the Neva. Towards midday the Vyborgites overwhelmed a company of the Moscow Regiment which held the Liteiny Bridge with machine guns, and swept into the town, carrying the soldiers with them. On the way, the arsenal was taken by storm. Armed squads were hastily formed on the spot. About 40,000 rifles were distributed in the space of an hour. The unorganised mutiny of the soldiers directly merged with the revolutionary movement of the proletarians. Armed workers headed the mutinous soldiers. The movement was transformed into a revolution, which overthrew tsarism by force of arms.

The mutiny of the soldiers and the demonstrations of the workers were not fortuitous and independent paths of the February Revolution. The Workers' demonstrations were **paving the way for and stirring up** the mutiny of the soldiers at a time when the troops were still obeying the tsarist authorities. **Without the political leadership** of the workers there would have been no mass revolt of the soldiers. It is not for nothing that the men of the Volhynia and Lithuania Regiments proceeded not to the centre of the city, not to the Duma, but to the working-class district of Vyborg. But the way for both the action of the workers and the mutiny of the soldiers had long been paved by the persistent and self-sacrificing work of the Bolshevik Party. Before its arrest the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party had printed a leaflet which said:

"We cannot wait and hold our peace any longer. The working class and the peasants, clad in grey great-coat and blue blouse, joining a hand, must wage a fight against the tsarist clique, in order to put an end for ever to the shame that is oppressing Russia. . . . The time for an open struggle has arrived."¹

The two streams, directed by the Party, came closer and closer, until they merged into the flood of victorious revolution.

¹ "To All the Working Men and Women of Petrograd." Leaflet of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Petrograd Committee, 1916.

The city was soon filled with automobile trucks and cars carrying armed soldiers and sailors. Gendarmes and recalcitrant officers were hunted out, disarmed and, in the passion of the fight, exterminated. Prisons were wrecked. Hundreds of active revolutionaries obtained their freedom and immediately took their place in the ranks of the fighters.

Police stations were set on fire. Endless cheers resounded, sweeping from district to district.

Brief and stormy meetings were held. Bolshevik leaflets passed from hand to hand.

"Call upon everybody to join the struggle," an appeal of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks stated. "Better to die a glorious death fighting for the cause of the workers, than to perish at the front for the sake of capitalist profits or to die from hunger and unendurable toil. . . . Everybody rally to the red banner of revolution! Down with the tsarist monarchy! Long live the democratic republic! . . . The landed estates for the people! . . . Down with the war! . . . Long live the Socialist International!"¹

The tsarist Ministers met at the Ministry Palace. Reports of revolt poured in from every quarter. Cossack petrels reported that a government detachment, consisting of a thousand men under the command of Colonel Kutypov, which had been sent against the Volhynia men, was unable to advance. The soldiers were fraternising with the insurrectionaries.

The perplexed Ministers permitted General Khabalov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, to proclaim a state of emergency in the capital. But the order could not be printed: the printshop of the Governor of the City was in the hands of the rebels. A thousand copies were finally printed in the Admiralty. Two police officers succeeded in pasting up a few copies of the order, but they were quickly torn down by the crowd and trampled underfoot.

The Ministers were sitting in perplexity listening to the new reports, when firing was heard in the distance. It was decided to extinguish all lights in the palace and to assemble at least some of the loyal troops in order to put up a resistance. But there was no attack and the lights were put on again. "After the light was put on, to my utter astonishment, I found myself under the table,"² one

¹ "The February Revolution in Documents," "Proletarskaya Revoliutsia, 1923" No. 1 (13), p. 285.

² M. V. Rodzyanko, "The State Duma and the Revolution of February 1917," Rostov-on-Don, 1919, p. 41.

of the Ministers subsequently told Rodzyanko, the President of the State Duma.

It was a false alarm. The armed crowd moved towards the Taurida Palace. The Council of Seniors—representatives of all the fractions—was holding a meeting in the Duma. Rodzyanko reported on the insurrection and on the panic of the government. He sent the following telegram to the tsar:

“The situation is growing worse. Measures must be taken immediately, for to-morrow will be too late. The last hour is at hand, the hour in which the fate of the fatherland and the dynasty will be decided.”¹

In place of a reply from General Headquarters Rodzyanko found on his table the tsar's ukase dissolving the Duma. What was to be done? Not to obey the ukase and to meet in session would be to disobey the monarch and to adopt the path of revolution. Of this the Duma was incapable. Accept the ukase and disperse? But the noise of shots and the roar of the approaching crowd could be heard outside. The loyal landlords and bourgeois decided to submit to the ukase of the Emperor and to dissolve the State Duma as an institution; the members of the Duma, however, were not to disperse but to meet as “private citizens” at an “unofficial” conference. In this way they obeyed the ukase but left their hands free.

They did not meet in the White Hall, where they usually assembled, but in the Semi-Circular Hall in order to stress by this detail the “private” character of the meeting. More than two hundred deputies crowded around the table, where Rodzyanko, raising his hands in perplexity, kept asking: “What is to be done?” One of the Cadets, Nekrasov, who was regarded as the most Left of them all, proposed that one of the “popular generals” should immediately be appointed dictator, for the suppression of the revolt. This was pooh-poohed; it was angrily remarked that the Ministers and generals were so scared that they would have to be dragged out from under their beds. Dzyubinsky, a Trudovik (member of the Group of Toil), recommended that a plenipotentiary commission for the restoration of order should be formed from members of the Duma. Milyukov opposed both these suggestions. He advised waiting until it became clear which side the majority of the soldiers and workers would take.

At the height of the discussion the captain of the guard burst into the hall, crying: “My assistant has been badly wounded, protect me!”² The deputies looked out of the window and saw a crowd surrounding the palace. The

¹ Ibid., p. 42.

² V. Shulgin, “Days,” “Russkaya Mysl’ (Russian Thought),” Prague, 1922. Book VIII—XII, p. 93.

sound of rifle butts was soon heard on the stairs. The revolution was at the threshold of the Duma. A Provisional Committee of ten persons was hastily elected "to restore order in Petrograd and to maintain contact with institutions and persons." The committee consisted of, M. V. Rodzyanko, V. V. Shulgin (Nationalist), P. N. Milyukov (Cadet), N. V. Nekrasov (Cadet), S. I. Shidlovsky (Octobrist), I. I. Dmitryukov (Octobrist), A. I. Konovalov (Progressivist), V. A. Rzhevsky (Progressivist), V. N. Lvov (Right), A. F. Kerensky (Trudovik) and N. S. Chkheidze (Menshevik).

The insurgent people blocked all the streets abutting on the Taurida Palace. The courtyard was filled by an immense crowd. Armed soldiers and workers flocked through the palace.

The monarchist Shulgin, in his reminiscences depicts the state of mind of the scared bourgeoisie as follows:

"Machine guns—that is what I wanted, because I felt that the language of machine guns was the only language the mob could understand, and that lead alone could drive the fearsome monster that had broken loose back into his lair. . . . Alas, this monster was . . . His Majesty the Russian People! . . .

"That which we had feared so much, that which we had desired to avoid at all costs, was already a fact. The revolution had begun."¹

At General Headquarters the morning of February 27 passed as usual. Tsar Nicholas II appeared quite composed when he went to receive the daily reports. The events in Petrograd were known. A letter had arrived the day before from the tsarina describing the incidents in the capital on February 25.

"It's a **hooligan** movement," the tsarina wrote, "young boys and girls running about and screaming that they have no bread—only to excite—then the workmen preventing others from work—if it were very cold they would probably stay in doors."²

It was believed that "hunger riots" were taking place in Petrograd, and at General Headquarters they were accustomed to pay no attention to the starvation of the workers. Nicholas endeavoured to reassure the alarmed tsarina:

"The disorders among the troops come from the **convalescent company**, according to news I got. I wonder

1 V. Shulgin, "Days," etc., p. 96.

2 Letter of February 25, 1917.—"Trans."

what Paul [Commander of the Guards—*Ed.*] is doing? He ought to keep them in hand."¹

Troops were transferred to Petrograd from behind the front. Khabalov was ordered to put a stop to the disorders immediately.

But by midday more alarming news began to arrive. The tsarina wired:

"The revolution yesterday [February 26—*Ed.*] assumed frightful proportions. I know that other army units have joined. The news is graver than ever before."²

Within an hour a second telegram arrived:

"Concessions are essential. The strikes continue. Many troops have joined the revolution."³

Thereafter Petrograd almost ceased to reply to calls.

The courtiers at General Headquarters grew alarmed. The tsar held a long conference with General Alexeyev, Chief of Staff, on what measures should be adopted. It was proposed to send troops to Petrograd under the command of a general who had seen service. By the evening Nicholas had made up his mind to depart for Petrograd himself. At 7 p.m. Nicholas informed his wife:

"Leave to-morrow 2-30. Guard cavalry from Novgorod ordered at once for town."⁴

Events moved at catastrophic speed.

News was received from the outskirts of Petrograd that all the troops had raised the red flag. There were no reliable troops left in the capital.

General Headquarters was in a feverish state. The commanders of the various fronts were summoned to the direct wire. Troops were withdrawn from the front-line trenches. When his assistant inquired what had happened, General Alexeyev impatiently answered: "Petrograd is in revolt."⁵

It was realised at General Headquarters that the "food riot" had assumed the dimensions of a revolution.

Tsarism was in its last throes, but it still attempted to resist the revolution. Khabalov hastily selected a shock battalion from "loyal" regiments; the battalion consisted of six companies of infantry and one and a half squadrons of cavalry with fifteen machine guns. But even this detach-

1 Letter of February 27, 1917—"Trans."

2 A. "Blok, The Last Days of the Imperial Power. Unpublished Documents," Petrograd, 1921, pp. 77-8.

3 A. Blok, etc., p. 78.

4 Telegram No. 12—"Trans."

5 A. Blok, "The Last Days of the Imperial Power. Unpublished Documents," Petrograd, 1921, p. 78.

ment went over to the insurrectionaries at the first encounter. General Khabalov, with another detachment selected from the Lithuania, Keksholm and Izmailovsky Regiments, sought refuge in the Admiralty and endeavoured to take action against the rebels. But this select detachment, too, melted away under his very eyes. On the morning of February 28, Khabalov informed General Headquarters over the direct wire:

"The number of troops remaining loyal to their duty has been reduced to 600 infantry and 500 horse with 15 machine guns and 12 guns. . . . The situation is grave in the extreme."¹

He had scarcely concluded his conversation with General Headquarters when the last of the "loyal" troops went over to the workers.

The rapidity with which the revolution spread in the army may be judged from the records of the Military Commission of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma:²

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time of Day</i>	<i>Number of Insurrectionaries</i>
February 26	3 p.m. to 6 p.m.	600
February 27	morning	10,200
February 27	midday	25,700
February 27	evening	66,700
February 28	morning	72,700
February 28	midday	112,000
February 28	evening	127,000
March 1	morning	144,700
March 1	midday	(about) 170,000

Lenin, explaining why the revolution succeeded so rapidly, wrote:

"But while the defeats in the war were a negative factor hastening the outbreak of the crisis, the connection of Anglo-French finance capital, of Anglo-French imperialism, with the Octobrist and Constitutional-Democratic capital of Russia was a factor that speeded the crisis.

"This highly important aspect of the situation, is, for obvious reasons, not mentioned by the Anglo-French press, but is maliciously emphasised by the German. We Marxists must face the truth soberly, and not allow ourselves to be confused either by the official lies, the sugary diplomatic and ministerial lies of the first group of imperialist belligerents, or by the sniggering and smirking of its financial and military rivals of the other

¹ "The Revolution of February 1917," 'Krasny Arkhiv,' 1927, No. 2 (21) p. 19.

² "Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison. Materials and Documents," Leningrad, 1932, p. vi.

belligerent groups. The whole course of events in the February-March Revolution clearly shows that the British and French embassies, with their agents and 'connections,' who had for a long time been making desperate efforts to prevent 'separate' agreements and a separate peace between Nicholas II (who, let us hope and endeavour, will be the last) and Wilhelm II, directly strove to replace Nicholas Romanov.

"Let us harbour no illusions.

"The fact that the revolution succeeded so quickly and—at the first superficial glance—so 'radically' is due to the fact that, as a result of a unique historical situation, **absolutely dissimilar movements, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary political and social tendencies have merged, and merged in a strikingly 'harmonious' manner.** There was the conspiracy of the Anglo-French imperialists, who impelled Milyukov, Guchkov and Co. to seize power **for the purpose of continuing the imperialist war, for the purpose of conducting the war still more ferociously and obstinately, for the purpose of slaughtering fresh millions of Russian workers and peasants in order that the Guchkovs might obtain Constantinople, the French capitalists Syria, the British Capitalists Mesopotamia, and so on.** This on the one hand. On the other, there was a profound proletarian and mass popular movement of a revolutionary character (a movement of the entire poor population of town and country) **for bread, for peace, for real freedom.**"¹

All was over in Petrograd. But General Headquarters and the tsar continued to send troops from the front. They were placed under the command of General Ivanov, who had distinguished himself in the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt in 1905. General Ivanov was invested with dictatorial powers. But his troop train reached Tsarskoye Selo with difficulty, and here his soldiers immediately began to fraternise with the revolutionary soldiers. General Ivanov himself barely managed to escape arrest. On the return journey his train was driven into a siding. Communication with the front had already been severed.

Returning from General Headquarters, the tsar got no further than the station of Dno. Trains coming from the other directions were crowded with soldiers, who spread the news of the revolt in the capital. It was useless to proceed further. Nicholas II turned and went to Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front were located, with the object of raising the army against Petro-

¹ Lenin, "Letters From Afar," "Selected Works," Eng. ed., Vol. VI. (Eng. ed.), pp. 7-8.

grad. In Pskov he was informed of the victory of the revolution, and telegrams received from all the commanders of the fronts advised him to give way. A manifesto issued by the revolutionary organisations was transmitted from Petrograd. Resistance would have been futile, and Nicholas resolved to abdicate.

While the tsar and General Headquarters were flinging their last reserves into the fight, the Petrograd workers and soldiers set about forming their own political and organisational centre—the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. On the evening of February 27 the first sitting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened.

DUAL POWER

It was the workers and the peasants in soldiers' uniform who made the revolution; but it was not they who at first enjoyed all its fruits. Side by side with the Soviet there arose a government of the bourgeoisie.

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma did not regard itself as a power either with respect to the moribund autocracy or with respect to the insurrectionary people. The Committee had been elected to "restore order," and this is what it zealously set about doing. Immediately after its elections on February 27, Rodzyanko, now chairman of the Committee, went to visit Prince Golitsyn, President of the Council. The latter told him that all the members of the government had resigned, and that he himself was expecting arrest any moment. Rodzyanko once more got into communication with the tsar and with General Headquarters and negotiated with the commanders of the fronts, begging them to put in a word for the Duma to Nicholas. But events moved rapidly. News of revolt began to arrive from cities close to Petrograd. No reassuring news was received from General Headquarters, while information came from the left wing of the Taurida Palace, where the Soviet of Workers' Deputies had assembled, that the soldiers of the insurgent regiments had sent their representatives. The garrison ignored the Committee of the Duma and established contact directly with the Soviet. The balance of forces was not in favour of the bourgeoisie. The latter had demanded of the tsar a "government of victory" so as to fight the war to a finish and avert revolution. But the revolution forestalled the bourgeoisie. The only thing that remained was to join the revolution and to endeavour to assume control of it, in order to decapitate it. While the working population was fighting and dying in the struggle against tsarism, the bourgeoisie hastily disguised their "government of victory" as a "government of revolution," with the hope of crushing the revolution.

Late that night the Provisional Committee met and decided to take the power into its own hands. Early next morning Rodzyanko telegraphed General Headquarters that the Ministers had been arrested and that the government no longer existed.

"The rabble are beginning to gain the mastery of the situation, and the Committee of the State Duma, in order to prevent the extermination of officers and officials, and

to calm the heated passions, has decided to take over the functions of government.”¹

The Provisional Committee appointed Commissars of the Duma to the Ministries on February 28. News arrived that Moscow and other cities had joined the revolution, and these cities inquired what was to be done about the organisation of government. Rodzyanko sent telegrams to all the cities announcing the formation of the Provisional Committee. All that day, regiment after regiment that had gone over to the revolution kept coming to the Taurida Palace. Rodzyanko and Milyukov made speeches recommending the soldiers to return to barracks and obey their officers. In one of his speeches Rodzyanko called upon the soldiers to calm down and surrender their weapons. News of this rapidly spread through the garrison. It was said that Rodzyanko had already issued orders to disarm the insurrectionary soldiers. The regiments that had just been to the Duma began to demand that deputies be sent them to dispel the impression created. This is how Shulgin describes the growing alarm:

“I recall that a certain Right Nationalist was sent to one of the regiments. . . . He returned . . .

“‘Well?’

“‘Oh, everything went off all right. I spoke to them, and they cheered. I told them that nothing could be done without the officers, that the fatherland was in peril. They promised that everything would be all right; they believe in the State Duma. . . .’

“‘Well, thank God for that. . . .’

“‘But soon the telephone rings. . . .’

“‘What’s that? Why, you have just had a deputy. . . . Everything went off very well. . . . What’s that? Again unrest? Whom? Somebody more Left? Very well, we shall send somebody at once.’

“‘We send Milyukov. Milyukov returns in an hour. He is very pleased with himself.

“‘They are a little excited. It seems to me that they were not addressed along the proper lines. . . . I spoke in the barracks from a sort of scaffold. The whole regiment was present and also men from other regiments. . . . Well, they are in a very good mood. They carried me shoulder high. . . .’

“‘But a little later the telephone rings again, insistently.

“‘Hallo! I’m listening! Which regiment? What, again? What about Milyukov? Why, they carried him

¹ A. Lukomsky, “Reminiscences,” *“Arkhiv Russkoi Revolyutsii”* (“Archives of the Russian Revolution”), Vol. II, Berlin, 1921, p. 20.

shoulder high. . . . What? What do they want? Somebody more Left? Very well, we shall send a Trudovik.'"¹

The discrepancy between the class composition of the army and the class aims it served under tsarism and under the bourgeoisie was revealed at the very outset of the revolution. The processes that had been maturing within the army for so long rose to the surface as soon as the autocratic régime was overthrown.

"We first saw two soldiers," writes General Knox, who witnessed the first buffets of the Revolution in Petrograd from a window of the Ordnance Department. ". . . Then came a disorderly mass of soldiery, stretching right across the wide street and both pavements. . . . There were no officers."²

The officers, irrespective of their class origin and political sympathies, abandoned their regiments. The new officers belonging to the petty-bourgeoisie and the old regular officers were united by their fear of an armed bloc of workers and soldiers.

This same general, who had been charged to see to it that the Russian army fulfilled its obligations to the Allies, stated after a visit to the regiments that all the forty officers of one battalion of the Volhynia Regiment had been driven out, twenty-two officers had been driven out of the Jaeger Regiment, while in the first Railway Regiment only sixteen of the sixty-four officers remained, and these were left without weapons.

"'I am probably the only one in Petrograd that now wears a sword,' was the melancholy conclusion of the British general's observation."³

One of the first endeavours of the bourgeoisie on the outbreak of the revolution was to retain control of the army. On February 27, even before power had been seized, the Provisional Committee had set up a Military Commission which included several officers and generals. The purpose of the Commission was to help the officers retain control over the soldiers. But the movement swept past the Commission like a river in flood. General Knox gives a vivid example of how rapidly the soldiers ceased to be amenable to orders. A delegation of Petrograd soldiers came to the Provisional Committee requesting that an order be framed embodying the revolution in the army. When told that the time was unfavourable for such deci-

1 V. Shulgín, "Days," "Russkaya Mysl," Prague, 1922, Book VIII-XII, pp. 119-20.

2 A. Knox, "With the Russian Army," 1914-17, London, Hutchinson, 1921, Vol. II, pp. 553-54.

3 Ibid., p. 563.

sions, one of the soldiers turned on his heel saying: "So much the better. We will write the order ourselves."¹

"We will do it ourselves" was the motto that helped to organise the soldiers from the very outset of the revolution.

The Soviet of Workers' Deputies—which from the very first day of the revolution was also the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies—became a power. Rodzyanko, the Chairman of the Provisional Committee, was soon made to realise this. On March 1, he was summoned to Pskov to see the tsar. The railwaymen refused to supply a train without a permit from the Soviet. Rodzyanko appealed to the Soviet, which, after a brief discussion, declined to issue a permit. That evening Rodzyanko was summoned to the direct wire to speak with the tsar in Pskov, but Rodzyanko declined to go to the telegraph office alone. Sukhanov relates that Rodzyanko said to representative of the Soviet:

"Let 'Messieurs the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' give me an escort or come with me themselves, otherwise I may be arrested there at the telegraph office. . . . After all, you have the strength and the power. You can arrest me, of course. . . . Perhaps you will arrest us all, who knows?"²

And the Soviet did indeed possess the power. It was in its way a government. In the early morning of February 28 the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet resolved to form district committees and to create a workers' militia. That same morning the first number of the "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet" appeared containing an appeal by the Soviet, which stated:

"The Soviet of Workers' Deputies, which is holding its sessions in the building of the State Duma considers that its principal aim is to organise the forces of the people and to strive for the complete consolidation of political freedom and popular government in Russia. The Soviet has appointed District Commissars to establish popular government in the districts of Petrograd. We invite an entire population of the capital immediately to rally around the Soviet, to organise local committees in the districts and to take over the administration of all local affairs. Let us jointly, by common effort, fight for the complete abolition of the old government and for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot."³

¹ A. Knox, etc., p. 568.

² N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book I, Petrograd, 1919, p. 212.

³ "To the Population of Petrograd and Russia from the Soviet of Workers' Deputies," "Izvestia (Gazette) of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies," No. 1, February 28 1917.

That very same day, February 28, the Soviet decided to restore railway communication between Petrograd and Moscow. The first joint meeting of the now combined Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was held on March 1. Representatives from the regiments spoke fervidly of the growing lack of confidence in the Duma ever since Rodzyanko had recommended the surrender of arms. It was decided at this meeting that all political actions should be governed solely by the instructions of the Soviet and that the instructions of the Military Commission should be obeyed only if they did not conflict with those of the Soviet.

Immediately after a stormy meeting, a group of soldiers surrounded the desk of N. D. Sokolov, a member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet and a Menshevik, who was sitting in a room adjacent to the meeting hall. Sokolov had been instructed to publish the decisions of the Soviet in the form of a general order to the troops. Sokolov wrote down what the soldiers surrounding him dictated.

And it was actually under pressure of the masses that the first revolutionary order was promulgated, that order of which Kerensky subsequently said that he would "gladly have sacrificed ten years of his life that the order might never have been signed."¹

We quote this order in full:

ORDER No. 1

March 1, 1917.

To the garrison of the Petrograd Area. To all soldiers of the guard, army and artillery and to the fleet for immediate and precise execution and to the workers of Petrograd for their information.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. Every company, battalion, regiment, depot, battery, squadron, branch of military administration and naval vessel shall immediately elect a committee of representatives of lower ranks of the given unit.

2. All units of the armed forces which have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies shall elect one representative from each company, who shall present himself at the building of the State Duma with written credentials on March 2, at 10 a.m.

3. In all their political actions military units shall obey the instructions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and their own committees.

4. Orders of the Military Commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed only if they do not conflict with

¹ A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. I, Book I Paris, 1921 p. 66.

the orders and decision of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

5. Arms of all kinds, such as rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc., shall be placed at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion committees and shall under no circumstances be issued to officers even on the demand of the latter.

6. Soldiers must observe strict military discipline when in military formation and when performing military duties, but when not performing military duties and when not in military formation—in their political, civil and private lives—soldiers may not be restricted in any of the rights enjoyed by all citizens.

In particular, coming to attention and compulsory saluting when off duty are abolished.

7. Similarly, officers' titles, such as Your Excellency, Your Honour, etc., are abolished and are replaced by such forms of addresses as Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.

Rudeness to soldiers on the part of officers and, in particular, addressing them in the second person singular is forbidden, and all infraction of this rule; as all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers in general, must be reported by the latter to the company committees.

This order shall be read in all companies, battalions and regiments on all ships, in all batteries and in all other combatant and non-combatant units.

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

This order transformed the Soviet into an all-embracing revolutionary organisation of the masses. All military units with their arms and their ammunition came under its political control.

The order contained a clause providing for the election of officers, but it was deleted on Sokolov's instructions when the order was being printed.

On March 1 Soviets of Workers' Deputies were formed in Moscow, Samara and Saratov. In Nizhni Novogorod five thousand workers came from Sormovo and fraternised with the garrison. In Tver several thousand workers went to the barracks and then marched with the soldiers through the streets of the city.

Under such circumstances, the authority of the Provisional Committee was, of course, extremely precarious. An understanding with the Soviet had to be arrived at. At midnight on March 1 the Provisional Committee invited representatives of the Soviet to attend its meeting. The Mensheviks N. S. Chkheidze, N. D. Sokolov, N. N. Sukhanov

and Y. M. Steklov (who later joined the Bolsheviks), and a Socialist-Revolutionary, V. N. Filippovsky, arrived from the Soviet.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet had also discussed the problem of power a little before this invitation was received. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries had a majority on the Executive Committee. In their eyes the February Revolution was a bourgeois revolution, not only because it had put an end to the semi-feudal régime, but also because, in their opinion, the bourgeoisie was the only guiding force of the revolution. Potresov, an old and prominent extreme Right Menshevik, put the matter plainly. He wrote:

"At the moment of the bourgeois revolution, the best prepared, socially and psychologically, to solve national problems is this same bourgeoisie. That is to say, it is this same class that is destined to be the lord and master in the immediate future, even if it be only for a brief period of history, for the time necessary for the consolidation of the régime of a developed capitalist system in the country."¹

There was absolutely no difference of opinion between the Right Mensheviks and the Left Mensheviks as to the character of the future power. N. N. Sukhanov was regarded as the most "Left" of the Mensheviks. He was almost a "defeatist," indited articles against the war, and on this question differed from the official standpoint of the Mensheviks. This "semi-Leninist," as he called himself, argued at the time as follows:

"The power which will replace tsarism must be a bourgeois power. Trepov and Rasputin should be replaced and can be replaced only by leaders of the 'Progressive Bloc' in the Duma. Such is the settlement we must strive for. Otherwise the coup will fail and the revolution will perish."²

Sukhanov then went on to explain why it was the bourgeoisie that must assume power. The democracy was disunited, it had no political organisations of its own, it could not wield the State machine without an apparatus of power, and as to creating a new state machine, it could not even dream of this.

"The existing State machine, the army of officials, the Zemstvos and the City Dumas, which were elected on a property qualification and which were supported by all

1 A. Potresov, "Fatal Contradictions of the Russian Revolution," "Dyelo (The Cause)" 1917, No. 3-6, p. 119.

2 N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book I, Petrograd, 1919, p. 17.

the forces of democracy, might obey Milyukov, but would not obey Chkheidze. There was no other apparatus, nor could there be any other apparatus."¹

This is how Sukhanov explained why the power must pass into the hands of the bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeois was entirely at a loss in the revolution, and never even thought of claiming power himself or of placing anybody else in power except the accustomed "master." Only one thing troubled the leaders of the Soviet, whom chance had raised on the crest of the revolutionary wave:

"The question . . . is, will the propertied classes of Russia **consent** to accept power under such conditions? And the task therefore is to **compel them to take power.**"²

Left without the support of the autocracy, the bourgeoisie feared to assume the burden of government. This was frankly admitted by Shulgin:

"We had been born and educated to praise or blame the government while sheltering under its wing....We were capable in an extremity of passing over without difficulty from the deputies' benches to the government benches . . . **on condition that the imperial guard protected us.** . . . But in face of a possible collapse of power, in face of the bottomless abyss of this collapse, our heads grew giddy and our hearts failed us."³

Losing self-control as the revolution spread, the leaders of the Soviet attempted to force the reluctant "lord and master" to take power.

The Executive Committee of the Soviet resolved to allow the Provisional Committee to draw up the list of members of the government at its own discretion, not to join the government itself, but to transfer the power to it on the following conditions: (1) complete amnesty for all political and religious prisoners; (2) freedom of speech, association, assembly and the right to strike; (3) abolition of all disabilities of social rank, nationality and religion; (4) replacement of the police by a militia; (5) democratic elections to local government bodies; (6) abstention of the government from all measures which might predetermine the future form of government before the Constituent Assembly meets; (7) revolutionary regiments not to be granted civil rights. Not a single one of the demands of the Soviet was such as might evoke an acute struggle, as, for instance, the demand for land, peace, or the eight-hour day. The petty-bourgeois Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the Soviet deliberately avoided raising

1 N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book I, Petrograd, 1919, p. 18.

2 N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book I, Berlin, 1922, p. 231.

3 V. Shulgin, "Days," "Russkaya Mysl," Prague, 1922, Book VI-VII, p. 134

these fundamental issues so as not to frighten the bourgeoisie.

The Provisional Committee of the State Duma sat awaiting the arrival of the delegation from the Soviet in a state of great nervousness. Report of the rapid spread of the revolution were coming in from all hands. Telephone calls were received from the regiments declaring that the attitude of the soldiers to the officers was growing steadily worse. The delegation of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks from the Soviet had no sooner set foot in the right wing of the palace than Rodzyanko and Milyukov began to vie with each other in describing the anarchy in the city and reporting all sorts of rumours of street disorders. The bourgeois leaders painted the picture in the blackest colours in preparation for the bargaining they expected to ensue. But, to their astonishment, not a word of objection came from the delegation. The petty-bourgeois representatives of the Soviet listened in sympathy. Milyukov realised that the visitors from the left wing of the Taurida Palace were no less scared of the revolution than the hosts in the right wing. Milyukov immediately recovered his self-possession and reached out for the conditions of the Executive Committee with a businesslike air. On the whole the conditions of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were acceptable, he declared, and could serve as a basis for an agreement between the Soviet and the Committee of the State Duma. But Milyukov added, there were points to which he emphatically objected. First of all there was the point about refraining from taking any measures that might predetermine the form of government. Having now recovered calm, the leader of the bourgeoisie began to persuade the delegation to consent to a monarchy, to replace Tsar Nicholas by his son, with Michael as regent. This was the old programme, the programme the bourgeoisie had put forward long before the revolution. "One is a sick child, and the other is an all-round fool,"¹ said Milyukov, seconded by Rodzyanko and the other members of the Committee. Milyukov once more read over the conditions of the agreement, unreservedly consented to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, but came to a halt on the point regarding the form of government.

After some dispute, the following compromise formula was adopted:

"Immediate preparations for the convocation, on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, of a Constituent Assembly to determine the form of government and the constitution of the country."²

¹ N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book I, Berlin, 1922, p. 279.

² P. N. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book I, Sofia, 1921, p. 28.

Formulated in this way, the clause did not tie Milyukov's hands; he could interpret the condition in his own way.

In connection with the last demand, too, the one dealing with the rights of soldiers, Milyukov introduced an amendment which would facilitate his future policy viz. "as far as military and technical conditions permit."¹

Having so easily disposed of the proposals of the Soviet, Milyukov demanded an obligation in his turn: the Executive Committee was to publish a declaration stating that the government in question had been formed with the consent of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and therefore deserved the confidence of the people. The declaration should also contain an appeal to the soldiers to recognise their officers.

The meeting was over. The Provisional Committee proceeded to draw up a list of members of the government, while the representatives of the Soviet set about drawing up their declaration. The parties met again at dawn on March 2. The declaration drawn up by the representatives of the Soviet did not please Milyukov, and he sat down to correct it then and there. The representatives of the Soviet drew up all the points of a declaration announcing the Provisional Government, while Milyukov, the leader of the bourgeoisie, drew up the declaration of the Executive Committee. This scene epitomised the future relations between the bourgeois government and the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviet.

That same morning the new government was announced: Premier and Minister of the Interior, Prince G. E. Lvov; Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Milyukov (Cadet); Minister of War and Marine, A. I. Guchkov (Octobrist); Minister of Ways of Communications, N. V. Nekrasov (Cadet); Minister of Commerce and Industry, A. I. Konovalov (Progressivist); Minister of Finance, M. I. Tereshchenko; Minister of Education, A. A. Manylov (Cadet); Procurator-General of the Synod, V. N. Lvov; Minister of Agriculture, A. I. Shingaryov (Cadet); Minister of Justice, A. F. Kerensky (Trudovik); Comptroller General, I. V. Godnev. Six persons, i.e., the majority of the government, were taken from the "Cabinet of Confidence" which had been projected in the autumn of 1915.

The Soviets had the armed force and the support of the masses, yet the power fell into the hands of the Provisional Government. A dual power, a rare occurrence in history, was created. On this subject, Lenin wrote:

"The striking feature of our revolution is that it has established a **dual power**... In what does this dual power consist? In the fact that side by side with the Provisional Government, the government of the **bourgeoisie**,

¹ Ibid., p. 28.

there has developed **another** government, weak and embryonic as yet, but undoubtedly an actually existing and growing government—the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."¹

Furthermore, the Soviets, which had been created by the victorious workers and soldiers, but which were headed by Mensheviks, voluntarily acknowledged the authority of the Provisional Government and voluntarily surrendered to the bourgeoisie the power won by the soldiers and workers.

Why?

Because, as a class, the bourgeoisie had been incomparably better organised than the proletariat and the peasantry, and it became much better organised during the war. During its conflicts with the autocratic regime over the war and the impending revolution the bourgeoisie virtually created its future apparatus of power.

"It was not by chance," wrote Lenin, "that this party [i.e., the capitalists—*Ed.*] secured power, although it was not the capitalists, of course, but the workers and peasants, the soldiers and sailors, who fought the tsarist troops and shed their blood for freedom. Power was secured by the party of the capitalists, because that class possessed the advantage of wealth, organisation, and knowledge. Since 1905, and particularly during the war, the class of capitalists and landlords associated with them in Russia made its greatest progress in the matter of its own organisation."²

The proletariat proved to be less prepared than the bourgeoisie for the seizure of power. The politically most developed members of the Bolshevik Party and the proletariat were in exile in foreign countries or in remote parts of Siberia, or had perished in the war, or else were spread over the various war fronts. They had been replaced by peasants who had come to work in the towns, and by less experienced Party members. It is true that the majority of the newly-fledged workers came from the poor peasantry and only a small number from kulak families or from the rank of the urban petty-bourgeoisie. The latter category went to work in the munition factories in order to escape mobilisation. But both categories brought their petty-bourgeois prejudices and political blindness into the ranks of the proletariat. This circumstance temporarily tended to weaken the proletariat.

Finally, a circumstance of great importance was the

¹ Lenin, "A Dual Power," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. V p. 27.

² Lenin, "Lessons of the Revolution," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI p.198.

fact that millions of people who were politically dormant in "the prison of the nations"—as tsarist Russia was called—were suddenly aroused to political life. The millions of small people, petty-bourgeois who had formerly been oppressed by the frightful yoke of tsarism, overwhelmed the proletariat numerically. The politically-minded proletarians were submerged by and in part succumbed to this vast petty-bourgeois wave. Large numbers of workers were infected by the compromising spirit of the petty-bourgeoisie.

This is why the fruits of the victory gained by the revolutionary workers and peasants in February 1917 fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie.

It was for this same reason that while the Bolsheviks formed the vanguard of the barricade fighters, it was the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who formed the overwhelming majority in the Soviets. It was the petty-bourgeois tide that at first determined the composition of the Soviets and ensured the dominance of the petty-bourgeois leaders. While the Bolsheviks were engrossed in the struggle in the streets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the Soviets. In accordance with a decision of the Provisional Executive Committee elected by the Petrograd Soviet, the big factories sent one representative for every thousand workers to the Soviet, whereas factories with less than one thousand workers also elected one deputy to the Soviet. On this basis of representation, the big factories, in which 87 per cent of the Petrograd proletariat were employed, received 124 seats, or only two seats more than the small factories which together employed only 13 per cent of the workers.

In this way the industrial giants, the "Bolshevik" factories, the leaders of the movement, were submerged by the small industrial enterprises of the handicraft type.

In addition, deputies were elected to the Soviet by the various branches of the military administrations, military auxiliary services and stores; hundreds of peasants—soldiers from the garrison, where politically immature elements predominated—were elected.

Such were the factors which determined the character of the leadership in the Petrograd Soviet.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT STRIVES FOR THE UNDIVIDED POWER OF THE BOURGEOISIE

Assured of the support of the Petrograd Soviet, the Provisional Government first devoted its attention to the question of the Romanov dynasty. On March 2, without the knowledge of the Soviet, it dispatched A. I. Guchkov and V. V. Shulgin to the tsar in Pskov. After their departure, at about 3 p.m., Milyukov announced the formation of the government at a meeting in the hall of the Taurida Palace. Milyukov's speech was greeted with approval, but voices of protest were heard amidst the applause. The speaker was interrupted by cries of, "Who elected you?" When Milyukov referred to Prince Lvov as the "representative of organised public opinion," several members of the audience shouted, "Of the propertied classes!" i.e., of bourgeois public opinion. Milyukov had to go into long praises of Guchkov, and even to resort to an obvious falsehood in order to silence objection. "At the moment that I am addressing you here in this hall, Guchkov is organising our victory in the streets of the capital," said Milyukov, whereas in fact Guchkov was at that moment travelling post-haste to the tsar. Cries from all parts of the huge hall demanded: "What about the dynasty?" Taking his courage into his hands, Milyukov at last made a cautious attempt to reveal his cards:

"I know beforehand that my reply will not satisfy all of you, but I shall tell you nevertheless. The old despot, who has brought Russia to the verge of ruin, will voluntarily abdicate, or will be dethroned. The power will pass to a regent, Grand Duke Michael. Alexei will be the heir to the throne."¹

This statement provoked an uproar. "That is the old dynasty!" was shouted from the body of the hall. When the uproar subsided, Milyukov endeavoured to mitigate the effect of his statement:

"Yes, gentlemen, that is the old dynasty which you, perhaps, do not love and which I, perhaps, do not love either. But the point now is not whom we love. We cannot leave the question of the form of government unanswered and unsettled. We picture it as a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy. Others perhaps picture it differently. But if we begin to quarrel over that now,

¹ "In the Catherine Hall," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies," No. 4, March, 3, 1917.

instead of deciding immediately, Russia will be plunged into a state of civil war and the regime just destroyed will be restored.... As soon as the danger passes and order is securely established, we shall proceed to make preparations for convening a Constituent Assembly.... on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage and secret ballot. The freely-elected representatives of the people will decide who more faithfully expresses the general opinion of Russia—we or our opponents.”¹

Milyukov's speech evoked intense feeling in the factories and regiments. That evening a group of officers came to the Taurida Palace. They declared that they dared not return to their regiment until Milyukov withdrew his words. The members of the government gathered in alarm. “In order to pacify the people,” it was decided to announce that Milyukov “had expressed his personal opinion.”

While Petrograd was stormily protesting against the attempt to impose a new tsar on the people, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived at Pskov and reported the government's plan to transfer the throne to Alexei. Nicholas II announced that he had thought the matter over and now abdicated the throne in the name both of himself and of his son in favour of his brother Michael. The ex-tsar spoke of his paternal feelings: “I cannot part with my son.”² The fact is that Nicholas was guided by motives of policy: he did not want to subject his son to risk, and preferred to temporise. Guchkov and Shulgin transmitted the text of the abdication to the Provisional Government by direct wire and left for Petrograd. In view of the state of feeling in the capital, the government decided not to publish the abdication. They managed to warn Shulgin in time by telephone, but Guchkov on his arrival went straight from the train to a meeting of railwaymen at the station, read the Manifesto and concluded with the words: “Long live the Emperor Michael!”³ Cries of “Down with the tsar!” were shouted in response. The excited workers demanded that Guchkov should be immediately arrested and searched. “Horse-radish is no sweeter than radish,” was the comment of the indignant soldiers when they heard of the proposal to replace Nicholas II by Michael II.

The Provisional Government, faced with the mood of the masses, realised that the preservation of the monarchy was out of the question. In the early morning of March 3, Rodzyanko, Milyukov, Guchkov, Nekrasov, Kerensky and

¹ Ibid.

² A. Lukomsky, “Reminiscences,” *Arkhiv Russkoi Revolutsii*, Vol II, Berlin, 1921, p. 25.

³ M. V. Rodzyanko, “The State Duma and the Revolution of February 1917,” *Rostov-on-Don*, 1919, pp. 45-6.

other members of the government went to visit Grand Duke Michael. The majority of the delegation tried to persuade him to abdicate the throne in his turn. The only members of the delegation opposed to this were Milyukov and Guchkov who promised the Grand Duke to gather an armed force outside Petrograd for the defence of the monarchy. Michael himself realised that he would be unable to retain the throne. The day before he had asked for a train to take him to Petrograd from Gatchina, but the reply he got from the Soviet was that "Citizen Romanov" could go to the station, buy a ticket, and travel in the ordinary train. Michael Romanov thought the matter over for a while, spoke to Rodzyanko in private, and declared that he renounced the throne. Milyukov relates that thereupon Kerensky shook the Grand Duke's hand and said, "You are a noble man, Your Highness."¹

The monarchy could not be saved, but the bourgeoisie strove to lend the government as legitimate an appearance as possible. Guchkov and Shulgin got the tsar to appoint Prince Lvov President of the Council. It was intended to create the impression that the head of the new government had been legitimately endorsed by the former Emperor. Rodzyanko frequently stressed the fact that Prince Lvov—

"embodied continuity of power, which had been delegated to him by the still undeposed supreme ruler."²

But in point of fact, when Nicholas signed the order for Lvov's appointment he was no longer tsar. In his act of abdication Michael called upon the people to obey the

"Provisional Government, which has arisen at the instance of the State Duma and which is endowed with plenary power."³

Even the new Commander of the Petrograd Military Area was appointed with the consent of the old government. General L. G. Kornilov was proposed in place of General Khabalov. General Kornilov was in the good graces of the court and had even "been honoured with the attention" of Nicholas II on his return to Russia after his escape from Austria, where he had been a prisoner of war. On March 5 Prince Lvov sent a telegram dismissing all Governors and Vice-Governors of provinces and entrusting their functions to the chairman of the provincial Zemstvos. But many of these Chairmen had been appointed by the

¹ P. N. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book I Sofia, 1921, p. 33.

² M. Y. Rodzyanko, "The State Duma and the Revolution of February 1917," Rostov-on-Dun, 1919, p. 48.

³ "Abdication of Grand Duke Michael," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet," No. 5, March 4, 1917.

old regime, and even those who had been elected belonged to extreme reactionary groups.

The vigorous protest of the workers and soldiers against the attempts to save the monarchy made it clear to the leaders of the government that the bourgeoisie could not establish its undivided power by force. Open coercion irritated the masses, provoked resistance and only helped to spread the revolution. Only one thing remained, viz., to make concessions, to wriggle, to make unstinted promises, in order to gain time, to muster strength—and then to suppress the revolution. One of these concessions was the inclusion of Kerensky in the government. In the negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet on the night of March 1, Kerensky had not been mentioned as a prospective Minister. V. V. Shulgin recounts in his memoirs that Shingaryov, Constitutional Democrat and Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government, had said on the eve of the revolution:

“If the power falls on us we shall have to seek support by extending the Progressive Bloc to the Left...”

“How do you conceive this?”

“I would summon Kerensky.”

“Kerensky? In what capacity?”

“In the capacity of Minister of Justice, let us say... This post has no significance just now, but we must deprive the revolution of its ringleaders... Among them Kerensky is after all unique... It would be far more advantageous to have him with us than against.”¹

The Provisional Government tried to avoid tying its hands. On March 6 it addressed an appeal to the people in which it vaguely declared that it

“regards it as its sacred and responsible duty to accomplish the desires of the people and to lead the country into the bright path of a free civil system.”²

What exactly the “desires of the people” and the “sacred duty” of the government were, it was impossible to gather from this florid and prolix appeal. It promised that a Constituent Assembly would be convened to settle all fundamental questions, but the date of its convocation was not stated. It was behind the Constituent Assembly that Milyukov took refuge when at the meeting he was flooded by protests against the monarchy. It was to the Constituent Assembly that the government referred those who demanded the settlement of the questions of land, bread and peace.

1 V. Shulgin, “Days,” “Russkaya Mysl,” Prague, 1922, Book VI-VII, p. 117.

2 “From the Provisional Government,” “Vestnik” (Bulletin) of the Provisional Government, No. 2, March 7, 1917.

The appeal of March 6, like the first announcement of the Provisional Government of March 2, said absolutely nothing about transferring the land to the peasants. A.I. Shingaryov, a rural doctor, a Cadet, and member of the Fourth Duma, was appointed Minister of Agriculture. His appointment was solely due to the fact that he had constantly spoken on the food question in the Duma. In the eyes of the Provisional Government the Minister of Agriculture was primarily a Minister of Food. The revolution began with "food riots"; "riots" also threatened the newly-formed government. But the peasantry had not yet raised its voice in demand of land. While saying nothing about the land question, the Provisional Government decided on March 9 to institute criminal proceedings against the peasants of the Kazan Province for attacks on the landlords.

But scarcely two weeks had elapsed before the peasants began to show evidence of themselves. "The peasants... attacked and partially plundered the Alexandrovka estate," it was reported from the Kursk Province.¹ The steward of the Trubetskoi estate in the Ryazan Province complained that the peasants were demanding that the estate should be handed over to them. On March 16 Shingaryov received a telegram reporting a peasant riot in the Moscow Province. Similar reports were arriving from all parts of Russia.

The Provisional Government at first attempted to repress the peasant movement by the old and tried method. In the early part of March troops were sent to "pacify" the peasants. Detachments were dispatched to the provinces of Kursk, Mogilev and Perm. But the Lvov-Milyukov-Shingaryov government soon learnt that the peasants could no longer be pacified by the old method. Mere suppression was now impossible. In one way or another, concessions would have to be made. On March 12, the government announced that the lands belonging to Nicholas II were to be handed over to the treasury, and on March 16 this decision was extended to the lands of all members of the Romanov family.

On March 17 the Lvov government issued a declaration to the peasants.

"Land reform... will undoubtedly be discussed by the Constituent Assembly which is about to be summoned," the Provisional Government promised. "The land question cannot be settled by seizure," it went on to declare. "Violence and robbery are extremely pernicious and dangerous methods to use in the sphere of economic relations."²

¹ "Central Archives," The Peasant Movement in 1917, Moscow, 1927 p. 3.

² "Decision of the Provisional Government," Vetsnik of the Provisional Government, No. 14, March 21, 1917.

This preaching of abstention from violence was intended only for the peasants; the government reserved violence for its own use. On April 8, Prince Lvov, the Prime Minister, who was at the same time Minister of the Interior, instructed the provincial commissars to suppress unrest among the peasants by every means at their disposal, "even to the extent of calling out the troops." The commissars of the Provincial Government and the representatives of the State Duma appointed to the provinces obeyed the instructions of the Prime Minister with great zeal.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks condoned the punitive measures of the government. On March 16 a Petrograd regional conference of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party expressed its opposition to the agrarian movement and declared that

"every attempt at the immediate seizure of privately owned land may have disastrous effects on the course of agricultural life... The confiscation of cultivated land belonging to the tsar and the royal family and to private landlords may be effected only in a legislative way through the Constituent Assembly, which will confer land and freedom on the people."¹

The Socialist-Revolutionaries proved to be more reactionary than the bourgeoisie, for only a few days before the Provisional Government had confiscated the lands of the tsar and the tsar's family. On April 3 the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, on the motion of the Mensheviks, adopted a resolution which stated:

"...Agrarian disorders can benefit only the counter-revolution and not the peasants. It must be remembered that the power is now in the hands of the people, and the people will themselves settle the land question in the Constituent Assembly."²

Neither threats nor violence could halt the agrarian movement.

"In April there appeared the first symptoms of a change in the attitude of the peasants towards the legal settlement of the land question, and parallel with this change corresponding news began to arrive in the form of telegrams from various localities,"³

1 "Resolution of the Petrograd Regional Conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries," "Dyen" (Day), No. 2, March 7, 1917.

2 Central Archives. Verbatim Report of the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Moscow, 1927, p. 312.

3 "Central Archives" of the October Revolution. Records 406, "Department of Militia," Section II, File No. 15a, Part I, folio 219.

the Minister of the Interior reported in an arid, official style to the Provisional Government. The landlords decided that new tactics would have to be adopted against the peasantry.

"The landlords have come to understand," Lenin wrote in this connection, "that they cannot rule by the whip any longer. They understand that very well now and are adopting a method of ruling which is a novelty for Russia, but which has long prevailed in Western Europe. Revolutions serve as lessons to the landlords and capitalists; they teach them that the people must be ruled by deceit and flattery; they teach them that they must adapt themselves, attach a red badge to their coats, and although they may be parasites, declare: We are revolutionary democrats; just wait a little, please, and we shall do everything for you."¹

On April 11 the government passed a law entitled "On the Protection of Crops," which virtually guaranteed the landlords their lands, rents and "the expenses incurred by them in sowing the crops, in the event of 'popular riots.'"²

Shingaryov attempted to calm the peasants by setting up conciliation boards, in which the landlords were to enjoy a predominant influence. Lenin characterised this attempt to reconcile the landlords and peasants as follows:

"One landowner having two thousand desyatins of land—and three hundred peasant families having two thousand desyatins of land. This is how the matter stands in Russia as a whole. Three hundred peasants must wait for 'the voluntary agreement' of one landlord!"³

But this suited the landlords very well. Shingaryov decided to exploit the idea of a "voluntary agreement" of this kind.

On April 21 regulations governing the Land Committees were issued. Shingaryov's biographer, A. G. Khrushchov, a Cadet, tells how the Minister of Agriculture conceived the functions of the Land Committees:

"A.I.'s [Shingaryov's—Ed.] original idea was that the Land Committees should be set up exclusively for the purpose of collecting and examining material on the land question... According to the draft originally drawn

1 Lenin, "Speech on the Agrarian Question, June 4, 1917," "Selected Works" (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, pp. 362-63.

2. "Decree of the Provisional Government," Vestnik of the Provisional Government, No. 31, April 14, 1917.

3 Lenin, " 'Voluntary Agreement' Between Landowners and Peasants?" "Collected Works." (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 192.

up by A.I., the committees were not to be invested with any executive functions nor allowed to interfere in agrarian relations."¹

At the first meeting of the Chief Land Committee, Khrushchov himself, who was Assistant Minister of Agriculture, explained the necessity for this measure in the following way:

"The agrarian movement is growing and assuming forms which threaten to disrupt the whole economic life of the country. Urgent measures must be taken to organise local Land Committees."²

In accordance with Shingaryov's regulations, a Chief Land Committee was set up in the capital, and provincial and Uyezd (district) Land Committees in the localities. The creation of Volost (rural area) Land Committees was not obligatory under the regulations. Lenin called the regulations governing the Land Committees a "fraudulent law written by the landlords."

"...The Committees are, in accordance with the fraudulent law written by the landlords," Lenin wrote, "so constituted that the Uyezd Committees are less democratic than the Volost Committees, the Provincial Committees are less democratic than the Uyezd Committees, and the Chief Committee less democratic than the Provincial Committees."³

The actual organisation of the Committees, however, proceeded along somewhat different lines. The first to arise were the Volost Committees; they arose long before the regulations of April 21 were issued. They began to increase very rapidly in number in April. The Provincial and Uyezd Committees, the organisation of which was entrusted to the Commissars of the Provisional Government, were set up very slowly, as though on the heels of the Volost Committees and imposing their control on the latter.

The policy of the Chief Land Committee was completely determined by its composition. The Provisional Government appointed twenty-five of the members—the overwhelming majority of them Cadets; six members represented the Peasant Alliance and the All-Russian Peasant Soviet, three represented the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, while the political parties were represented by one member each, the Cadets and the parties more to the Right receiving six more seats in this way. A. S. Posnikov, a professor of political economy and member of the fourth Duma, a Progressive belonging to the same party

1 A. Khrushchov, "A.I. Shingaryov, His Life and Work," Moscow, 1918, pp. 98-99.

2 "The Chief Land Committee," "Dyelo Naroda, (The People's Cause)," No. 54, May 20, 1917.

3 Lenin, "A New Fraud Practised on the Peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 392.

as Minister Konovalov, was appointed Chairman of the Chief Land Committee.

The professor was both manager of the Peasants' Bank and manager of the Nobles' Bank, and it was this combination of functions, apparently, which rendered Posnikov in the eyes of the bourgeoisie a fit person to "reconcile" the peasants and the landlords. Defining the functions of the Chief Land Committee at its first meeting, the Chairman spoke

"of the necessity of removing a misconception which is very widespread at the present time, namely, that with the forthcoming agrarian reform all land will be taken from the owners without compensation. The Committee must declare that this will not be the case."¹

The Chief Land Committee was only intended as a screen from the peasants. The real business of the landlords and the bourgeoisie was done without this organisation. The Chief Land Committee held endless debates over various drafts for an agrarian reform, delaying the final decision in every possible way. In this manner the Provisional Government manoeuvred, passing from threats and punitive expeditions to conciliation boards and temporising until the moment came when it could take the whole power into its own hands.

In relation to other questions the Provisional Government pursued these same tactics—conceding small matters in order to forestall more serious demands. On March 11 the manufacturers of Petrograd signed an agreement with the Petrograd Soviet providing for the introduction of an eight-hour working day, but on March 16, at a conference with Konovalov, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Efron, a representative of the Petrograd Society of Mill Owners and Manufacturers, declared that "the agreement arrived at in Petrograd... is a temporary concession."²

With regard to the food question, the government at first took no measures at all. Food lines were not diminished as a result of the transfer of the Ministry of Agriculture from the charge of the tsarist dignitary Rittich to that of the Cadet Minister Shingaryov. On March 4 the Food Commission of the Petrograd Soviet had established a fixed scale of prices for articles of general consumption in the city of Petrograd. In response, the baker shops began to conceal bread. The workers in the factories demanded that grain should be taken from the wealthy. On March 14 the Food Commission of the Soviet proposed that grain should be requisitioned from all landlords owning not less than 70 hectares of land. The Provisional Government

¹ "The Chief Land Committee," "Ryech," No. 117, May 20, 1917.

² "Conference at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry," "Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta," (Commercial and Industrial Gazette), No. 56, March 17, 1917.

decided to take food affairs into its own hands. On March 21 the Food Commission of the Soviet turned over its powers to the State Food Committee. On March 25 the Provisional Government was obliged to ratify a grain monopoly order, in accordance with which grain surpluses belonging to the landlords were placed at the disposal of the State. Every member of the family of a landlord and every one of his servants and workers was allowed 50 pounds of grain per month for food until the new harvest. Definite quotas were assigned for fodder and for sowing purposes. Over and above this, 10 per cent of all the quotas was left at the disposal of the owners "in case of emergency." Shingaryov explained this act of the government as being due to the fact that the war was obliging the State to intervene in all phases of economic life. The increased demand for grain, he asserted, accompanied as it was by increased difficulty in securing it, demanded the abolition of free and unrestricted trade in grain. Shingaryov, however, did not mention the chief reason for this decree, namely, the pressure exercised by the revolutionary masses on the government. The bourgeois and landlords at first vigorously opposed the grain monopoly. Even before the decree was published, the First All-Russian Congress of Commerce and Industry, held in Moscow on March 19-23, protested against "the dangerous project for the introduction of a grain monopoly" and rejected the proposal for a monopoly by a majority vote. Rodzyanko, the chief pleader of the landlords in the fight against the grain monopoly, wrote to Kerensky of the necessity of annulling the "risky measure."¹ A solid opposition to the grain monopoly was put up by the Grain Merchants' Alliances, the Commodity Exchange Committees in a number of large cities, etc. But this was only a temporary outburst, due to the unexpectedness of the measure; it was an instinctive act of self-defence, a precautionary counter-blow. And the sponsors of the law themselves soon explained that it was in fact passed as an insurance against attacks by the working population, and that nobody had any intention of carrying it into effect. At the Seventh Congress of the Cadet Party, Shingaryov assured his colleagues that this was "an incomplete grain monopoly."² He referred to it as a bitter necessity." At the Third Extraordinary Congress of representatives of the Council of Congress of commodity exchange and Agriculture, held April 16-29, 1917, Shingaryov reassured the bourgeois and landlords, explaining that they had nothing very much to fear.

1 "Rodzyanko Against the Grain Monopoly," "Novaya Zhizn (New Life)," No. 108, August 28, 1917.

2 "Congress of the National Freedom Party. Shingaryov on the Grain Monopoly," "Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 70, March 29, 1917.

"This is not a finished grain monopoly," he argued. "We are touching neither the production of grain nor its final distribution through the distributing machinery; this is only the right to dispose of grain taken after the harvest."¹

In a private conversation with Senator Shidlovsky, who complained of the smallness of the grain quotas left to the landlords, Shingaryov reassured him, and all the landlords through him, by declaring: "You just ignore them [the quotas—Ed.]; who is going to keep a check on you?"² Thus the Ministers of the Provisional Government came before the masses with "revolutionary" laws, but behind the backs of the people recommended the landlords to sabotage them.

The work of counteracting economic disruption passed into the hands of Konovalov, a big textile manufacturer and an active figure in a number of capitalist organisations. Konovalov appealed to the bourgeoisie to combat profiteering, he even spoke of interference by the State in private trade and industrial affairs, but in practice all he did was to remove every restriction on the formation of joint stock companies. It was not without good reason that Konovalov, Guchkov and Tereshchenko were spoken of at the meeting of the Central War Industry Committee in the following terms:

"We representatives of commerce and industry regard you three with especial pride, because in our eyes you are not only valorous Russian citizens, but also fine and worthy sons of commercial and industrial Russia."³

Those "worthy sons of commercial and industrial Russia" dexterously and systematically hoodwinked the Russian people.

There was one question, however, which could not be deferred until the Constituent Assembly. This was the question of war. Every possible measure was taken to protect the army from the influence of revolutionary Petrograd. News of the development of the revolution was intercepted and the soldiers were not allowed to receive newspapers. On the night of March 3, General Alexeyev, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, sent the following secret telegram to the various fronts:

"In connection with a telegram received from the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies

1 "The Third Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Commodity Exchange Trade and Agriculture," "Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta," No. 86, April 27, 1917.

2 S. I. Shidlovsky, "Reminiscences," Part II, Berlin, 1923, p. 115.

3 "Meeting of the Central War Industry Committee," "Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta," No. 49, March 9, 1917.

on the Western Front, reporting that a deputation of fifty persons from the new government had left Veli-kiye Luki for Polotsk and was disarming the gendarmes, an inquiry was made on this subject of the President of the State Duma, who replied that no deputation had been sent. It therefore appears that purely revolutionary and unbridled bands are beginning to arrive from Petrograd and are trying to disarm the gendarmes on the railways; they will, of course, next try to seize power both on the railways and in the rear of the army, and most likely will endeavour to penetrate into the army itself. Most energetic measures must be taken; a watch must be kept on the railway junctions and garrisons must be maintained at these junctions consisting of reliable units under firm command. On the appearance of such self-appointed delegations anywhere, it is desirable that they should not be dispersed, but that an attempt should be made to seize them and, if possible, to court-martial them on the spot and to carry out the sentences immediately."¹

The Commander-in-Chief of the South-eastern Front, General Brusilov, sent telegrams demanding the adoption of the most vigorous measures to prevent the penetration of "disorganisation and anarchy" into the army.

The tsarist generals were preparing to greet revolution in the army with cold steel and courts-martial. Order No. 1 was withdrawn from circulation just as peremptorily as the old police used to destroy revolutionary leaflets.

On March 6, simultaneously with its general appeal to the population, the Provisional Government published an appeal to the army. The question of the war was referred to more or less cautiously. All the appeal said on the subject was that the army would maintain unity, solidarity and firm order. The soldiers were called upon to obey their officers unreservedly while the Provisional Government, for its part, would supply the army "with everything necessary to fight the war to a victorious finish."²

The next day Guchkov issued a new ordinance abolishing Order No. 1.

The leaders of the Soviet, including those who, like Sokolov, had drawn up Order No. 1 five days earlier, helped Guchkov to abolish this order. General Denikin, relating what was told him by General Potapov, speaks of this as follows:

"On the evening of March 6 a delegation from the

1 "Order by General Alexeyev," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 9, March 8, 1917.

2 "From the Provisional Government to the Army on Active Service," "Vestnik of the Provisional Government," No. 2, March 7, 1917.

Soviet, consisting of Sokolov, Nakhamkes, Filippovsky (a lieutenant), Skobelev, Gvozdyev, Paderin, a soldier, and Kudryavtsev (engineer), visited Guchkov at his apartment to discuss the question of reforms in the army. The meeting was a very stormy one. Guchkov declared that it was impossible for him to accept the demands of the delegation, and he left the room several times, declaring that he would resign the Ministry. When he went out, I [Potapov—*Ed.*] acted as chairman. Agreements were drafted, Guchkov was again invited in, and the meeting ended by the adoption of an appeal which was signed by Skobelev in the name of the Soviet, by myself in the name of the Committee of the State Duma and by Guchkov in the name of the government. The appeal rescinded Orders Nos. 1 and 2 [Order No. 2, issued by the Soviet, explained that Order No. 1 did not institute the election of officers but empowered the committees to object to the appointment of commanders—*Ed.*], but the Minister of War promised to introduce in the army more effective reforms than he had at first proposed, establishing new rules governing the relations between commanders and soldiers.”¹

On March 9, the Provisional Government issued an appeal to the army signed by the Minister of War and Marine attacking the Petrograd Soviet, although in very cautious terms:

“ Rally round the Provisional Government, confident that it will devote every effort to your defence. In the capital certain groups are continuing to show discord, impeding the decisions of the Provisional Government and hampering their realisation. . . . Do not listen to the trouble-makers. Many German spies, disguised in soldier's uniform, are sowing discord and disharmony in your midst.”²

Guchkov was in too great a hurry. The appeal of the Ministry of War betrayed the true character of the government. On March 11, the Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda*, which had begun to appear on March 5, declared that the Provisional Government's appeal was nothing but an attack on the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Protest meetings were held in the garrison of the capital. Delegates from the soldiers at the front began to visit the Petrograd Soviet and insistently demanded that measures be taken against the offensive of the generals.

¹ A. I. Denikin, “Sketches of the Russian Revolt,” Vol. I, Book I, Paris, 1921, p. 67.

² “ Appeals of the Provisional Government,” “ Vestnik of the Provisional Government,” No. 5, March 10, 1917.

Several times already since the petty-bourgeois leaders to the Soviet had surrendered the power to the bourgeoisie they had protected the latter from the blows of the agitated masses, for which there were many provocations. On March 7 the Executive Committee of the Soviet had set up a "Contact Commission" consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev. The Executive Committee defined the purpose of the Commission as being

"to keep the Soviet informed of the intentions and actions of the Provisional Government, to keep the latter informed of the demands of the revolutionary people, to bring influence to bear on the government to have these demands satisfied, and to exercise constant control over their fulfilment."¹

As a matter of fact, the "Constant Commission" assisted the Provisional Government in its efforts to pacify the incensed masses. Such was the case in respect to the arrest of Nicholas and his family. The Provisional Government allowed the tsar to leave Pskov for General Headquarters, where he met the army generals and where Grand Dukes visited him freely. This aroused tremendous indignation among the soldiers and workers. The Executive Committee of the Soviet was obliged to demand the arrest of the tsar, and on March 7, the Provisional Government too decided to keep Nicholas Romanov and his family under restraint.

On March 7 the Provisional Government drafted the text of an oath to be taken by the army and by all public servants. The oath made no mention of the revolution, and, furthermore, took over the sign of the cross and the reference to God from the old tsarist oath. This provoked a new outburst of indignation. On March 12 the Soviet informed the Provisional Government that it considered the wording of the oath unsuitable, and began negotiations for the drafting of a new form of oath. At the same time it was made clear that the rejection of the form of oath proposed was not a call to disobey the Provisional Government.

Such also was the case with regard to the war question. The protest against Guchkov's action steadily grew. The soldiers and workers demanded peace. On March 11 a meeting of 1,500 persons was held on the Petrograd Side, which decided to call upon the Soviet to appeal to the peoples of the world, and especially to the people of Germany and Austria, to compel their governments to conclude peace. On March 12 a huge meeting at the Izhory Works, situated not far from Petrograd, demanded that the

¹ "The Attitude of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the Government," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 10, March 9, 1917.

Soviet should appeal to the working class of the belligerent countries to revolt against their government and to conclude peace. On that same day a huge demonstration was held in Moscow under the slogans "Long Live the Constituent Assembly!" and "Peace and the Brotherhood of Nations!"¹

Under pressure of the mass movement, the compromising leaders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet decided to issue a declaration in response to the numerous resolutions and demands. On March 14, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies published an appeal addressed to all the nations of the world. Announcing that the tsar had been dethroned, that Russia was now a democratic country, and that it was time for the peoples, themselves to settle the question of war and peace, the Soviet declared:

"Realising its revolutionary strength, the Russian democracy declares that it will by every means in its power resist the annexationist policy of its ruling classes, and it appeals to the peoples of Europe to take joint and resolute action on behalf of peace."²

The appeal of the Soviet did not indicate what specific measures should be taken to secure peace. It did not even promise to undertake peace negotiations in the near future. On the contrary, the appeal stressed the point that:

"We shall staunchly defend our own freedom from all reactionary attempts both from within and from without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors and will not allow itself to be crushed by foreign military force."³

The leaders of the Soviet continued to demand that the army should continue the war.

The appeal of the Soviet pleased neither the Russian bourgeoisie nor the bourgeoisie of the Allied countries. However indefinite the terms in which it was written, it nevertheless did in a vague way speak of peace and called upon the peoples to combat the annexationist policy of their governments. The Ambassadors of the Allied countries got busy. Paléologue and Buchanan demanded that the Provisional Government should clearly define its position. On March 16, Milyukov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad in which he asserted that it was the aim of the Russian revolution to fight the war to a victorious finish. The telegram sent to

1 "In Moscow," "Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 58, March 14, 1917.

2 "To all the Nations of the World," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 15, March 15, 1917.

3 Ibid.

the Russian representatives in neutral countries—Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, etc.—made no mention of military aims.

In the course of an interview he gave to newspaper reporters on March 23, Milyukov said:

“The fact that we Russians are claiming Constantinople and the Straits in no way implies that we are encroaching on the national rights of Turkey, and nobody can accuse us of annexationist tendencies. The possession of Tsargrad [the Tsar’s City, i.e., Constantinople—*Trans*] has for ages been regarded as a Russian national aim.”¹

Milyukov’s interpretation of the appeal of the Soviet of March 14 was of a frankly imperialist character. This might again incense the masses. The leaders of the Soviet demanded that the question should be discussed in the “Contact Commission.” At this juncture Tsereteli appeared in the Commission. Tsereteli was a Menshevik, a former deputy in the second Duma, who in 1907, under the tsar, had been sentenced to penal servitude. A fiery orator, wearing the halo of a martyr, Tsereteli at once assumed a position of a leader among the Mensheviks. He proposed on this occasion that the government should make a solemn declaration to the army and the population promising firstly, definitely to abandon the policy of annexation and, secondly, to take measures to secure universal peace. V. D. Nabokov, Executive Secretary of the government, a Cadet, relates how Tsereteli tried to persuade the members of the government:

“He argued that if the Provisional Government made such a declaration there would be an unprecedented outburst of enthusiasm in the army and that he and those who shared his views could then with absolute assurance and without any doubt of success proceed to rally the army to the support of the Provisional Government, which would at once acquire tremendous moral authority. ‘Say this,’ he said, and all will follow you like one man.”²

Tsereteli thus directly advised the bourgeoisie to issue a declaration in order to pacify the people. Nabokov recalls that, observing Milyukov’s hesitation, Tsereteli began to persuade him in the most eager terms:

“Tsereteli insisted, and a rather comic impression was caused by his assurances, that if only the basic idea of the instructions were recognised, Milyukov would be able

1 “Interview with P. V. Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs,” “Russkiye Vedomosti, No.” 66, March 23, 1917.

2 V. D. Nabokov, “The Provisional Government. Reminiscences,” Moscow 1924, pp. 102-03.

to discover subtle diplomatic methods of carrying these instructions into effect."¹

The Provisional Government capitulated to the arguments of the "Contact Commission." On March 28 a declaration was published, the substance of which was as follows:

"Leaving it to the will of the people, in close unity with our Allies, to settle finally all questions connected with the World War and its cessation, the Provisional Government regards it as its right and duty to announce today that the aim of free Russia is not to exercise mastery over other nations, not to deprive them of their national possessions, and not to seize foreign territories by force, but to achieve lasting peace on the basis of the self-determination of nation."²

The Provisional Government took the advice of the "Contact Commission" and couched its declaration literally in the words of the appeal of the Soviet of March 14. But having paid tribute to the demands of the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviet, the government added:

"The Russian people will not permit their native country to emerge from the great struggle humiliated and with its vital forces undermined. These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which is unswervingly carrying out the wishes of the people and protecting the rights of our country, at the same time faithfully observing the obligations assumed towards our Allies."³

Following the advice of the Mensheviks, the government skilfully masked the imperialist character of its policy by "democratic" slogans.

The masses, who had made the revolution, who had revolted against the imperialist slaughter and against those who were responsible for it, were being dragged back into the war by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The predatory war in the interests of the capitalists was justified on the plea of defending the revolution and protecting the revolutionary fatherland. In his pamphlet, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution," Lenin wrote:

"Revolutionary defensism must be regarded as the most important and striking manifestation of the petty-bourgeois wave that has overwhelmed 'nearly everything.'

¹ N. D. Nabokov, "The Provisional Government. Reminiscences," Moscow 1929 p. 103.

² "Appeal of the Provisional Government to the Citizens of Russia," "Vestnik of the Provisional Government," No. 18, March 28, 1917.

³ Ibid

There can be no greater enemy to the progress and success of the Russian revolution."¹

The Bolshevik Party drew a clear distinction between the revolutionary defencism of the masses and the defencism of the petty-bourgeois leaders. The defencism of the petty-bourgeois leaders was not due to misunderstanding, but to their class contacts and traditions, to the class position of the social groups whose interests they expressed. The defencism of the masses had entirely different roots. The proletarians and poor peasants had no interest in the seizure of foreign territory and the coercion and plunder of other nations. The defencism of the masses was directly due to the fact that they had been fooled by the bourgeoisie and its servitors. The bourgeoisie, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks even more, played on the masses' pride in having made the revolution, on the joy and intoxication of the "springtide of revolution." In newspapers, at meetings, in theatres and cinemas, matters were depicted as though the character of the war had changed with the replacement of the tsar by the bourgeois Provisional Government. Before, it was asserted, the war was a predatory war and was conducted by the tsar; but now the tsar has been overthrown, we have a revolution, and the country must be defended. The mass of the workers and poor peasants did not at first perceive the falsity of this assertion and allowed themselves to be deceived by the bourgeoisie.

The deception had to be explained to the hoodwinked soldiers and workers, they had to be shown that the bourgeoisie favoured the continuation of the war not in the interests of the revolution, but in order to grow rich and to defend their profits. It had to be explained that the character of a war depends on the class which wages the war, and that war is an inevitable continuation of the policy of the ruling class. This had to be explained to millions and millions of people. The workers and poor peasants had to be got to shake off the influence of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois parties. The selfish purpose of the high-sounding and florid talk of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks about the revolution, about defending "free Russia" and about the "great conquests of democracy" had to be exposed. The whole brunt of this difficult fight against the social demogogy of the bourgeoisie fell on the shoulders of the Bolshevik Party.

But this very important fight had certain peculiar features. One could not go to the hoodwinked people and openly advocate the slogan, "Down with the war!" Very

¹ Lenin, "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI

often such an appeal would at once dispose an audience against the speaker, and would only cause harm. As Lenin said:

“The slogan ‘Down with the war’ is, of course, a correct one. But it fails to take into account the specific nature of the tasks of the present moment and the necessity of approaching the masses in a **different** way. It is, in my opinion, similar to the slogan ‘Down with the tsar,’ with which the inexperienced agitators in the ‘good old days’ went simply and directly to the country districts—and received a beating.”¹

Under Lenin’s leadership, the Bolsheviks resolutely and fearlessly set out to battle the petty-bourgeois wave that had temporarily swept the masses off their feet.

¹ Lenin, “Selected Works,” (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI pp. 53-57.

CHAPTER III

LENIN RETURNS TO RUSSIA

I

SEEKING A WAY INTO REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

WHEN the February Revolution broke out Lenin was living in Switzerland. On the first news of the upheaval the leader of the Bolshevik Party decided to return immediately to Russia, where the spark he had fanned so indefatigably all his life had at last flared into flame. Lenin discerned more clearly than anybody what prospects faced the Russian Revolution and what dangers lurked in its path. He knew from long experience that the most sinister enemies of the revolution would be its sham friends, the petty-bourgeois praters, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had betrayed the interests of the working class many times before.

"Refuse to show any shadow of confidence in or support of the new government (any shadow of confidence in Kerensky, Gvozdyev, Chkhenkeli, Chkheidze and Co.) and observe a state of armed waiting, of armed preparation to secure a wider basis for a higher stage,"¹

is what Lenin wrote from Switzerland several days after the outbreak of the February Revolution in response to an inquiry from the Petrograd Bolsheviks.

These few words outlined an entire programme of action. But instructions "from afar" were not enough. Lenin felt that he must be himself where the flames of the revolution had flared up, and where pseudo-Socialists were flocking from all parts of the world, to help the Russian Mensheviks extinguish these flames.

But how to get into revolutionary Russia? England and France, which controlled all the ways of access to Russia, would not allow the Bolsheviks, especially Lenin, to return to Petrograd. They were well aware of Lenin's attitude to the war of plunder. The capitalists understood full well what "damage" the Bolsheviks might cause them by exposing the predatory, imperialist slaughter.

¹ Lenin, "Two Letters to A. M. Kollontai," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX.

It was obvious that the Bolshevik Party and the Russian proletariat would adopt the right attitude and find the right slogans. But Lenin's arrival would expedite the process. The bourgeoisie, both Russian and foreign, acted as its predecessor had acted at the time of the Paris Commune. When the Paris Communards offered in exchange for Blanqui, the famous revolutionary, a number of priests and bishops who had got stranded in Paris, the Versailles butchers of the Commune replied: 'To surrender Blanqui to the Communards would be equivalent to presenting them with a whole army.'

Lenin was not allowed to return to Russia.

He pondered over every means of getting back. To appeal for assistance to the Provisional Government would have been quite useless. Milyukov, the Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, had sent a telegraphic circular to all Russian Embassies and Missions abroad, which said:

"In the event of any doubt arising as to the personality of political exiles desiring to return to Russia under the act of amnesty, you are requested to form, in connection with the foreign branch of the Ministry under your charge, a committee consisting of representatives of the political exiles, to elucidate all doubts that may arise in this respect."¹

Milyukov's circular was confirmed by a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassies and Missions abroad, stating:

"When issuing passports to exiles, you may be guided by testimony as to their military reliability furnished by other trustworthy exiles or by committees formed in accordance with our telegrams."²

It was very unlikely that any "trustworthy" exile would testify to Lenin's "military reliability" as understood by the Provisional Government. Lenin's attitude to the war was generally known. Some other way of getting back to Russia had to be found. N. K. Krupskaya (Lenin's wife—*Trans.*) relates how Lenin worried over the problem:

"Ilyich was in a fever. We asked Bronsky to find out whether it would not be possible to get to Russia through Germany with the aid of a smuggler. We soon found out that a smuggler could take him only as far as Berlin. Moreover, the smuggler was in some way or other connected with Parvus, and Vladimir Ilyich would have

1 A. L. Popov, "The Diplomacy of the Provisional Government in Combat in the Revolution," "Krasnyy Arkhiv," 1927, Vol. I, (XX), pp. 4-5.

2 Ibid., 4. 5.

nothing to do with Parvus, who had grown rich on the war and had become a social-chauvinist.

"Some other way had to be found... Ilyich did not sleep nights on end. One night he said to me: 'You know, I could travel with the passport of a dumb Swede.' I laughed and said: 'It won't work, you might give yourself away in your sleep. You might dream of the Cadets and exclaim in your sleep, "Scoundrels, scoundrels!" And they would find out you are not a Swede!'"¹

Only one way remained open to Lenin, and that was to travel through Germany by getting the Russian government to exchange Russian exiles for German prisoners of war. Generally speaking, this method had already been tried. During the war an important bourgeois liberal, M. Kovalovsky, returned to Russia through Germany and in Petrograd was met at the station with great ceremony by Milyukov himself, who at that time was only just dreaming of becoming a Minister. In his speech of welcome, Milyukov never even hinted that to travel through Germany was high treason. But this same Milyukov—now Minister in the Provisional Government—accorded Lenin an entirely different reception.

It was not Lenin who conceived the idea of returning through Germany. This plan was proposed by Martov, a well-known Menshevik, after it had become known that the British Government would not allow people opposed to the war to return to Russia. Martov's plan was approved at a meeting of representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Bundists and the Mensheviks. Telegrams were sent to Russia demanding that permission should be obtained for the exiles to pass through Germany in exchange for German and Austrian prisoners. For two weeks the exiles waited in vain for a reply. The Provisional Government had apparently pigeon-holed the telegrams. The British and Russian governments were working hand in hand.

Only after this did Lenin decide to put Martov's plan into execution and to arrange for the passage of the Bolsheviks through Germany. Foreseeing the rabid outcry the defencists and the bourgeoisie would raise over this, Lenin took great pains to have every step in the preparations for the return supported by documents. He carefully collected all evidence of the obstacles placed by the Provisional Government in the way of the return of the Bolsheviks. Lenin secured the consent of a number of internationalists to his departure from Switzerland, and the following statement was drawn up:

¹ N. K. Krupskaya, "From Exile to Petrograd," in F. Platten's "Lenin's Return to Russia in March 1917," Moscow, 1925, pp. 113-14.

"We, the undersigned, are aware of the difficulties raised by the Entente governments to the return of the Russian internationalists, and of the conditions accepted by the German government for their return through Germany. We fully realise that the German government has consented to the passage of the Russian internationalists only in order to intensify the anti-war movement in Russia in this way. The undersigned declare:

"The Russian internationalists, who throughout the war have tirelessly and energetically fought all the imperialisms, and especially the German imperialism, are returning to Russia to work on behalf of the revolution; by this action they will help the proletariat of all countries, and in particular the proletariat of Germany and Austria, to start their own struggle against their governments. The example shown by the heroic struggle of the Russian proletariat is the best and most powerful stimulus to such a struggle. For all these reasons, the undersigned internationalists of Switzerland, France, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Norway consider that their Russian comrades are not only entitled but are even obliged to take advantage of the opportunity offered of returning to Russia."¹

On Lenin's suggestion, Fritz Platten, Secretary of the Swiss Socialist Party, concluded an agreement with the representatives of the German government which stipulated that (1) the right to travel through Germany was to be given to all exiles irrespective of their attitude to the war; (2) the car in which the exiles travelled was not to be subject to search, examination or inspection, and (3) the exiles undertook, on their arrival in Russia to demand the exchange of Austrian and German prisoners of war for the Russians allowed to return through Germany.

On March 26, together with a group of exiles accompanied by Fritz Platten, who had arranged for the passage through Germany, Lenin left Switzerland for Stockholm, whence he travelled to Petrograd via Finland.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks who accompanied him travelled through Germany in a special car and, in accordance with the stipulations governing the passage, communication between the German authorities and the travellers could be maintained only through Fritz Platten. Thus arose the legend of the "sealed car" in which the Bolsheviks were supposed to have travelled through Germany.

On the way, German chauvinists attempted to get into conversation with Lenin, but the latter categorically refused to meet them.

¹ "Protocol of the Journey Through Germany," "Lenin Miscellany," Vol. II, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1924, pp. 392-93.

Thirty-two exiles in all left Switzerland, among them nineteen Bolsheviks, six Bundists and seven members of other parties and groups. It is interesting to note that the exiles remaining in Switzerland, who had refused to travel with Lenin, decided on April 30 to return to Russia by the same way; for no other way was open. There were no Bolsheviks among them.

LENIN IN PETROGRAD

The Allied imperialists kept a keen eye on Lenin's every movement. On April 3, the day he arrived in Petrograd, the British Embassy submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs giving its opinion of Lenin. This memorandum declared that Lenin was a good organiser and an extremely dangerous man and that it was very likely that he would find numerous followers in Petrograd.¹

That very same day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a memorandum from the French Ambassador also referring to Lenin's passage through Germany.

A Neratov, Assistant Foreign Minister, made the following notation on these documents:

"All information received from third parties must be published in the press to-morrow without fail, the sources not being indicated, and the goodwill shown by the German government towards Lenin and the others should be stressed."²

This was the origin of the mesh of lies and slanders that was woven around Lenin's return to Russia. The fear that "this good organiser would find numerous followers in Petrograd" inspired the Allied imperialists to start a campaign against Lenin. He was accused almost of high treason in Germany's behalf. The example of the Provisional Government was followed up by the entire bourgeois and defencist press. This is what **Ryech**, the Cadet newspaper, wrote on April 5, 1917:

"Citizen Lenin and the comrades who hastened to return to Russia, before they selected the route through Germany, should have asked themselves why the German government was so eager to accord them this unparalleled service, why it deemed it possible to give passage through its territory to citizens of a hostile country returning to that country. The reply, we think, would have been clear. The German government hoped that the earliest possible return of Citizen Lenin and his Comrades would be to Germany's interest: it believed in the Germanophilism of the leader of the Bolsheviks. And the very possibility of such a reply, in our opinion, should have been quite sufficient for any responsible man of politics returning to Russia for the benefit of the peo-

1 A. B. Popov, "The Diplomacy of the Provisional Government in Combating the Revolution," "Krasnyy Arkhiv," 1927, Vol. I, (XX), p. 11.

2 Ibid., p. 12.

ple to refrain from taking advantage of this strange amiability ... But we think ... that for a Russian man of politics, whatever his views, the way to the heart and conscience of the people of Russia does not lie through Germany."¹

The Socialist-Revolutionaries did not lag behind the Cadets. On April 16, V. Chernov, the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, wrote to Lenin in "Dyelo Naroda" literally in the same terms as the Cadets:

"It did not occur to him that even from his own point of view, the permission of England for his return would have been better, if only for the fact that it would have been extorted by the pressure of the Russian revolution, while the permission of Germany may be due to suspicious motives."²

All of them—from the British imperialists to the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—libelled Lenin in one and the same stereotyped way, incited the backward masses against him and hinted that the Bolshevik leader was a spy in the pay of Germany.

But the proletariat and the soldier-peasants were not taken in by this abominable slander. On April 3, the day of Lenin's arrival, the Third Company of the Finland Regiment adopted a resolution protesting against the slanders of the bourgeoisie and its menials in the petty-bourgeois camp:

"Considering that the only safe road to Russia lies through Germany, we demand that the Provisional Government should immediately come to an agreement with the German government for the exchange of our political exiles for German prisoners."³

The workers of Petrograd greeted their beloved leader with unfeigned joy. Huge demonstrations marched from all parts of the city to the Finland Railway Station. Lenin's comrades, his fellow-fighters in the Bolshevik Party, came to welcome the man who had created and moulded this heroic party. The revolutionary soldiers and sailors came for advice, and eagerly seized upon every militant slogan uttered. Working men and women, sailors, soldiers, Party organisations and the first detachments of the Red Guard came to welcome the leader of the revolution. The streets were filled with marching columns of workers carrying banners with the inscription, "Welcome, Lenin!" An

1 "Lenin's Arrival," "Ryech," No. 78, April 5, 1917.

2 V. Chernov, "Lenin's Dyelo Naroda," No. 26, April 16, 1917.

3 "The Third Company of the Finland Regiment of the Guards," "Rabochaya Gazeta" (Workers' Paper), No. 38, April 23, 1917.

enormous crowd flooded the square of the Finland Railway Station.

Mensheviks also appeared to welcome Lenin. The Menshevik leaders came to dissuade Lenin from fighting for the Bolshevik line. They came to sever him from the masses. Chkheidze, a prominent Menshevik, read Lenin a veritable sermon on how to conduct himself in the revolution.

The Menshevik Sukhanov, a confederate of Chkheidze in betraying the proletariat and combating the Bolshevik Party, testifies to how this Menshevik dominie tried to persuade Lenin to desist from revolution:

"At the end of a small group of people, behind whom the door immediately banged to again, Lenin came, or rather rushed, into the royal waiting room, wearing a felt hat, his face frozen with cold and with a gorgeous bouquet of flowers in his hands. Dashing to the centre of the room, he came to an abrupt halt in front of Chkheidze, as though he had encountered an entirely unexpected obstacle. Thereupon Chkheidze, without relaxing his dour look, pronounced the following 'speech of welcome,' consistently maintaining not only the spirit and style but also the tone of a moralising sermon:

"Comrade Lenin, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the whole revolution, we welcome you on your arrival in Russia.... But we consider that the chief task of the revolutionary democracy at the present time is to defend our revolution from all attempts against it both from within and from without. We consider that what is needed for this is not disunion, but the union of the ranks of the entire democracy. We hope that you will pursue these arms together with us..."

"Chkheidze paused. I was overcome by the unexpectedness of the thing. What attitude could Lenin possibly adopt towards this 'welcome' and this magnificent but? But Lenin apparently knew very well what attitude to adopt. He stood with a look on his face as though all this did not concern him in the slightest—he kept glancing around, peering into the faces of the bystanders and even staring at the ceiling of the waiting room...and then—now having definitely turned away from the delegates of the Executive Committee—'replied' as follows:

"Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors, and workers! I am happy to greet in your persons the victorious Russian revolution, to greet you as the vanguard of the world proletarian army...The predatory imperialist war is the beginning of a civil war all over Europe. The hour

is not far off when, at the call of our comrade, Karl Liebknecht, the peoples will turn their weapons against their exploiters—the capitalists...The dawn of the world Socialist revolution has already begun...In Germany, everything is in a ferment...To-morrow, any day now, European imperialism may completely collapse. The Russian revolution you have made marks the beginning of this and has started a new era. Long live the world Socialist revolution!"¹

Having rid himself of the Menshevik dominions, Lenin went out on to the steps of the station. The square suddenly came to life. The huge crowd greeted the leader with cheers. Lenin was helped to mount an armoured car; searchlights played on him. Lightly stamping his feet, as though testing the strength of the armoured car, Lenin confidently launched his appeal for a world Socialist revolution to the crowd, which stood listening with bated breath. Lenin's speech at once raised the revolution to a higher level.

The revolution needed a mind of unusual power to find its bearings rapidly, in the complex tangle of contradiction and antagonisms and to point out unerringly the immediate goal of the masses.

A will of unusual strength was needed to lead the masses to this goal by a sure path.

Lenin possessed this gigantic mind and will, fortified by the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the tasks of the proletariat. The leader of the revolution had assumed his post.

1 N. Sukhanov, "Notes on the Revolution," Book 3, Berlin, 1922, pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER IV

THE APRIL CONFERENCE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS)

UPON his arrival in Russia, Lenin flung all his energies into revolutionary work. On the morning of April 4 he put forward his theses, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the present Revolution," at a conference of leading Bolshevik Party functionaries and then read his theses at a meeting of delegates—Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—who had attended the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies held at the end of March 1917.

In these theses—historically known as the April Theses—Lenin summed up the experience gained by the Party in the struggle and presented a clear-cut programme of action for the Party in the new stage. Lenin's April Theses opened a new chapter in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the Bolshevik Party—new, not in the sense that it marked a break with the old theory and practice of Bolshevism, but in the sense that the theses constituted an all-embracing programme of action for the party of the proletariat in the transitional stage inaugurated by the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917.

The overthrow of tsarism had changed the conditions under which the Bolsheviks worked.

"This was a tremendous turning point in the history of Russia and an unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party," Stalin wrote in reference to the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917. "A new orientation of the Party was required in the new conditions of the struggle."¹

The Bolshevik Party had only just emerged from its illegal underground existence. Numerous members of the Bolshevik Party were returning from exile in distant parts of Russia. Hundreds and thousands of Bolsheviks were making their way to Petrograd, Moscow and other industrial centres from Naryn, Turukhansk, Yakutia and from remote places of exile in the Far North. The railways were jammed by military traffic and could not carry the returning exiles fast enough. The Committee for Aiding Amnestied Persons, which was helping the political exiles to return home, had

¹ J. Stalin, "The October Revolution." "A Collection of Articles and Speeches," Moscow, 1932, p. 58.

fallen under the sway of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who hampered the return of the Bolshevik exiles. The Bolsheviks were scattered over the vast territory of the country, from Petrograd to Vladivostok, from Archangel to the Caucasus.

But the Bolshevik Party was closely knit, ideologically and organisationally, by a long and successful struggle against every species of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionism and by a constant struggle against opportunist vacillations and deviations from Lenin's line. The Bolshevik Party entered the new stage equipped with Lenin's plan of transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to a Socialist revolution, the plan he had drawn up as far back as 1905. The Bolsheviks entered the new stage supported by Lenin's doctrine that it was possible for Socialism to triumph in one country alone. The Bolsheviks were armed with Lenin's theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. They exposed the predatory and annexationist character of the imperialist war. The whole history of the revolution had prepared the Bolshevik Party for the "new orientation in the new conditions of the struggle."

The Party did not stop at the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks called upon the proletariat to continue the revolution. The Bolsheviks opposed the imperialist war, which did not cease to be a predatory war because of the transfer of power to the bourgeois Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks exposed the class character of the Provisional Government and called upon the proletariat to consolidate and develop the Soviets as organs of revolutionary power.

On March 14, two days after his return from exile Stalin wrote in "Pravda":

"We must consolidate...the Soviets, make them universal, and link them together under the aegis of the Central Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies as the organ of revolutionary power of the people."¹

But general conclusions had to be drawn from the experience of the Party; the new tasks under the new conditions had to be formulated. And this is what Lenin did in the April Theses. Stalin wrote of these theses:

"It required Lenin's famous 'April Theses' to enable the Party to emerge on to the new road at one stride."²

LENIN'S THESES

1. In our attitude towards the war, which also under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably re-

¹ J. Stalin, "The Road to October, Articles and Speeches." March-October, 1917. Moscow, 1925, 2nd edition, p. 2.

² Ibid., p. viii.

mains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession must be made to 'revolutionary defencism.'

The class-conscious proletariat could consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: (a) that the power of government pass to the proletariat and the poor sections of the peasantry bordering on the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete and real break be made with all capitalist interests.

In view of the undoubted honesty of broad strata of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism, who accept the war as a necessity only and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary thoroughly, persistently and patiently to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that it is impossible to end the war by a truly democratic, non-coercive peace without the overthrow of capital.

The widespread propaganda of this view among the army on active service must be organised.

Fraternalisation.

2. The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place the power into the hands of the proletariat and the poor strata of the peasantry.

This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of freedom (Russia is now the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence in relation to the masses, and, finally, by the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and socialism. The specific situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the specific requirements of Party work among unprecedented large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.

3. No support must be given to the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises must be explained, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure, and not the unpardonable illusion-breeding "demand" that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an imperialist government.

4. The fact must be recognised that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our Party is in a minority, and so far in a small minority, as against a bloc of all the petty-

bourgeois opportunist elements, who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and convey its influence to the proletariat, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries down to the Organisation Committee (Chkhaidze, Tsereteli, etc.), Steklov, etc., etc.

It must be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the **only possible** form of revolutionary government and that therefore our task is, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic and persistent **explanation** of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.

As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticising and explaining errors and at the same time advocate the necessity of transferring the entire power of State to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes.

5. Not a parliamentary republic—to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step—but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.

Abolition of the police, the army (i.e., the standing army to be replaced by the universally armed people) and the bureaucracy.

The salaries of all officials, who are to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.

6. In the agrarian programme the emphasis must be laid on the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.

Confiscation of all landed estates.

Nationalisation of all lands in the country, the disposal of the land to be in the charge of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The creation of model farms on each of the large estates (varying from 100 to 300 desyatins, in accordance with local and other conditions, at the discretion of the local institutions) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account.

7. The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, control over which shall be exercised by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

8. Our **immediate** task is not to "introduce" Socialism but only to bring social production and distribution of products at once under the **control** of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies.

9. Party tasks:

(a) Immediate summoning of a Party congress.

- (b) Alteration of the Party programme, mainly:
 - (1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;
 - (2) On the question of our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state" (i.e., a state of which the Paris Commune was the prototype).
 - (3) Amendment of our antiquated minimum programme.
- (c) A new name for the Party (instead of "Social-Democrats," whose official leaders **throughout** the world have betrayed Socialism by deserting to the bourgeoisie [the "defencists" and the vacillating "Kautskians"], we must call ourselves a Communist Party).

10. A new International.

We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International directed against the **social-chauvinists** and against the "Centre."*

*The "Centre" in the international Social-Democratic movement is the tendency which vacillates between the chauvinists ("defencists") and internationalists, i.e., Kautsky and Co. in Germany, Longuet and Co. in France, Chkheidze and Co. in Russia, Turati and Co. in Italy, MacDonald and Co. in England, etc. (Lenin's footnote.)¹

Lenin's speech came as a bombshell to the Mensheviks. Plekhanov called it a "farcical dream," the ravings of a madman. "Lenin is calling for civil war," the Mensheviks exclaimed in horror.

Tsereteli spoke in opposition to Lenin:

"If power had been seized in its first days the revolution would have ended in utter defeat very soon. The annulment of our treaties with the Allies would have resulted in our being crushed from without. And profound reaction against Socialism would have gained sway in Europe; the International would have been crushed. . . . You cannot isolate yourself from the entire people and from the class-conscious proletariat."²

At this same conference, Chkheidze endeavoured to scare Lenin by declaring:

"Lenin will remain alone outside the revolution, and we all will go our own way."³

There was consternation even among some of the Bolsheviks, who were dismayed by the difficulties of the impending struggle. But the Party as a whole remained faithful to its

¹ See Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," "Selected Works." (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, pp. 21-24.

² "Conference of Representatives of the Social-Democratic Parties on the Subject of Unity," Yedinstvo (Unity), No. 5, April 5, 1917.

³ Ibid.

leader, as was borne out at the All-Russian Conference of the Bolsheviks.

The April (Seventh) Conference was held in Petrograd on April 24-29, 1917. It was attended by 133 voting delegates and 18 delegates with a voice but no vote, who together represented about 80,000 Party members.

Before the Revolution of February 1917 the Bolshevik Party had been an underground organisation and had carried on its activities secretly. It was an illegal party and membership in it was punishable by arrest, exile and penal servitude. All conferences and congresses of the party were held in secret, the majority of them abroad. The April Conference was the first legal conference in the history of the Bolshevik Party.

Lenin's fellow-fighters arrived from all parts of the country. Comrades returned from remote exile and from penal servitude; delegates arrived from industrial centres and from the border regions inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. Leaders and organisers of the recent barricade fighting attended from mills and factories of the capital. Among those who took part in the work of the conference were Lenin, Stalin, Molotov, S. Kosior, Krupskaya, Stasova and Dzerzhinsky; Moscow (city and region was represented by Zemlyachka, Nogin, Bubnov, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Smidovich and others; the Donbas by Voroshilov, Samara by Kuibyshev, the Urals by Sverdlov. Many other prominent Bolsheviks attended, and the fact that representatives of Party branches cut off from the guiding centres found a common language and solidly supported Lenin was one more proof that the tsarist government had not broken the will of the Party and had not severed its contacts with the masses; it was proof that the Party had been preserved and that it had grown organisationally and ideologically.

The All-Russian April Conference of the Bolsheviks had all the importance of a Party Congress held at a most serious moment of history. As Lenin pointed out in his opening speech, the Conference met "in the midst not only of the Russian revolution, but also of a developing international revolution."¹

The delegates from the various localities related how rapidly the Bolshevik Party was growing and what a tremendous amount of work it had performed in the two months of the revolution.

During the war in the city of Petrograd there were about 2,000 dues-paying members of the Party, whereas on the eve of the April Conference there were 16,000 dues-paying members. In Kronstadt there had been only a

¹ Lenin, "Speech Delivered at the Opening of the All-Russian April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 24, 1917," "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book 1, p. 271.

small underground organisation; now there were 3,000 Bolsheviks in Kronstadt. There were 3,000 in Helsingfors and 560 in Vyborg. There were 7,000 Bolsheviks in the city of Moscow and 13,000 in the Moscow Region as a whole. There were 3,500 in the city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk alone. There were more than 1,500 members in Saratov, 2,700 in Samara and 400 in Kazan. Whereas underground work in the Urals used to be carried on in nine places, on the eve of the April Conference there were 43 branches with a total membership of 16,000 Bolsheviks. Before the February Revolution there were 100 Bolsheviks in Lugansk, now there were 1,500.

In addition to "Pravda" (Truth), several Bolshevik newspapers had already appeared. There were the "Sotsial-Demokrat" (Social-Democrat) in Moscow, with a circulation of 60,000 copies; the "Uralskaya Pravda" ("Urals Truth") in the Urals, the "Vperyod" (Forward) in Ufa, the "Volna" (Wave) in Helsingfors, the "Golos Pravdy" (Voice of Truth) in Kronstadt, the "Zvezda" (Star) in Ekaterinoslav, the "Proletary" (Proletarian) in Kharkov and the "Kavkazsky Rabochy" (Caucasian Worker) in the Caucasus. Saratov, Samara and Kazan each had their Bolshevik newspaper.

The influence of the Bolsheviks was rapidly spreading. In the Urals they had the following of nearly all the Soviets. Everywhere they introduced the eight-hour day and instituted control over industry. In the Donbas, one delegate related:

"Lugansk is now practically in the hands of the workers. When there are more Party workers the Bolsheviks will undoubtedly have complete power in their hands. . . . The miners are everywhere: in the commissariats, in the militia and on the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. They are even acting as judges. All the organisations are under the control of the miners, so that the miners are complete masters in the collieries."¹

The Bolsheviks carried on propaganda among the prisoners of war—German, Australian and Czecho-Slovakian. In Lugansk, a Bolshevik organisation numbering forty members had existed among the prisoners of war even before the February Revolution; after the revolution its membership increased to over a hundred. In the Urals, in spite of the orders of War Minister Guchkov forbidding prisoners of war to participate in demonstrations, the Bolsheviks got Germans and Austrians to take part in the May Day celebrations. Hundreds of splendid organisers and thousands of devoted revolutionary fighters emerged from the ranks of the prisoners of war as a result of the work of the Bolsheviks.

¹ "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917." Moscow, 1934, pp. 144-75.

Village nuclei were formed by the Bolsheviks in a number of places. A peasant congress in Penza supported the Bolsheviks; the peasants resolved to confiscate the landed estates and to take possession of all their farm implements for the common use. In the Moscow and the Volga Regions and in the Ukraine the Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining control over several peasant Soviets.

Wherever the influence of the Bolsheviks was strong, the revolution went farther than it did in the centre. A delegate from a district in the Moscow Region declared:

"In Orekhovo-Zuyevo the power is entirely in the hands of the workers. Nobody may carry arms without the permission of the Soviet. The peasants are working hand-in-hand with the workers. . . . The peat incident is characteristic. We told the capitalists that if they did not give us fuel, if they did not create the proper conditions for work, we would confiscate their plant. . . . Comrade Lenin says that power must be seized by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—but we have nothing more to do in this respect."¹

Lenin at the April Conference dwelt in detail on the fact that the provinces were outstripping the capital:

"The material presented by the comrades on the activities of the Soviets, although incomplete, has been extremely interesting. This is perhaps the most important material provided by the Conference; it is material which enables us to test our slogans by the actual course of events. The picture created disposes us to draw optimistic conclusions. The movement began in the centres, where at first all the energies of the proletariat were concentrated on the struggle. A tremendous amount of energy was expended in fighting tsarism. In Petrograd this struggle has led to the removal of the central state authority. Gigantic work has been done . . .

"The revolution is passing from the centre to the provinces. This is what happened in France—the revolution is becoming municipal. The movement in the provinces shows that the majority there are in favour of the peasants and the workers, that there the leaders consist of bourgeois least of all, that there the masses are not dismayed. The more information we gather, the more it shows that the larger the proportion of proletarians among the population and the smaller the number of intermediate elements, the better the revolution progresses in the localities."²

1 "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), April 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 119.

2 Ibid., pp. 129-30.

The reports of the delegates from the various localities showed how far the revolution had progressed wherever the Bolsheviks led the working masses. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in a number of the industrial areas had become masters of the situation. The government authorities were impotent. They could issue no orders without the sanction of the Soviet. The Soviets assumed charge of food affairs. They took the industries under their control and saw that work in the factories was not interrupted.

The reports of the delegates from the various localities once more showed that in their practical and political work the Bolsheviks were prepared for Lenin's April Theses.

The Bolshevik (April) All-Russian Conference opened on April 24 at 10 a.m. in one of the lecture halls of the Higher Courses for Women in Petrograd. Lenin made a brief opening speech. He said that the prophecy of the great founders of Communism had come true: the World War had inevitably led to revolution. The great honour of starting the revolution had fallen to the Russian proletariat, but the latter must not forget that the Russian revolution was only part of the world revolution. Lenin concluded with the words: "Only from this angle can we define our tasks."¹

The Conference conveyed its greetings to the first of the internationalists, Lenin and Karl Liebknecht, the latter of whom had been imprisoned by the German imperialists. The Conference instructed the presidium to find ways and means of conveying the greetings of the Bolsheviks to Liebknecht in prison.

After Lenin's introductory speech, the Conference approved the following agenda:

1. The current situation (the war and the Provisional Government, etc.).
2. Peace conference.
3. Attitude to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
4. Revision of the Party programme.
5. Our tasks in connection with the situation in the International.
6. Union of the Social-Democratic internationalist organisations.
7. Agrarian question.
8. National question.
9. Constituent Assembly.
10. Organisation.

¹ Lenin, "Speech Delivered at the Opening of the All-Russian April Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 24, 1917," "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 27.

11. Reports from the regions.

12. Election of Central Committee.

The central items at the Conference were Lenin's reports on the current situation and the agrarian question, which were a development of the April Theses.

The substance of Lenin's reports was as follows:

The chief symptom by which Marxists determine the character of a revolution is the transfer of power from one class to another. In the February Revolution power passed from the feudal landlords to the bourgeoisie and the capitalist landlords, i.e., landlords who ran their estates on capitalist lines. A new class had come into power—the bourgeoisie—and from this standpoint the February Revolution was a bourgeois revolution.

But on coming to power the bourgeoisie had to solve three problems: to end the war, to give land to the peasants and to save the country from the economic crisis.

Could the bourgeoisie end the war? War is an inevitable consequence of capitalist development. As long as capitalism exists, wars are bound to continue. The present war was an imperialist war on the part of both groups of belligerent powers, that is to say, it was a war waged by the capitalists for mastery of the world, for profitable markets and for the suppression of weak nationalities. The transfer of power from Tsar Nicholas Romanov to the government of landlords and capitalists had not changed the character of the war as far as Russia was concerned. The new government was continuing the annexationist and predatory war. It had reaffirmed all the former tsarist treaties, which promised the Russian capitalists the spoliation of China, Turkey, Persia and other countries. Since it represented the interests of capital, the new government could not renounce annexations, i.e., the conquest of foreign countries, or the keeping of other nationalities under Russia's sway. At the best, the bourgeoisie might, under the pressure of the masses, end the present war by a peace. But it would be an imperialist peace made at the expense of the weak and oppressed nations. Such a peace would inevitably lead to a new war.

Could the bourgeoisie give the peasants land? The landed estates were mortgaged up to the hilt with the bourgeois banks. To take away the land from the landlords would be to hit at the pockets of the bourgeoisie. At the best, if the people exerted strong pressure, the bourgeoisie might sacrifice part in order to save the whole, and would surrender some of the land to the peasants for compensation. But this would not solve the agrarian problem. Furthermore, the war had reduced peasant husbandry to such a plight that it was impossible for the

peasants to carry on in the old way. They required implements and cattle, and these could be obtained only in a revolutionary way, by depriving the bourgeoisie of its capital.

At the Petrograd Conference of Bolsheviks, held on the eve of the April Conference, Lenin had said:

"The bourgeoisie might reconcile itself to the nationalisation of the land if the peasants took the land. As the proletarian party, we must say that the land alone cannot feed you. Consequently, in order to cultivate it, communes would have to be organised... The Cadets are already acting as bureaucrats. They are telling the peasants to wait until the Constituent Assembly. Ours is the only party that is issuing slogans which really further the revolution."¹

Of course, the bourgeoisie might attempt to achieve an economic improvement, but only at the expense of the poor peasants and the workers, by laying the whole burden on their shoulders.

Having seized power, the bourgeoisie was unable to solve a single problem of the revolution. As a matter of fact, it had taken over the power of government only with the purpose of combating revolution. The problems of the revolution could be solved only by the new class, the working class, to which the power should be transferred.

"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia—Lenin said—is that it represents a **transition** from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power into the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place power into the hands of the proletariat and the poor strata of the peasantry."²

Thus the specific feature of the situation was that it represented a **transition** from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a Socialist revolution, or, as Lenin put it, the **growing over** of the bourgeois revolution into the Socialist revolution.

The transfer of power to the proletariat did not necessitate an immediate revolt against the Provisional Government. It would have to be overthrown, but not at the moment, not by direct storm. The country was enjoying almost complete political freedom. The government had not yet resorted to violence against the revolution, because

¹ Lenin, "The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 14-22, 1917," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 181.

² Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI.

the weapons were actually in the hands of the masses. The workers and peasants had no interest in the war. Their defencist sentiments were only superficial, the result of "honest error," as Lenin expressed it, and therefore, he recommended, the workers had to be helped by "patient" explanation to understand their error.

"We must admit," Lenin said in the draft resolution he submitted to the Conference, "that a very large number of the 'revolutionary defencists' are honest, i.e., they really do not desire annexations, conquests and the oppression of weak nations, and are really striving for a democratic and non-oppressive peace between all the belligerent countries. This must be admitted because the class position of the proletarians and the semi-proletarians of town and country (i.e., of people who earn their livelihood wholly or partly by selling their labour power to the capitalists) is such that these classes have no interest in the profits of the capitalists."¹

Lenin at the Conference explained this passage of the resolution in the following way:

"There is no doubt whatever that, as a class, the proletariat and semi-proletariat have no interest in war. They are under the influence of tradition and deceit. They still lack political experience. Hence, our task is one of prolonged explanation. We do not make the slightest concession on matters of principle, but we cannot approach them as we approach the social-chauvinists. These elements of the population have never been Socialist, they have not the slightest inkling of Socialism and are just awakening to political life. But their class consciousness is growing and broadening with extraordinary rapidity. We must know how to adapt our explanations to them, and that is a most difficult thing, particularly for a party that but yesterday was underground."²

The Soviets represented the majority of the workers and working peasants. But the leadership of the Soviets had fallen into the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who had surrendered the power to the Provisional Government. The latter had the support of the Soviets, and it would be overthrown only by winning a majority in the Soviets.

These circumstances created a phenomenon that was extremely rare in revolution: power could be transferred from the Provisional Government to the Soviets by peace-

¹ Lenin, "Report on the Current Situation," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 94.

² Ibid., p. 95.

ful means. All that was required was to isolate the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, to destroy their influence over the masses.

"All power to the Soviets!"—such was the slogan of the Bolshevik Party at this stage of the revolution.

By the power of the Soviets Lenin did not mean that the capitalists should be expelled from the Provisional Government and representatives of the Soviets substituted in their place.

Trotsky completely distorted the Bolshevik line when subsequently, in his article, "The Lessons of October," he asserted that his proposal to transfer the power from the hands of the ten capitalist Ministers to ten Peshekhonovs¹ was equivalent to Lenin's slogan, "All power to the Soviets!" It was not a question of replacing capitalist Ministers by Socialist Ministers. Lenin's slogan implied the destruction of the bourgeois State apparatus and its replacement by a new kind of State apparatus, the Soviet State apparatus.

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were in the majority in the Soviets; the Bolsheviks were in the minority. But the Soviets, if they took over the power, would be subject to the constant pressure of the masses, and the members of the Soviets would be freely elected and recalled. Under such circumstances, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries would either advance, by endeavouring to achieve the purposes of the revolution, or, which was more likely, they would remain at a standstill and thus expose themselves. The workers and peasants would support the Bolsheviks, who were actually fighting in the interests of the working population, and the Bolsheviks would become the majority in the Soviets. Having become the majority, the genuinely revolutionary Bolshevik Party would proceed to carry out its programme, namely, conclude a democratic peace, confiscate the landed estates and hand over the land and the implements for its cultivation to the toilers, and undertake immediate measures of economic restoration at the expense of the capitalists by nationalising the banks and the large enterprises. These measures would not constitute an immediate transition to Socialism, but in their sum total they would represent the first step towards the transformation of Russia into a Socialist country.

"What, then, are the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat?" Lenin asked at the April Conference of the Bolsheviks. And he replied as follows:

"The main defect and the main error in all arguments of the Socialists is that the matter is put in too general a

¹ Peshekhonov was a petty-bourgeois Socialist.—Ed.

form—the transition to Socialism. What we should discuss is concrete steps and measures. Some of them are ripe, others are not. We are in a period of transition. We have created forms that patently differ from the forms of bourgeois States. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies are a form of State without parallel anywhere or at any time. This form represents the first steps towards Socialism, and is inevitable at the inception of a Socialist society. This is a fact of decisive importance...

"Why do we desire the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies?"

"The first measure the Soviets must accomplish is the nationalisation of the land... Private ownership of land must be abolished. This is the task facing us, for the majority of the people are for it. To accomplish this, we need the Soviets. It is a measure that cannot be effected with the aid of the old government bureaucracy."

"The second measure. We cannot advocate the 'introduction' of Socialism—that would be sheer nonsense. We must preach Socialism." The majority of the population of Russia consists of peasants, of petty proprietors, who cannot even conceive of Socialism. But what objection can they have to there being a bank in every village which would enable them to improve their husbandry? They can have no objection to that. We must preach these practical measures to the peasants and imbue them with the firm conviction that they are indispensable.

"The sugar syndicate is a different matter—that already exists. Our proposal here must be eminently practical. These fully developed syndicates must be handed over to the State. If the Soviets wish to assume power, it must be only for such ends. There is no other reason why they should assume power. The matter stands as follows: either the Soviets develop, or they die an inglorious death, as was the case with the Paris Commune. If it is a bourgeois republic that is wanted, the Cadets can manage that just as well."¹

Advancing the slogan, "All power to the Soviets!" for the transition period, Lenin outlined a definite programme for the Soviets when they had achieved power.

As Stalin points out, the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" implied:

"The rupture of the bloc of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries with the Cadets, the formation of a Soviet government consisting of Mensheviks and So-

¹ Lenin "Report on the Current Situation," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.) Vol. VI., pp. 100-101.

cialist-Revolutionaries (for at that time the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks predominated in the Soviets), freedom of agitation for the opposition (i.e., for the Bolsheviks) and the free struggle of parties within the Soviets, the assumption being that by means of such a struggle the Bolsheviks would succeed in capturing the Soviets, and in changing the composition of the Soviet government by a peaceful development of the revolution. Of course, this plan did not imply the dictatorship of the proletariat. But it undoubtedly would make it easier to create the conditions necessary to ensure the dictatorship, for by putting the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into power and forcing them to carry into effect their anti-revolutionary platform, it hastened the exposure of the true nature of these parties, it hastened their isolation, their rupture with the masses."¹

Lenin proposed tactics that conformed with his estimate of the current situation, namely, to explain to the masses at every step that the Provisional Government was counter-revolutionary and incapable of bringing about peace or of giving the peasants land; to show that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were nothing but servitors of the bourgeoisie and that the power could be taken from the capitalists only if the treacherous character of the compromising Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties were exposed. In the preparatory stage of the proletarian revolution, the petty-bourgeois compromising parties constituted the greatest danger of all. Diverting the masses from the fight against the enemies by advocating a compromise with the bourgeoisie, they undermined the will to struggle and demoralised the workers and other sections of the working population. If the compromising parties were not exposed and isolated, the masses could not be trained for the decisive fight against the bourgeoisie. All genuinely revolutionary elements, those who were prepared to go the full limit, had to be rallied to the support of the Party, and the defencists, the supporters of a "war to a victorious finish," had to be isolated.

These tactics, which were designed by the Bolsheviks to achieve the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets, were explained by Lenin at the April Conference as follows:

"Some may ask: Have we not repudiated our own principles? We advocated the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war—are we not going back on ourselves? But the first civil war in Russia has ended; we are now passing to a second war—a war between im-

¹ J. Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," "Leninism," Vol. I, p. 128.

perialism and the armed people. In this transitional period as long as the armed force is in the hands of the soldiers, as long as Milyukov and Guchkov have not resorted to violence, this civil war, as far as we are concerned, turns into peaceful, prolonged, and patient class propaganda. If we speak of civil war before people have come to realise its necessity, we shall certainly be guilty of Blanquism. We are for civil war, but only when it is waged by a class conscious of itself. Only he who is known to the people as a despot can be overthrown. But there are no despots now: the guns and rifles are in the hands of the soldiers, and not the capitalists; the capitalists are getting their way now not by violence, but by fraud. To cry out against violence now is nonsense."¹

This orientation towards a proletarian, Socialist revolution presumed a new disposition of class forces. The bourgeoisie in town and country could be opposed only by the proletariat, acting in close alliance with the poor peasants and neutralising the unstable elements among the peasantry—the middle peasants. But "neutralising" did not mean that the middle peasants should be neutral, should hold aloof from the struggle and await its issue. In a civil war, when the people are sharply divided into two hostile camps, there can in general be no neutrals, there can be none who take no part in the fight. Neutralising the middle peasant meant compelling him not to interfere with the revolution, but it also meant securing his help, if possible. As a matter of fact, right up to the eve of the proletarian revolution the majority of the middle peasants, clad in soldier's uniform, were the greatest waverers of all, and it was only in September 1917, when the agrarian question and the question of peace could be settled only by the proletariat, that they began to act as the temporary supporters of the workers. But it was just because the middle peasant was a vacillating ally that Lenin insisted on an alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants.

Lenin's proposals were hostilely received not only by the petty-bourgeois parties, not only by Trotsky, but also by a small group within the Bolshevik Party. Kamenev, supported by Rykov, Nogin and others, opposed Lenin and asserted that until the landed estates had been abolished it could not be said that the bourgeois revolution had ended and that the transfer of power to the Soviets was on the order of the day. As against Lenin's revolutionary call to break with the Provisional Government and to transfer the entire power to the Soviets, Kamenev advocated that

¹ Lenin, "Report on the Current Situation," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 95.

the Soviets should exercise control over the Provisional Government. Kamenev, in fact, took up the Menshevik position of defending the bourgeois government, which could not and would not advance a single step, because it was counter-revolutionary by its class nature. To demand control over such a government, without possessing the real power to back that control, was to disseminate among the people the false hope that the bourgeoisie was capable of achieving the aims of the revolution.

Criticising Kamenev's views, Lenin said :

"I can understand the uneducated mass of workers and soldiers naively and unintelligently believing in control. It is sufficient, however, to ponder over the fundamental aspects of control to realise that such a belief is a retreat from the basic principles of the class struggle."¹

At the Petrograd Conference of Bolsheviks, which was held a few days earlier than the All-Russian Conference, Lenin had said in reply to Kamenev :

"There can be no control without power. To control by means of resolution, etc., is pure nonsense."²

The nature of the differences between Lenin and the group of Right Bolsheviks was expressed most definitely of all by Rykov in his speech at the Conference.

"Where will the sun of Socialist revolution rise?" he asked. "I consider that, in view of all the conditions, in view of our petty-bourgeois level, the initiative of a Socialist revolution cannot be ours. We possess neither the forces nor the objective conditions for this. But in the West the question is approximately in the same stage as the overthrow of tsarism with us."³

Like Kamenev, Rykov would not go beyond a bourgeois revolution for Russia. Lenin severely criticised this Menshevik attitude :

"Rykov says that Socialism must come from other countries with a more developed industry. But this is not so. Nobody can say who will begin it and who will end it. That is not Marxism but a parody on Marxism."⁴

1 Lenin, "Report on the Current Situation," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 91.

2 Lenin, "Two Rebuttals During the Discussion of the Resolution on the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government," "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 209.

3 "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)," April 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 93.

4 Lenin, "Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation," "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX, Book I, p. 287.

The Conference supported Lenin. Only seven or eight delegates abstained from voting on Lenin's motions, the rest voted in favour. This was one more proof of the ideological solidarity of the Party.

The April Conference adopted a resolution on the principal question on the agenda—the current situation—of which the chief point was as follows :

“The proletariat of Russia, operating in one of the most backward countries of Europe, in the midst of a small-peasant population, cannot set itself the aim of bringing about the Socialist transformation immediately.

“But it would be a great mistake, and in practice even complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to deduce from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that we must confine our activities within limits acceptable to the petty-bourgeoisie, or that we must reject the leading role of the proletariat in the work of explaining to the people the urgency of a series of steps towards Socialism which are now practically ripe.

“Such steps are, firstly, the nationalisation of the land. Such a measure, while not directly transcending the bounds of the bourgeois system, would nevertheless be a serious blow at the private ownership of the means of production, and to that extent would strengthen the influence of the Socialist proletariat over the semi-proletarians of the countryside.

“Such steps are, further, the establishment of State control over all the banks and their amalgamation into a single central bank, and also over the insurance societies and the larger capitalist syndicates (e.g. the Sugar Syndicate, the Coal Syndicate, the Metal Syndicate, etc.), and the gradual introduction of a fairer progressive tax on incomes and property. Economically, such measures are completely ripe, technically they can without question be put into effect immediately, and politically they may well meet with the support of the overwhelming majority of the peasants, who would in every respect benefit from these reforms.”¹

Reporting to the Conference on this part of the resolution, Lenin added :

“‘This is a bourgeois revolution, and it is therefore useless to speak of Socialism,’ say our opponents. But we say just the reverse : ‘Since the bourgeoisie cannot find a way out of the present situation, the revolution is going on.’ We must not confine ourselves to democratic phrases, we must make the situation clear to the masses

1 “The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks),” April 1917, Moscow, 1934, pp. 285-86.

and must indicate to them a series of practical measures: they must take over the syndicates and must control them through the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, etc. And when all such measures are carried out, Russia will stand with one foot in Socialism."¹

The Conference adopted a separate resolution on the war, which was drafted by Lenin. In this resolution Lenin described the class significance of the war, explained what the revolutionary defensism of the masses meant and dwelt chiefly on how to end the war. On this last point the resolution of the April Conference of the Bolsheviks states:

"As regards the most important question of all, how to end this war of the capitalists as early as possible—and not by a coercive peace, but by a truly democratic peace—the Conference recognises and resolves:

"This war cannot be ended by the refusal of the soldiers of only one side to continue the war, by the simple cessation of hostilities by one of the belligerent parties.

"The Conference once more protests against the vile slander spread by the capitalists against our Party that we are sympathetic towards a separate peace with Germany. We consider the German capitalists the same sort of bandits as the Russian, British and French capitalists, and Kaiser Wilhelm as much a crowned bandit as Nicholas II and the British, Italian, Rumanian and all other monarchs.

"Our Party will patiently but persistently explain to the people the truth that wars are conducted by governments, that wars are always intimately associated with the policy of definite classes, and that this war can be ended by a democratic peace only as a result of the transfer of the entire power of the State in at least several of the belligerent countries to the class of proletarians and semi-proletarians, which is really capable of putting and end to the yoke of capital."²

In the light of this resolution on the war, it is very important to note the opinion of the Bolsheviks on a proposal to summon a peace conference. A Danish "Socialist" named Borgbjerg came to Petrograd. He belonged to the opportunist majority of the Danish Social-Democratic Party, which had gone over to the side of its bourgeoisie. Borgbjerg, speaking in the name of the three Scandinavian parties—the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish—which

¹ Lenin, "Speech in Favour of the Resolution on the Political Situation," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 232.

² "The Seventh (April), All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)," April, 1917, Moscow, 1984, pp. 221-2.

also favoured the defence of the bourgeois fatherland, suggested that the Petrograd Soviet should summon a Socialist peace conference. Borgbjerg admitted that he was acting on behalf of German defencists of the type of Scheidemann, who agreed to peace negotiations on the basis of Germany's renunciation of her conquests. It was clear that under the spur of starvation, economic disruption and growing revolution in the rear, German imperialism was endeavouring, through the intermediary of a neutral "defencist"—Denmark was not one of the belligerent countries—to come to a peaceful understanding with her antagonists over the division of the spoils. Germany was prepared to renounce the conquests she had made during the war, but she said nothing of her earlier conquests. The British and French defencists did not agree to a peace conference, thereby showing that their masters—the British and French imperialists—would not hear of peace and were in favour of fighting the war to a victorious finish. The Bolshevik Conference exposed the imperialist character of this peace farce. The resolution stated:

"Socialists cannot, without betraying the proletarian cause, participate either directly or indirectly in this filthy and mercenary deal between the capitalists of the various countries for the division of their plunder."¹

The conference dwelt specially on the role of the British and French defencists:

"The Conference further records the fact that the British and French Socialists, who have gone over to the side of their capitalist governments, have refused to attend the conference Borgbjerg is endeavouring to organise. This fact clearly shows that the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie, whose agents these supposed Socialists are, want to continue, want to drag out this imperialist war and refuse even to discuss the concessions which the German imperialist bourgeoisie is obliged to promise through Borgbjerg under the influence, of growing exhaustion, famine, economic disruption and, what is most important, the approaching workers' revolution in Germany."²

The Conference decided to make these facts known as widely as possible, and declared that the Bolsheviks would attend a conference and enter into a fraternal alliance only with those labour parties of other countries which were also

1 "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)." April, 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 227.

2 Ibid., p. 228.

fighting in their own countries for the transfer of power to the proletariat.

An important part in the struggle for the transfer of power to the new class was played by the oppressed nationalities. The result of the revolution would depend on whether the proletariat succeeded in securing the following of the working masses of the oppressed nationalities. The bourgeois government was continuing the old tsarist policy of throttling and crushing the national minorities. The national movement was suppressed as of yore. The Finnish Diet and similar bodies were dispersed. "Russia, united and indivisible," continued to be the guiding principle of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties. The Bolsheviks were the only party to oppose this feudal principle and openly to declare that the working populations of the oppressed nations were entitled to determine their own destinies.

In his report to the Conference, Stalin, who in conjunction with Lenin had drawn up the principles of the policy of the Bolsheviks on the national question, brought out the predatory character of the government's policy and mercilessly exposed the petty-bourgeois compromisers, who were following in the wake of the bourgeoisie. Stalin set forth the revolutionary programme of the Bolshevik Party in opposition to those who wanted to perpetuate national oppression:

"...Our views on the national question can be reduced to the following propositions: (a) recognition of the right of nations of secession; (b) regional autonomy for nations remaining within the given State; (c) special legislation guaranteeing freedom of development for national minorities; (d) a single, indivisible proletarian body, a single party for the proletarians of all nationalities of the given State."¹

Y. Pyatakov made a counter-report on the national question at the Conference and was supported by several delegates. He declared that in the era of a world economy, which bound all countries together in an indissoluble bond, the national State represented a past stage in history:

"The demand for independence has been borrowed from another historical era; it is reactionary, because it wants to reverse history. On the basis of an analysis of the new era of imperialism, we declare that we cannot at the present moment even conceive of any other fight

¹ "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)," April, 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 194.

under the slogan 'Down with frontiers!'—and fight for the abolition of all frontiers."¹

Pyatakof's speech was severely criticised by Lenin, who said:

"The method of a Socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with frontiers!' is a complete muddle... What is meant by the 'method' of a Socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with frontiers!?' We recognise the necessity for the State, and a State presumes frontiers... It would be insane to continue the policy of Tsar Nicholas."²

L. Kamenev and Y. Pyatakof were united by their common misunderstanding of the aims of the revolution. The former, by denying the Socialist character of the revolution, was dragging the Party into the Menshevik swamp. The latter, without coming out openly against Lenin's position on this question, was in practice condemning the revolution to isolation and defeat. The Party fought on two fronts—against the Right opportunists and against the "Left" oppositionists.

The reports of Lenin and Stalin covered the principal questions at the Conference. Other delegates only developed the leading ideas set forth by Lenin and Stalin.

On the question of the attitude towards the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Conference stressed the fact that in the provinces the revolution was advancing and was making for the transfer of the entire power to the Soviets, whereas in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain other large cities, where the main forces of the bourgeoisie were concentrated and where the policy of compromising with the bourgeoisie was most marked, the transfer of power to the Soviets would be accompanied by very great difficulties. The resolution stated:

"It is therefore the task of the proletarian party, on the one hand, to give all possible support to this development of the revolution in the provinces and, on the other hand, to carry on a systematic fight within the Soviets (by means of propaganda and by new elections) for the triumph of the proletarian line; to direct all its efforts and attention to the worker and soldier masses, to the separation of the proletarian line from the petty-bourgeois line, the internationalist line from the defencist line, the revolutionary line from the opportunist line, and to the organisation and arming of the workers

¹ "The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)," April, 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 195.

² Lenin, "Speech on the National Question, April 29, 1917," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 277.

and the preparation of their forces for the next stage of the revolution.”¹

Having discussed the question of “uniting the internationalists against the petty-bourgeois defencist bloc,” the Conference declared its opposition to any kind of bloc with parties which had not abandoned defencism. The Conference rejected agreements with social-chauvinists of other countries and advocated the creation of a Third International.

The April Conference of the Bolsheviks was of tremendous significance for the development of the Party and the revolution. The April Conference served to concentrate the attention of the Bolshevik Party on the struggle for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the Socialist revolution. The Conference drew up a definite revolutionary programme for this stage in the transformation of the revolution. The Conference indicated the classes which furthered the revolution. It adopted decisions on every fundamental question of the revolution—war, land, and the fight against famine. It pointed to the only way out of the situation, namely, the transfer of the entire power of the State to the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, Peasants’ and other Deputies all over Russia.

Lenin, in his speech closing the April Conference said:

“The proletariat will find in our resolutions material to guide the advance to the second stage of our revolution.”²

As against the honeyed phrases of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which called on the masses quietly to submit and calmly to await the blessings that might be conferred on them by the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks issued a bold fighting call, a call for the further development of the revolution.

The heroic path leading to the defeat of tsarism having been traversed, the Party, at its April All-Russian Conference, worked out the general lines for the defeat of the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois allies. And the unanimity with which the Conference adopted the decisions on the reports of Lenin and Stalin was a pledge of victory in this new stage.

¹ “The Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference and the Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks),” April, 1917, Moscow, 1934, p. 238.

² Lenin, “Concluding Remarks at the Closing of the Conference, April, 29, 1917,” “Collected Works,” (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 238.

CHAPTER V

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY WORKS TO WIN THE MASSES

I

THE APRIL DEMONSTRATION

Just before the April Conference of the Bolsheviks the class antagonisms in Petrograd assumed an open form. Neither the concessions of the bourgeoisie nor the manoeuvres of the compromisers were of any avail. On April 20 and 21 mass demonstrations against the war were held in the streets of the capital.

Until now the Provisional Government had concealed its true intentions. Its references to the war were deliberately vague and designed to inspire the masses with the hope that the slaughter would soon come to an end. The government bided its time, waiting until the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had accomplished their task of preparing the masses for the continuation of the war. But the bourgeoisie began to fear that the efforts of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik agitators would be nullified by the growing hostility to the war. Moreover, the government's declaration of March 28, which spoke, although vaguely, of "the establishment of a lasting peace on the basis of the self-determination of nations," had produced an unpleasant impression on the Allied imperialists. They demanded a plain answer—would Russia fight?

On April 18 Milyukov explained that the declaration of March 28 expressed "the general desire of the people to fight the World War until a decisive victory is achieved."¹

It was on this very day—May 1 (New Style)—that the workers and soldiers demonstrated on the streets under the slogan announced in the declaration of the Soviet: "A Peace Without Annexations and Indemnities!"

The patently imperialist character of Milyukov's note evoked a furious protest—above all among the troops quartered in Petrograd. On April 20 the Finland Regiment organised a demonstration. They bore a banner with the

¹ "Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs," "Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 87, April 20, 1917.

inscription, "Down with the Policy of Conquest!" A little later the 180th Regiment came out. A part of the naval garrison demonstrated. No Officers accompanied them. Over 15,000 demonstrators assembled in a determined mood in front of the Mariinsky Palace, where the Provisional Government was in session. Gotz and Skobelev, leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were sent to address the soldiers, but their speeches were unavailing. The soldiers adopted the following resolution:

"Having acquainted ourselves with Milyukov's note on the aims of the war, and expressing our indignation at this shameless utterance, which is in open contradiction to the appeal of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to the peoples of the world and to the declaration of the Provisional Government itself, we demand Milyukov's immediate resignation."¹

In order to divert the attention of the masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Soviet. At this meeting the representative of the soldiers and sailors assembled in front of the Mariinsky Palace declared that the crisis would be overcome either by "our own government" or by "civil war."

The action of the workers and soldiers evoked the counteraction of the bourgeoisie. The supporters of the Provisional Government brought out regiments which had still not realised the true policy of the Provisional Government. House-owners, shopkeepers, small tradesmen and salaried employees, led by the Cadets, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, organised a demonstration under the slogan "Confidence in the Provisional Government!"

Under cover of this noisy patriotic demonstration, the government proceeded to adopt more vigorous measures. General Kornilov, the new Commander of the Petrograd Military Area—the man who was later to become the standard-bearer of counter-revolution—ordered the Mikhailovsky Artillery School to dispatch two batteries of guns to the Palace Square. The private soldiers at the school and some of the officers decided to verify whether the Soviet was cognizant of Kornilov's order. They learnt that the Soviet had given no instructions. Within two hours the over-zealous general was obliged to countermand the order for the dispatch of guns. But the mere fact that the order had been given showed that the government had intended

¹ "The Provisional Government. A Resolution of the 180th Infantry Reserve Regiment and the Finland Guards Regiment, April 20, 1917," "Soldatskaya Pravda" (Soldier's Truth), No. 8, May 10, 1917.

to fire on the demonstration. This was borne out by subsequent events: here and there the workers were fired on.

The action of the bourgeoisie, in its turn, evoked a demonstration by the proletariat. The following day the workers of factory after factory flocked into the streets. The outskirts of the city were filled with workers and soldiers who had come out to protest against the imperialist policy. In the centre of the city, along the Nevsky Prospect, marched small groups of government supporters.

Banners bearing the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government!" were also to be met with in the workers' demonstration. This slogan was advanced by a section of the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee although it was counter to the policy of the Central Committee of the Party. Lenin severely condemned this thoughtless slogan. At the April Conference of the Party, he said:

"All we wanted was to carry out a peaceful reconnaissance of the enemy's forces, but not to give battle.... To move 'a wee bit more to the Left' at the moment of action was inept. We regard this as a great crime, as an act of disorganisation."¹

L. Trotsky, who at that time was not yet a member of the Bolshevik Party, has completely distorted Lenin's views. In his "Lessons of October," Trotsky writes:

"The April demonstration, which went 'more to the Left' than was necessary, was a reconnoitring skirmish to test the mood of the masses and the relations between them and the majority on the Soviet. Having made this reconnaissance, Lenin withdrew the slogan demanding the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government, but withdrew it for several weeks or months, depending on the speed with which the indignation of the masses against the compromisers would grow."²

This false assertion is fundamentally contradictory to Lenin's whole tactics. In April Lenin did not withdraw the slogan demanding "the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government," for the simple reason that Lenin had not advanced this slogan in April. In fact, Lenin was opposed to this slogan in April and condemned it at the Party Conference. The great significance of the tactics of the Bolsheviks lay precisely in the fact that their slogans reflected the cherished wishes of the masses, that they formulated the political demands of the masses and rallied the masses around the Bolshevik standards. The recon-

¹ Lenin, "Reply to the Discussion on the Current Situation, April 24," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 232.

² L. Trotsky, "Lessons of October," "Collected Works," Vol. III, Part I, Moscow, pp. 27-8.

naissance of the enemy's strength, of which Lenin speaks, means something quite different in class war from what it means in ordinary war.

"A political army is not the same thing as a military army," as Stalin very aptly puts it. "While a military command begins a war with an army ready to hand, the Party has to create its army in the course of the struggle itself, in the course of the collisions between classes, as fast as the masses themselves become convinced by their own experience that the slogans of the Party, the policy of the Party, are right."

"Of course, every such demonstration threw a certain amount of light on the interrelation of forces which were hidden from the eye; there was a certain amount of reconnoitring, but this reconnoitring was not the motive for the demonstration, but its natural consequence."

The April demonstration in Petrograd served to stimulate the class consciousness of the masses in other industrial centres.

The Moscow proletariat responded to the events in Petrograd by a demonstration of solidarity.

The April events in Moscow were described by an employee in the office of the Governor of the City of Moscow as follows:

"A crowd of people filled the square in front of the Soviet. Orators clung to the Skobelev monument. Red flags fluttered and waved above the crowd and scores of placards were held aloft bearing the motto, 'Down with Milyukov!' The crowd was in an exalted and excited mood... One after another, Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary orators appeared on the balcony of the House of the Soviets and made pacifying speeches... The crowd down below on the square greeted the orators in a very unfriendly spirit; the pacifying speeches were interrupted by catcalls, ironical interjections and demands for Milyukov's resignation. Red placards with the demand, 'Down with Milyukov!' were poked up by the crowd to the balcony so that the orators could see them better.... The situation grew more alarming when the demonstrators were joined by the 55th Regiment, which arrived almost in full strength also bearing banners with the demand 'Down with the Capitalist Ministers!' 'Down with Milyukov!'"²

The demonstrating soldiers were joined by large numbers of workers from the Zamoskvorechye district, promi-

1 J. Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," "Leninism," Vol. I, p. 123.

2 A. N. Voznesensky, "Moscow in 1917," Moscow, 1928, pp. 45-46.

nent among whom were the workers from the Michelson Factory, who had established friendly relations with the Fifty-fifth Regiment.

The April demonstration and the echo it evoked in the country revealed the full profundity of the political crisis.

The soldiers, who had sincerely believed that the Provisional Government desired peace, were incensed most of all. The unstable mass swung to the Left, to the side of the workers. The vacillations of this mass, which, as Lenin defined it, "could by its strength decide everything," imparted motion to the extremes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie supported the Provisional Government, the proletariat supported the slogans of the Bolshevik Party. The question was, which of the two classes—the proletariat or the bourgeoisie—would win the following of the unstable mass, the petty-bourgeoisie?

The petty-bourgeois leaders in the Soviet, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, had also momentarily swung towards the revolution, but the bourgeoisie scared them with the spectre of civil war, and after the demonstrations of the workers the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks again obediently followed the bourgeoisie. Before the April crisis about half the members of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet had declared their opposition to the Provisional Government, but after the demonstrations thirty-four members, as against nineteen, supported a motion expressing confidence in the capitalists and readiness to work hand in hand with them.

A resolution drafted by Lenin and adopted by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party described these class movements as follows:

"The petty-bourgeois masses, being incensed with the capitalists, first swung away from them towards the workers, but two days later they again followed the Menshevik and Narodnik [i.e., Socialist-Revolutionary—*Trans.*] leaders, who were advocating 'confidence' in and 'compromise' with the capitalists.

"These leaders agreed to a compromise, completely surrendered their positions and contented themselves with the empty and purely verbal reservations of the capitalists."¹

The April outburst proved to the bourgeoisie that by himself Kerensky—the "hostage of democracy," as he was called—could not ensure the support of the masses. A further extension to the Left would have to be made. The Provisional Government decided to sacrifice Guchkov and

¹ Lenin, "Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Adopted on the Morning of April 22, 1917," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 224.

Milyukov. On April 26 the government issued an announcement declaring that it would invite fresh public forces into the government. On April 27 Prince Lvov wrote to Chkheidze proposing that the Soviet should appoint its representatives to the government, otherwise the bourgeoisie would resign the government. Having failed to secure undivided power, the bourgeoisie hoped to put an end to the dual power by forming a coalition with representatives of the Soviet. And that is just how Milyukov regarded the coalition:

"At any rate it [the coalition government—*Ed.*] enables us to hope for the attainment of two of the most important aims of the moment, viz., reinforcement of the government and a change in the mood of the army."¹

But the Executive Committee of the Soviet was bound by its old resolution of February 28 not to join the Government. The ultimatum of the bourgeoisie created a situation in which the power might fall into the hands of the Soviet, and this was precisely what the compromisers feared most of all. An all-Russian conference of Mensheviks was at that time in progress. It explained the necessity of joining the government as follows:

"Incapable either of sufficiently energetic revolutionary measures in the sphere of internal development, or, in particular, of a consistent policy of peace in the sphere of foreign relations, it [the Provisional Government—*Ed.*] has inspired mistrust in the broad democratic masses. It therefore did not enjoy the necessary plenitude of power, and a considerable part of the latter steadily passed to the Soviets."²

The Mensheviks frankly admitted that the power was passing from the Provisional Government to the Soviets. This transfer of power to the Soviets could be prevented only by joining the government and thus bolstering it up. On May 1 the Executive Committee rescinded its old resolution and resolved to appoint another four "Socialist" Ministers to the government. On the evening of May 5, reporting to the Soviet on the subject of the new government the Menshevik Skobelev said:

"If, on the basis of this declaration, you deem it necessary to appoint us to the new government, you will then have to display complete confidence in the government and ensure it full power."³

1 "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 18.

2 "The All-Russian Conference of Menshevik and Joint Organizations of the R.S.D.L.P.," Moscow, 1917, p. 35.

3 "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 60, May 7, 1917.

At this meeting, A. R. Gotz, one of the most prominent Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, stated that the Socialist-Revolutionaries were appointing their representatives to the government in order that they might there achieve the demand for "land and freedom." Gotz concluded his speech with the words:

"They are not going as captives of the bourgeoisie, but in order to occupy a new position in the trenches of the revolution, now pushed forward."¹

Tsereteli said at this meeting of the Soviet that there were only two ways out of the existing situation: either to join the government or to take power. The second alternative, in Tsereteli's opinion, was out of the question because

"the bourgeoisie is not isolated: it is supported by a part of the army and by the peasantry, and these would swing away from the revolutionary movement."²

The Soviet endorsed the decision of the Executive Committee. On the following day, May 6, the following list of members of the coalition government was published: Premier and Minister for the Interior, Prince G. E. Lvov; Minister of War and Marine, A. F. Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Justice, P. N. Pereverzev (a close supporter of the Socialist-Revolutionaries); Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko; Minister of Ways of Communication, N. V. Nekrasov (Cadet); Minister of Commerce and Industry, A. I. Konovalov (Progressivist); Minister of Production, A. A. Manuylov (Cadet); Minister of Finance, A. I. Shingaryov (Cadet); Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Post and Telegraph, I. G. Tsereteli (Menshevik); Minister of Labour, M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik); Minister of Food, A. V. Peshekhonov ("Popular Socialist"); Minister of Poor Relief, Prince V. N. Shakhovskoi (Cadet); Procurator-General, V. N. Lvov (Centre); Comptroller-General, I. V. Godnev (Octobrist).

Kerensky's appointment betrayed the real purpose of the coalition. He was put in charge of the Ministers of War and Marine in the belief that he enjoyed a certain measure of confidence among the armed forces. The day before, on May 5, at the evening session of the Soviet, a representative of the Eleventh Army had emphasised the extreme importance of Kerensky's appointment on the grounds that he enjoyed the confidence not only of the soldiers but also of

¹ "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 60, May 7, 1917.

² Ibid.

many officers. It was largely on the recommendation of Milyukov that Tereshchenko—a millionaire and patron of Affairs. “He at least will know how to talk to the diplomats.” Milyukov said, referring to the new Minister’s knowledge of languages and his polished manners. But it was not so much a question of manners as of politics.

Nabokov, a Cadet, wrote of Tereshchenko as follows:

“The aim he set himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs was to follow the policy of Milyukov, but in such a way as not to be interfered with by the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies. He wanted to fool them all.”¹

¹ V. D. Nabokov, “The Provisional Government. Reminiscences,” Moscow, 1924, p. 78.

THE COALITION GOVERNMENT IN ACTION

The coalition with the compromisers (the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—*Trans.*) enabled the bourgeoisie to institute a sort of division of labour within the government. The "Socialist" Ministers came out before the people with "democratic" speeches and proposals, while the leaders of the bourgeoisie, screened by the compromisers, mobilised their forces for a new offensive against the revolution. The State Duma resumed its activities under the guise of "private conferences." The first of these conferences was held on April 22. Rodzyanko defined the purpose of these conferences as follows: people were expecting the Duma delegates "to indicate how the ship of State should be steered."¹ And N. V. Savich, an Octobrist, added: "It is our business to mould public opinion."²

The Minister of Agriculture in the May Coalition Government was V. M. Chernov. A leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and its theoretician, he was also reputed to be an expert on the agrarian question. Having received a Ministerial portfolio, Chernov should have endeavoured to put the muddled, Socialist-Revolutionary theories into practice. But it was not for this purpose that the Socialist-Revolutionary leader had been invited to join the government. Prince Volkonsky, a big landlord in the Tambov Province, wrote a letter to Chernov at the beginning of June explaining what the landlords expected of him.

"Only by prescription from above," the Prince bombastically wrote, "can uniformity of action be attained. only in this way can cold water be poured on the coals of greed heated by the passions of the class war, the smoke of which bids fair to becloud all conception of social benefit and the flames to devour the fortunes of those who fan them.... They [the peasants—*Ed.*] must be authoritatively told that there are actions which in times like ours are unnatural. They must be told this, and they can be told this by you alone, from St. Petersburg. Every word uttered here, locally, is under suspicion: they will not believe one because he is a landlord, another because he is a merchant, a third because, 'of course,' he is a 'lawyer,' and, generally, because they are all 'bour-

¹ "The Bourgeoisie and Landlords in 1917, Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 21.

² "Private Conference of Members of the State Duma," "Ryech," May 6, 1917, No. 105.

geois' and 'old-regime.'... You, M. le Ministre, are new-regime... Say the word, and they will believe you. There is still time, but not much."¹

The landlords recommended V. Chernov to pose as "new-regime," in the expectation that the Socialist-Revolutionary leader would be believed and that he would be able to pour cold water on the "coals of greed," as people like Volkonsky called the seizure of the landed estates by the peasants.

Chernov began to the best of his ability to pour water on the conflagration that was spreading in the countryside. Such was the real purpose of the numerous bills he initiated. He was invested with the halo of a champion of the interests of the peasants. Chernov was called "the muzhiks' Minister," but, it was added, it was unlikely that he could do anything, because he did not enjoy the support of the government. This legend was energetically disseminated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who feared that, for all the bills he initiated, the activities of the Minister would undermine the peasants' confidence in their party. The halo of a champion of the muzhiks that surrounded the name of Chernov was advantageous to the landlords themselves, for it fostered the hope among the peasants that a peaceful arrangement could be arrived at with the owners of the land. Somewhat later, when the Cadets began to accuse Chernov of carrying through the programme of his party and of conniving at the "peasant disorders," he hastened to disavow the honorary title of "the muzhiks' Minister." On July 1 Chernov wrote:

"It is precisely the purpose of my bills to divert local public activity into legal channels, for otherwise it inevitably overflows its banks and, like a flood, causes much of destruction."²

Such were Chernov's aims—namely, to prevent the peasant flood from overflowing its banks and to avert the break-up of the landed estates. But in the midst of rising revolution this was a difficult task. The "muzhiks' Minister" made continual blunders: at one time, pushed on by the peasant organisations, he would run too far ahead; at another, intimidated by the angry outcry of the Cadets, he would lag behind. The Chief Land Committee refused to acknowledge Chernov's creations. P. A. Vikhliayev, Assistant Minister of Agriculture, was obliged at one meeting of the Chief Land Committee to admonish its members that the Minister of Agriculture could not be transformed

1 "The Bourgeoisie and the Provisional Government," "Proletarskaya Revolyutsia," 1926, No. 10 (57), pp. 246-47.

2 "Statement by V. M. Chernov in Reference to Prince G. E. Lvov's Letter," "Dyen," No. 107, July 12, 1917.

into the horn of a gramophone and that he must be allowed a certain measure of independence. The "gramophone," of course, was not the Chief Land Committee, which did not engage in practical work, but the organisation of the landed proprietors and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. It was from these bodies that the Provisional Government actually received its practical instructions.

The guiding hand of the landlords was clumsily revealed in the very first measures taken by the "muzhiks' Minister." The first thing the Ministry of Agriculture began to fuss with was the prohibition of the purchase and sale of land—one of the peasants' chief demands. Feverish speculation in land had begun with the outbreak of the revolution. Landlords sold off their estates—chiefly to foreigners, who were confident of their immunity. Landlords broke up their estates and transferred them to sham owners. Land was neglected and left uncultivated. The peasants demanded an immediate embargo on the purchase and sale of land. They had to be pacified. Chernov drafted a bill prohibiting transactions in land until further notice. On the basis of this draft, Pereverzev, the Minister of Justice, a Popular Socialist, sent a telegraphic circular to the public notaries on May 17 temporarily prohibiting transactions in land.

The landlords at once gave the Ministers to understand that they had reckoned without their host. The Council of the United Societies of the Nobility sent a memorandum dated May 24 expressing surprise that the precipitate telegram of the Minister of Justice had not been refuted in the press. The landlords explained to the Minister that prohibiting transactions in land meant depriving the landlords of the right to dispose of their property and limited their enjoyment of it, and that, finally, it was a reversion to serfdom, because it tied the landlord to land which he might want to dispose of. In conclusion, the Council of the United Societies of the Nobility reminded the Provisional Government that in its declarations it had repeatedly promised to leave the settlement of the land question to the Constituent Assembly. The protest of the landlords was supported by the Committee of Congress of Representatives of Joint Stock Companies, by the land banks and by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. At the end of May, Minister of Justice Pereverzev explained in a telegraphic circular that the embargo on transactions in land did not extend to mortgages or the transfer of mortgages. This concession virtually nullified the embargo on transactions in land.

On June 24 a report appeared in the press to the effect that the Minister of Agriculture had introduced a new

bill prohibiting the purchase and sale of land. While the "muzhiks' Minister" was introducing this bill, Demyanov, the Assistant Minister of Justice, definitely abolished every restriction on land transactions and explained that such transactions must be effected and endorsed strictly in accordance with existing legislation.

Behind all this business of the embargo on transactions in land stood Rodzyanko, the Chairman of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, whom Lenin called "this former President of the former State Duma ... this former agent of Stolypin the Hangman."¹

Skobelev, the Minister of Labour, also served as a screen for the bourgeoisie.

There had been no special Ministry of Labour in the government before; there had only been a Labour Department of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Those who controlled the factories also controlled labour questions. But since the government had decided to crowd up and make room for several Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, "labour" had to be taken out of the charge of the bourgeois Minister, and on May 5 a new Ministry was created. When the Department of Labour was still part of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a Special Committee for the Preliminary Drafting of Labour Legislation had been set up. The Committee consisted of eight representatives from the Soviet, eight from the employers, one representative each from the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities and two representatives from the Central War Industry Committee. No serious improvements could be expected from a committee constituted in this way. The labour representatives were always in the minority. This Special Committee drafted a law on trade unions. The bourgeois representatives strove to limit the rights of the trades unions. Skobelev preserved the Special Committee, which continued its old practices under the new "Socialist" Minister. The bill for an eight-hour day never got beyond the offices of the Ministry of Labour. The bourgeoisie had achieved its purpose: the agreement with the Soviet for the introduction of an eight-hour day proved to be nothing more than a temporary concession.

On April 23 the former, non-coalition government had passed a law on "workers' committees in industrial enterprises." These committees were entrusted with cultural and educational work in mills and factories, with regulating relations between workers and with representing the latter in negotiations with the managers. Nothing was said of the part the committees were to play in production; it was left

¹ Lenin, "How the Peasants Were Deceived—and Why," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 378.

to the employers and the workers to decide by "mutual agreement" whether members of the committees were to be relieved of their regular work; even the formation of the committees—which were known as factory committees—was not obligatory. Not only did Skobelev not change this state of affairs, but he openly declared that the factory committees had outlived their day. Skobelev proved to be a good champion of the interests of the capitalists.

Skobelev did not confine his activities to his own department. He helped other Ministers, especially Kononov, who had formerly been in charge of labour himself. The Provisional Government had said nothing definite in its declaration of May 6 on the subject of combating economic disruption. Kononov considered it his main business to postpone the settlement of urgent questions. Here, as in the other Ministries, numberless commissions and committees were set up which managed to pigeon-hole every question that came before them. V. A. Stepanov, the Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, a Left Cadet and member of the Fourth State Duma, related at a conference of members of the latter body on May 20 how the question of increasing wages had been discussed in his Ministry. Industrialists from the South of Russia, headed by the Cadet N. N. Kutler (a large landowner, who after the 1905 Revolution had been put in charge of the Department of Land and Agriculture), submitted a statement to the Provisional Government asserting that the workers' demands placed industry in a hopeless position. They declared that an increase in wages would not only swallow up their entire profit, but would make it impossible to pay wages without a considerable increase in the price of goods. The Minister of Commerce and Industry invited representatives from the factory owners and the workers to come to Petrograd. After a discussion lasting two days, it was decided to set up a special commission.

"To-day," V. A. Stepanov reported at the conference of the Duma, "this committee, divided into sections, met for the first time and examined the available material. It is of course very difficult to say what will come of it. It may be, God grant, that this hope will be fulfilled and that this commission will succeed in arriving at some understanding. Some of the workers said in private conversation that if such is the real position, they are prepared to moderate their demands—to what extent it is of course difficult to say. But then a very thorny question remains: what if these delegates, having satisfied themselves of the correctness of the figures, express their consent to moderate the demands; will this consent be tantamount to a renunciation of demands by the 800,000 workers they re-

present; or will it not rather end by their being deprived of their mandates as traitors who have betrayed the interests of the workers and have not justified their confidence? If this consent is not received, resort must be made to these two commissions [one for the verification of the manufacturers' figures, and the other for the study of a minimum wage—*Ed.*] as a last attempt...to find a solution to the problem."¹

On May 23 the commission rejected every one of the workers' demands. The question was transferred from committee to commission, and from commission to section with the sole purpose of delaying settlement.

In the middle of May the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet adopted a resolution on the necessity for State regulation of the national economy and for the establishment of special bodies for this purpose. Under the pressure of the Soviets, the Provisional Government on May 27 instructed several of the Ministers to draft a bill providing for the organisation of a supreme body to regulate the economic life of the country. Konovalov resigned, declaring that this was an "excessive demand." He was replaced by the Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Left Cadet V. A. Stepanov. The Committee on the development of the productive forces of Russia which had been set up by Konovalov on May 5, and which had done nothing since, on July 8 prepared a draft for a declaration on economic policy by the Provisional Government. It was not until June that the government endeavoured to review its own actions: it was not until June that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in the person of Stepanov, began seriously to reflect on the grave condition of the country, with a description of which the draft began. At one of the meetings of the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Commerce and Industry, its Chairman, the Cadet N. N. Kutler, a prominent figure in banking and industrial circles, demanded that the Provisional Government

"should announce its economic programme stating whether it intends to socialise industry or to preserve the capitalist system."²

Apparently, Kutler feared that on joining the first coalition government the Socialist Ministers, for all one knew, might set about introducing Socialism. Stepanov first of all replied to these fears of Kutler and the bourgeoisie generally.

1 "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 64.

2 V. Reichardt, "The Efforts of the Russian Bourgeoisie To Maintain Its Economic Mastery (February-October, 1917)," "Krassnaya Letopis" (Red Chronicles). 1930, No. 1 (34), p. 18.

"In view of the present meagreness of Russia's resources Socialism in itself would not save her from impoverishment,"¹

he said in the preamble to the statement. In the body of the draft statement itself he further explained that:

"Socialism must rest on the powerful foundation of universal organisation, which does not exist in Russia; on the full development of productive forces, the proper utilisation of which Russia has in fact not yet undertaken; finally, the transition to Socialism by one State alone is even impossible."²

Stepanov assembled the Menshevik arguments of the Second International to the effect that the victory of Socialism in one country alone is impossible and made deft use of them in his draft statement. Finally, he declared:

"That it is impossible for Russia to adopt a Socialist organisation of her national economy at the present time apparently arouses no doubt either among the members of the Provisional Government or among the realistically-minded circles of the revolutionary democracy. A declaration should be made by the government to this effect in order to avoid all misunderstanding."³

Minister Skobelev, representing the "realistically-minded circles of the revolutionary democracy" to which Stepanov referred, hastened to remove every possibility of "misunderstanding." On June 16, in an interview given to Moscow journalists, he confirmed Stepanov's thesis by declaring that when speaking of the regulation of industry by the State he in nowise meant Socialist production. The bourgeois could be quite easy in their minds: Stepanov and "Socialists" like Skobelev would conscientiously protect them from Socialism.

Food affairs were transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the newly created Ministry of Food, which was placed under the charge of the statistician Peshekhonov, a Popular Socialist and "ultra-moderate Narodnik," as Lenin described him. Peshekhonov made it clear that his appointment to the Ministry would entail no radical change in Shingaryov's policy. The new Minister was referring to the preservation of the grain monopoly and the fixed prices, but as a matter of fact he left intact the entire policy of the former Minister. Landlords and merchants were speculating in grain and completely nullifying the fixed prices.

¹ "The Economic Condition of Russia Before the Revolution," "Krasnyi Arkhiv", 1925, No. 3 (10), pp. 88-93.

² Ibid., pp. 88-93.

³ Ibid, p. 87

The keeping of strict accounts of grain stocks might have been a valuable method of combating profiteering. This had already been stipulated by the law of March 25, which provided that accounts of the amount of grain produced should be kept. Shingaryov had left the profiteers and landlords unmolested. So did the "Socialist" Minister. In reply to a questionnaire sent out by the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies, four-fifths of the provinces, thirty-two out of thirty-eight, stated that no accounts of the amount of grain produced had been kept, while four provinces stated that their accounts were inexact. In answer to the question whether a grain monopoly had been instituted, one province replied that the monopoly had been instituted, three stated that no monopoly had been instituted, twenty-three stated vaguely that "it is being introduced" and six that it had been instituted partially. Peshekhonov not only failed to organise control over grain deliveries, but even failed to secure the keeping of elementary accounts of them. The result was that profiteering in grain developed without let or hindrance. The food lines grew longer and longer, and workers' wives were obliged to stand in queues for hours on end.

Skobelev, Peshekhonov and Chernov were living illustrations of Lenin's thesis:

"The Minister renegades from Socialism were mere talking machines for distracting the attention of the oppressed classes."¹

¹ Lenin, "Lessons of the Revolution," "Selected Works", (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 199.

THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The bourgeoisie explained the February Revolution as a protest of the masses against the defeats suffered by the tsarist army in the war. It preached the doctrine that the principal purpose of the revolution was to fight the war to a victorious conclusion, to seize Constantinople and so forth. The bourgeois government had not the slightest intention of revising the imperialist programme. It now intended to carry out, now more successfully, the imperialist plans of conquest which the Russian bourgeoisie had supported before.

Under the pretext that the country was at war, the bourgeoisie appealed for national unity, and attempted to make this an excuse for evading a settlement of grave social problems.

It was obvious that the Provisional Government set up by the bourgeoisie had no serious intention of settling the national question, that it was in fact incapable of settling it. The bourgeoisie regarded the preservation of its rule over the non-Russian nationalities of the border regions and its own continued imperialist expansion as one of the foundations of its economic and political power and of its class domination. Supported by the petty-bourgeois parties—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks—the bourgeoisie advocated the old tsarist slogan, “Russia, united and indivisible,” only adorned with the pink flag of “revolutionary democracy.”

Unable to suppress the movement for national emancipation in the border regions of Russia by reprisal, the Provisional Government hoped to weaken this movement by making unimportant concessions, such as the abolition of religious restrictions and the quota for Jews in educational institutions, the admission of “aliens” into the government services and so on. While renouncing the extreme measures of persecution of the oppressed nationalities practised by the tsarist government, the bourgeoisie allowed them no rights apart from the general civil liberties. Even the question of teaching in the native languages was not settled, although this was one of the minimum demands. The decree of the Provisional Government of March 20, 1917, permitted

“the use of languages and dialects other than Russian in the business affairs of private associations, in private

educational institutions of all kinds and in the conduct of commercial books.”¹

The fall of the autocracy and the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie did not put an end to national oppression. Only, as Stalin said:

“The old, crude form of national oppression was replaced by a new, refined, but all the more dangerous form of oppression.”²

As a result, the movement for national emancipation, far from diminishing after the February Revolution, became more intense. Stalin later characterised this movement in his article “The October Revolution and the National Question” as follows:

“In the period of bourgeois revolution in Russia (which began in February 1917) the national movement in the border regions bore the character of a bourgeois movement of emancipation. The nationalities of Russia, which had for ages been oppressed and exploited by the ‘old regime,’ now for the first time felt their strength and hurled themselves into combat with their oppressors. ‘Abolish national oppression’ was the slogan of the movement. In a trice, ‘national’ institutions sprang up all over the border regions of Russia. The movement was headed by the national, bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia. ‘National Councils’ in Latvia, the Estonian Region, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, the Caucasian highlands, Kirghizstan and the Middle Volga Region; the ‘Rada,’ in the Ukraine and in White Russia; the ‘Sfatul Tarli’ in Bessarabia; the ‘Kurultai’ in the Crimea and in Bashkiria; the ‘Autonomous Government’ in Turkestan—such were the ‘national’ institutions around which the national bourgeoisie rallied its forces.”³

In the Ukraine, the bourgeois emancipation movement was headed by the Central Rada, which was formed in Kiev in the early months of the revolution. Its leaders were Vinnichenko, Petliura, Mazepa and Tkachenko of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and Grush-evsky, Khristyuk, Zaliznyak, Kovalyov and others of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Rada enjoyed the support of a considerable number of the peasants, chiefly of the prosperous peasants.

In its “First Manifesto,” published at the beginning of June 1917, the Rada merely proclaimed the principle that

1 “Decision of the Provisional Government,” “Vestnik Vremennovo of the Provisional Government,” No. 15, March 22, 1917.

2 J. Stalin, “The October Revolution and the National Question,” “Marxism and the National and Colonial Question,” (Eng. ed.) 1935, p. 69.

3 Ibid., p. 68.

the Ukrainian people must determine its own destiny, but did not insist on the immediate proclamation of Ukrainian autonomy. Moreover, the Manifesto contained the reservation that there could be no question of the political separation of the Ukraine from Russia. Lenin described these first national demands made by the Ukraine of the Provisional Government as "very modest."

A few days after the appearance of the first Manifesto of the Central Rada, Lenin wrote:

"No single democrat can...deny the right of the Ukraine freely to secede from Russia: it is the unqualified recognition of this right that alone makes it possible to agitate for a free alliance of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, for a **voluntary** union of the two peoples into one State...Accursed tsarism transformed the Great Russians into butchers of the Ukrainian people and in every way bred in the latter a hatred of those who forbade even the Ukrainian children to speak and study in their native language."¹

But in the camp of the Provisional Government, which was led by the Cadets, with whose national policy the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were in agreement, the announcement of the Rada evoked a storm of fury. *Ryech*, the principal organ of the Cadets, described the manifesto of the Ukrainian Rada as "one more link in the German plan for the disintegration of Russia." *Ryech* declared:

"The reservations in no wise alter the fundamental fact that the Rada has, in its own name and in the name of the Ukrainian people, refused...to submit to the Provisional Government and has proclaimed itself the government of the Ukraine...It must be confessed that Messieurs the Ukrainians are playing dangerous jokes on Russia."²

This is the way the bourgeoisie reacted to the slightest attempt directed against "Russia, united and indivisible." It branded the Ukrainians as traitors and German agents and warned that the action of the Rada

"will be condemned by positively all public organisations, with the exception, perhaps, of the most irreconcilable supporters of 'disannexation'—the Bolsheviks."³

The hostile opinions of the Bolsheviks expressed by the bourgeois imperialists only served to increase the sympathy for the Bolsheviks of the democratic elements

¹ Lenin, "The Ukraine," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 534.

² Editorial in *Ryech*, No. 137, June 14, 1917.

³ *Ibid.*,

who were striving for national liberation. A comparison of the conduct of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the Bolsheviks towards the nationalities of former tsarist Russia was sufficient to show who the real friends of the oppressed nationalities were.

The fight over the Ukrainian question became more and more heated. Feeble and hypocritical attempts were made by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to arrive at a decent "compromise" between the Rada and the Provisional Government. But nothing came of it. All the demands of the Ukrainians were rejected.

At this juncture Lenin wrote an article entitled "The Ukraine and the Defeat of the Ruling Parties of Russia," in which he said:

"The Provisional Government's rejection of these very modest and very legitimate demands was a piece of unexampled shamelessness, of savage insolence on the part of the counter-revolutionaries and a manifestation of the true policy of the Great Russian bullies; and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, scorning their own party programmes, tolerated it in the government and are now defending it in their newspapers. To what depths of shame the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks have sunk! How pitiful to-day are the subterfuges of their papers—*Dyelo Naroda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta*.

"Chaos, confusion, 'Leninism in the national question,' anarchy—such are the expletives of the enraged landlords hurled by both newspapers at the Ukrainians."¹

At the beginning of July, three representatives of the government—Kerensky, Tsereteli and Tereshchenko—arrived in Kiev, and concluded a diplomatic truce with the Rada. This truce conferred no real rights on the Ukrainians and only hinted that such rights might be granted in future. But even this agreement evoked a hostile outburst in the bourgeois camp. The bourgeois Ministers used the negotiations with the Ukraine as a pretext to resign from the Provisional Government. The Cadets took this step at the time of the July events in Petrograd, and they declared that they were resigning owing to differences over the Ukrainian question.

When the Cadets rejoined the government in August 1917, relations with the Ukraine grew worse than ever. An order of the Provisional Government on August 4 annulled all the concessions to the Ukraine contained in the July agreement. The order confined the Ukraine to the five

¹ Lenin, "The Ukraine and the Defeat of the Ruling Parties of Russia" "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, pp. 539-40.

western agricultural provinces, and excluded the Donbas, the Ekaterinoslav Province and the Black Sea provinces. Moreover, the functions of the Rada were reduced to a minimum, only certain rights of local government being reserved to it.

The Central Rada adopted a position of hostility towards the Provincial Government. From that time on until the October Revolution, sympathy for the Bolsheviks steadily grew among the Ukrainians even among those who supported the petty-bourgeois nationalists, because of the Bolsheviks' correct policy on the national question.

The Provisional Government did not solve the national question in Finland either. On March 7, 1917, it passed an act restoring the Constitution "conferred" on the Grand Duchy of Finland by Alexander I. The Russian bourgeoisie refused to go beyond this tsarist Constitution: Finland received no new rights and the Finnish Diet was not granted supreme powers.

The Finnish people demanded autonomy. Negotiations on this question were conducted between the Finnish Diet and the Provisional Government throughout April and May 1917. The autonomy proposed by the Diet provided for the preservation of Russian control over foreign relations and military affairs, and even for the retention of the post of Governor-General of Finland. But the Provisional Government would not agree even to this proposal. It insisted that the convocation and dissolution of the Diet should be a prerogative of the Russian government, whose sanction should also be necessary for decisions of the Diet affecting the interests of Russia. The right to decide which questions "affected the interests of Russia" was to be left to the Russian Governor-General. This would in fact deprive the Diet of the last vestige of independence.

In reply to the demands of the Provisional Government the Diet passed a law on July 5 establishing the supreme authority of the Seim in all questions except military and foreign affairs. The Provisional Government retorted with a decree dissolving the Diet. A Manifesto issued by the Provisional Government on July 18, 1917, declared that the Diet was arrogating to itself

"the arbitrary right of anticipating the will of the future Russian Constituent Assembly... Let the Finnish people weigh its own destiny. It can be decided only with the consent of the Russian people."¹

1 "Manifesto of July 18, 1917, on the Dissolution of the Diet and the Holding of New Elections," "Vestnik of the Provisional Government," No. 110, July 21, 1917.

Following on this, the building of the Diet was occupied by troops at the orders of the Menshevik Gegechkori, subsequently Minister of Foreign Affairs in Menshevik Georgia. Deputies refusing to submit to the orders of the Provisional Government were not admitted to the Diet building.

At the beginning of 1917 the majority of the members of the Finnish Diet belonged to the Social-Democratic Party, which was a fairly powerful organisation. While taking an active part in the leadership of the movement for Finnish emancipation, the Finnish Social-Democrats had no consistent policy on the national question and perpetually tended to take up a bourgeois position. The opportunism of the Finnish Social-Democrats was one of the factors responsible for Finland's adopting a bourgeois form of state. This was in a large degree facilitated by the fact that for a long time the Bolsheviks in Finland, in their anxiety to avert a split in the Social-Democratic Party, refrained from breaking with the Mensheviks.

The attitude of the Bolshevik Party towards Finnish national independence was quite clearly expressed in the resolution adopted by the Bolshevik Conference of April 1917 in connection with Stalin's report, as well as in a number of articles by Lenin and other Bolsheviks.

Lenin wrote:

"The tsars pursued a policy of annexation, callously exchanging one people for another by agreement with other monarchs (the partition of Poland, the deal with Napoleon over Finland, and so on), just as the landlords used to exchange peasant serfs. The bourgeoisie, having become republican, is carrying on this same policy of annexation, only more subtly, more covertly. . . . Comrades, workers and peasants, do not submit to the annexationist policy of the Russian capitalists, Guchkov, Milyukov and the Provisional Government, in relation to Finland, Courland, the Ukraine, etc!"¹

Towards the end of the summer of 1917, bourgeois armed detachments, on the one hand, and a workers' Red Guard, on the other, began to be formed in Finland. The former established contact with the police, the latter with the Russian troops in Finland. The soldiers of the units quartered in Finland began to adopt the Bolshevik position.

The imperialist policy of the Provisional Government was even more marked in relation to the Eastern peoples than in relation to Finland.

Two fundamental trends were to be observed in the national movement among the Eastern peoples after the

¹ Lenin, "Finland and Russia," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.) Vol. XX, p. 324.

February Revolution: unitarism: and national federalism. Unitarism was supported by the Moslem merchant bourgeoisie, particularly the Tatar, and by the nationalistically-minded intelligentsia, who demanded nothing more than "national cultural autonomy." The advocates of "the national territorial federal principle" represented the young native industrial bourgeoisie. The federalist movement among the Moslems was led by the bourgeoisie of Azerbaidjan. A decision in favour of federation and "national territorial autonomy" was also adopted in Turkestan at the First and Second Moslem Congresses. This decision, incidentally, reflected the fear of the Russian revolution entertained by the native bourgeoisie, the desire to set up a barrier against the revolution.

There were comparatively few Bolsheviks in Turkestan, and what is more, many of the local Bolsheviks distorted the policy of the Bolshevik Party on the national question and committed gross mistakes in their dealings with the native population. The nationalist parties—the Kazakh "Allash-Orda" and the Uzbek "Uleme"—therefore found it easy to gain a large following among the population.

The February bourgeois revolution did not improve the condition of the working population of the oppressed nationalities of Central Asia. The programme of the Revolutionary League of Kirghiz Youth, formed after the February Revolution, described the condition of Central Asia as follows:

"The February Revolution, having overthrown the monarchy, has once again placed the power in the hands of the Russian officials and the local Russian kulaks. The Local Committee of the Provisional Government, which is made up of such elements, sets itself the aim not of establishing equality of status for the Kirghiz population, but of oppressing and exterminating the Kirghiz population."¹

The first act of the Provisional Government in relation to Turkestan was to pass a decree on March 18, 1917, granting an amnesty to the Russian butchers in the Kirghiz rebellion of 1916. All the Russian pogromists guilty of murder and outrage against the native population were released from prison. This act of the Provisional Government evoked profound indignation among the native population.

The indignation of the oppressed nationalities of Central Asia was heightened by the appointment of N. N. Shchepkin—one of the leaders of the Cadet Party—Chairman of the Government Committee in Turkestan. This

¹ T. Ryskulov, "The Revolution and the Native Population of Turkestan," Part I, 1917-19, Tashkent, 1925, p. 4.

committee was invested with the rights of the Governor-General of pre-revolutionary days. It was empowered to decide the question of introducing local government in Turkestan and the steppe regions (Kazakhstan). Moreover, the Provisional Government considered that Zemstvo institutions would be quite sufficient, although the population demanded autonomy.

The Provisional Government did absolutely nothing to solve the national problem.

The centralised bureaucratic apparatus of the tsarist government in the national regions was left intact. Russian continued to be the official language for all the nationalities. The State schools likewise remained Russian. The demand of the oppressed nationalities for national rights was refused. Instead of immediately meeting the urgent needs and wishes of the nationalities, which had remained unsatisfied for centuries, the Provisional Government advised the oppressed nationalities to wait until their destinies were decided by the Constituent Assembly...which would be summoned nobody knew when.

If certain national demands were satisfied while the Provisional Government was in power, this was contrary to its will and counter to the wishes of the bourgeoisie. For instance, the Provisional Government made a magnanimous gesture of proclaiming the independence of Poland. But the independence of the Polish State had been proclaimed by the German imperial government a year before the February Revolution, and the Russian bourgeoisie was obliged to reconcile itself to this because Polish territory was occupied by German troops, and there was no hope of recovering it by armed force anyhow. But in the case of territories occupied by Russian troops, the policy of the Provisional Government in no way differed from the tsarist policy.

The Provisional Government, which stood for the continuation of the imperialist war, naturally refused to satisfy the elementary demands of the oppressed nationalities of Russia, and in this it was supported by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

The change in the personnel of the Provisional Government was not followed by any change in its programme. Everything remained as of old, except that in its fight for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie the government now had the support of the Soviets.

The coalition with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks enabled the bourgeoisie to emerge from the April crisis unscathed. But the bourgeoisie could not remove the causes of the crisis. The war continued, with all its costly sacrifice of life. The defencist slogan of "War to a victorious finish" continued to conflict with the class position of the masses, who had no interest in the war. And since the causes of the crisis had not been removed, fresh outbreaks were inevitable. This is why the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party stresses the fact that the slogans of the hour continued to be:

"1. To **explain** the proletarian line and the proletarian method of ending the war.

"2. To **criticise** the petty-bourgeois policy of placing trust in the government of the capitalists and compromising with it.

"3. To carry on propaganda and agitation from group to group in every regiment in every factory, and, particularly, among the more backward masses, such as domestic servants and unskilled labourers, since it was on them especially that the bourgeoisie endeavoured to rely in the days of the crisis.

"4. To **organise, organise and once more organise** the proletariat, in every factory, in every district and in every city quarter."¹

The fight for the support of the masses had entered a new phase.

In pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the Bolsheviks carried their activities into the barracks and working-class quarters. They worked boldly and skilfully to open the eyes of the people to the counter-revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government and to the compromising policy of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks made particular efforts to bar the Leninist agitators from the regiments. At public meetings the compromisers showered

¹ Lenin, "Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. Adopted on the Morning of April 22, 1917," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 225.

the Bolsheviks with slander and abuse. But the persistence of the Bolsheviks, their conviction of the justice of their cause, and the clear and precise slogans issued by Lenin's Party did their work. The soldiers and workers became more and more impervious to the patriotic intoxication of bourgeois speeches; they began more and more frequently to cry, "Down with the pimps!" and to demand that the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik orators be ejected from the barracks and factories. The simple and direct speeches of the Bolsheviks were listened to with growing attention.

Mass work, which reinforced the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, was developed first of all in the primary workers' organisations—the factory committees and the trade unions. Having overthrown the autocracy, the Russian working class began to organise with unparalleled speed. In Petrograd and Moscow over 130 trade unions were formed in the months of March and April alone, at which time there were already about 2,000 trade unions in Russia.

This sweeping organisational activity was everywhere led by the Bolsheviks. Their influence spread with particular rapidity in the factory committees. The Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees, held May 30 to June 3, was entirely under the guidance of the Bolsheviks and was strikingly symptomatic of the growing influence of the Bolshevik Party among the working class. By an overwhelming majority, the Conference adopted Lenin's resolution on measures for combating economic disruption. The resolution of the Mensheviks on this subject received only thirteen votes out of a total of 421. The resolution adopted by the Conference concluded by stating that the social and economic measures it enumerated as being essential for the working class could be successfully carried out only if the power of the State were transferred to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Despite the Menshevik theory that the trade unions should be "neutral" and independent of political parties, the trade unions, under the influence of the Bolshevik slogans, were being increasingly drawn into the political struggle.

The greater part of the working population could not be got at once to recognise the necessity of fighting for Socialism and of consciously supporting the proletarian revolution. They were hostile to the bourgeoisie for dragging out the war, but they were still a long way from realising the possibility of taking power into their own hands. Skilful handling was required to lead them to adopt the class slogan: "All power to the Soviets!" A great part in rallying the toiling population was played by the slogan . . . "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!" Simple and

comprehensible, it helped to expose the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—who stubbornly strove to keep the ten “capitalist Ministers” in the government—and brought home the necessity of transferring power to the Soviets.

The efficiency of the agitational work of the Bolshevik Party lay in the fact that it approached the masses in the right way and formulated their instinctive discontent in the form of trenchant slogans.

Stalin refers to the astonishing success of the Bolshevik Party as follows:

“For the victory of the revolution, if that revolution is really a people’s revolution, a revolution which draws in the masses in their millions, it is not enough that the Party slogans should be right. For the victory of the revolution one more condition is required, namely, that the masses themselves should become convinced by their own experience of the correctness of those slogans. Only then do the slogans of the Party become the slogans of the masses themselves. Only then does the revolution really become a people’s revolution.”¹

Guided by Lenin, the tactics of the Bolsheviks at this period were to lead the masses step by step to understand the slogans of the Party and to fight for these slogans.

The energetic and persistent work of the Bolshevik Party very soon bore fruit in the shape of two important events: the struggle at the First Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and the June demonstration held in Petrograd in connection with this Congress.

The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened on June 3. It was attended by over 1,000 delegates, 822 with a right to vote and the remainder with a voice but no vote. The petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc had an overwhelming majority at the Congress: the Socialist-Revolutionaries were represented by 285 delegates and the Mensheviks by 248 delegates. Nearly all the smaller groups solidly supported the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Only 105 of the delegates were Bolsheviks.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks opened the Congress with great pomp and referred to it as a congress of the “revolutionary democracy.” Under this category the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks included workers, peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie of the towns, salaried employees, officials, members of the liberal professions and, finally just “enlightened people” generally, irrespective of the class they belonged to.

¹ J. Stalin, “The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,” “Leninism,” (Eng. ed., 1935), Vol. I, p. 129.

It was to the interest of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to befog the minds of the proletariat with hazy terminology. Nothing better suited their petty-bourgeois nature or helped them to play a prominent part in political life than the pompous and highly general formula "revolutionary democracy."

The Congress was attended by representatives of 305 joint Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies 53 Soviets from regional and provincial centres, 21 organisations in the army on active service, 8 organisations in the army in the rear and 5 organisations in the navy.

This was the only organised and armed force in the Russian revolution. Nobody could have withstood the strength of the Soviets. Yet the Congress betrayed complete impotence. The Congress refused to organise a government, although it possessed every requisite for the creation of a real power. There was logic and system in this. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries headed the Soviets, but by fearing to take power without the capitalists they in effect decapitated the revolution. They did everything to repress the revolutionary energies of the workers and peasants. The eager creative spirit of the masses was frittered away. The revolutionary initiative of the awakened people could find no outlet, and was squandered in sterile attempts to reconcile the interests of the workers and the capitalists. Instead of actively opposing the capitalists, who were growing more and more insolent, they advocated arbitration courts, in which all questions would be decided by representatives of the government. Instead of calling for a fight for an immediate improvement of conditions, they advocated waiting until the war came to an end and a Constituent Assembly summoned. Instead of demanding peace, they demanded war to a victorious finish!

The interests of the working class and the land-hungry peasantry were systematically sacrificed to the interests of the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries served as a vehicle for the sway of the bourgeoisie over the workers and peasants.

Since the Soviets refused to take over power, what were their functions reduced to? To hearing reports. They held dreary and interminable discussions on "the nature of the government power." Lengthy, diluted and non-committal resolutions were adopted. "Met, sat, talked and smoked," was the ironical comment of the workers on the meetings of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

The first item on the agenda of the Congress was the question of policy towards the Provisional Government and the creation of a revolutionary power. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries resolutely rejected the pro-

posals that power should be transferred to the Soviets. Scared by the sabotage of the bourgeoisie, and accustomed to be at its beck and call, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks endeavoured to give the masses a perverted idea of the character of the government. At the Congress, Tsereteli, the Menshevik leader, made the emphatic assertion:

"There is no political party in Russia at this juncture which would say: 'Hand over the power to us, quit, we will take your place ...'"¹

"There is no such party in Russia!" Tsereteli loudly proclaimed amid the tense silence of the audience.

And suddenly, like a thunderbolt, a voice resounded in reply:

"There is such a Party!"

It was the voice of Lenin, hurling this challenge at the Mensheviks in the name of the Bolshevik Party.

The audience was electrified. The drowsy Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik delegates were suddenly jerked into wakefulness and began to buzz with excitement. Delegates rose to their feet to get a glimpse of the man who had hurled this challenge at the bosses. Consternation reigned among the leaders in the presidium. But Lenin was already mounting the rostrum.

"He said that there is no political party in Russia that would express its readiness to take the entire power upon itself," Lenin said. "I say there is! No party can refuse this, and our party does not refuse it; it is prepared at any minute to take over the entire power."²

The unprincipled, pusillanimous and double-faced tactics of the Mensheviks were countered by the bold and firm policy of the Bolsheviks.

Many of the delegates knew Lenin only from the libellous articles of the bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik press. The rank-and-file delegates wanted to hear the leader of the Bolsheviks, of whom the defenders of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie wrote so much and so savagely. They wanted to hear from his own lips an exposition of the views of the Bolsheviks. The delegates listened to his calm and confident speech in profound silence.

Observing this, the managers of the Congress greeted Lenin's declaration with laughter and scornful interjections.

"You may laugh as much as you please," Lenin retorted.

¹ Central Archives, "The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," Vol. I, Moscow, 1930, p. 65.

² Lenin, "Speech on the Attitude to the Provisional Government," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, pp. 481-82.

ed, "but if Citizen the Minister confronts us with this question side by side with the Right party, he will receive a suitable reply... Give us your confidence and we will give you our programme.

"This programme was given by our Conference on April 29. Unfortunately, it is being ignored and not taken as a guide. Apparently, a popular explanation of it is required."¹

And Lenin went on to expound the principal decisions of the April Conference of the Bolshevik Party.

As his speech progressed, the mood of the delegates, especially of the soldiers, gradually changed. They eagerly listened to what Lenin said of the predatory war, which the government was continuing and of the peace which neither the bourgeois government nor its petty-bourgeois allies desired or were able to bring about. Step by step, Lenin dispersed the mist of lies and slanders and set forth a consistent and extremely clear programme.

The time allotted for Lenin's speech was expiring. "Don't give him any more time," was shouted from the front benches, where the leaders sat. Indescribable tumult prevailed. Protests and demands to extend the time of the speaker were raised, punctuated by applause. The applause spread and gained in vehemence. In face of these protests the presidium was obliged to put the question to the vote and to extend the speaker's time. The question was decided by the rank-and-file delegates, the soldiers and workers, who were deeply impressed by Lenin's calm and confident words.

Amidst the applause of these delegates, Lenin concluded his speech with the words:

"The transfer of power to the revolutionary proletariat, supported by the poor peasantry, means a transition to a revolutionary struggle for peace in the surest and most painless forms known to mankind. a transition to a state of affairs in which the power and victory of the revolutionary workers will be ensured in Russia and all over the world."²

Lenin's declaration that the Bolsheviks were prepared to take over power focussed the attention of the whole Congress. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries who subsequently took the floor confined themselves to controverting Lenin. Kerensky, Skobelev, Chernov, Filippovsky, Dan and others argued the necessity for an agreement with the bourgeoisie and demanded that the Congress should support the government of the Russian capitalists.

¹ Lenin, "Speech on the Attitude to the Provisional Government," "Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, p. 488.

² Ibid.

The resolution proposed by the Bolshevik fraction contained a vigorous criticism of the Provisional Government. It declared that the latter was incapable of saving the country from economic collapse and of securing peace. The resolution exposed the "Socialist" Mensheviks, who used their authority to screen the counter-revolutionary government. Stressing the fact that the policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie had suffered complete shipwreck, the Bolshevik resolution proposed that power should be transferred to the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

What did the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries advance in opposition to the revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks? The resolution passed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and adopted by the Congress declared:

"The transfer of the entire power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies at this juncture of the Russian revolution would considerably weaken the latter, prematurely repel from it elements which are still capable of serving it, and bode the collapse of the revolution."¹

The First Congress of Soviets clearly shows how profound was the gulf between the revolutionary party of the proletariat—the Bolsheviks—and the representatives of the petty-bourgeois parties—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The latter considered the revolution at an end. They did not, and indeed could not, because that would have been contrary to their interests, desire anything more than the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie. This was stated at the Congress without the slightest ambiguity by the Menshevik Dan, who was one of those that criticised Lenin's programme. He said:

"Even if we now had a cabinet that was entirely Socialist, we must say that this cabinet could conduct no other policy than that of the bourgeois revolutionary democracy. And this we must also bear in mind when—if it should so happen—the power falls into our hands."²

Fortunately for the revolution, it did not happen—the power did not fall into Dan's hands.

Another remarkable speech made by Lenin at the Congress dealt with the question of war and peace. Lenin subjected the hypocrisy of the compromising and pandering policy of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries on the question of war and peace to devastating criticism. Reminding the Congress of the appeal addressed by the

¹ Central Archives, "The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," Vol. I, Moscow, 1930, p. 237.

² Ibid, p. 140.

Petrograd Soviet to the peoples of the world on March 14, with its call, "Refuse to serve as instruments of conquest and violence of kings, landlords and bankers," Lenin said:

"When you say, 'Refuse to serve as the instruments of your bankers,' while at the same time you admit your own bankers into the cabinet and seat them side by side with Socialist Ministers, you are reducing all your manifestos to naught and are in practice negating your whole policy. . . ."¹

"You have become entangled in inextricable contradictions," Lenin said in the same speech. ". . . You advise other nations to renounce annexations, while you are introducing them in your own country. You say to other nations, 'Overthrow the bankers,' but you do not overthrow your own bankers."²

The attitude of the majority of the Congress to the main question—the organisation of the government power—predetermined the remaining questions. By leaving the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the Congress reduced its own lukewarm resolutions to naught.

The Bolsheviks proposed and defended their own resolutions on the main questions, thus creating a platform around which to mobilise the masses for the revolutionary struggle. The Bolsheviks appealed to the masses over the heads of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders and of the Congress of Soviets. Lenin's speeches and the Bolshevik resolutions found a wide echo among the working people, inspiring them with disgust at the compromisers and stimulating the class consciousness of the workers.

A vivid illustration of the growth of the influence of the Party among the masses was furnished by the June demonstration, which took place while the Congress was still in session.

1 Lenin, "Speech on the War," "Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 151.

2 Lenin, "Speech on the War," "Selected Works", Vol. VI, pp. 158, 161.

THE JUNE DEMONSTRATION

The June demonstration, like the April demonstration, was the outcome of a spontaneous process. But by this time the Bolsheviks had gained a firm foothold among the workers of Petrograd. In June the Bolsheviks were able to direct the spontaneous and growing discontent into organised channels, which had not been the case in April. With the object of lending shape and depth to the movement, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party appointed a peaceful demonstration to be held on June 10. The demonstration was to take place under the Bolshevik slogan: "All Power to the Soviets!" "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!" "Workers' Control of Industry!" and "Bread, Peace and Freedom!" The purpose of this peaceful demonstration was to make known to the Congress of Soviets the will of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd, who demanded that the entire power of the State should be transferred to the Soviets.

The masses were still further incensed by an order of the Provisional Government to evict the anarchists from a villa belonging to Durnovo, a former tsarist dignitary. This order added fuel to the flames. The anarchists occupied only a small part of the building; the greater part was occupied by Red Guards and trade unions. The workers of the Vyborg District, where Durnovo's villa was situated, were stirred into action. They regarded the actions of the Provisional Government as a direct defence of the former Ministers, who distinguished themselves by their exceptional devotion to the autocratic régime. Indignation grew, spreading from district to district. The demonstration promised to become a gigantic protest against the compromisers who supported the Provisional Government; it promised to deprive them of every shred of confidence among the Petrograd proletariat if they did not adopt a firm revolutionary policy.

The leaders of the compromising parties got wind of the proposed demonstration and raised the cry that a Bolshevik conspiracy was afoot. They asserted at the Congress of Soviets that the counter-revolutionaries were planning to take advantage of the Bolshevik demonstration, and in this way they got the Congress to pass a resolution prohibiting demonstrations. Dire threats, even the threat of expulsion from the Soviets, were held out against the Bolsheviks should they dare to demonstrate in the streets.

But very soon the true motives for prohibiting the demonstration came to light. On June 11 a joint meeting

was held of the Presidium of the Congress of Soviets, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies and the bureau of all the fractions at the Congress. This meeting sat as a court of judgment on the Bolshevik Party. The Menshevik Dan, who headed a commission appointed to investigate the proposed demonstration, moved a resolution condemning the Bolsheviks:

"The attempt of the Bolshevik centres to take advantage of the discontent and excitement of the toiling masses, caused by the grave economic crisis, to organise a demonstration on June 9 with slogans demanding the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power by the Soviets was a piece of political adventurism, the consequences of which would have been fully utilised by the counter-revolutionaries for their own benefit."¹

Dan again declared that the demonstration was prohibited because the counter-revolutionaries would endeavour to take advantage of the appearance of the workers and soldiers on the streets. But nobody cited any facts or evidence in support of this statement. They were all unanimous in declaring that the Bolsheviks were hatching a conspiracy behind the back of the Congress of Soviets and were preparing to resort to armed action.

The real reason the demonstration was prohibited was betrayed in his impetuosity by the Menshevik Tsereteli:

"Dan's resolution will not do. This is not the sort of resolution that is required now. What has taken place is nothing but a conspiracy, a conspiracy for the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, who know that they will never obtain power in any other way. . . . Let the Bolsheviks not blame us if we now adopt other methods. Revolutionaries who cannot bear arms worthily should be deprived of their arms. The Bolsheviks must be disarmed. . . . Machine-guns and rifles must not be left in their hands. We shall not tolerate conspiracies."²

Tsereteli's counter-revolutionary speech betrayed the utter inability of the petty-bourgeois parties to conduct an independent policy and their frank fear of the action of the revolutionary proletariat. Anger is a bad counsellor: in his irritation, Tsereteli blurted out the secret that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were preparing to hand over the entire power to the counter-revolutionary bour-

¹ "The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Minutes of the Meetings of the Executive Committee and the Bureau of the Executive Committee," Moscow, 1925, p. 198.

² "A Historic Meeting," "Pravda," No. 80, June 13, 1917.

geoisie and to clear the way for a military dictatorship of the type of that of General Cavaignac's dictatorship in France in 1848. Lenin wrote on this subject as follows:

"Not Tsereteli, not Chernov personally, and not even Kerensky are designed for the rôle of Cavaignac—other people will be found for this who at the proper moment will say to the Russian Louis Blancs, 'Get out of the way!'—but the Tseretelis and Chernovs are leaders of a petty-bourgeois policy which renders the appearance of the Cavaignacs possible and essential. . . . For Cavaignac is not fortuitous—his 'advent' is not an isolated fact. Cavaignac is the representative of a class (the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie), the vehicle of its policy. And it is precisely this class, it is precisely this policy, which you now are already supporting, Messieurs the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks."¹

The decision forbidding the demonstration had been adopted by the Congress of the Soviets, which was considered the supreme organ of the Soviets. In view of this, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party bowed to the decision of the Congress and cancelled the demonstration appointed for June 10. But it was difficult to carry out this decision, for the resolution forbidding the demonstration had been taken late on the eve of the appointed day. However, the Bolsheviks were able to prevent the masses from demonstrating in the streets. This was the first experience in a complex and difficult manoeuvre, namely, calling a retreat at a time when the spontaneous discontent of the masses had reached the point of overflowing.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks cancelled the Bolshevik demonstration, but they could not cancel the causes which drove the masses to action. Delegates to the Congress who visited factories and regiments everywhere observed the seething discontent of the workers and soldiers and their growing anger, which was ready to break out at any moment.

When the delegates related their impressions, the Congress of Soviets decided to appoint a demonstration on June 18 with the object of providing an outlet for the feelings of the masses and of endeavouring to get them to accept the slogans of the compromisers. Moreover, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks wanted to measure swords with the Bolsheviks and were confident of gaining control of the demonstration.

There was a reason why June 18 was chosen as the day of the demonstration. The petty-bourgeois leaders knew that an offensive at the front was to begin that day. The

¹ Lenin, "The Class Origins of Present and Future Cavaignacs," "Collected Works", (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX, pp. 537-38.

demonstration of confidence in the Congress was also to serve as a manifestation of approval of the military offensive.

But the compromisers miscalculated. Nearly 500,000 workers and soldiers demonstrated in the streets on June 18. Columns bearing red banners and revolutionary placards moved towards the centre from all parts of the city. The overwhelming majority of the demonstrators marched under Bolshevik slogans. Only very rarely were placards to be seen expressing confidence in the Provisional Government. These were greeted by catcalls and laughter, and the small groups demonstrating their "confidence" tried to hurry by as quickly as possible.

The abominable slander that the Bolsheviks were hatching a plot was completely refuted by the demonstration. What conspiracy could there be when the entire revolutionary population of Petrograd had appeared in the street to demonstrate its will? It was perfectly plain where the population stood: small, huddled groups of demonstrators called for "confidence in the government," while hundreds of thousands of workers supported the Bolshevik slogans.

Stalin has described this demonstration in the following words:

"A feature that struck the eye: not a single mill, not a single factory, not a single regiment displayed the slogan 'Confidence in the Provisional Government!' Even the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries forgot (or, rather, did not dare) to display this slogan. They had everything you please—'No split!' 'For Unity!' 'Support the Soviet!' 'Universal Education!' (believe it, or not!)—but the chief thing was missing: there was no **confidence** in the Provisional Government, not even with the crafty reservation 'to the extent that.' Only three groups had the courage to display the slogan of confidence, but even they were obliged to regret it. These were a group of Cossacks, a 'Bund' group and Plekhanov's 'Unity' group. 'The Holy Trinity!'—the workers on the Field of Mars ironically called them. Two of them (the 'Bund' and the 'Unity') were compelled by the workers to furl their banners amidst cries of 'Down with them!' The Cossacks, who refused to furl their banner, had it torn to shreds. And one anonymous banner of 'confidence' stretched 'in mid-air' across the entrance to the Field of Mars was torn down by a group of soldiers and workers amid the approving comments of the public: 'Confidence in the Provisional Government is hanging in mid-air.'"¹

¹ J. Stalin, "At the Demonstration," "The Road to October," 2nd ed. Moscow, 1925, pp. 53-54.

In brief, the general note of the demonstration was lack of confidence in the government on the part of the vast majority of the demonstrators, and an obvious fear to go against the current on the part of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The demonstration revealed that the influence of the Bolshevik Party had grown tremendously. Not only did the masses bear Bolshevik banners and support the Bolshevik slogans, but thousands of workers openly announced themselves as Bolsheviks.

The compromisers were unable to conceal their defeat.

The central organ of the Mensheviks stated that they had hoped to carry out a demonstration of confidence in the Soviets and the Provisional Government, but as a matter of fact

"the demonstration of June 18 was transformed into a demonstration of non-confidence in the Provisional Government. . . .

"In its external aspect, the demonstration of June 18 produced a dispiriting impression. It seemed as though revolutionary Petrograd had parted ways with the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. A few days ago . . . the Congress had expressed its confidence in the Provisional Government.

"On June 18 revolutionary Petrograd seemed to express its complete lack of confidence in this Provisional Government."¹

The collapse of the influence of the petty-bourgeois compromisers among the Petrograd proletariat was admitted by the entire bourgeois and Menshevik press.

They all spoke as though by common consent of the victory of the Bolsheviks—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with bitterness, the Cadets with alarm, and the Monarchists with malicious glee.

"Novaya Zhizn" the Left Menshevik paper, summed up its observations in the following words:

"Sunday's demonstration revealed the complete triumph of 'Bolshevism' among the Petrograd proletariat and the garrison."²

But it was among the bourgeoisie that the demonstration evoked the greatest alarm.

1 N. Cherevanin, "Lessons of the Demonstration of June 18," "Rabochaya Gazeta," No. 85, June 20, 1917.

2 "Sunday's Demonstration," "Novaya Zhizn," No. 53, June 20, 1917.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE

The bourgeoisie was watching the behaviour of the compromisers with great growing nervousness. It had already felt for some time that the ground had become insecure under their feet. The Cadets, the principal bourgeois and landlord party, grew increasingly pessimistic over the dwindling influence of their "allies"—the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The reactionaries feverishly devised new methods of retaining the support of the masses. In the joint opinion of the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois allies, one such method would be an offensive at the front. The calculations of the Cadets were extremely simple, namely, to involve the army in an offensive with the help of the compromisers. The continuation of the war would inevitably strengthen the hand of the military. This would put an end to the duality of power, and the entire power would pass into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Victory at the front would evoke a new wave of patriotism and encourage defencist sentiments. In the hurly-burly of war the burning question of the revolution—land and the condition of the workers—could be postponed and finally removed from the agenda altogether.

On the plea that all efforts must be concentrated on the struggle against the foreign enemy, the counter-revolutionaries would be in a position to maltreat, arrest and shoot those who agitated against the war.

The offensive at the front would benefit the bourgeoisie even if it failed. The entire blame for the failure could be laid on the Bolsheviks.

The British and French imperialists were likewise demanding active measures. They had realised for some time that Russia was not in a condition to prosecute the war any further. It was not by chance that America had entered the war very soon after the February Revolution: the American soldiers were to replace the exhausted Russian armies. But the transport of troops required time, and meanwhile the Russians had to be induced to divert as many German army corps as possible to their own front. It was necessary, as General Knox, the British representative at Russian General Headquarters, relates in his memoirs,

"to keep at all events some Russian troops on the line to prevent all German troops from going West."¹

¹ A. Knox, "With the Russian Army 1914-1917", London, Hutchinson & Co., 1921, Vol. II, p. 617.

The imperialist press persistently demanded an offensive. The diplomats haunted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insisting on vigorous military action. Delegations of Socialists came to Russia from Great Britain, France and America to persuade the Russian people "to do their duty." Arthur Henderson, J. H. Thomas and Albert Thomas, Socialist compromisers of international fame, visited the Russian front and Russian barracks and factories, appealing "in the name of the revolution," to the soldiers and workers to fight.

On May 16, 1917, a report appeared in the French newspaper "Information" to the effect that America was prepared to grant Russia a big loan if "counter-guarantees" were given.

"From this the conclusion is drawn," the paper stated, "that America's secret note to Russia demands guarantees against the conclusion of a separate peace and a promise of whole-hearted co-operation. It is considered that such a definite guarantee by Russia would be the launching of an offensive on the Russian front."¹

The imperialists wanted to buy the Russian army just as cattle are bought for slaughter. The semi-colonial dependence of Russia became even more pronounced under the bourgeois Provisional Government than under the tsar.

The growing discontent of the masses and the rumours of an impending demonstration expedited the preparations for the military offensive. Stores of shells, guns and machine-guns were accumulated, purchased with money supplied by the British and French imperialists. Reliable troops were hastily transferred to the main points of attack.

The front was inundated with Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik agitators. Resorting in turn to coaxes and threats, promises and deceit, they urged the soldiers "in the name of the revolution" to undertake the offensive. To what lengths the deceit was carried may be judged from an incident related by a soldier of the Sixth Finland Regiment.

For a long time the regiment would not allow itself to be persuaded. But at last a delegation arrived from the Guards Corps and declared in the name of all the guards regiments that they would turn their bayonets on the Finland Regiment if the latter refused to attack.

The soldiers were dumbfounded when they learnt that they stood alone. Under pressure of the officers and of the delegation, they grudgingly raised their hands in favour of the offensive. This soldier of the Finland Regiment relates:

¹ "Les Etats-Unis auraient envoye une note secrete a la Russie," 'Information,' No. 136, May 16, 1917.

"The artillery preparations for the attack were carried out brilliantly. The enemy's barbed wire defences were swept away, and our regiment, with slight losses, burst into the front line of the half-destroyed German trenches. The second and third lines of defence were taken by storm. The counter-attack cost the Germans dear. About 200 corpses of German soldiers, lads and young-men in undershirts and unbuttoned uniforms, lay strewn about, their faces buried in the ground.

"In the third-line trenches our men lay down and demanded to be replaced, because one of the guards' delegates at the meeting had declared that the guards would take our places as soon as we had broken through the German lines of defence. All the efforts of the generals to induce us to continue the attack were in vain. The Sixth Finland Regiment declared that they had fulfilled their obligations and would wait until they were replaced by the guards. Since the replacements did not arrive, the soldiers and the soldiers' representatives on the regimental committee appointed a delegation to visit the regiments of the Guards Corps.

"Imagine our indignation and rage when we learnt that the soldiers of the Guards Corps had never had any intention of attacking, that they were being threatened with the guards, and as to the delegation that had visited us, it was simply the Menshevik group on the corps committee, to whom none of the guards paid the slightest attention, because as a matter of fact the whole corps was being led by a Bolshevik-minded committee of one of the divisions. We had been duped in the most unscrupulous manner."¹

The plan for the offensive had been drawn up before the revolution. On December 17 and 18, 1916, a conference was held at General Headquarters of the commanders of the fronts, who presented their schemes of attack. It was then that Nicholas II gave orders for an offensive to be launched in the spring,

"the main blow to be delivered from the region of the Eleventh and Seventh Armies in the direction of Lvov, and secondary blows to be delivered on the other fronts."²

The Generals of the Provisional Government did not even take the trouble to work out a new strategical plan; they simply dug out the old tsarist plan. In this, as in everything else, the Provisional Government continued the brainless policy of the autocratic régime.

¹ V. A. Malakhovsky, "The Seventh Army in the Struggle for October," "Manuscript Records of the History of the Civil War, No. 1587."

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 703, folio 504.

The offensive was originally planned for June 10. But on this day the Congress of Soviets was still in session. It was deemed desirable to get the consent of the defencists to the reckless venture. Kerensky requested that the offensive be postponed until he had secured a resolution of approval. General Headquarters consented to postpone the offensive for two days, but no longer, because "the enemy has obviously already got wind of the preparations on our side,"¹ as General Brusilov, the Supreme Commander, explained.

The two days passed. No resolution had been adopted and the generals were growing restive. On June 12 Brusilov summoned Kerensky to the direct wire and insisted that he immediately come to General Headquarters. Being himself occupied in coaxing the delegates at the Congress of Soviets, Kerensky sent the Chief of Chancellery of the Ministry of War to negotiate.

"The resolution will be passed to-day or to-morrow," the Chief of Chancellery assured Brusilov. "It has been greatly delayed by the events in Petrograd, namely, the action of the Bolsheviks. . . . Many delegations from divisions at the front have already visited us. . . . The Minister has explained to each of these delegations that the orders of their commanders must be obeyed unreservedly. . . . They all departed satisfied on the whole, but this shows that, for the sake of certainty, the arrival at the front of the Minister himself with a resolution of the soldiers and workers, in addition to a resolution of the Peasants' Congress, is absolutely essential."²

Having obtained the resolution of the Congress approving the further prosecution of the war, Kerensky left with it for the front.

The offensive began on June 18.

In Petrograd thousands of workers and soldiers were sternly marching and demanding peace, yet at the front hundreds of thousands of men were being sent to their doom.

In Petrograd, the proletarian masses were voting against the Provisional Government, yet at the front thousands of men were perishing at the orders and for the sake of this government.

In the streets of the revolutionary capital the workers were tearing down banners with the motto. . . "Confidence in the Government!" Yet at the front, under this same motto, thousands of the finest members of the working population

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1494S, folio 7.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1494S, folios 204-07.

were being maimed and destroyed in a storm of shell-fire.

The attack on the Austro-German armies was delivered along a front of 70 kilometres, between the villages of Zdvizhino and Topelikha, where 312 battalions—about 300,000 strong—had been assembled. Here, too, were assembled about 800 light guns and over 500 medium and heavy guns. After an artillery barrage lasting two days, the Russian troops attacked. The Seventh Army captured the enemy's trenches. But the incompetent generals were unable to consolidate the victory. Reinforcements arrived slowly, or were held up altogether *en route*. The enemy took advantage of the delay, mobilised his forces, and compelled the Russians to retreat.

This state of affairs was duplicated on the front of the Eleventh Army. Having occupied the enemy's trenches, the regiments did not know what to do next. The plan of the army had not provided for a successful issue to the attack. The troops came to a halt. Time passed, the enemy brought up reinforcements and launched a counter-offensive.

On June 25, to the astonishment of the stupid generals, the Eighth Army began a successful advance. General Headquarters decided to swap horses in midstream—to alter the plan of attack and to dispatch reinforcements from the Seventh Army to the Eighth Army. But this bold manœuvre was too much for the old generals. Interminable time was spent in writing the orders. Even more time was spent in search of the required reinforcements, and by the time they had been found, the enemy had already delivered a crushing counter-blow (July 6).

Prepared in a hurry and based on fraud and deceit, the Kerensky-Brusilov offensive collapsed. Within four or five days the gulf between the soldiers and the bourgeois officers became fully revealed. The artificially fanned military enthusiasm soon collapsed, and the troops, who had been driven to attack by coercion and fraud, hurried back to the rear.

In the ten days that the offensive lasted the armies on the South-Eastern Front lost about 60,000 men. Such was the bloody price paid for Kerensky's reckless adventure.

Proper measures for the success of the blow had not been taken. Plans had not been worked out. The commander of one of the armies was removed on Kerensky's orders because he had not drawn up a detailed plan of attack. The technical preparations for the offensive were beneath all criticism. In the Tenth Army only three masked batteries instead of eighteen were set up on the front occupied by the II Caucasian Corps, and only 5,000 paces of trench were dug instead of 30,000. The I Siberian Corps in this same army had dug only one-third the length of trench

planned. There was a shortage of cartridges. The training of the men was far from satisfactory.

Many of the soldiers even did not know how to use their rifles. The employment of the reserves and the contact between the various units could hardly have been worse.

"It is not astonishing," Stankevich, one of the Military Commissars of the Provisional Government, bitterly confessed, "that our offensive failed. . . . Does not the secret of our military failures in face of the offensive of the enemy on the South-Western Front lie in complete lack of preparation?"¹

The army proved to be technically unprepared, as one of the most active organisers of the offensive admitted. But the bourgeoisie found other excuses: it attempted to foist the whole blame on the Bolsheviks.

On June 23, as soon as the first news of the defeat arrived, General Brusilov sent an urgent wire to Kerensky:

"... The mood of the Fifth Army at the front is very bad. ... The troops refuse to take up position and categorically protest against the offensive. ... It is being openly stated in some of the regiments that they recognise no other authority but Lenin. ... I consider that the purging of the army can be effected only after the purging of the rear and after the propaganda of the Bolsheviks and the Leninists has been proclaimed criminal and punishable as high treason. ..."²

The tsarist general betrayed the secret of the offensive: its purpose was not so much to wage war on Germany as to combat the revolution.

The offensive at the front collapsed, and with it collapsed the manoeuvre of the Cadets. The bourgeoisie realised that not only had the compromisers lost their influence over the masses, but the army was escaping from its control. By the time of the June offensive the revolution had taken firm hold in the army and threatened to wrest it altogether from the grasp of the reactionaries.

¹ V. V. Stankevich, "Society, War and the Army,"—"The People and Army," Book I, 1918, Petrograd, p. 69.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1494S., folio 67.

SPREAD OF REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY

The bourgeoisie and its lackeys flooded the front with leaflets. One hundred and fifty army newspapers coaxed the soldiers day in, day out to remain at the front. Their minds confused at first by the demagoguery of the Socialist defencists, the soldiers maintained a gloomy silence.

While feverish work was proceeding "above," mustering forces to subjugate the masses, an equally feverish process was proceeding "below," as a result of which the masses were losing confidence in those "above" and shaking off the fetters of self-deception. The dry reports of the headquarters staffs of the armies recorded facts that showed that the army was "disintegrating" from day to day.

This is how the situation was depicted at a conference of commanders of fronts held on May 4, 1917:

General Brusilov, Commander of the South-Western front, said:

"One of the regiments declared that not only did it refuse to attack, but it desired to quit the front and return home. The committees resisted this tendency, but they were told that they would be removed. I argued with the regiment for a long time, and when I asked whether they agreed with me, they requested permission to give their reply in writing. Within a few minutes a placard hung before me: 'Peace at All Costs, Down with the War!' . . . In the end they promised to stay where they were, but refused to attack, arguing as follows: 'Our enemy is a good fellow and has informed us that he will not attack if we do not attack. We must return home so as to enjoy the advantages of liberty and land—why get crippled?'"¹

General Dragomirov supplemented this with the following:

"The prevailing sentiment in the army is a longing for peace. Anybody can easily gain popularity in the army by advocating peace without annexations and the right of self-determination for nations. . . . The desire for peace is so powerful that new reinforcements refuse to accept arms, saying, 'We don't need them, we don't intend to fight . . .'" [Our emphasis—Ed.]²

General Shcherbachov, Commander of the Rumanian Front, stated:

¹ A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt", Vol. I, Book 2, Paris, p. 50. Ibid., p. 52.

"Since my recent appointment I have already visited all the Russian armies under my command, and the impression I got of the morale of the troops and their fighting efficiency corresponds with what has just been described to you at length. . . . I shall mention only one of the finest divisions in the Russian army, which among the old troops had earned the title of the 'Iron Division,' and which brilliantly maintained its old glory in this war. Having been placed on an active sector, this division refused to perform sapping work in preparation for a new attack, on the grounds that they had no wish to attack."¹

Letters written by soldiers give a clear idea of how the spirit of revolution progressed in the army.

The abrupt change from an autocratic monarchy to political liberty, and the fact that millions of people who had formerly been ordinary, unobtrusive citizens had now been drawn into the revolutionary struggle, at first fostered a defencist spirit which fettered the minds of the soldiers.

"We welcome and support the slogan of the Supreme Commander, 'War to Victory!'" one soldier wrote on the outbreak of the February Revolution; but thereupon added, "Some are worn out, while others are hiding behind the law of the old regime and behind capital. They live in bliss. These people, together with the gendarmes, guards and police, should be sent to the trenches, while those who have suffered so much should be sent back to Russia in their place."²

The same ideas are to be found in soldiers' letters written in March, 1917, but now they bore a more definite class tinge :

"We all feel and realise quite well what we want. God only grant us victory over the foreign enemy and then we shall tackle the internal enemy, that is, the landlords."³

And the letter goes on to stress the principal aim: "to take the land from the landlords."⁴

A third soldier complains :

"We are glad of liberty. It is terrible to die when the doors have been flung wide open in Russia. . . . Every. . . . soldier wants to see the bright and happy life of to-day for which we have been waiting for 307 years. . . . But the terrible thing is that this bloodshed will never cease."⁴

1 A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt", Vol. I, Book, 2, Paris, pp. 54-5.

2 "Soldiers' Letters of 1917", Moscow, 1927, pp. 18-19.

3 Ibid, pp. 29-30.

4 Ibid. p. 34.

5 Ibid., p. 40.

And, finally, in a letter written from the front in April, a soldier writes:

"Let these gentlemen know whether the army does want to fight for a complete victory like one man, and let these gentlemen take the most vigorous measures to put a stop to this terrible and useless slaughter, and as soon as possible, otherwise it will be too late."¹

And another soldier, writing on behalf of the Thirty-first Alexeyev Regiment of the Eighth Infantry Division, explains just how long the army was prepared to wait:

"If this goes on much longer, we pledge our honest word of honour that on May 15 we will quit the front, and then let them all perish, not only the soldiers in the front line but the whole of Russia."²

The mass of the soldiers very soon lost their defencist illusions. The organisations created in the army under the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, and then in every large city, were extremely active. Relying on the proletarians scattered through the regiments, the Bolshevik military organisations formed Party nuclei in the army, distributed literature and organised meetings and lectures. A newspaper called "Soldatskaya Pravda" (Soldier's Truth) was started in Petrograd and immediately attained a circulation of 50,000 copies. It acted as an organising influence in places where the Party apparatus had not yet penetrated. Another newspaper, "Okopnaya Pravda" (Trench Truth), was published at the front. These army newspapers were vivid examples of Lenin's description of what a newspaper should be—a "collective organiser"³—the correspondents who wrote for the papers became organisers of Bolshevik work in the regiments, while the readers became rank-and-file Bolsheviks.

The Bolshevik newspapers very soon gained great popularity and prestige among the soldiers, who supported them materially, sacrificing not only their last copecks, but also medals, religious emblems, crosses of St. George, wedding rings, and so forth.

Neither rabid persecution nor direct prohibition could prevent the penetration of the newspapers into the army. Soldiers and workers in the war area created an organisation which performed heroic work in distributing the papers. Every copy was read until it was literally worn to shreds. Aided by railwaymen, postal workers, automobile drivers and field kitchen staffs, the papers not only reached

1 "Soldiers' Letters of 1917," Moscow, 1927, p. 43.

2 Ibid., p. 43.

3 Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?"—"Selected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol II.

the trenches, but were also spread along the living chain of sentinels directly facing the "enemy."

The difficulties that confronted the Bolsheviks in their efforts to destroy the influence of the bourgeoisie over the masses were somewhat greater in the national regiments (i.e., regiments recruited from the various non-Russian nationalities inhabiting Russia—*Trans.*), where not only the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had to be combated, but national prejudices as well.

It was necessary, in addition to exposing the Provisional Government, to destroy the influence exercised over the toilers of the various nationalities by their native bourgeoisies, who also were in favour of continuing the imperialist war. But here, too, the workers and peasants soon learnt by experience that what the Bolsheviks said was true.

The military organisation of the Bolshevik Party carried on extensive work in the army. By the end of April half the soldiers of the garrison of Petrograd were under Bolshevik influence. Stable Bolshevik organisations had been formed in the Pavlovsky, Izmailovsky, Preobrazhensky, Finland and other regiments.

The military organisation of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had contacts with the regiments at the front and with a number of garrisons in the rear. How great its influence was may be judged from the All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the Bolshevik Party.

The Conference opened on June 16 and was attended by delegates from forty-eight organisations at the front and seventeen organisations in the rear. Delegates came from 500 regiments distributed along the four principal fronts and in thirty of the largest cities in the country.

The only regions not represented were the Caucasus and Eastern Siberia.

There were about 160 delegates representing approximately 26,000 soldiers belonging to Communist nuclei.

The Conference sat for ten days—June 16—26—and under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Party performed a tremendous amount of work.

In addition to the hearing of reports from the various localities, which gave a vivid picture of the situation at the front, there were several general questions on the agenda: organisation of the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—speaker, Lenin; the national movement and the national regiments—speaker, Stalin; the agrarian question—speaker, Lenin, etc.

At the time of the Conference a widespread national movement had developed in the army. National regiments

were being formed. Soldiers belonging to one nationality were transferred from front to front. Widespread agitation for the formation of national regiments was carried on. While the bourgeoisie of the various nationalities strove for the formation of national regiments, hoping to use them as an instrument against the revolution, the more reactionary of the commanders resisted this in every way. Playing on the chauvinistic prejudices fostered by tsarism, the Great-Russian oppressors endeavoured to incite the soldiers against the formation of national units.

Several delegates at the Conference spoke against the formation of Ukrainian regiments. They argued that the creation of Ukrainian regiments in time of war presented difficulties of a purely technical character and that the demand for Ukrainisation came from the Ukrainian landlords, and not from the Ukrainian people as a whole.

A definite Bolshevik line was needed. This line was laid down by Stalin in his speech.

Having pointed out that the policy of the Provisional Government on the national question was a Great-Russian policy, Stalin set up in opposition to it the Bolshevik national programme: self-determination of nations, including the right of secession.

"The Conference is firmly convinced," the resolution proposed by Stalin ran, "that only the resolute and unalterable recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, recognition in deed and not merely in word, can strengthen fraternal confidence between the peoples of Russia and thus make for their real union—a voluntary, not an enforced union—into a single State."¹

On the subject of the formation of national regiments, the Conference adopted the following unanimous resolution:

"Convinced that the formation of national regiments generally is not in the interest of the toiling masses—although, of course, the Conference does not deny the right of every nationality to form such regiments—the Conference expresses the firm assurance that the proletariat of the Ukraine, like the proletariat of Russia generally, being interested in the replacement of the standing army by a popular militia, will resist the transformation of the national regiments of the Ukraine into a standing army divorced from the people."²

The resolution of the Conference created a firm basis for the work of the Party within the national regiments.

¹ S. E. Rabinovich, *The All-Russian Military Conference of the Bolsheviks in 1917. "Resolutions of the All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Front and the Rear, June 1917,"* Moscow, 1931, p. 73.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

While condemning every manifestation of Great-Russian chauvinism, the Conference at the same time warned against possible deviations in the direction of local nationalism and insisted that persistent work be carried on to Bolshevise the national regiments. The fight on two fronts, so distinctly outlined in Stalin's speech, played an effective part in enlisting the national regiments on the side of the revolution, particularly in October.

The All-Russian Conference of Military Organisations of the Bolshevik Party in the Front and the Rear reviewed the four months of struggle between revolution and counter-revolution for the support of the army, and the conclusion it drew was that victory was definitely swinging to the side of revolution.

Final victory could be achieved only by intensifying the struggle, only by extending the work in the rear and at the front.

But the Conference noted one other achievement of the Bolshevik Party, namely, the successful effort to create a proletarian militia, the Red Guard.

Thus the creation of a proletarian militia inevitably tended to destroy the old apparatus of power—the police and the army—and enlisted into the public service vast numbers of working people who could quite successfully replace the tsarist officials. The proletarian militia became a political school for large numbers of workers. By training the people in the use of arms, the proletarian militia tended to develop into a class army, an army capable of fighting for the power of the Soviets.

This was not only a fight for the creation of proletarian cadres of insurrection. Military and technical preparations for insurrection and the creation of a military force for the purpose of revolution were only a part of this demand. The demand for the organisation of a proletarian militia raised the whole question of power; it showed how large masses of people could be drawn into politics, rescued from the influence of the bourgeoisie and won for the cause of revolution. The proletarian militia directly prepared the masses for the fight for power.

Lenin wrote on the subject of forming a militia as follows:

“Comrades, workers, urge upon the peasants and the rest of the people the necessity of creating a universal militia in place of the police and the old bureaucracy! . . . Under no circumstances be content with a bourgeois militia. Enlist the women into public service on an equal footing with men. Be sure you see to it that the capitalists pay the workers for days devoted to public service in the militia!

“Learn methods of democracy in actual practice, right now, yourselves, from below; rouse the masses to active, immediate, universal participation in government—this and only this will ensure the complete triumph of the revolution and its unswerving, deliberate and systematic advance.”¹

The Party did not put forward a separate and detailed plan for the creation of a proletarian militia. A task of such profundity and extent could not easily be continued within any narrow scheme. On the contrary, the Party stressed the fact that the proletariat would tackle this task in various ways. As Lenin wrote:

“In some localities of Russia the February-March Revolution has given the proletariat almost full power—in others, the proletariat will begin to build up and strengthen the proletarian militia perhaps by ‘usurpation’; in still others, it will probably work for immediate

¹ Lenin, “On the Proletarian Militia,” *The Revolution of 1917*,—“Collected Works,” (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX Part I.

elections, on the basis of universal, etc., suffrage, to the City Dumas and Zemstvos, in order to turn them into revolutionary centres, etc., until the growth of proletarian organisation, the close relations between the soldiers and workers, the movement among the peasantry, the disillusionment of very many in the competence of the militarist-imperialist government of Guchkov and Milyukov will have brought nearer the hour when that government be replaced by the 'government' of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies."¹

Proletarian militias began to be formed everywhere in the country. In places where large numbers of proletarians were concentrated and where the Bolsheviks had strong organisations, the proletarian militia was formed literally in accordance with the plan outlined by Lenin. For instance, in Kanavino, a suburb of Nizhni Novgorod, where the Bolsheviks were strong, a militia, paid by the capitalists, was instituted in nearly every one of the sixteen factories, together employing a total of 30,000 workers. The bourgeoisie tried to confine the functions of this militia to guarding the factories and maintaining "order." But as a matter of fact, the Kanavino militia constituted the local authority: the workers controlled production, supervised the distribution of food, regulated conflicts between employers and the workers and so forth. It was in relation to the workers of Kanavino that Lenin wrote:

"This reliable method is being adopted by the working masses themselves. The example of the Nizhni Novgorod workers should be followed throughout Russia."²

This example was followed very closely by the workers of Orekhovo-Zuyevo. A strong Bolshevik nucleus had been formed in Orekhovo-Zuyevo in the very first days of the February Revolution. The workers took over control of the civil militia, in which the bourgeoisie had already managed to enlist high-school students. The Bolshevik organisation set up a staff to direct the military training of the workers. This staff, while guiding the activities of the fighting squads, undertook a topographical study of the city in the event of street warfare and set up an intelligence department to get to know the state of mind of the local counter-revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks of Orekhovo-Zuyevo obtained arms for the proletarian militia "in accordance with local conditions." The officers of the regiment quartered in the vicinity of the city were sent invitations "for the purpose of creating a bond with the workers."

¹ Lenin, "Letters from Afar" The Revolution of 1917, "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.) Vol. XX. Part I.

² Lenin, "On the Proletarian Militia," The Revolution of 1917, "Collected Works," (Eng. ed.), Vol. XX. Part I.

"We entertained them well with food and drink," relates M. I. Petrokov, a worker of Orekhovo-Zuyevo, "and in addition gave them some good cloth, and thus gained possession of their rifles to the number of 300, and of 61,000 service cartridges. This was all brought to us that very same night."¹

Just as in Kanavino, the militia in Orekhovo-Zuyevo constituted the actual power of the proletariat in the district. The representatives of the Provisional Government could not carry out a single measure without the sanction and consent of the militia, and with the aid of the latter the workers of Orekhovo-Zuyevo achieved quite important successes in their economic struggle.

The militia of Orekhovo-Zuyevo took an active part in the October fighting; they fought the Junkers in Moscow no worse than the Moscow workers themselves did.

Armed squads of Bolshevik Party members were formed in other districts. They gradually began to enlist workers not belonging to the Bolshevik Party. In Ekaterinoslav a secret squad, armed with revolvers, had been formed even before the February Revolution. The purpose of the squad was to serve "only secret mass meetings and secret meetings in houses in order to prevent discovery and to scare off spies."²

After the revolution this squad rapidly began to reinforce its ranks from members of the Bolshevik organisation. At the end of April it was retitled and called a Red Guard, but those who desired to join it had to furnish a recommendation from a Bolshevik Party organisation.

In the Urals, a proletarian militia arose in the process of combating counter-revolutionary acts.

For instance, Cossacks guarding a wine-cellar in Troitsk on May Day, broke the locks and seals and got at the vodka. They got drunk and began to wreck the wine-cellar. Suspicious individuals began to prowl around the drunken Cossacks, inciting them to "beat up" the Jews. The Bolsheviks summoned an extraordinary meeting at which it was decided to mobilise all members of the party and to form squads for the defence and protection of the citizens of Troitsk.

An appeal was also issued to workers not belonging to the Party. Squads led by members of the Bolshevik Party were immediately formed in the factories. Arms were obtained from the staff of the 131st Reserve Infantry Regiment. Two weeks after order had been restored part of the weapons were returned, but part concealed in the

¹ M. I. Petrokov, "Reminiscences," "MS. Records of the History of the Civil War," No. 311.

² "The Fight for the Soviets in Ekaterinoslav," "Dnepropetrovsk," 1927, p. 176.

factories. The workers' squads in Troitsk continued to combat the counter-revolutionary acts of the local bourgeoisie, kulak and officers; they guarded meetings and released Bolsheviks from prison. After the October Revolution the Troitsk Bolsheviks tested their arms fighting the bands of Ataman Dutov.

But in most parts of Russia the proletarian militia was formed as detachments of the Red Guard. The Red Guard was the most typical form of the proletarian militia.

THE RED GUARD IN THE CAPITAL

FROM the very first days of the revolution the proletariat of Petrograd diligently set about arming itself. The workers compelled the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviet to sanction from above what had already been accomplished from below. On February 28 the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the Soviet adopted the following decision:

"The workers in the mills and factories shall organise a militia consisting of 100 men for every 1,000 workers."¹

But, just as in the case of Order No. 1, as soon as it became clear that the bourgeoisie had withstood the first onslaught, the Mensheviks endeavoured to nullify this concession.

The Executive Committee first of all forbade the issue of arms to the workers, and then, at its meeting on March 7, declared in favour of merging the factory militia with the general civil militia. The Executive Committee recommended the workers:

"(1) To merge the whole organisation with the city militia. (2) At the same time to preserve their independent organisation and to set up their elected militia committees; to accept the white armlet and number of the city militia and the credentials issued by the factory militia to the white armlet of the city militia, and retain their own numbers and their own credentials."²

This "recommendation" is, incidentally, characteristic of a method the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks usually resorted to. Fearing to repel the workers by open and downright support of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois leaders endeavoured to adorn their proposals with "democratic" labels: the workers' militia was to be dissolved, but, as a consolation, the worker militiamen were to be allowed to retain insignia.

The masses realised that the proletarian militia would have to be formed despite the wishes of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and in opposition to them.

On March 3 the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party instructed two of its organisers to submit a project for the formation of cadres of a proletarian militia.

¹ "Decision of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies,"—"Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Supplement to No. 1," February 28, 1917.

² "The City Militia,"—"Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, No. 10," March 9, 1917.

This decision, in fact, was the origin of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The Military Commission, as we have already seen, was active chiefly among the soldiers, while the formation of a proletarian militia was energetically and ably undertaken by the districts organisations. Small groups of factory militia sprang up in a number of industrial establishments and gradually attracted more and more workers. Everywhere the proletariat was arming. Weapons which had been buried before the revolution were dug up; arms were obtained from the soldiers, or purchased wherever possible. Many weapons had been prudently secured in the early days of the revolution. We learn from an order issued by General Kornilov, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, in which he demanded that the population should immediately surrender all weapons, that over 40,000 rifles and 30,000 revolvers had been taken from the arsenal in the early days of the revolution.

The order issued by the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the Soviet to merge the factory militia with the city militia was not obeyed by the workers, nor did they surrender their arms. Groups of armed workers formed in the factories and in connection with certain of the trade unions continued to exist and to grow under various names, such as "Party squads," "workers' militia of the district Soviets," "workers' squads," "fighting squads," etc.

Much effort was spent by the workers in disputes over the payment of these armed squads. The workers demanded pay for the time spent on militia duty at the rate of their average wages. The employers, conscious of the support both of the government authorities and of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, refused to pay. The Petrograd City Duma agreed to pay the members of the workers' squads only if they dissolved and joined the ordinary militia.

The members of the proletarian militia were not paid, the issue of arms to them was forbidden, and when the campaign against the Bolsheviks became intense after Lenin's return to Russia, steps were taken to disarm them. Many were arrested. The proletarian militia was the first organisation against which the Provisional Government launched its terror—so seriously did the bourgeoisie regard the formation of the Red Guard. But in spite of all this, the proletarian militia, under one name or another, continued to grow in the mills and factories.

Resolutions began to appear in the Press demanding the arming of the proletariat.

Thus, on April 15, the workers of the Old Parviainen factory sent a resolution to the "Izvestia of the Soviet of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" insisting on the dissolution of the Provisional Government, which was only hindering the revolution, and the transfer of power to the Soviets, and demanded :

"A Red Guard shall be organised and the whole people armed."

The movement assumed such wide proportions that a uniform system of organisation became a necessity.

In the middle of April the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party, in response to the anti-Bolshevik campaign and the counter-revolutionary acts of the bourgeoisie, discussed the question of creating special squads of Party members to safeguard the Party's freedom of action.

On April 28 the Soviet of the Vyborg District, which by that time consisted almost entirely of Bolsheviks, unanimously resolved to transform the militia into a "Workers' Guard," and on the next day "Draft Regulations of the Workers' Guard" were published in "Pravda." The draft regulations contained the following points:

"Aims and objects: 1. The aims and objects of the Workers' Guard are:

- (a) To defend the gains of the working class by force of arms.
- (b) To safeguard the life, safety and property of all citizens without distinction of sex, age or nationality.

"Membership: 2. Membership in the Workers' Guard is open to working men or working women belonging to a Socialist party or to a trade union, who can become Guards on the recommendation of or election by a general meeting of their factory or workshop."¹

The Executive Committee of the Soviet, which had always been opposed to independent workers' squads, swung still more to the Right under the influence of the April events. When publishing the draft regulations on April 28, the "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" prefaced them by a warning editorial in which the Menshevik writer expressed the fear that

"the Red Guard, in the form in which it is projected, represents a direct menace to the unity of the revolutionary forces,"²

and was only calculated to drive a wedge between the

1 "The Workers' Guard," "Pravda," No. 44, April 29, 1917.

2 "The Red Guard," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers Deputies," No. 52, April 28, 1917.

workers' squads and the revolutionary army. The fact that the regulations of the Red Guard were published even after this panicky editorial shows that the demands of the workers were more than the Mensheviks could withstand.

On April 28 a conference of representatives of the workers of various factories were held. It was attended by 156 delegates from eighty-two Petrograd factories and twenty-six delegates from party organisations. The Menshevik delegates demanded that the workers' squads should be placed under the control of the Soviet. A representative from the Executive Committee of the Soviet declared that

"the unfavourable attitude of the Executive Committee to the idea of a Red Guard is now being embodied in a definite resolution of the Bureau of the Executive Committee which will be published to-morrow."¹

The meeting was outraged by this announcement and elected a delegation to negotiate with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee. The following day the delegation visited Chkheidze at the offices of the Executive Committee. The response of the Mensheviks to this visit was a brief article in No. 54 of the "Izvestia" entitled "Red Guard or Militia?" in which it was again urged that the workers' squads should merge with the "organisation of the militia"² and terminate their independent existence.

Resisting the compromising Soviet, the Bolsheviks focused their activities on the separate factories where detachments of the Red Guard had already been created. The Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks set about strengthening its leadership of the factory committees in the capital. This was essential for the successful arming of the proletariat, because the work of organising armed squads was chiefly in the hands of the factory committees. The Bolshevisation of the factory committees directly resulted on increasing the influence of the Party in the trade unions and in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The disputes between the employers and the workers over the payment of the militia were a reflection of the stubborn efforts made by the workers to create a Red Guard. The Petrograd Chief of Militia issued orders "to detain and disarm all militiamen whose armlets bear the letters 'P.M.' (People's Militia) instead of 'C.M.' (Civil Militia)."¹ In reply the Bolsheviks focused intention on the question of

1 "Conference on the Red Guard," *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 10, April 29, 1917.

2 "Red Guard or Militia?" "—*Izvestia* of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, No. 54, April 30, 1917.

a people's militia at the election meetings to the district Dumas. The Council of the Society of Mill-Owners continued to receive complaints from capitalists in which it was declared that the demands of the workers' militia were being supported by the factory committees. The workers formed a united front against the employers.

An incident that occurred at the leather factory of I.V. Ossopov & Co. was characteristic. The owners of the factory complained to the Council of the Mill-Owners of the "over-militant attitude of the militiamen" and of the fact that they were being supported by the factory committee and the workers of the factory as a body—again over the question of paying the militia. The Council of the Society recommended the owners to appeal to the Ministry of the Interior. Confident of their strength, on April 16 the owners informed the worker-militiamen that they would no longer pay them as from March 10. The workers' militia arrested the factory management and summoned a general meeting of the workers. The director of the factory was invited to attend. He refused to come, and was brought to the meeting by force. The workers of the factory decided that every one of the demands of the militiamen was justified and should be satisfied and resolved

"categorically to demand that the factory management should pay the comrades of the militia according to their wage categories as from March 10, otherwise the meeting has decided energetically to support our comrades of the militia with every means in our power."²

Under pressure of the workers, many employers—such as Siemens-Schuckert, the Army and Navy Instrument Factory, the leather factory of A. Paramonov—agreed to concede.

Protests addressed by the capitalists to the Ministry of the Interior show how the workers, led by the Bolsheviks, put the idea of the universal arming of the proletariat into effect. In a statement addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, the All-Russian Society of Leather Manufacturers declared:

"A new type of militia has now been organised in the big leather factories. The workers elect one militiaman for every 100 workers, and the group thus formed exercises in shooting and other duties of militiamen for one month; they are then replaced by a fresh group, the idea being that in time all the workers in the factories shall

1 "A Democratic Militia or a Bureaucratic Police?" ("Pravda," No. 64, May 24, 1917.

2 V. U. Hessen, "The Red Guard and the Petrograd Industrialists in 1917," —"Krasnaya etopis," 1928, No. 3 (27), p. 64.

have had training as militiamen. [Under such circumstances] the purpose of the worker-militiamen is rather obscure, and at any rate is in no wise necessitated by the requirements of production."¹

The proletarian militia passed through very much the same stages of development in the provinces as in Petrograd. The February Revolution furnished the proletariat with arms. The workers' squads at first functioned as a militia, protecting the cities from banditry and drunken riots. Every where they met with the resistance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

On March 2 a people's militia was formed in Moscow with functions similar to the one in Petrograd, viz., "to maintain peace and order." From the very first days of the revolution the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries protested against the arming of the workers and even threatened to arrest all who were found in possession of arms. Nevertheless, part of the arms found their way to the factories, and the fighting squads when formed underwent military training. The distribution of weapons was uneven and casual. The greater the energy and initiative displayed, the better was the arming effected. For example, the workers of the Michelson factory learnt that arms evacuated by the Warsaw police were stored in the warehouses of the Siberian Bank at the Ryazan-Urals Railway Station. It was decided to gain possession of them. The workers of this same factory manufactured bombs at night, and at the time of the October Revolution were able to arm their own Red Guard, neighbouring factories and the soldiers of the Dvina Regiment. By April they had already organised a detachment of the Red Guard consisting of over 400 men.

In April, according to Peché, an organiser of the Red Guard in Moscow, there were workers' squads in the Michelson factory, the Motor factory, the telephone equipment factory, the Provodnik factory and others. But as a rule there was a shortage of weapons. For example, the Red Guard formed in June at the Postavshchik factory in Moscow, consisting of eighty men, was obliged to use sticks during rifle drill owing to a shortage of rifles.

From the very outset the Moscow Bolsheviks devoted considerable attention to the proletarian militia. At a City Conference of the Moscow Bolshevik held on April 3-4 a resolution was adopted dealing with the current situation and the tasks of the proletariat, one of the points of which ran as follows:

"To organise an armed people's militia recruited under

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—406,—“Chief Department of Militia,” Section III, File No. 134, folio 43.

the strict control of the proletarian and peasant organisations.”¹

And ten days later, on April 14, the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party, in furtherance of this point, adopted the following propositions by an almost unanimous vote:

“1. Comrades should join the Red Guard.

“2. It should be proposed to the Committee of Public Organisations through the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies that preference be given, if not to members of the Party, at least to workers.

“3. Factory squads should be formed for the protection of the factories. The factory-owners would thus have to procure arms.

“4. Party squads or rifle clubs should be organised and all measures taken to secure arms.”²

The efforts of the Moscow Bolsheviks to form a proletarian militia were a model of flexible tactics. Workers’ detachments were being organised in the factories. The bourgeoisie determined to outwit the Bolsheviks and gain control of the movement. To this end the Committee of Public Organisations, which was under the sway of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, undertook to form a Red Guard.

The Bolsheviks first of all made it incumbent on the members of the Bolshevik Party nuclei in the factories to join these detachments. Meanwhile, as long as the control of the Red Guard was in the hands of the Mensheviks, the Party recommended that Party squads should be formed and armed. These tactics would make it possible to gain control of the organisation from within. The subsequent development of the political struggle justified these tactics. The Moscow Bolsheviks managed to retain control of the detachments.

A meeting of the Moscow Committee, the Moscow District Committee and the Regional Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee held on April 28, to which active members of the organisation were invited, adopted a resolution on policy towards the Provisional Government which contained the following point:

“A workers’ Red Guard shall immediately be organised without predetermining the forms it may assume.”³

1 “Resolution on the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Proletariat adopted at the Moscow City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., April 3–4, 1917.” —“Sotsial-Demokrat,” April 6, 1917.

2 Archives of the Moscow Committee of the C.P.S.U., “Minutes of the Meeting of the Moscow Committee of the Bolsheviks on April 14, 1917.”

3 October in Moscow. Materials and Documents, Moscow, 1932, p. 19

Thus wherever the Bolsheviks led the proletariat—in the capital and in the provinces, in the Urals and in the Donbas, in the Ukraine and in the Caucasus—detachments of the Red Guard were formed, even though as a result of a severe and obstinate struggle. Persecuted by the government, and in face of the resistance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks succeeded in guiding the initiative of the masses and in carrying on widespread work for the organisation of a proletarian militia. In striving for the formation of a proletarian militia, the Bolsheviks utilised every class demand of the workers and exposed every attempt at compromise on the part of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Whether it was a question of housing or of the food shortage, of taking steps to avert famine or of commandeering surplus grain, the Bolsheviks were able to show that the measures of the government and the promises of the Mensheviks could not be carried out until the working population took its share in the government of the country and until the police and the army were replaced by a proletarian militia organised for defence and offence. This policy helped to instil in the minds of the proletariat the idea that a class civil war, a proletarian revolution, was inevitable.

In May, when re-elections to the district Dumas were in full swing and the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were carrying on vociferous agitation, promising the proletariat food and houses, Lenin wrote an article entitled "Forgetting the Main Thing," in which he reviewed the struggle for the creation of a proletarian militia and said:

"...Once we forget the crude and cruel conditions of capitalist domination, all such platforms, all such lists of high-sounding reforms are nothing but empty words which in practice turn out to be either the most 'pious wishes,' or simple deception of the masses by ten-a-penny bourgeois politicians."¹

As long as there existed a police force or an alternative militia, separated from and directed against the people, no serious and radical reforms in the interest of the working population were possible.

"A people's militia, instead of a police force and a standing army, is a condition for successful municipal reforms in the interests of the toilers."²

"A people's militia," Lenin wrote, "would be an education in democracy for the real masses."

¹ Lenin, "Forgetting the Main Thing,"—"The Revolution of 1917," (Eng. ed.), Vol. II.

² Ibid.

"A People's militia would mean that the poor are governed **not only** through the rich, not through **their** police, but by the people themselves, predominantly by the poor.

"A people's militia would mean that control (over factories, dwellings, the distribution of products, etc.) is **capable** of becoming something more than a paper project.

"A people's militia would mean that bread would be distributed without bread lines and **without any** privileges for the rich."¹

The Bolsheviks were as a result very successful in forming a proletarian militia: by July the Party had its armed detachments in every industrial centre, made up of advanced proletarians who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the great, revolutionary cause of the Party.

¹ Lenin, "Forgetting the Main thing," — "The Revolution of 1917," (Eng. ed.), Vol. II

CHAPTER VII

THE JULY DAYS

1

WORKERS' ACTIONS IN THE CAPITAL

THE forces of revolution that caused the June crisis continued to operate with growing intensity.

Not one of the aims of the revolution had yet been achieved. Food difficulties increased. Economic disruption grew, spreading from region to region and from district to district. Factory after factory came to a standstill—mostly at the instance of the employers. The paralysis of the productive organism crept over the whole country, spreading along the transport arteries.

One hundred and eight factories employing 8,701 workers were closed down in May, 125 factories employing 38,455 workers in June, and 206 factories employing 47,754 workers in July. The output of metal declined by 40 per cent. and of textiles by 20 per cent.

Famine loomed.

It was clear that the bourgeoisie had assumed the offensive. The class purpose of this offensive was blurred out with cynical frankness by Ryabushinsky, a big industrialist, at a congress of merchants and industrialists. He gleefully announced that the time was at hand when

“the gaunt hand of famine and nation-wide poverty will seize the friends of the people—the members of all these committees and Soviets—by the throat.”¹

All through May, and especially in June, strikes were continually breaking out all over the country, the workers demanding an eight-hour day and an improvement in their material conditions.

The Donbas was seething, the conflicts between the workers and employers never ceasing for a moment. A wave of strikes swept over the Urals. Over 20,000 workers of the Sormovo Works, in the Nizhni Novgorod region, went on strike. Prolonged industrial conflicts became a normal occurrence in the Moscow district.

The agrarian revolution was rapidly gaining ground in the country districts. By July forty-three provinces were

¹ “The Commercial and Industrial Congress,” —“Russkiye Vedomosti,” No. 177, August 4, 1917.

affected by the peasant movement. Peasants were rising against the landlords despite the Socialist-Revolutionaries entrenched in the peasant Soviets.

The movement of the workers and peasants was bound to affect the army, in which there were special causes for acute discontent among the soldiers. There were persistent rumours that the death penalty was to be restored at the front and that refractory regiments were to be disbanded. A state of nervousness and alarm prevailed and tended more and more to find expression in a blunt refusal to fight.

The struggle was particularly acute in Petrograd. The June demonstration had shown how great was the latent strength of the proletariat and the Bolshevik Party. After the June events, every day brought news of fresh demonstrations for one cause or another. What alarmed the bourgeoisie and the compromisers most was that these demonstrations invariably assumed a political, and very often a Bolshevik, hue. On June 2 the workers of the Skorokhod factory demanded the transfer of power to the Soviets; on June 8 the workers of the Obukhov factory adopted a similar resolution; on June 10 the workers of the Old Parviainen factory insisted on the transfer of power to the Soviets. On June 13, nineteen factories and three army units in Petrograd were on the side of the Bolsheviks. "We have overthrown the old government, we will bring down Kerensky as well!" the workers and soldiers declared. The movement for the transfer of power to the Soviets grew with extreme rapidity. Only a spark was required to start an explosion among the incensed masses and to launch them against the capitalist government.

The bourgeoisie realised whither the mood of the workers and soldiers in the capital was tending. The situation was aggravated by the ominous news from the front.

The official reports spoke with growing alarm of tens of thousands of deserters from the front. The headquarter staffs of the armies complained that the soldiers' committees were arbitrarily removing officers. But what the commissars and generals referred to in their telegrams most of all was the universal fraternization that was going on. Control of the army was slipping from the hands of the commanders.

The offensive begun so ineffectually in June had collapsed. A catastrophe might occur at any minute. Urgent measures had to be taken before the news of the defeat at the front added fuel to the flames. Another reason why urgent measures had to be adopted was that the elections, to the Constituent Assembly were approaching. Try as it would to postpone the elections, the government was compelled by the pressure of the masses to appoint the convo-

cation of the Constituent Assembly for September 30. The collapse of the offensive and the alarming news from the countryside left not the slightest doubt that the peasant delegates in the Constituent Assembly would adopt a position far to the Left of their official leaders, the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

On July 2, seizing on a chance pretext, the bourgeoisie withdrew its representatives from the government.

The Cadet Ministers—Shingaryov, Minister of Finance, Manuylov, Minister of Education, and Prince Shakhovskoi, Minister of Poor Relief—announced their disagreement with the policy of Kerensky and Tereshchenko on the Ukrainian question, and resigned from the government. Nekrasov, Minister of Ways of communication, at first tendered his resignation, but later thought better of it and sent a letter to the Cadet Central Committee resigning from the party. The bourgeoisie calculated that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were well aware of the State of alarm and were informed of the military disaster, would fear to take power into their own hands. The Cadets knew that, scared at their threat to resign from the government, the compromisers would convulsively cling to the bourgeois Ministers and consent to any concession. It was in the interest of the Cadets to provoke a government crisis, wring full power from the scared petty-bourgeois, and then launch a determined attack on Bolshevism. On June 3, at a conference of members of the State Duma, Milyukov had declared amidst applause:

“Russian society must unite in the struggle against this menace of Bolshevism...If, after long procrastination, the Provisional Government realises that the government has other means besides persuasion—the means it has already begun to use—if it adopts this path, the conquests of the Russian revolution will be consolidated. And we must call upon each other and upon the Provisional Government to follow this path.”¹

And then the whole game would be played in accordance with the old, familiar rules: the proletariat would be provoked into premature action and then ruthlessly crushed by armed force. The Cadets had the support of the bourgeois and the Black Hundred parties. At a private conference of members of the State Duma held on June 16 in connection with the elections to the city district Dumas, Purishkevich declared:

“If you reflect on the figures, on the results of these elections, you will realise that a brilliant victory has been won by the noble party of ‘National Freedom’ [as the

¹ “Conference of Members of the State Duma,” “Rech,” No. 129, June 4, 1917

Cadets called their party—*Ed.*], because this party, the extreme Right party in Russia obtained the votes of all those standing more to the right.”¹

In face of the menace of revolution, all the bourgeois parties rallied around the Cadets.

The Cadets, however, had miscalculated. Their manoeuvre created a crisis not only in the government but also in the country.

The first news of the manoeuvres of the Cadets provoked an outburst of indignation among the workers. At a joint meeting of the company and regimental committees of the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment held on the morning of July 3, voices were raised demanding that the question of armed action should be discussed. The proposal was taken up by those present, who started a meeting on the spot.

The representatives of the rank and file demanded immediate armed action for the overthrow of the Provisional Government. The soldiers spoke indignantly of Kerensky's attempts to smash the revolution under cover of cries about fighting the war to a victorious finish. There were cries of “Out into the streets!” The excited machine-gunners rushed out of the barracks where the meeting was held, crying, “Down with the War!” and “All Power to the Soviets!”

Piling machine-guns into automobile trucks which were hung with placards bearing the inscriptions, “Let the bourgeoisie Perish by Our Machine-Guns!” and “Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!” the regiment moved towards the Taurida Palace, despite the appeals of the Bolshevik Party to refrain from action.

The machine-gunners elected delegates and dispatched them post-haste to other regiments, to the big factories and to Kronstadt. Everywhere the machine-gunners' delegates found the atmosphere heated, and the masses ready to fight.

“About 2 p.m. on July 3,” a worker of the New Parvialen factory relates, “several comrades arrived from the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment and requested us to give them an automobile truck for their machine-guns and to support their action against the Provisional Government... A general meeting of the workers was summoned. The meeting was a stormy one. The comrades from the Machine-Gun Regiment argued eagerly and convincingly that the overthrow of the Provisional Government and of Kerensky was timely and essential. The workers were in an extremely revolutionary mood... I went home to get my gun. When I returned trucks were leaving the factory

¹ The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917.—“Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma, Moscow,” 1932, p. 127.

yard carrying machine-gunners and a number of our workers."¹

A similar frame of mind was encountered by the delegates to the other factories. Thus machine-gunners arrived at the Putilov works at about 2 p.m. and called upon the workers to come out against the government which was threatening to dispatch the revolutionary garrison to the front. "Down with such Ministers!" was heard from all parts of the huge crowd. In response to the request to support the action of the machine-gunners, the workers cried: "Let's go, let's go!"² Late that night about 30,000 Putilov workers, with their wives and children, marched to the Palace, calling out other factories and regiments on the way.

In Kronstadt the delegates from the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment called a meeting on the Yakornaya Square. Their appeal met with a warm response. The sailors decided to support the action of the garrison and workers of Petrograd. Raskolnikov, Vice-Chairman of the Kronstadt Soviet, managed in the meantime to get into touch with the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party by direct wire and to report on the state of affairs in Kronstadt.

"The question is not whether to act or not to act," he said. "It is a question of a different order: will the action take place under our leadership, or will it take place without the participation of our Party—spontaneously, and in an unorganised way? In either case, action is absolutely inevitable, and nothing can avert it."³

The Executive Committee of the Kronstadt Soviet resolved to join in the action of the Petrograd garrison and appointed the assembly of the armed units for dispatch to Petrograd for 6 a.m. on July 4.

¹ Romanov, "The Parviainen Factory."—"Leningrad Workers in the Fight for the Power of the Soviets, Leningrad, 1924," p. 54.

² "The Putilov Works."—"Leningrad Workers in the Fight for the Power of the Soviets, Leningrad, 1924," p. 47.

³ F. F. Raskolnikov,—"Kronstadt and Petrograd in 1917",—"Moscow, 1925, p. 116.

THE JULY DEMONSTRATION IN THE CAPITAL

The Bolshevik Party was well aware of the state of feeling in the army and among the workers in the factories. It fully realised how much revolutionary energy had accumulated among the masses. But the Party did not consider the time ripe for an armed fight, and it was not on the initiative of the Bolsheviks that the masses came out on to the streets in the July days. The Party was opposed to immediate action. On June 22 a joint conference of members of the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Bolshevik military organisation had stressed the fact that this was not a favourable moment to accept the challenge.

The Bolsheviks kept a careful watch on the manoeuvres of the Cadets. Lenin warned the Party that it was in the interest of bourgeoisie to provoke the revolutionary masses of Petrograd to come out on to the streets before the revolutionary ferment had spread to the whole country.

But the movement in the capital was rapidly gaining in intensity. The counter-revolutionary character of the government was daily becoming more obvious to the masses. Every hour exposed the compromising policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. At a moment when the movement was growing, and promising to grow still more rapidly, it would be a mistake to take risks.

"Let the future Cavaignacs begin first."¹ Lenin said.

There were other reasons that inspired the tactics of the Bolshevik Party. Important as Petrograd was, it alone would not decide the issue of the revolution. It would be madness to resort to action without the proletarians of the Urals, without the miners of the Donbas and without the soldier millions. The army was obviously slipping from the grasp of the government, the army already did not trust the Provisional Government, but it was still under the influence of its committees, which were dominated by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Party, the Bolsheviks, and particularly the representatives of the military organisation of the Party, opposed armed action on July 3. But the excitement of the soldiers and workers in the capital had already reached bursting point.

The Second Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party was being held just at this time (July 1-3). Representatives from the Machine-Gun Regiment appeared at

¹ Lenin, "At the Breaking Point,"—"The Revolution of 1917," (Eng. ed.), Vol. II.

the Conference and reported the action of the regiment. Speaking at the Conference, Stalin described this incident as follows:

"You recall how you told the delegates that Party members cannot go counter to the decision of their Party, and how annoyed the representatives of the regiment were, and how they declared that they would rather resign from the Party than go against the decision of the regiment."¹

At about 5 p.m. on July 3, Stalin, speaking on behalf of a joint meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Conference which had been held at 4 p.m., officially declared at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets that the Party had decided not to take action. An appeal was immediately drawn up and sent to the "Pravda" to be published on the morning of July 4. Those who had attended the meeting and the Conference hurried to the districts to restrain the masses from action. But it was already too late to stop the movement. The people listened impatiently to the Bolsheviks, and then poured into the streets. Two Bolsheviks, who had vainly tried to restrain the soldiers of the Moscow Regiment and the workers of the neighbouring factories, were told by the demonstrators:

"If we did not know them personally we would have chased them out as Mensheviks."²

Some other decision was necessary. Rank-and-file members of the Bolshevik Party in many cases took this decision on their own initiative and responsibility—so high had the political development of the Party become. They clearly realised that if left to itself the demonstration would be smashed by the counter-revolutionaries. Having lost all hope of stopping the avalanche, the Bolsheviks placed themselves at the head of the demonstration: they assumed charge of the movement and surrounded the demonstration by armed Red Guards to protect it from possible provocative action by the counter-revolutionaries.

"The demonstration was under way," Stalin said later at the Conference of the Petrograd Bolshevik organisation. "Had the Party the right to wash its hands of the action of the proletariat and soldiers and to hold aloof? We anticipated the possibility of even more drastic consequences to the demonstration than have actually occurred. We had no right to wash our hands of it; as the Party of the proletariat we were obliged to intervene in the demonstration and lend it a peaceful and organised character,

¹ The Second and Third Petrograd City Conferences of the Bolsheviks, July and October 1917.—"Minutes and Materials, Moscow, 1927," pp. 53-54.

² Y. Kokko, "The Aivaz Factory in the July Days,"—"Leningrad Workers in the Fight for the Power of the Soviets, Leningrad, 1924," p. 68.

without setting ourselves the aim of seizing power by force of arms.¹

At about 10 p.m. on July 3 delegates from the Bolshevik City Conference, members of the Bolshevik Central Committee and representatives from the army units and the factories met in the Kshesinska mansion. The meeting discussed the events in Petrograd and adopted the following resolution:

"The crisis of power which has arisen will not be settled in the interests of the people if the revolutionary proletariat and the garrison do not immediately declare, firmly and resolutely, that they are in favour of the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. For this purpose, an immediate demonstration of the workers and soldiers in the streets is recommended in order to express their will."²

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, together with the Petrograd Committee and the military organisation of the Party, resolved to rescind their previous decision forbidding the demonstration and to assume charge of the spontaneous movement and to lend it an organised character. A peaceful demonstration was appointed for July 4 under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" Since the earlier appeal had already been printed, "Pravda" appeared next day with a blank page. The new appeal was issued as a handbill calling upon the workers and soldiers of Petrograd in the following terms:

"Now that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has clearly come out in opposition to the revolution, let the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies take the entire power into its own hands."³

On the following day a new and powerful demonstration took place, this time led by the Bolshevik Party. A headquarters staff was formed to direct the movement, and instructions were drawn up. The demonstrators were protected by armoured cars stationed in various parts of the city. A company from the Machine-Gun Regiment was sent to the Fortress of Peter and Paul.

Sailors from Kronstadt and troops from Peterhof, Oranienbaum, Krasnoye Selo and other places joined the demonstration on July 4. The sailors from Kronstadt assembled before the Kshesinska mansion and insistently requested that the leader of the Party, Lenin, should address them.

1 The Second and Third Petrograd City Conferences of the Bolsheviks, July and October 1917,—"Minutes and Materials, Moscow, 1927," pp. 53-54.

2 "October in Petrograd," Leningrad, 1933, p. 81.

3 "The Events in Petrograd,"—"Sotsial-Demokrat, No." 104, July 11, 1917.

Lenin addressed them in a brief speech, the only one he made during the July events. He conveyed the greetings of the Petrograd workers to the revolutionary sailors of Kronstadt and expressed the conviction that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was bound to win. At the same time, Lenin appealed for "firmness, steadfastness and vigilance."¹

The columns of demonstrators marched to the Kshesinska mansion, where the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party were quartered, and thence to the Taurida Palace, where the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets held its sessions. There the columns elected delegations to transmit the demands of the masses. Ninety representatives, elected by fifty-four enterprises, passed before the members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. One after another, the delegates stepped forward and fervently called upon the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to take the power into its hands. The frightened Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks whispered to each other in alarm as they heard the measured tread of the demonstrators. But they arrived at no decision. The growing tumult created by about half a million demonstrating workers and soldiers scared the leaders of the "revolutionary democracy." They tried in every way to avoid carrying out the demands of the people.

¹ Lenin, "An Answer",—"Towards the Seizure of Power," (Eng. ed.), Vol. I.

THE JULY DEMONSTRATION SMASHED

While the demonstrators were fervently calling for the power of the Soviets, behind their backs the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were feverishly mobilising forces against the revolution. Troops loyal to the government were summoned to the Taurida Palace. Towards 7 p.m. the Vladimirsky Military School, the 9th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cossack Regiment appeared on the Palace Square.

At a joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies held on July 5, the Menshevik Voitinsky reported:

"There was a time when we had no forces of any kind. Only six men guarded the entrance to the Taurida Palace, and they were not in a position to hold back the crowd. The first unit to come to our aid consisted of armoured cars. . . . **We had firmly made up our minds** that if violence were offered by the armed bands, we would **open fire.**"¹

Orders were given to the committee of the Fifth Army to dispatch troops to Petrograd. The 14th Cavalry Division, the 14th Don Cossack Regiment, the 117th Izborsky Regiment and other units were immediately dispatched from the front. Lieutenant Mazurenko, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, was appointed commander of the mixed detachment. Dudarov, the Assistant Minister of Marine, sent orders to the submarines in Helsingfors not to hesitate to sink the revolutionary ships if they set sail for Petrograd.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks hesitated less than ex-Tsar Nicholas did in the last days of the reign to withdraw troops from the front to combat the revolution. The infuriated petty-bourgeois proved to be no less reactionary than the generals of the Tsar.

Acting in close alliance with the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, General Polovtsev, Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, gave orders on the morning of July 4 that order should be restored immediately.

In various parts of the city—on the corner of the Nevsky Prospect and the Sadovaya, on the Liteiny Prospect, in the vicinity of the Engineers' Castle and in other places

¹ "The All-Russian Central Executive Committee During the July Days of 1917,"—"Krasny Arkhiv," 1926, No. 5 (18), p. 215.

—rifle fire was opened on the demonstrators by provocateurs and counter-revolutionaries. There were attacks by Cossacks and junkers. The counter-revolutionaries decided to assume the offensive. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee assigned two Socialist-Revolutionaries—Avksentyev and Gotz—to assist the government commission appointed “to restore and maintain revolutionary order in Petrograd.” On the morning of July 5 the offices of the “Pravda,” and the “Trud” (“Labour”) printshop were wrecked by counter-revolutionary detachments.

Believing that the demonstration was over, the Bolsheviks had already on July 4 called upon the demonstrators to disperse quietly. But in view of the attacks by the junkers and Cossacks the sailors remained in Petrograd. They occupied the Kshesinska mansion and the Fortress of Peter and Paul, and together with the machine-gunners prepared for defence.

On the night of July 5 fresh government reinforcements arrived from the front. Wholesale arrests were conducted in various parts of the city. Premises were searched and wrecked. Petrograd assumed the appearance of an occupied city. The streets were filled with junker patrols. The working-class quarters were cut off from the centre. On the night of July 5 a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies adopted a resolution by which they unreservedly associated themselves with the foul action of the counter-revolutionaries:

“The meeting considers that the measures taken by the Provisional Government and the Military Commission appointed by the Bureaux of both Executive Committees were in the interests of the revolution.

“Recognising the need for further resolute measures to restore and maintain revolutionary order in Petrograd, the meeting endorses the powers conferred on Comrades Avksentyev and Gotz by the Bureaux of both Committees.”¹

The meeting also endorsed Dudarov's telegram.

The representatives of counter-revolution began to adopt the language of ultimatums. The delegation from the Kronstadt sailors, which was at that time conducting negotiations with the Military Commission of the Central Executive Committee, was ordered to disarm immediately. The situation on July 5-6 was described by Stalin in a report

¹ “Joint Session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies,” *Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*, No. 111, July 7, 1917.

he made to the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party as follows:

"On July 5 negotiations took place with the Central Executive Committee, represented by Lieber. Lieber stipulated that we [i.e., the Bolsheviks—*Ed.*] should withdraw the armoured cars from the Kshesinska mansion and that the sailors should return to Kronstadt. We agreed on condition that the Soviet would protect our Party organisations from possible raids. In the name of the Central Executive Committee, Lieber assured us that our stipulations would be observed by the Central Executive Committee and that the Kshesinska mansion would remain at our disposal until we received permanent quarters. We kept our promises. The armoured cars were withdrawn and the Kronstadt sailors agreed to return, only with their arms. The Central Executive Committee, however, did not keep a single one of its promises. On July 6, Kozmin [Assistant Commander of the Petrograd Military Area—*Ed.*] telephoned to the Kshesinska mansion demanding that the Kshesinska mansion and the Fortress of Peter and Paul should be evacuated within three-quarters of an hour, otherwise, he threatened, armed forces would be dispatched against them. . . . The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party delegated me to the Fortress of Peter and Paul, where I succeeded in persuading the sailors present not to accept battle, since the situation had taken such a turn that we were being faced by counter-revolution, by the Right wing of democracy. In my capacity as representative of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets I went with Bogdanov to see Kozmin. He had everything ready for action: artillery, cavalry and infantry. We argued with him not to resort to armed force. Kozmin resented the fact that civilians were hampering him by their constant interference, and it was only reluctantly that he agreed to comply with the insistent demand of the Central Executive Committee. It is clear to me that the Socialist-Revolutionary military men wanted bloodshed so as to give a 'lesson' to the workers, soldiers and sailors. We prevented them from having their way. . . . The Central Executive Committee, scared by the Bolsheviks and the counter-revolutionaries, has concluded a shameful alliance with the counter-revolutionaries and is complying with their demands, namely, to surrender the Bolsheviks, to arrest the delegates from the Baltic Fleet and to disarm the revolutionary soldiers and workers."¹

On July 4 the Provisional Government had instructed the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, General

¹ J. Stalin, "The Road to October, Articles and Speeches," March-October 1917, Moscow, 1925.

Polovtsev, "to clear Petrograd of armed people." The instructions went on to say:

"At the same time you are instructed to arrest, as participators in the disorders, the Bolsheviks occupying the Kshesinska mansion, to clear it and occupy it with troops."¹

On the morning of July 6 the Fortress of Peter and Paul was occupied by a detachment of cyclists, and a little later troops occupied the Kshesinska mansion, which they wrecked. That same day, July 6, the Provisional Government issued orders for the arrest of Lenin.

A savage campaign was launched against the Bolshevik Party and its leaders. Lenin was slanderously accused of being a German spy. This absurdity was fabricated from the "testimony" of a provocateur, a certain sub-Lieutenant Yermolenko of the 16th Siberian Regiment, supposed to have been dispatched by the German command to the Sixth Army to agitate for the conclusion of peace with Germany. The Provisional Government had been in possession of this "testimony" ever since April, but had withheld it until a more suitable moment. On July 5 these libellous fabrications were published in a yellow sheet, "Zhivoye Slovo" ("The Living Word"), by G. Alexinsky, a former Social-Democrat and member of the Second Duma, and V. Pankratov, at one time a member of the Narodnaya Volya Party. The Provisional Government hesitated to publish these "documents" in its own name, and instead entrusted them to the persons mentioned.

Dan, the Menshevik leader, giving evidence before the Investigation Commission, declared that he did not believe in the complicity of the Bolsheviks in German espionage, but nevertheless permitted himself to make the provocative statement that German agents had taken part in the demonstration of July 3-5.

"While I am profoundly convinced that agents of the German General Staff hitch on to all movements of the character of the movement of July 3-5, nevertheless, I have never accused any of the Bolsheviks, still less the Bolshevik Party as a whole, of German espionage."²

The counter-revolutionaries demanded that Lenin should be brought to trial. Lenin did not await arrest, and went into hiding. Some Party members (Rykov, Nogin and Kamenev) declared that Lenin should appear for trial. Trotsky, too, demanded that Lenin should give himself up to the authorities. But this was vigorously opposed by

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—3,—"Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Register I," File No. 42, folio 1.

2 "The July Days in Petrograd,"—"Krasny Arkhiv," 1927, No. 5 (24), pp. 66-67.

Stalin, who declared that there was no guarantee that Lenin would not be brutally done to death."¹

How correct was Stalin's estimate of the danger that threatened Lenin is best shown by the testimony of General Polovtsev, who played a leading part in the July massacre.

Polovtsev later wrote in his memoirs, "Days of Eclipse":

"The officer who set out for Terijoki in the hope of catching Lenin asked me whether I wanted this gentleman delivered whole or in pieces. . . . I smiled and said that arrested men often attempt to escape."²

Lenin himself expressed the following opinion regarding this trial:

"The court is an organ of power. The liberals sometimes forget this. It is a sin for a Marxist to forget it.
"Where, then, is the power? . . .
"There is no government. It changes daily. It is inactive.
"It is the military dictatorship that is active. Under such conditions it is ridiculous even to speak of a 'trial.' It is not a question of a 'trial,' but of an **episode in the civil war.** . . .

"I have done nothing unlawful. The court is just. The court will examine the case. The trial will be public. The people will understand. I shall appear."

"This reasoning is naive to the point of childishness. Not a trial, but a campaign of persecution against the internationalists is **what the authorities need.** To imprison them and hold them is what Messrs. Kerensky and Co. want. So it was (in England and France), so it will be (in Russia)."³

On July 7 the Provisional Government decided to disband all military units that had taken part in the demonstration of July 3-5. This decision was preceded by analogous demands from Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, which were transmitted to Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on July 4. Buchanan considered it necessary to:

"1. Re-establish the death penalty throughout Russia for all individuals subject to military and naval law.

"2. Require the units who took part in the unlawful demonstration of the 16th and 17th⁴ to give up agitators.

On July 8 orders were issued dissolving the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Sailors of the Baltic

1 "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917", Moscow, 1934, p. 28.

2 P. A. Polovtsev, "Days of Eclipse", Paris, p. 143.

3 Lenin, "The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders Appearing Before the courts," Collected Works, (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, pp. 24-25.

4 New Style.—Trans.

Fleet—the Centrobalt, as it was called for brevity. Instructions were given to arrest and send to Petrograd for interrogation all the ringleaders in the disorders among the garrison of Kronstadt and the crews of the warships Petropavlovsk, Respublika and Slava, whose names, the lackeys of the bourgeoisie asserted, were “besmirched by counter-revolutionary actions and resolutions.”

“3. Disarm all workers in Petrograd.

“4. Establish a military censorship of the press, with authority to confiscate the machinery of papers inciting the troops or the population to conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.

“5. Establish a ‘militia’ in Petrograd and other large towns under wounded officers from soldiers who have been wounded at the front, choosing preferably men of forty years and over.

“6. Disarm all units in Petrograd and district who do not agree to the above conditions and transform them into labour battalions.”¹

That very same day Kerensky circulated a lying radio-gram which stated:

“It has been ascertained beyond doubt that the disorders in Petrograd were organised with the help of German government agents... The leaders and persons who have stained themselves in the blood of their brothers and by a crime against the country and the revolution, are being arrested.”²

The “Socialist” Ministers—who constituted the majority in the government after the resignation of the Cadets—realised that open counter-revolutionary actions on the part of the government might arouse the resistance of the masses. While not desisting from crushing the revolution, the Minister compromisers decided to pass several “revolutionary” measures as a sop to the people. It was proposed to proclaim Russia a republic, disperse the Privy Council and the State Duma and to draft agrarian legislation. On July 7 Kerensky outlined this programme at a meeting of the Provisional Government. In reply, Prince Lvov resigned and left the meeting.

The alarm was sounded in bourgeois circles. The Provisional Committee of the State Duma declared that it considered

“its removal from the work of forming the new Provisional Government politically disastrous.”³

¹ A. Know, “With the Russian Army,” 1914-1917, London Hutchinson & Co., 1921, Vol. II, p. 662.

² “Telegram of the Minister of Marine,” *Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies*, No. 112, July 8, 1917.

³ “Resolution of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma,” *Rech*, No. 158, July 8, 1917.

That evening Prince Lvov sent a letter to the government protesting against the programme outlined. In his opinion, all the clauses were

"in the nature of casting State and moral pearls to the masses for the sake of demogogy and in order to satisfy the demands of their petty self-conceit."¹

Intimidated by the bourgeoisie, the "Socialist" Ministers abandoned their intentions. On July 8 the Provisional Government endorsed Kerensky as Prime Minister, he at the same time retaining the posts of Minister of War and Minister of Marine. Nekrasov was included in the government as Assistant Prime Minister. The Ministry of the Interior was presented to Tsereteli. That same day the government published its programme, which contained not a single one of the recently proposed measures. The government's declaration reiterated the declaration of the first coalition government of May 6, and directly referred to this declaration several times. The Provisional Government promised to bend every effort in the fight against the foreign enemy and also to convene the Constituent Assembly at the time appointed and to draft agrarian measures. At the same time it was stated that in the sphere of labour policy "bills are being drafted for an eight-hour working day and for comprehensive labour protection,"² and so forth. For the purpose of combating economic disorganisation, the government would set up an Economic Council and a Chief Economic Committee to evolve a general plan of organisation of national economy and labour.

Like previous declarations, the new programme contained nothing explicit. Ex-Tsar Nicholas wrote in his diary of the new government and its declaration as follows :

"Saturday, July 8. There has been a change in the government: Prince Lvov has resigned and Kerensky will be President of the Council while remaining Minister of War and Minister of Marine and in addition taking over control of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. He is the right man in the right place at the present moment: the more power he has, the better."³

The government had the whole-hearted support of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. On July 9, a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the

¹ "Prince Lvov's Declaration to the Provisional Government," *Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*, No. 113, July 9, 1917.

² "From the Provisional Government," *Rech*, No. 159, July 9, 1917.

³ "Diary of Nicholas Romanov," *Krasny Arkhiv*, 1927, No. 2 (21), p. 91.

All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies proclaimed the new Ministry to be a "government for the salvation of the revolution":

"It is invested with unlimited powers for the restoration of organisation and discipline in the army and for resolutely combating every manifestation of counter-revolution and anarchy."²

Having invested the Provisional Government with emergency powers, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries indicated where the blow should be struck so as to smash the revolution most surely. At a joint meeting of the two Executive Committees held on July 13, Dan made the following:

"What Comrade Kerensky called upon us to do, we have already done. Not only are we prepared to support the Provisional Government, not only have we delegated plenary powers to it, but we demand that the government should use these powers... This morning, at a meeting of the fraction of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks... a resolution was adopted which we submit to the meeting and are assured it will adopt..."²

The resolution was then read. It demanded that the Bolsheviks should be tried, that Lenin should appear for trial, that all persons summoned for trial should be expelled from the Soviet and that all members of the Soviet should implicitly obey the decision of its majority.

This resolution revealed to what depths the petty-bourgeois parties had sunk. But it was not the only act of its kind. On July 8 an article appeared in "Novoye Vremya" a reactionary bourgeois paper, demanding that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries should take "decisive steps to dissociate themselves from criminal Bolshevism and to place themselves above the suspicion of according comradely protection to Lenin."³

And on July 11, to the glee of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks published an appeal to the members of the party in the name of the Organisation Committee, which acted as the Menshevik Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. This appeal stated:

"The criminal adventure instigated by Lenin's head-quarter staff was able to attain the proportions it did and become a menace to the cause of revolution only

1 "Establishment of a Revolutionary Dictatorship." — "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", No. 114, July 11, 1917.

2 "Joint Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies." — "Novaya Zhizn", No. 74, July 14, 1917.

3 Hofsteter. "They Must Dissociate Themselves," — "Novoye Vremya", No. 14821, July 8, 1917.

because this staff had the support of large sections of the workers and because Social-Democracy proved too weak to paralyse demagogy by its organised intervention... It is time to declare loudly and clearly that 'Bolshevism,' the Bolshevism of which Lenin is the mouth-piece and leader, has diverged so far from Social-Democracy, has become so permeated by anarcho-syndicalist ideas, that it is only by some misunderstanding, by force of inertia, that it still screens itself by the banner of the R.S.D.L.P."¹

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had achieved the full circle of their development and had crowned the period of compromise with the bourgeoisie by definitely deserting to the enemies of the revolution.

On July 12 the government restored the death penalty at the front and established military tribunals to deal with the revolutionary soldiers. Decrees were also issued introducing preliminary military censorship, closing down the Bolshevik papers ("Pravda," "Okopnaya Pravda," etc), and providing for the disarmament of the workers. The programme outlined by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, was carried into effect in its entirety. Not without good reason did Sir George Buchanan later write in his reminiscences in reference to the Provisional Government:

"But, black as was the outlook, I was nevertheless inclined to take a more hopeful view of things. The government had suppressed the Bolshevik rising and seemed at last determined to act with firmness... On my calling on him a few days later, Tereshchenko assured me that the government was now completely master of the situation."²

While pursuing a vigorous counter-revolutionary policy, the Provisional Government tried to divert the attention of the masses by throwing them sops. At the meeting of the government at which the death penalty was introduced, a bill was adopted forbidding the purchase and sale of land. The Petrograd garrison was disarmed, but on July 13 Polovtsev, the man who had smashed the July demonstration, was removed from his post of Commander of the Petrograd Military Area.

As soon as it became clear that the July demonstration had failed, the Provisional Government decided to reform the Cabinet once more. On July 11, I. N. Efremov, a former member of the State Duma, a land-owner and

1 "To All Members of the Party,"—"Rabochaya Gazeta," No. 103, July 11, 1917.

2 Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassell and Co., 1923, Vol. II, pp. 156-58.

member of the Progressivist Party, was appointed Minister of Justice; A. A. Baryshnikov, a former member of the State Duma, a Progressivist, was appointed Acting Minister of Poor Relief; Takhtamyshev was appointed Acting Minister of Ways of Communication. A little prior to this the Progressivists had formed a new party—the Russian Radical Democratic Party—in order to extend their base by inviting the support of the petty-bourgeois section of the population. The new party declared in favour of a coalition and the admission of bourgeois representatives to the government.

However closely allied the Progressivists were to the Cadets—Lenin called them “a crossbreed of Octobrists and Cadets”¹—they could not represent the bourgeoisie, whose political leaders were the Cadets. On July 13 Kerensky invited the Central Committee of the Cadet Party to nominate its candidates to the Cabinet. The Cadets declined. On July 15 three prominent Moscow Cadets—N. I. Astrov, later a member of General Denikin’s government, N. M. Kishkin, who later, in 1919, attempted to organise a rebellion in Moscow in support of Denikin, and V. D. Nabokov, Executive Secretary of the First Provisional Government—sent Kerensky a letter setting forth the terms on which the Cadets would be prepared to join the government. The Cadets insisted that the members of the government must in their activities be independent of all organisations and parties, that the government must not undertake any big reform before the Constituent Assembly met, that discipline must be restored in the army, that the soldiers’ committees must not be allowed to interfere in questions of military tactics, and that an end must be put to multiple powers. It was no longer enough for the Cadets that the petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviets had invested the government with plenary power. They wanted the government to exercise that power independently of the Soviet. On July 18, at another of the “private conferences of members of the State Duma,” the leaders of the bourgeoisie announced what their aim was. Purishkevich hysterically clamoured:

“The power must be a power, the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies must be put in their place and dissolved.”²

A. M. Maslennikov, a houseowner, lawyer and member of the Progressivist Party, seconded the arch-reactionary Purishkevich:

¹ Lenin, “The Results of the Elections,”—“Collected Works,” (Russ. ed.), Vol. XVI, p. 262.

² “The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma,” Moscow 1932, p. 202.

"It is time to say why it is we have sunk to this shame and humiliation... It is the dreamers, the crazy people, who imagine themselves to be the shapers of world policy, who are to blame for this; it is the petty careerists, who want in the revolution to ride about in automobiles and live in palaces and who have sold Russia to the Germans, who are to blame for this... A handful of crazy fanatics, a handful of rogues, a handful of traitors have hitched themselves on to the revolution and this handful has called itself 'the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.'"1.

F. I. Rodichev, one of the founders of the Cadet Party who, as Minister for Finland in the Provisional Government, pursued a chauvinistic, Great-Russian policy, insisted that the demands made by Kishkin, Astrov and Nabokov should be accepted, and said threateningly :

"We are afraid that the Bolshevism that has perhaps already shown its face in the towns will show its face in the countryside, but we must combat this, and we must call upon the government to combat it, and not to connive at it, and to organise an administration, to organise an authority in the country."2

When the atmosphere had become sufficiently heated, Milyukov spoke. He made a detailed analysis of the Cadets' demands. The bourgeois leader asked the excited audience:

"Do you consider it right that the Party of National Freedom... should condemn its members to the rôle of a screen, which we have refused to play until now, that the Party of National Freedom should nevertheless join the government? We think not... And we considered that we would be simply deceiving the country... if we accepted the proposal made to us on any conditions, and not on the conditions which we put, and which—I am glad to say—are put by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma as well."3

Milyukov went so far in his frankness as to demand a further postponement of the Constituent Assembly (the Government had promised to convene it on September 17).

The joint organisations of merchants and industrialists issued a declaration in support of Milyukov's demands. Landlords and bourgeois joined forces over the demands of the Cadet Party.

1 "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 197.

2 Ibid., p. 207.

3 Ibid., p. 217.

On July 20, Kerensky again invited Kishkin and Astrov to join the government. He assured the Cadets that:

"The Provisional Government is invested with plenary power and is not answerable to any public organisations or parties."¹

Milyukov expected that the Soviet would fully endorse this statement. But the militant attitude of the bourgeoisie frightened the leaders of the Soviet and they hesitated to accept all the Cadets' conditions. Kerensky decided to bring pressure to bear on the vacillating compromisers. On July 21 he tendered his resignation. Kerensky justified this step on the ground that he evidently did not enjoy sufficient prestige to form a government and that, on the other hand, he considered that Russia could be ruled only by a government that would unite all the public organisations. The bourgeois Ministers—Tereshchenko, Godnev, Efremov, Lvov and Nekrasov—supported Kerensky and also tendered their resignations. The Provisional Government resolved not to accept the resignations of Kerensky and the other Ministers and to leave the Cabinet unchanged until a new government was formed in one way or another. It was decided to summon that evening a meeting of the Central Committees of the Popular Socialist Party, the Cadets, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Radical Democratic Party (the former Progressivists), the Chairman of the State Duma, the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. At 9 p.m. a preliminary meeting of both Executive Committees was held, at which Tsereteli reported on the course of the crisis. Dan proposed that the session should be suspended, that they should all remain in the Taurida Palace and that those invited should attend the meeting of the Cabinet at the Winter Palace.

The joint conference of the government and the Central Committees of the compromising and bourgeois parties opened at 11-30 p.m. The discussion lasted into the morning. The bourgeoisie insisted on the adoption of the Cadets' conditions. The compromisers demanded the recognition of the declaration of July 8. Speaking on behalf of the Mensheviks, Dan declared that "at the proper moment" they would not fear to take power.² but before this was done every avenue must be explored to

1 "Letter of A. F. Kerensky to V. D. Nabokov, N. M. Kishkin and N. I. Astrov," "Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 123, July 21, 1917.

2 "A Historic Meeting,"—"Den," No. 117, July 23, 1917.

create a coalition government. Chkheidze plied Milyukov with questions on his attitude towards the questions of peace and land. Milyukov referred him to the letter of the Moscow Cadets and added:

"First we must create a powerful Russia, and then only can we speak of achieving national aims and of observing our obligations to our Allies."¹

Realising the state of mind that prevailed, Milyukov rapidly changed his tactics. He played on Kerensky's popularity and proposed that the latter be personally entrusted to form a Cabinet of persons whom he might deem fit to invite. This proposal suited the bourgeoisie because in this way the Cabinet would be independent of organisations. But it suited the compromisers also, because it enabled them to save their face in the eyes of the masses: Kerensky the "Socialist" would remain at the head of the government. The Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries declared in their resolutions that they

"place full confidence in Comrade Kerensky in the formation of a Cabinet made up of representatives of all parties that are prepared to work on the basis of the programme announced by the Government of Comrade Kerensky on July 8."²

On July 22 a joint meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies entrusted Kerensky with the task of forming a Cabinet. The reference to the declaration of July 8 was obviously intended as a smoke-screen. That same day the Provisional Committee of the State Duma also "entrusted" Kerensky with the formation of a Cabinet, but made no mention whatever of the declaration of July 8. On July 24 the Central Committee of the Cadet Party agreed to include its representatives in the government, at the same time emphasising the point that the old conditions retained their force:

"Taking note of the declaration of the Prime Minister to the effect that he intends to take as the basis for the creation of a strong government the dire necessity of prosecuting the war, maintaining the fighting capacity of the army and restoring the economic power of the State, the Central Committee of the Party of National Freedom leaves it to its colleagues, on the personal selection of Kerensky, to join the government and to occupy the posts offered them."³

1 "A Historic Meeting," "Den," No. 117, July 23, 1917.

2 Ibid.

3 "Negotiations for the Formation of a New Cabinet," "Den," No. 118, July, 25, 1917.

That very same day the new Cabinet was announced : Premier and Minister of War and Marine, A. F. Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary); Assistant Premier and Minister of Finance, N. V. Kekrasov (Left Cadet); Minister of the Interior, N. D. Avksentyev (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko; Minister of Justice, A. S. Zarudny (Popular Socialist); Minister of Education, S. F. Oldenburg (Cadet); Minister of Commerce and Industry, S. N. Prokopovich (non-party, close to the Cadets); Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov (Socialist-Revolutionary); Minister of Post and Telegraph, A. M. Nikitin (Menshevik); Minister of Labour, M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik); Minister of Food, A. V. Peshekhonov (Popular Socialist); Minister of Poor Relief, I. N. Efremov (Radical Democratic Party); Minister of Ways of Communication, P. N. Yurenev (Cadet); Procurator-General, A. V. Kartashov (Cadet); Comptroller-General, F. F. Kokoshkin (Cadet).

And that is just the opinion subsequently expressed of the composition of the new government:

"While the Socialists had a small nominal superiority, the real superiority on the Cabinet unquestionably belonged to the convinced supporters of bourgeois democracy."¹

The July events were reflected in the provinces. On July 4, when the first news from Petrograd was received in Moscow the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies passed the following resolution:

"Until further orders all public manifestations in Moscow, whether in the shape of demonstrations or street meetings, are forbidden."²

But in spite this prohibition, that very same day huge demonstrations of workers marched from the out-skirts to the centre of the city, many of the banners and placards bearing slogans demanding the transfer of power to the Soviet. Several detachments from the Moscow garrison joined the demonstrating workers.

A meeting addressed by Bolshevik speakers was held on the Skobelev Square.

Bolshevik sympathies obviously prevailed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. On July 5 the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies passed a resolution demanding the trans-

¹ P. N. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, pp. 44-5.

² "Appeal of the Moscow Soviet,"—"Izvestia of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies," No. 103, July 5, 1917.

fer of power to the Soviets. A huge demonstration of workers and soldiers from the local garrison was held in Ivanovo-Voznesensk on July 6.

Demonstrations, and in some cases revolts of soldiers took place in Yaroslavl, Rostov, Kostroma, Shuya, Kovrov, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kiev, Riga and a number of other cities. An armed detachment, under the command of Colonel Verkhovsky, was dispatched from Moscow to Nizhni-Novgorod to disarm the local garrison.

THE PROLETARIAT LOSES FAITH IN THE COMPROMISERS

Thus the demonstration of July 3-5 was smashed and the Bolshevik Party driven underground.

It would appear that the movement had ended in defeat. But as a matter of fact it was in a way a victory for the revolution in its transition from a bourgeois revolution to a Socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie rather overrated its success: the superficial and easily-discernible changes prevented it from observing the profound process of redistribution of class forces that was going on beneath the surface. When the tsarist autocracy smashed the peaceful demonstration of January 9, 1905, it put an end not to the workers' movement but to the workers' faith in the Tsar. In the same way, by suppressing the July demonstration, the bourgeoisie destroyed not the workers' revolution but the workers' confidence, not so much in the bourgeoisie itself—that had been destroyed long ago—but in the petty-bourgeois leaders.

Among the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators there were quite a number of rank-and-file Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Like many thousands of non-party workers who had trusted the petty-bourgeois bloc, they now clearly realised the utter vileness of the latter's treachery. The July days drove a wedge between the rank-and-file and the leaders of the compromising parties: while the leaders passed over to the camp of the bourgeoisie, the rank-and-file swung sharply towards the proletariat.

The ranks of the Bolsheviks began to swell rapidly. In three weeks the Petrograd membership of the Bolshevik Party increased by 2,500. The growth of the Party and of its influence among the workers can also be judged from the results of the elections to various organisations in the mills and factories. The elections of stewards to the sick benefit societies in the New Lessner factory and the Old Lessner factory resulted as follows: of a hundred stewards elected, fifteen were Socialist-Revolutionaries, five Mensheviks and eighty Bolsheviks. Until then less than half the stewards had been Bolsheviks. At the Ericson factory, of sixty stewards elected, seven were Mensheviks, fourteen Socialist-Revolutionaries and thirty-nine Bolsheviks. At the Treugolnik factory, of a hundred stewards elected about seventy were Bolsheviks, whereas previously the majority of the stewards had been Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The results were similar in the elections to the Soviets. At the Franco-Russian factory three Bolshevik deputies were elected in place of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. A Bolshevik was elected in place of a compromiser at the Langensiepen factory, and so on.

The workers were deserting the bankrupt parties and going over to the Bolsheviks. If they did not always join the Party—frequently because of the savage persecution—they nevertheless threw off the influence of the petty-bourgeois leaders.

Everywhere the result was the same: after the first days of unbridled repression, the workers as it were withdrew into themselves, and, having thought the question over, gradually went over to the Bolshevik camp.

"We made a report on the Petrograd events," a delegate from Grozny related at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, "and what was the result? Not a single word from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks: they were crushed. After this the campaign of slander ceased and, what is more, Socialist-Revolutionaries began to join our organisation."¹

"The Socialist-Revolutionaries enjoy great influence," a delegate from the Donbas reported. "But after the events of July 3-5 a flow of workers from the Socialist-Revolutionary organisations into ours became noticeable. ... Prominent Socialist-Revolutionaries joined our organisation and declared that the ruling classes have betrayed the interests of the workers."²

Further evidence of the disintegration of the petty-bourgeois parties is provided by the growth of the opposition within their ranks. Among the Mensheviks there was a growth in the strength of the Left Wing, whose leader, Martov, even proposed during the July days that the power should be transferred to the Soviets; the Right Wing of the Mensheviks virtually broke away and allied itself with the "Den" newspaper, which was edited by the well-known liquidator, Potresov. The Left current among the Socialist-Revolutionaries gained strength. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party was being rent to pieces: the Rights abused the leaders, while the Lefts accused the Rights of treachery.

The July movement gave rise to what was frequently observed in the subsequent history of the Party: sensing the danger which threatened its party, the proletariat rallied still more closely around the Bolsheviks. Very soon

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 91.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

after the July events the first "Party Week" was held, during which workers flocked to the Party in large numbers.

The July demonstration played an important part in one other respect. It supplied the workers and peasants with an answer to the fundamental question of the revolution—in whose hands was the power? The broad mass of the working population now clearly perceived to their cost that the power had passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Lenin expressed the following opinion of the July days:

"The movement of July 3-4 was the last attempt by way of demonstrations to induce the Soviets to take power. From that moment on, the Soviets, i.e. the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in control of them, virtually handed over power to the counter-revolution, represented by the Cadets and supported by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. A peaceful development of the Russian revolution has now become impossible, and the question as put by history is: either a complete victory for the counter-revolution, or a new revolution."¹

The working out of new tactics for the new stage of the revolution was a task undertaken by the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party.

¹ Lenin, "An Answer,"—"Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI p. 45.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY

1

THE historic Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party met in Petrograd on July 26 and sat until August 3, 1917.

J. M. Sverdlov, reporting to the Sixth Congress, stated that the number of organisations of the Party had increased since the April Conference from 78 to 162. The Party membership had trebled in three months—from 80,000 to 240,000. There were 41,000 Party members in Petrograd, 50,000 in the Moscow district, 25,000 in the Urals, 16,000 in the Donbas, 10,000 in the Kiev district, 9,000 in the Caucasus, 12,000 in Finland, 14,000 in the Baltic provinces, 13,000 in the Volga district, 7,000 in the Odessa district, 10,000 in Siberia, 4,000 in the Minsk district, 1,500 in the Northern district and, finally, 26,000 in the Party organisations in the army and navy.¹

The Bolshevik press had also grown considerably during this period. The Party had forty-one newspapers with a daily circulation of 320,000 copies. Twenty-seven of the newspapers were published in Russian, the remainder in Georgian, Armenian, Latvian, Tatar, Polish and other languages.

After the July events, eight of these newspapers were prohibited, including the central organ of the Party, "Pravda." But by the time the Congress opened five of them had reappeared under new names.

The influence of the Bolshevik Party among the masses had grown immensely. This was clearly borne out by facts mentioned in the reports made at the Congress by the delegates from the various localities. V. N. Podbelsky, a delegate from Moscow, said:

"The tremendous influence of our organisation, comrades, was reflected in the fact that all the mass actions took place under our slogans.... The demonstration of June 18, officially organised by the Soviet, was held under our slogans. At the assembly places appointed by the Soviets miserable groups of twenty or thirty people gathered—the masses followed our banners. Wherever we arranged meetings huge crowds assembled, 'while the

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, pp. 36-37.

other spots remained deserted and came to life only when our banners approached and when our people spoke.”¹

Acting in accordance with the resolution of the April Conference of the Bolshevik Party, the Moscow organisation was able to rally vast numbers of working people. The Moscow Bolsheviks won control of a number of trade unions, from which the workers expelled the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The compromisers continued to dominate in the Moscow Soviet, but the influence of the Bolsheviks among the masses had become so strong that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were frequently obliged to vote in support of Bolshevik resolutions. At a joint meeting of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies in Moscow on July 25, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries did not dare to refrain from supporting the Bolshevik protest against the introduction of the death penalty. At a conference of Moscow factory committees held July 23-28, a number of Mensheviks, under the pressure of the masses, voted for the Bolshevik proposal to introduce workers' control over production. The terror instituted by the government after the July events did not halt the growing influence of the Moscow Bolsheviks. The persecution of the Party increased, it became more difficult to arrange indoor and outdoor meetings, but no diminution of Party membership was to be observed. The Moscow Bolsheviks continued stalwartly and confidently to carry on their work among the masses, in which they were guided by the instructions of Lenin and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The Moscow delegate at the Bolshevik Congress explicitly stated:

“In conclusion, I consider it extremely important to note the complete unanimity that prevails in ideological work between Moscow and Petrograd, as was expressed both at the time of the crisis of April 20-21 and on the question of taking action during the July days.

“This unanimity, which was achieved even without preliminary agreement, convinces us, comrades, of the essential correctness of our position and inspires us with even greater confidence and enthusiasm in our work.”²

The delegate from the Donbas spoke of the rapid growth of the Bolshevik organisation there. Bolshevik resolutions were adopted at all workers' meetings. The Bolshevik influence predominated among the workers. In many of the factories the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were joining the Bolshevik nuclei.

¹ “The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917,” Moscow, 1934, p. 55.

² Ibid, p. 57.

The influence of the Bolshevik Party was growing in the Volga district. In the elections to the City Duma in Tsaritsyn, the Bolsheviks obtained 39 seats out of 102. In Saratov the Bolshevik Party took third place at the elections. The Bolsheviks in the Volga district were carrying on fruitful work among the oppressed nationalities. In Kazan the programme of the Bolshevik Party had been translated and published in the Tatar language.

In Grozny the Bolshevik Party had had a membership of 800 on the eve of the April Conference; by the time of the Sixth Congress the membership had increased to about 2,000. The work of the Bolsheviks in Grozny had to be conducted under extremely difficult circumstances. An Anti-Bolshevik Society had been formed in the city. The Bolsheviks were branded as German spies; they were provoked into action and then beaten up. The Bolsheviks were accused of inciting the Chechens against the Russians. On July 9 a decision was taken in a Cossack village near Grozny to evict all Bolsheviks within three days. One teacher was evicted from the village solely on the grounds that she was the wife of a Bolshevik.

But the workers supported the Bolshevik organisation. They were not even deterred by the repressive measures instituted after the July events.

"The July events," the Grozny delegate said, "so to speak crystallised our Party: convinced workers, who will never disavow our Party, came to join its ranks."¹

In Transcaucasia, the Bolsheviks worked under very difficult conditions. They succeeded in gaining the support of the soldiers—there were 80,000 troops stationed in Tiflis alone. But the Regional Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was under the sway of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, began to withdraw the Bolshevik regiments from the city and to replace them by others. The new regiments were first quartered for a while in the country districts, where slanderous agitation against the Bolsheviks was carried on among the soldiers. When the new regiments became Bolshevikised in their turn, they too were withdrawn from the cities. Bolshevik newspapers were confiscated. On one occasion the Executive Committee of the Tiflis Soviet held up 40,000 copies of "Pravda". Threats to prohibit the Bolshevik newspaper, "Kavkazsky Rabochy (Caucasian Worker)," were made at every meeting of the Soviet.

"Our work there," the delegate from Transcaucasia related, "is the work of martyrs. But even after this

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 91.

we continued our activities. Our paper became a soldiers' paper: we received sackloads of letters and thousands of telegrams of sympathy from the front."¹

In the interval between the April Conference and the Sixth Congress the Bolshevik Party had gained tremendous experience in mass work. The rapidly changing political situation and the tense and feverish practical activity had inspired a number of new forms of mass work. In regiments and factories were formed what was known as "zemlyachestva"—societies of soldiers or workers coming from one district, and sometimes from one village. Political talks were arranged in these societies, and soldiers leaving on furlough were supplied with political literature. In Kronstadt the Bolshevik organisation sent groups of agitators from these "zemlyachestva" to the villages and the provincial cities.

Apart from the "zemlyachestva," work was carried on in clubs. One of these clubs was formed in Petrograd by the military organisation of the Bolshevik Central Committee. It was a club for soldiers called "Pravda" ("Truth"), where lectures were delivered and the programme of the Bolshevik Party discussed.

Work among the soldiers in the garrisons and at the front assumed wide dimensions. The Bolshevik military organisation in Moscow had a membership of over 2,000. The Moscow Bolsheviks sent literature and agitators to the front. Reporting at the Sixth Congress on behalf of the Moscow military organisation, Yaroslavsky stated that in one month alone over 170 delegates had arrived from the front in quest of Bolshevik literature. And this in spite of the fact that soldiers were persecuted for reading Bolshevik papers.

At the front, particularly the part of it nearest to Petrograd, in the Twelfth Army for example, the Bolshevik Party organisations rapidly recovered from the suppression of the July demonstrations. The very day after the generals had closed down "Okopnaya Pravda" a new paper, "Okopny Nabat" ("Trench Alarm"), appeared. On July 20 the Bolsheviks already managed to summon a conference of delegates from twenty-three regiments—Russian, Siberian and Lettish. This conference sent a protest to Petrograd against the repressive measures of the Provisional Government and demanded the liberation of all arrested Bolsheviks.

There were over 2,000 Bolsheviks in the Lettish Regiments, but, as a matter of fact, the Lettish Bolsheviks

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 92.

had the support of all the 48,000 men of these regiments. A Lettish delegate at the Sixth Congress said :

"The General Staff now regrets that it permitted the formation of the national regiments, but it is already too late to disband the eight Lettish regiments. The Lettish riflemen declared that they would not allow it. The Siberian regiments announced that if the Lettish regiments were disbanded they too would have to be reckoned with; and vice versa. There is complete unanimity between the Lettish and the Siberian regiments, and if the General Staff does not succeed in provoking us to premature action, I hope we shall be able to turn the Twelfth Army into a 'Red Army.'"¹

The Party carried on its work with great persistence and intensity within the Soviets—those mass political organisations—boldly exposing the treacherous policy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The Bolshevik wave flooded the lower storeys of the Soviets, and bade fair to reach the upper storeys. The leaders of the Soviets in many cases no longer reflected the state of mind of their electors. Endeavouring to resist the pressure from below, the leaders of the petty-bourgeois bloc resorted to the old and tried method of postponing and delaying the new elections to the Soviets by every means in their power. But the Party skilfully frustrated this manoeuvre too, and created its strongholds in the district Soviets. Thus, at the time of the Sixth Party Congress, six of the ten district Soviets in Moscow were under the complete sway of the Bolsheviks. Forced out of the Soviets by the pressure of the masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks entrenched themselves in the urban and rural local government bodies, from which they endeavoured to combat the influence of the Bolsheviks.

On the municipal bodies too—the City Dumas, in which the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were entrenching themselves in order to combat the Soviets—Lenin's followers were winning important positions.

The Party fought no less persistently for the control of other organisations. The trade unions were becoming Bolshevikised. The factory committees in the industrial centres entirely supported the Bolsheviks.

The Party carried on extensive work among the youth. At the time of the Sixth Party Congress the Youth League in Petrograd had a membership of about 50,000 and carried on an active fight in support of the Bolshevik slogans.

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) August 1917," Moscow, 1934, pp. 84-85.

The influence of the Party was just as strong among the youth in other large industrial centres.

The reports from the various localities made at the Party Congress showed that while the Party had not yet gained an overwhelming majority in the mass organisations of the proletariat and peasantry all over the country, it had nevertheless secured a very firm foothold at the decisive points. The membership of the Party had trebled since the April Conference, it had gained tremendous experience in the revolutionary struggle, and its influence among the masses had grown.

The Congress was obliged to meet semi-legally. Government spies, hired and voluntary, prowled about the city trying to discover where the delegates were meeting. On July 29 the Provisional Government issued an ordinance empowering the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior to prohibit any meeting or congress at their discretion. This ordinance was obviously aimed at the Bolsheviks.

The Congress, which was attended by 157 delegates with the right to vote and 112 delegates with a voice but no vote, opened on the Vyborg side in Petrograd, and then, from motives of secrecy, transferred to the Narva Gate at the other end of Petrograd.

"The meetings were held in such secrecy," one of the delegates relates, "that many of the comrades adopted false names, because we expected more raids and arrests every day."¹

So real was the threat of arrest that it was thought expedient to interrupt the business long before the end of the Congress in order to elect the Central Committee before it was too late.

Under such circumstances haste was essential. Only the most urgent questions could be dealt with. Thus, the Congress considered it impossible to undertake the actual revision of the Party Programme. The drafting of the new programme was entrusted to the newly-elected Central Committee.

The Congress endorsed the following agenda:

1. Report of the Organisation Bureau [which convened the Congress—*Ed.*].
2. Report of the Central Committee.
3. Reports from the localities.
4. The current situation:

(a) The war and the international situation.

¹ N. Yaroslavsky, "On the Eve of October, The Sixth Congress of the C.P.S.U.," Moscow, 1932, pp. 36-37.

- (b) The political and economic situation.
5. Revision of the programme.
6. Organisation.
7. The elections to the Constituent Assembly.
8. The International.
9. Party unity.
10. The trade union movement.
11. Elections.
12. Miscellaneous.

One of the first questions discussed at the Congress was whether Lenin should appear for trial. The discussion was opened by Sergo Orjonikidze. He was categorically opposed to Lenin's appearing in court.

"What is important for them," Orjonikidze said, "is to rob the ranks of the revolutionary party of as many leaders as possible. Under no circumstances must we surrender Comrade Lenin."¹

Orjonikidze was supported by Dzerzhinsky, who said:

"We must say clearly and definitely that those comrades were right who advised Lenin . . . not to allow himself to be arrested. We must give a clear answer to the campaign of the bourgeois press, which wants to disorganise the ranks of the workers."²

Only a few of the Congress delegates spoke in favour of Lenin's appearing for trial. Volodarsky and Lashevich said that Lenin's trial could be transformed into a trial of the government, from which the Party would benefit.

The Congress of the Bolshevik Party declared against Lenin's appearing for trial, thus endorsing the position which Stalin had taken up after the July demonstration was smashed.

The principal items on the agenda of the Congress were two reports by Stalin: the political report of the Central Committee and the report on the political situation. In the first of the reports, in which he presented a profound Leninist analysis of the July events and of the tactics of the Party at the time, Stalin raised questions on the answer to which the course and issue of the proletarian revolution in Russia would depend.

"Before passing to the report on the political activities of the Central Committee during the past two and a half months," Stalin said, "I deem it necessary to mention a fundamental fact which determined the activities of the Central Committee. I am referring to the development of

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1924, p. 32.

² Ibid., p. 32.

our revolution, which has raised the question of intervening in the sphere of economic relations in the form of control over production, of handing over the land to the peasants, of transferring power from the bourgeoisie to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. All this determines the profound character of our revolution. It has begun to assume the character of a Socialist, a workers' revolution."¹

No great objections were raised to the political Line of the Central Committee. The few remarks that were made chiefly pointed out that the contacts between the Central Committee and the provinces were inadequate. But Preobrazhensky endeavoured to utilise these remarks to prove that the July defeat was due to the fact that the Petrograd proletariat was isolated from the provinces.

With five abstaining and none voting against, the Congress approved the activities of the Central Committee and endorsed its report.

Stalin's second report was devoted to the tactics of the Party in the new stage.

The political situation in the country had drastically changed since the July days. From the position of unstable equilibrium in which it had been since the February Revolution, the government power had swung sharply to the Right: **the dual power of the Provisional Government and the Soviets had given place to the sole power of the bourgeoisie.** The liberties recently enjoyed had been replaced by "emergency laws" against the Bolsheviks. The government was making every effort to disarm the revolution. It was disbanding the revolutionary regiments and driving the Red Guard underground.

All possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution had vanished. The revolution could be advanced only by wresting the power from the hands of the bourgeoisie.

But there was only one class that could forcibly seize power; this was the proletariat, together with the poor peasants. The Soviets, still controlled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, had passed over to the camp of the bourgeoisie, and at this stage of the revolution could act only as accomplices of the counter-revolutionaries. After all that had occurred in connection with the July events, the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" which had been advanced in April, could now no longer be justified. However, the withdrawal of this slogan by no means implied renunciation of the fight for the power of the

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, pp. 14-15.

Soviets. Lenin had made it quite clear that it was not a question of the Soviets in general, the Soviets as organs of the revolutionary struggle, but only of the **present** Soviets, the compromising Soviets at the **present** stage of development of the revolution.

And it was this view of Lenin's that Stalin expounded and advocated at the Congress in his extremely vivid and precise report on the political situation. Describing the progress of the revolution, Stalin said:

"Meanwhile the war is continuing, economic disruption is spreading, the revolution is continuing and assuming an increasingly Socialist character. The revolution is invading the sphere of production—the question of control is being raised. The revolution is invading the sphere of agriculture—the question is being raised not only of confiscating the land, but also of confiscating livestock and implements. . . .

"Some comrades have said that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a Socialist revolution. They would have been right had there been no war, had there been no economic disruption, had the foundations of the national economy not been shaken. But this question of intervening in the economic sphere is arising in all countries as an essential question. This question arose in Germany, and was settled without the direct and active participation of the masses. The case is different here in Russia. Here the disruption has assumed more ominous proportions. On the other hand, nowhere has there been such freedom in time of war as in our country. Then there is the very high degree of organisation of the workers: for instance, 66 per cent of the metal workers in Petrograd are organised. Lastly, nowhere has the proletariat had such broad organisations as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. All this has precluded the possibility of the working-class masses not intervening in economic life. This is the real basis for raising the question of a Socialist revolution here in Russia."¹

Stalin concluded his report with the following words:

"... Until July 3 a peaceful victory, a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets was possible. If the Congress of Soviets had decided to take over the power, the Cadets, I think, would not have dared to take open action against the Soviets, because such action would have been doomed to failure. But now that counter-revolution has become

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 108.

organised and consolidated, to say that the Soviets can take over power by peaceful means is nonsense. The peaceful period of the revolution has ended, a non-peaceful period has begun, a period of clashes and explosions."¹

Stalin's report and the resolution he submitted evoked long discussion. The discussion showed that the differences over the character of the Russian revolution which had existed in the Party at the time of the April Conference were not yet entirely eliminated. Some of the delegates advocated retaining the old slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" and opposed Lenin's basic thesis that the Russian revolution was a Socialist revolution.

Arguing against Stalin, Nogin asked:

"What is the difference between Comrade Stalin's resolution and the resolutions of the April Conference? At that time we found that we were still facing a transition to the Socialist revolution. Is it possible, comrades, that our country has in two months made such a leap that it is already prepared for Socialism?"²

N. S. Angarsky, a Moscow delegate, said:

"But I do not agree with Comrade Stalin that we must stride across the bourgeois revolution to the Socialist revolution. Stalin says that the conditions in our country are fortunate, that in Russia as many as 70 per cent of the workers are organised, and so on. But this is far too little for a Socialist revolution. We have no reserves. The reserve is the peasantry, which at present is revolutionary, and which will remain so only until it receives land. The leap proposed by Comrade Stalin is not Marxist tactics, but tactics of despair, which so far are unwarranted."³

Nogin's arguments were seconded by Yurenev and Volodarsky.

"If our Party adopts Stalin's resolution," Yurenev said, "we shall move rapidly towards the isolation of the proletariat from the peasantry and the broad masses of the population. What is proposed here is essentially a dictatorship of the proletariat."⁴

A similar criticism was advanced by Zalezhsy, who considered untrue Stalin's assertion that on July 5 the power had passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. Yet Zalezhsy himself, from motives of secrecy

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917", Moscow, 1934, p. 111.

² Ibid., p. 124.

³ Ibid., pp. 111-12.

⁴ Ibid., p. 114.

and from fear of arrest, appeared at the Congress under the alias "Vladimir."

The events of the rising revolution had taught nothing to those who opposed Lenin's policy.

"A rupture between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry is inevitable and it will raise point-blank the question of who will hold power,"¹

said Nogin, reiterating his old idea that the bourgeois revolution was not yet over, and obstinately refusing to realise that the peasantry had already split and that the upper layer of the peasantry had already joined the camp of the bourgeoisie.

At the April Conference Nogin had failed to understand that economic disruption in the midst of a war had made the transition to Socialism an urgent necessity, and that this transition could be effected only by the proletariat together with the poor peasants. At the Sixth Congress Nogin again failed to understand that it was a question not of a "leap," not of the productive forces having matured in the space of a month or two but of a new disposition of class forces, which confronted the revolution with the necessity of the most revolutionary class seizing power.

In answer to the objection that he was going counter to the resolution of the April Conference of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin said at the Congress:

"And now a few words to Comrades Angarsky and Nogin on the subject of Socialism. We said at the April Conference that even then the moment had come to begin to take steps towards Socialism."²

Stalin then read the following passage from the resolution of the April Conference on the current situation:

"The proletariat of Russia, operating in one of the most backward countries of Europe, in the midst of a small-peasant population, cannot set itself the aim of bringing about the Socialist transformation immediately.

"But it would be a great mistake, and in practice even complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to deduce from this that the working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that we must confine our activities within limits acceptable to the petty-bourgeoisie, or that we must renounce the leading role of the proletariat in the work of explaining to the people the urgency of a series of steps towards Socialism which are now practically ripe."³

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

Pointing out that the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress was continuing the line laid down by the Bolshevik April Conference, Stalin continued:

"The comrades are three months behind the times. What then has happened in these three months? The petty-bourgeoisie has divided up into strata, the lower strata are deserting the upper strata, the proletariat is organising, and economic disruption is spreading, rendering still more urgent the introduction of workers' control (for instance, in Petrograd, the Donetz Region, etc.). All this speaks in favour of the positions already adopted in April. But the comrades would drag us back."¹

A sharp rebuff to those who were not in agreement with Stalin's resolution was administered at the Congress by Molotov. He said:

"...It is beyond doubt that the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has triumphed and is abolishing all liberties, and therefore, since the crisis of July 3-5, there is no possibility of a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets. On this point there is no difference of opinion between the comrades.

"The turning point lies in the termination of the peaceful character of the revolution.

"Power can be secured only by force...."

"The proletariat and the poor peasantry alone desire to take power, can take power, and will take power in the interests of the majority, whose representatives they are."²

Bukharin also criticised Stalin's report. Visualising the future development of the revolution as two successive stages, he said:

"The first phase is with the participation of the peasantry anxious to obtain land; the second phase is after the satiated peasantry has fallen away, the phase of the proletarian revolution, when the Russian proletariat will be supported only by the proletarian elements and the proletariat of Western Europe."³

As we see, the view expressed by Bukharin approached very closely to that advocated by Kamenev at the April Conference: either the proletariat act in conjunction with the peasantry, in which case it would not be a Socialist revolution; or the proletariat act alone, and only then would it be a Socialist revolution.

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917", Moscow, 1984, p. pp. 180-40.

² Ibid., pp. 182-83.

³ Ibid., 184.

In his reply to questions, in his reply to the discussion, and in his objections to amendments made to the resolution, Stalin again made a profound analysis of the given stage of the revolution. He said :

"We are now advancing the demand for the transfer of power to the proletariat and the poor peasantry. Consequently, it is a question not of form, but of the class to which power is being transferred, it is a question of the composition of the Soviets. . . . It must be clearly realised that it is not the question of form that is decisive. The really decisive question is whether the working class is mature enough for dictatorship ; everything else will come of itself, will be brought about by the creative force of the revolution."¹

Stalin further pointed out that withdrawing the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" by no means implied advancing the slogan "Down with the Soviets!" The Bolsheviks would not even resign from the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, however wretched might be the part it was playing.

The Bolsheviks would remain in the Soviets and continue to expose the tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

"The chief task," Stalin declared when winding up the debate, "is to propagate the idea that it is necessary to **overthrow** the existing power. We are not yet quite prepared for this idea. But we must prepare for it.

"The workers, peasants and soldiers must be got to realise that unless the present power is overthrown they will secure neither freedom nor land.

"And so, it is a question not of organising the power, but of overthrowing the power; and when we take the power into our own hands we shall be able to organise it."²

Stalin sternly criticises Bukharin's views.

"What is the prospect held out by Bukharin?" he asked. "His analysis is fundamentally wrong. In his opinion in the first stage we are approaching a peasant revolution. But it is bound to meet, it is bound to coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, will not at the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out. The second stage, according to Bukharin, is a proletarian revolution supported by Western Europe,

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917" Moscow, 1934, p. 118.

² Ibid., p. 139.

without the peasants, who will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom would this revolution be directed? Bukharin furnished no reply to this question in his toy scheme."¹

Bukharin classed the whole peasantry under one category, forgetting that the bourgeois imperialists had formed a bloc—as Stalin put it—only with the wealthy muzhiks. The poor peasants went along with the proletariat, and under its leadership.

Just as stern a rebuff was given to Preobrazhensky with his Trotskyite view that a victory for Socialism in one country alone was impossible. The resolution on the political situation proposed by Stalin stated:

"The aim of those revolutionary classes (i.e., the proletariat and the poor peasantry—Ed.) will then be to bend every effort to take the state power into their own hands and to direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and towards the Socialist reconstruction of society."²

This formulation was opposed by Preobrazhensky, who submitted the following amendment:

"I propose a different formulation of the end of the resolution: 'to direct it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards Socialism' ..."³

Criticising the view of Preobrazhensky, who supported Trotsky's theory that a victory for Socialism in one country alone was impossible, Stalin said:

"I am against such a conclusion to the resolution. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the very country that will pave the way to Socialism. No country has hitherto enjoyed such freedom as there was in Russia, no country has tried to adopt workers' control of production. Moreover, the base of our revolution is broader than in Western Europe, where the proletariat stands utterly alone face to face with the bourgeoisie. Here the workers are supported by the poorer strata of the peasantry... We must abandon the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter."⁴

The resolution adopted in connection with Stalin's report reviewed the past stage and indicated how the revolution could be promoted to a higher stage. The resolution stated:

1 "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917", Moscow, 1934, pp. 188-89.

2 Ibid., p. 228.

3 Ibid., p. 233.

4 Ibid., pp. 233-34.

"1. The development of the class struggle and the inter-relation of parties in the midst of an imperialist war, in conjunction with the crisis at the front and the growing independence of Russia on Allied capital, has led to the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary, imperialist bourgeoisie, which relies on a clique of higher military commanders and is concealed by a revolutionary screen set up by the leaders of petty-bourgeois Socialism

...

"4. With these parties dominating, the Soviets inevitably sank lower and lower, ceased to be organs of revolt or organs of state power, and their decisions inevitably took the form of impotent resolutions and pious wishes. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie, using the 'Socialist' Ministers as a cat's-paw, delayed the elections to the Constituent Assembly, hindered the transfer of the land to the peasants, sabotaged all efforts to combat economic disruption and—with the approval of the majorities in the Soviets—prepared for an offensive at the front, i.e., the resumption of the imperialist war, and in all these ways organised the forces of counter-revolution...

"6. In view of this course of events, the power of state at the present time has virtually passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie supported by the military clique. It is this imperialist dictatorship that has been carrying out all the above-mentioned measures for destroying political freedom, committing violence against the masses and ruthlessly persecuting the internationally-minded proletariat, while the central institution of the Soviets—the Central Executive Committee—is utterly impotent and inactive.

"The Soviets are suffering painful agony, undergoing disintegration because they did not promptly take the whole power of state into their own hands.

"7. The slogan propagated by our Party demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets, which was advanced during the first rise of the revolution, was a slogan making for a peaceful development of the revolution, for a painless transfer of power from the bourgeoisie to the workers and peasants, and for gradually getting the petty-bourgeoisie to abandon its illusions.

"Peaceful development and the painless transfer of power to the Soviets have now become impossible, because the power in fact has already passed into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The only correct slogan at the present time is the demand for the com-

plete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poor peasantry, is alone capable of performing this task, the task of the new upsurge."¹

The new slogan did not call for immediate action against the government. On the contrary, the whole resolution was a warning that the proletariat must not succumb to the provocation of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The resolution primarily stressed the necessity for organising and preparing all revolutionary forces for the moment when the general crisis in the country would create favourable conditions for an uprising and revolution.

The resolution was adopted with only four abstentions, none voting against.

The political situation was the central point of discussion at the Congress. The other questions on the agenda were decided in accordance with the policy laid down by the Congress on the subject of the proletarian revolution.

The resolution on the war stated that the imperialist slaughter was spreading. A new imperialist giant—America—had entered the war. America and the Allies had compelled China to join the imperialist war. The struggle between the imperialist powers was being waged virtually in all parts of the world. Another reason why the war dragged on was that the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the growing revolution was facilitated by the military dictatorship and the disunited state of the international proletariat.

The Russian revolution was highly dangerous for the imperialists of all countries. The revolutionary masses of Russia were displaying increasing hostility to the predatory war and were threatening to draw the proletariat of all countries into the struggle. This was why the imperialists of the world had launched a campaign against the Russian revolution, in which they had the support of the compromisers of all countries. By approving the Russian offensive at the front, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in Russia had deserted to the imperialists. The campaign for peace which the Petrograd Soviet had attempted to conduct by bringing "pressure" to bear on the imperialist governments and reaching agreement with the foreign defencists had patently collapsed. This collapse confirmed the view

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1934, pp. 238-40.

of the Bolsheviks that only a revolutionary struggle of the masses against imperialism in all countries, only an international proletarian revolution could bring a democratic peace to the exhausted nations.

In its concluding part, the resolution on the war adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party stated:

"9. The liquidation of imperialist domination will confront the working class of the country which first establishes the dictatorship of the proletarians and semi-proletarians with the task of supporting the fighting proletariat of other countries by every possible means (including armed force). In particular, this task will confront Russia if, as is very likely, the new and inevitable rise in the tide of the Russian revolution puts the workers and poor peasants in power before the revolution takes place in the capitalist countries of the West.

"10. The only possible way, therefore, in which the international proletariat can secure a really democratic termination of the war is for it to conquer power, and in the case of Russia, for the workers and poor peasants to conquer power. Only these classes will be capable of breaking with the capitalists of all countries and of really assisting the growth of the international proletarian revolution, which will put an end not only to the war, but also to capitalist slavery."¹

Having adopted the course of destroying the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party drew up a detailed economic programme for ending the crisis and restoring and organising economic life in the interests of the workers and the poor peasants. The resolution on the economic situation adopted by the Sixth Congress declared that, owing to the self-seeking administration of the capitalists and landlords, shielded by the defencists, the country was on the verge of economic collapse and ruin. The Congress mapped out in detail the measures that were essential for the salvation of the country—in the sphere of industry, agriculture, finance, municipal enterprise, etc. Workers' control over production, the confiscation of the landed estates, the nationalisation of the land and the nationalisation of the banks and the large-scale industries—all these definite and simple demands of the Bolsheviks were understood by the masses. But these measures could not be put into effect without putting a stop to the war without transforming the predatory war, the war of conquest, into a just war,

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow, 1984, p. 238.

a civil war. The resolution of the Sixth Congress stated:

"The only way out of the critical situation is to liquidate the war and to organise production not for the sake of war, but for the sake of restoring everything it has destroyed, not in the interest of a handful of financial oligarchs, but in the interest of the workers and the poor peasants.

"Such a regulation of production in Russia can be carried out only by an organisation that is under the control of the proletarians and semi-proletarians, which implies the passing of the power of the state into their hands."¹

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were constantly citing the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 and saying that the French toilers had displayed supreme heroism and marvellous courage in the struggle against their nobility and its British, Prussian and Russian allies. Why could not the Russian toilers fight the war with equal fervour, enthusiasm and passion in defence of the revolution?

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks said nothing about the conditions which made these miracles in France possible. The French people had destroyed their tsarist government. Led by their revolutionaries—the Jacobin Party—the toilers of France had completely shattered the edifice of feudalism. The French peasants had taken the land from the landlords. The French revolutionaries had settled accounts with the old regime and were resolutely leading the people against their enemies. All this made the war of the French a just war, a defensive war. The fact that the revolution had been carried out with determination had created the material conditions for the heroic, self-sacrificing and enthusiastic war of the oppressed classes of France against reactionary Europe.

The transformation of the predatory war into a civil war and the carrying into effect of the measures outlined in the economic platform of the Bolsheviks would markedly increase the fighting capacity of the country. Only by ruthlessly destroying the old regime, only by reviving the country and regenerating it on the basis of the Bolshevik platform, was it possible to create the material conditions for miracles even greater than those wrought in the French Revolution. Only a people emancipated from the slavery of capitalism and led by the Bolshevik Party could develop real revolutionary initiative.

The Congress devoted great attention to the work of

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917," Moscow 1934, p. 242.

the Bolsheviks in the trade unions. The Congress stressed the fact that revolutionary practice had completely refuted the opportunist theory that the trade unions should remain "neutral." In practice it was impossible for the trade unions to remain neutral. The war had split the whole labour movement, including the trade unions, into two camps. Those trade unions that supported the war and advocated the defence of the bourgeois fatherland in the predatory war were in fact siding with their imperialists. Only those trade unions that pursued a definite class line hostile to the bourgeoisie had been able to perform their duty of protecting the interests of the workers. The Congress called upon all members of the Bolshevik Party to join the trade unions and to work actively within them for their transformation into militant class organisations which, in close conjunction with the political party of the proletariat, would organise economic and political resistance to counter-revolution.

The resolution of the Congress stated:

"For the purpose of combating the economic disintegration of the country, which is being aggravated by the growth of counter-revolution, and with the object of bringing the revolution to a victorious conclusion, the trade unions should strive for state intervention in the organisation of the production and distribution of products, at the same time bearing in mind that only with a new rise in the tide of revolution, and only under the dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the poor strata of the peasantry, can these measures be carried into effect in the interests of the wide masses of the people.

"In view of the foregoing, the Congress declares that these important tasks can be accomplished by the trade unions of Russia only provided they remain **militant class organisations** and conduct their struggle in close organic collaboration with the political class party of the proletariat; provided that in the elections to the Constituent Assembly they energetically strive for the victory of the Socialist Party, which is unswervingly defending the class interests of the proletariat and advocating the earliest possible termination of the war by means of a mass revolutionary struggle against the ruling classes of all countries; provided that, with the object of ending the war as early as possible and creating an International, they immediately enter into contact with all trade unions which in the various countries are waging war on war, and together with them draw up a common plan of struggle

against the international slaughter and on behalf of Socialism; provided they conform their day-to-day struggle for the improvement of economic conditions to the present era of gigantic social conflicts; and provided, finally, that they stress in all their utterances that the problems with which history has confronted the Russian proletariat can be solved only on an international scale.

"International revolutionary Socialism versus international imperialism!"¹

The Congress also dealt with the question of the youth, as a reserve of the Bolshevik Party. The resolution on the Youth League stated:

"At the present time, when the struggle of the working class is passing into the phase of a direct struggle for Socialism, the Congress considers it one of the urgent tasks of the moment to secure the assistance of the class-conscious Socialist organisations of the young workers, and charges the Party organisations to devote the maximum possible attention to this work."²

The Congress once again emphasised that in elections to City Dumas, co-operative bodies and Soviets joint action could be allowed only with those who had completely broken with the defencists and were striving for the power of the Soviets.

The Congress admitted into the Party the group known as the Inter-Regionalists, which was headed by Trotsky. This group consisted of Mensheviks and some former Bolsheviks who had split away from the Party and had formed an organisation of their own in St. Petersburg in 1913. During the war the Inter-Regionalists opposed a split with the defencists, fought the Bolshevik slogan of converting the imperialist war into a civil war, rejected the policy which aimed at the defeat of the tsarist government in the imperialist war and denied the possibility of Socialism being victorious in Russia. Among the members of the Inter-Regionalist organisation in 1917 were L. Trotsky, A. Lunacharsky, K. Yurenev, A. Joffe, M. Uritsky, and V. Volodarsky. Under the influence of the development of the revolution, the Inter-Regionalists came to recognise the correctness of the Bolshevik position, broke with the defencists and at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party announced that they accepted the programme of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky was among the Inter-Regionalists admitted to the Party.

It should be noted that at the Sixth Congress the

¹ "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917" Moscow, 1984, pp. 246-47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

Inter-Regionalists demanded that Lenin should appear for trial before the court of the counter-revolutionary government. The Inter-Regionalists supported the opportunist line at the Congress and spoke against Stalin's resolution.

The Congress elected a Central Committee of twenty-one members and ten alternate members. The new Central Committee consisted of Artyom (Sergeyev), Berzin, Bubnov, Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Kamenev, Kollontai, Krestinsky, Lenin, Milyutin, Muranov, Nogin, Rykov, Shaumyan, Smilga, Sokolnikov, Stalin, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Uritsky and Zinoviev.

The Sixth Party Congress revealed how powerful a force the Bolshevik Party had become. Neither the slanders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks nor the government terror had halted the growth of the membership and influence of the Party. Virtually driven underground, the Bolsheviks displayed an astonishing ability to combine legal with illegal methods of struggle—an ability which had been developed in the long years of struggle against tsarism and the bourgeoisie. The Party gave a brilliant lesson in how the masses could be wrested from the influence of the compromisers. The Bolsheviks carried on active work in the regiments, the factories, the co-operative organisations and the trade unions, everywhere rallying the masses around Lenin's slogans.

The Sixth Congress was an extremely important event in the history of the Party. It was held on the eve of a new rise in the tide of revolution. The April Conference of the Bolsheviks had focused the attention of the Party on the transformation of the bourgeois revolution into a Socialist revolution; the Sixth Congress focused the attention of the Party on armed insurrection. All the resolutions and decisions of the Congress were subordinated to one aim, namely, to ensure the victory of the revolution in the new stage.

Lenin did not attend the Congress. He was being hounded by the Provisional Government and was obliged to remain in hiding. But Lenin kept in contact with the leaders of the Congress and gave them all necessary advice. Lenin's spirit, his ideas, his firm leadership and his direct and clear-cut recommendation inspired the work of the Congress and the speeches and utterances of Stalin. Stalin carried on Lenin's cause, rallying the Party for the urgent and decisive task—the overthrow of the bourgeois government and the seizure of power by the proletariat and the poor peasants.

CHAPTER IX

THE KORNILOV REVOLT

1

PREPARATIONS FOR A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

THE analysis of the course of the revolution given by Stalin at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party was very soon confirmed by the stormy progress of events.

The treacherous tactics of the compromisers during the July days had unleashed the forces of counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie openly assumed the offensive, trying to make up for lost time. A number of Bolshevik newspapers were suppressed. The revolutionary regiments in the garrisons of Petrograd and other cities were dispatched to the front.

The bourgeoisie hastened to smash the resistance of the proletariat before it could recover from the blow. "Back to the good old days!" was the cry of the counter-revolutionaries.

The supporters of counter-revolution, who had been saved by the compromisers after the July days, started a vigorous persecution not only of the Bolsheviks, but also of the petty-bourgeois leaders. As Lenin had foretold, the campaign was intensified not against the Bolshevik Party alone, but against all the democratic gains, including the Soviets.

The bourgeoisie openly spoke of the necessity of turning back—along the path already traversed by the country.

On August 20, at a "private Conference of members of the State Duma"—that legal centre of counter-revolution—Purishkevich declared.

"Until Russia gets a dictator invested with wide powers, until the Supreme Council consists of the finest of the Russian generals, who have been driven from the front and who have staked their lives for their country, there will be no order in Russia."¹

In his rashness, this servitor of the monarchy often blabbed more than he should. And now, too, Purishkevich betrayed the secret of the bourgeoisie. Rodzyanko, the

¹ "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917, Private Conference of Members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 280.

Chairman of the Conference, hastened to correct the mistake of the too outspoken reactionary:

"I decidedly disagree, and I consider that in the State Duma least of all, even at a private conference, is it possible to adopt a standpoint calling for a *coup d'état*, for a dictatorship of one kind or another, which, as you know, never comes by call, but arises spontaneously when the necessity for it has matured."¹

Endeavouring to calm the over loquacious and impetuous counter-revolutionary, Rodzyanko gave him to understand that it was not talk about a dictatorship that was required, but careful preparation for it.

"The country sought a name"²—that is how General Denikin expressed the general frame of mind of the counter-revolutionaries. There was a time when Kerensky could have become this "name." He had dealt very resolutely with the Bolsheviks, had disarmed the revolutionary regiments and had introduced the death penalty at the front. It might have been expected that he would continue to execute the plans of the bourgeoisie. He also seemed acceptable to the Allied imperialists. While crushing the Bolshevik movement and extending his control over the army, Kerensky demanded less of the "Allies" than prospective candidates who stood more Right.

Sir George Buchanan said plainly of Kerensky:

"But, while advocating fighting out the war to a finish, he deprecated any idea of conquest, and when Milyukov spoke of the acquisition of Constantinople as one of Russia's war aims, he [Kerensky—*Ed.*] promptly disavowed him."³

With Kerensky's help, Great Britain might get Russia to continue the war without giving her Constantinople, which the "Allies" had promised the tsar. But the generals and the leaders of the bourgeois parties were opposed to Kerensky. They were afraid of his close connections with the Soviets and did not trust him personally. Rodzyanko and his friends preferred a man of the sword to a politician. General Alexeyev was mentioned, Admiral Kolchak was considered, but when Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander the search ended. The "name" had been found. Buchanan wrote:

"Kornilov is a much stronger man than Kerensky, and were he to assert his influence over the army and were

¹ "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917, Private Conference of Members of the State Duma," Moscow, 1932, p. 282.

² A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 29.

³ Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 109.

the latter to become a strong fighting force he would be master of the situation."¹

The counter-revolutionaries energetically advocated the candidature of this general.

Kornilov was the son of a tsarist official; he was not a Cossack peasant, as he claimed to be in his manifestos to the people and the army. On graduating from the General Staff Academy, he served with the forces in the Far East and in Central Asia and in 1914 commanded the 48th Division on the Austrian Front. In the Battle of Lvov in August 1914 he lost twenty-two guns, and a large number of his men were taken prisoner. General Dwusilov, who at that time commanded the Eighth Army, even thought of dismissing Kornilov on account of this defeat, but in view of his personal bravery decided to leave him in command of the division. In April 1915, when the Austro-Hungarian army was driving the Russians out of Galicia, Kornilov was unable to organise the retreat of his regiments. A large part of his division was surrounded by the Austrians and ordered to lay down its arms. Kornilov refused, but made no attempt to force his way through the enemy. Together with his staff, he abandoned the division, which he himself had led into the trap, and took to the woods. Four days later the general surrendered to the Austrians. In April 1915, General Popovich-Lipovatz, brigade commander in the 48th Division, who was wounded in this engagement, told the true story of Kornilov's disgraceful conduct. But Popovich was ordered to hold his tongue, and General Ivanov, Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, even petitioned that Kornilov should be rewarded. A "report of victory" was drawn up and Grand Duke Nicholas brought Kornilov's "feat" to the notice of the tsar. Subsequently, in the autumn of 1916, all the materials relating to the surrender of the division were collected and sent to Kornilov with a request for an explanation. But the general maintained a discreet silence, and only ten months later, after he had already been appointed Supreme Commander, did he submit a report which had been drawn up by the Chief of Staff of the 48th Division. But now nobody dared speak of the ancient errors of the Supreme Commander.

Kornilov escaped from internment by bribing a hospital orderly. The general greatly exaggerated the difficulties of the escape in an account he gave to a reporter of the "Novoye Vremya" on September 3, 1916:

"I saw how the hut which my companion had entered

¹ Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassel & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 260.

was surrounded by Austrian gendarmes, and a few minutes later I heard firing—that was my companion exchanging shots with the enemy. But the fight was an unequal one and he was killed.”¹

As a matter of fact, the hospital orderly, Franz Mrnyak, a Czech, was not killed, and had not even exchanged shots. He ran into a gendarme by accident, was arrested, and at his trial related the details of the flight, stating that Kornilov had promised to pay him 20,000 gold krone in Russia for his services.

Kornilov's tales had their effect. Having all too little real proof of the bravery of their generals, the tsarist dignitaries “idealised” Kornilov's escape, and by weaving a legend around it, created a “name” for him. Kornilov was put in command of the XXV Army Corps on the Western Front, where he remained until the Revolution of February 1917. Kornilov was appointed Commander of the Petrograd Military Area and displayed great resourcefulness at the time of the April demonstration: it was on his orders that preparations were made to dispatch artillery against the workers. The bourgeoisie immediately recognised the “abilities” of the zealous general. Perhaps he seemed to them not at all a bad candidate for the role of Napoleon. Sir George Buchanan, who was well informed of what was going on in the government circles, states on the word of Tereshchenko:

“The government were taking steps to counteract this [i.e., the claims of the Soviet—*Ed.*] by increasing the powers of General Kornilov, who is in command of the Petrograd garrison.”²

When he was Minister of War, Guchkov recommended the appointment of Kornilov Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front. At the beginning of May Kornilov was given command of the Eighth Army on the South-Western Front. Kornilov was not devoid of courage, and in a fight could get a small unit to follow him by personal example. General Brusilov, a witness of Kornilov's martial exploits during the war, described him in the following terms:

“He would make a chief of a dashing partisan band—nothing more.”³

He was incapable of commanding large military formations. This was borne out in the Eighth Army at the time

¹ “How General Kornilov Escaped.” “*Novoye Vremya*,” No. 14546, September 3, 1916.

² Sir George Buchanan, “My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs,” London, Cassell & Co., Vol. II, p. 125.

³ A. A. Brusilov, “My Reminiscences,” Moscow, 1929, p. 233.

of the June offensive. Kornilov did not consolidate his initial success in time, delayed carrying out orders from the front headquarters, and the Eighth Army fled in as great a panic as the rest. Kornilov placed the whole blame for his failure on the revolution. He was supported by the Commissar of the Army, Naval Engineer Lieutenant Filonenko, and, in particular, by the Commissar of the Front, B. V. Savinkov, a Right Socialist-Revolutionary.

Savinkov's career is a succinct resumé of the whole history of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Savinkov had been a terrorist, a member of a group of action, and had taken part in a number of attempts on the lives of tsarist officials. After the Revolution of 1905 Savinkov retired from political activity and devoted himself to literature. He wrote "The Pale Steed," a novel in which the whilom bomb-thrower besmirches the revolution, as did many other intellectuals, who after the 1905 Revolution recoiled from the difficulties of the struggle. The adventurer is best characterised by his own maxim: "There are no morals, there is only beauty." Savinkov supported the imperialist demand for a war to a victorious finish. After the February Revolution Savinkov joined the extreme Right Wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and demanded a strong government. Sir George Buchanan says of him:

"Savinkov is an ardent advocate of stringent measures, both for the restoration of discipline and for the repression of anarchy, and he is credited with having asked Kerensky's permission to go with a couple of regiments to the Taurida Palace to arrest the Soviet."¹

Savinkov approved of Kornilov's attempt to lay the blame for the failure of the offensive on the Bolsheviks. The general was also supported by Filonenko.

Filonenko's type can be judged from a resolution drawn up by the soldiers:

"The general meeting of soldiers and officers of the Ninth Armoured Car Battalion, having discussed the question of Lieutenant M. M. Filonenko, the present Commissar of the Provisional Government at General Headquarters, has resolved:

"To bring to the attention of the Minister of War, Kerensky, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Congress of the Soviets that all Filonenko's former activities while an officer in the division consisted in systematically humiliating the soldiers, for whom he had no other appellation than 'blockhead,' 'dolt,' and so on, and birching them, as, for

¹ Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 164.

instance, Corporal Razin. While he was adjutant he ordered floggings without the sanction of the Battalion Commander, relying solely on his position and confident that nobody would dare to prevent him from punching the soldiers' faces, which he was always threatening and cynically advocating. He had an intolerably offensive attitude towards the soldiers, whom he regarded as inferior beings. And therefore, in view of such conduct, we consider that Filonenko is not fit to occupy the post of a Commissar of the Revolutionary Government."¹

Savinkov and Filonenko decided that the general, having been unable to cope with the foreign foe, would display greater ability in combating the internal foe. The two Commissars succeeded in getting Kornilov appointed Commander-in-Chief of the front. Savinkov wrote in this connection :

"With General Kornilov's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the armies on the South-Western Front, a systematic struggle against the Bolsheviks became possible."²

Kornilov justified the confidence of the counter-revolutionaries.

Encouraged by the open sympathy of the bourgeois elements, the general set about restoring the old discipline of the cane in the army. He presented an ultimatum demanding the introduction of the death penalty at the front. Kerensky immediately gave way and on July 12 sent telegraphic orders instituting the death penalty at the front.

Kornilov sent telegrams to Prime Minister Lvov, to Kerensky and to Rodzyanko, categorically demanding the adoption of emergency measures. On July 9 Kornilov gave orders to all commanders of troops to turn machine-guns and artillery on units which abandoned their positions without orders. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Executive Committee of the South-Western Front supported Kornilov and telegraphed Kerensky :

"To-day the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front and the Commander of the Eleventh Army, with the consent of the Commissars and the committees, gave orders to fire on deserters."³

Kornilov's telegrams and orders were obligingly printed by all the bourgeois newspapers. The papers spoke of

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—9. Extraordinary Commission to Investigate the Case of General Kornilov and His Accomplices, Register I, File No. 18, folio 125.

2 B. Savinkov, "General Kornilov,"—"Byloye (The Past)," 1925, No. 3 (31), p. 188.

3 P. N. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, p. 54.

Kornilov as the man who could stop the revolution. The government itself was not averse to taking further steps to smash the revolution, but was afraid of incurring the hostility of the masses. All the more willingly did it greet Kornilov's candidature for the dictatorship.

"When General Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander," General Denikin says in his memoirs, "all further search ceased. The country—some with hope, others with hostile suspicion—pronounced the name of the dictator."¹

Having found the "name," the reactionaries set about preparing public opinion. A pamphlet entitled "The First People's Supreme Commander, Lieutenant-General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov" was printed and distributed in a vast number of copies. The pamphlet declared that General Kornilov came of the people, and that now the people had elected him their Supreme Commander. In describing the military feats of the general, the author cast off all restraint. For example, speaking of the surrender of the 48th Division, the pamphlet stated that all that fell into the hands of the Austrians was—

"a small handful of men, seven in all, looking like shadows. Among them was Kornilov, heavily wounded, and a wounded ambulance man."²

As a matter of fact, the documents show that over 6,000 men were taken prisoner, while Kornilov himself, abandoning his division to its fate, surrendered four days later. His wound was insignificant. The author of this eulogy was V. S. Zavoiko, a close friend and colleague of Kornilov's.

The general himself understood very little of politics, and all his political work was done for him by Zavoiko, the son of an admiral who had been rewarded with an estate in the Podolsk Province. Zavoiko was Marshal of Nobility in the district of Gaissin. There he bought up estates of Poles which were sold under duress, cleared them of trees and sold the land to the peasants. Zavoiko accumulated a huge fortune by land speculation of this nature. During the 1905 Revolution, this adroit speculator, fearing that his estate might be wrecked, compelled the peasants of the hamlet of Dunayevtsy to register him and his sons as peasants. The local authorities refused to sanction this crafty manoeuvre, but by then the necessity for it had passed: the peasants' movement had been crush-

1 A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 29.

2 "The First People's Supreme Commander, Lieutenant-General Lavr Georgievich Kornilov," Petrograd, 1917, p. 35.

ed. Zavoiko also speculated in oil, was an agent of the firm of Nobel and managing director of the Emba and Caspian Co. He also engaged in banking operations, and together with Protopopov, published a Black Hundred newspaper, "Russkaya Volya" ("Russian Will") in May 1917, after Kornilov had been appointed Commander of the Eighth Army, Zavoiko joined one of the regiments of the Savage Division as a volunteer, but remained at army headquarters as Kornilov's orderly. An adroit speculator, connected with newspaper and industrial circles, Zavoiko launched a big publicity campaign. He printed telegrams to Kornilov, published documents of dubious authenticity, fabricated biographies and wrote most of the orders and manifestos of the Commander-in-Chief. Kornilov himself subsequently said of Zavoiko:

"He has an excellent command of the pen, and I therefore entrusted him with the compilation of such orders and documents as particularly required a strong, artistic style."¹

But Zavoiko's "artistry" was not confined to style. Milyukov, although implicated in the Kornilov adventure, frankly stated:

"Kornilov only neglects to add that Zavoiko's influence did not extend to style alone, but to the very contents of the political documents which emanated from Kornilov."²

In addition to advertising Kornilov, the latter's political associates engaged in more thorough preparations for a *coup d'etat*. They had been preparing their organisations in the big cities for some time. Everywhere secret societies were formed, in which chiefly officers and junkers were enrolled. The capital swarmed with secret leagues which were prepared to support the counter-revolution from within immediately armed forces approached the city.

Towards the end of July a body called the Republican Centre was formed in Petrograd with the purpose of uniting the activities of all the military organisations in the city. Its membership was nondescript, consisting of officers and government officials. The chairman of the society was a certain Nikolayevsky, an engineer, who served as a screen for the big bankers and industrialists. The latter feared to join the society, but generously provided it with funds. Having plenty of money, the Republican Centre was able to attract supporters. Denikin states in his memoirs that the Military Section of the Republican Centre controlled

¹ P. W. Milyukov, "History of the Second Russian Revolution," Vol. I, Book 2, Sofia, 1922, p. 60.

² Ibid., p. 60.

many small military organisations. At General Headquarters itself a body known as the Chief Committee of the Officers' League was formed under the patronage of the Supreme Commander. According to Denikin, this committee

"without attempting to draw up any political programme, set itself the aim of creating the soil and the force within the army for the establishment of a dictatorship—the only means, in the opinion of the officers, by which the country could still be saved."¹

At the beginning of August, Colonel Sidorin, a member of the Committee of the Officers' League, was delegated to the Republican Centre with the object of uniting the forces of the two organisations.

A big part in the preparations was taken by the officers' Military League, the organisation which had hailed Alexinsky when he foully accused Lenin of espionage. The members of the League presented an address to Admiral Kolchak when the sailors drove him out of Sevastopol.

These bodies were the embryo of the future white-guard organisations. Cadres were being mustered for the army of counter-revolution.

But these feverish preparations for a military dictatorship had to be consolidated politically. A strong national centre was required to head the movement and to justify it in the eyes of wider circles. The Provisional Government decided to summon a Council of State in Moscow, as far away as possible from revolutionary Petrograd. Screened by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, this Council in Moscow was to endorse the counter-revolutionary programme of the government and to approve its campaign against the workers and peasants.

The Council was convened in Moscow. The old capital seemed to the bourgeoisie safer than seething Petrograd.

Lenin called the Council of State "a counter-revolutionary, imperialist Council." On August 3, before the Council of State met, the Second All-Russian Congress of Commerce and Industry opened in Moscow, at which the flower of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie forgathered. Open references were already made at this Congress to the necessity of adopting resolute measures to bridle the workers, peasants and soldiers. Ryabushinsky, a big capitalist, trying to work up the feelings of the audience, cried :

"When will he arise, not yesterday's slave, but the free Russian citizen? Let him make haste—Russia

1 A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 28.

awaits him. . . . Let the stalwart character of the merchant assert itself to the full! Merchant men, we must save the Russian land!"¹

The Congress was greeted by Prokopovich, the Minister of Commerce and Industry. The merchants and manufacturers received the Left Cadet Minister with ironical shouts and laughter.

The counter-revolutionaries took advantage of the Congress of Commerce and Industry to set up what was known as the Council of Public Men, which was virtually the headquarters staff of counter-revolution. Its members were prominent leaders of the Cadets, Octobrists and avowed monarchists; Rodzyanko, General Alexeyev, General Brusilov, General Kaledin, General Yudenich and other generals, Milyukov, Maklanov and Kishkin—about 300 in all. The meetings were held in private. Press representatives were not admitted. On August 9, the Council of Public Men sent the following telegram to Kornilov, signed by Rodzyanko:

"In this ominous hour of severe trials, all thinking Russia turns to you in hope and faith. May God help you in your great feat of re-creating a mighty army for the salvation of Russia!"²

The Council of Public Men heard reports on the political, financial, economic, and military situation. On the subject of political situation, the Council adopted a resolution containing the following demand:

"Let a central power, united and strong, put an end to the rule of irresponsible corporate institutions in the administration of the State; let the demands of individual nationalities be confined within legitimate and just limits."³

An addendum to the resolution demanded that the Constituent Assembly should meet in Moscow. On the military question, Kornilov's programme was adopted. The Council elected a standing bureau for the organisation of all public forces. The bureau consisted of Rodzyanko, Ryabushinsky, Struve, Milyukov, Maklakov, Shingaryov, Shidlovsky, Shulgin, Kishkin, Kutler, and Novosiltsev from the Officers' League. In a word, all the bourgeois and landlord parties joined forces under the cloak of the Council of Public Men. It was this Council that later gave rise to the big counter-revolutionary organisations—the Right Centre and the National Centre—which played so important a part on the side of Kolchak and Denikin.

¹ Central Archives, "The Council of State," Moscow, 1930, p. xi.

² "The Council of State in Moscow," Rech, No. 188, August 10, 1917.

³ "On the Eve of the Council of State," Rech, No. 188, August 12, 1917.

The Council of State opened on August 12. Its very composition determined its counter-revolutionary character. It consisted of 488 members of the former four State Dumas and 129 members of Soviets and public organisations. The City Dumas received 129 seats, the Zemstvos 118 seats, commercial, industrial and banking circles 150 seats, scientific organisations 99 seats, the army and navy 177 seats, the clergy 24 seats, nationalist organisations 58 seats, the peasants 100 seats, the co-operative societies 313 seats, the trade unions 176 seats, etc. There forgathered at the Council, old generals, higher officers, Cadet professors, bishops, government officials and co-operative functionaries. Representatives of the bourgeoisie were also present, headed by Ryabushinsky, the man who had threatened the people with starvation and destitution if they did not renounce their demands.

The Bolsheviks decided to make a declaration exposing the Council of State, and then to withdraw from it. But the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets excluded the Bolsheviks from the delegation, fearing that they would spoil the effect of the demonstration of the "unity of all the vital forces of the country."

With the object of exposing and combating the counter-revolutionary Council of State, the Bolshevik Party decided to organise a one-day general strike in Moscow. This was the best form of struggle that could be adopted under the circumstances. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party issued a manifesto in which it appealed to the workers not to organise street demonstrations and not to succumb to provocation, since the bourgeoisie might take advantage of any such action to resort to armed force against the working class. The Moscow proletarians eagerly responded to the appeal of the Party. Despite the resistance of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik majority on the Moscow Soviet, which forbade the strike, over 400,000 workers downed tools in Moscow on August 12, the day the Council of State opened. The bourgeoisie were able to see with their own eyes who had the following of the working class. The militant spirit of the Moscow proletarians damped the ardour of the representatives of the bourgeoisie. They had fled from the revolutionary storms of Petrograd to "peaceful" Moscow, but in the streets of "peaceful" Moscow they were caught in the same revolutionary storm.

The *coup d'etat* for the purpose of establishing a military dictatorship was timed to coincide with the opening

of the Council of State. The press exalted Kornilov and burnt incense to him. The junkers guarding the Grand Theatre, where the Council sat, were issued live cartridges. Cossacks were summoned to Moscow from the front.

The speeches at the Council of State revealed the true aims of the bourgeoisie. Kerensky was not the master mind here. When, hinting at the July events, he threatened all conspirators against the government, whom he discerned "both on the Left and on the Right," those who were preparing an offensive against the revolution merely smiled ambiguously. Kerensky's hysterical threats did not frighten the bourgeoisie. It had quite convincing evidence of the complicity of the "Socialist" Kerensky in the preparations for the blow at the revolution.

The real leader of the reactionary forces at this gathering was Kornilov. He arrived in Moscow the day after the Council opened. At the Alexandrovsky railway station he was accorded a triumphant reception. He was carried shoulder high. The cadet Kodichev greeted him with the words :

"All of us, all Moscow, are united by our faith in you."¹

The wife of the millionaire Morozov fell on her knees before Kornilov.

In his speech at the Council, Kornilov plainly threatened the fall of Riga, hinted that he would open the road to Petrograd to the Germans and demanded that discipline should be restored in the army, that commanders should be granted power and the prestige of the officers enhanced. This candidate for the dictatorship recommended that the death penalty should be introduced not only at the front but also in the rear, and that the railways and munitions' factories should be militarised.

Kornilov was not the sole author of the programme of the dictatorship. It had been drawn up at the end of July at General Headquarters with the assistance of Savinkov and Filonenko. Kornilov first submitted the programme to Kerensky on August 3, and a second time, with additions and amendments, on August 10. But Kerensky delayed his reply.

"It set forth a whole series of measures," Kerensky subsequently wrote in explanation of his vacillations, "the greater part of which were quite acceptable, but formulated in such a way and supported by such arguments that the announcement of them would have led to quite opposite results."²

¹ A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 81.

² A. F. Kerensky, "The Prelude to Bolshevism—The Kornilov Rebellion," London, Fisher, 1919, p. 72.

On the eve of the Council of State the Cadets brought pressure to bear on Kerensky. On the morning of August 11, F. Kokoshkin declared to him that the Party of National Freedom would resign from the government if Kornilov's programme were not accepted. A new crisis was averted by the fact that the same day the Provisional Government had in the main adopted Kornilov's demands of August 3. After this, what was the value of the threats hurled by Kerensky at the "conspirators" against the government? The leader of the "revolutionary democracy," as he was called by the compromisers, took an advance part in the counter-revolutionary plot.

The programme of the counter-revolutionaries was most fully set forth at the Council of State by General Kaledin. The Cossack Ataman insolently demanded:

"1. The army must hold aloof from politics; meetings and assemblies, with their party conflicts and dissensions, must be completely forbidden.

"2. All Soviets and Committees must be abolished both in the army and in the rear.

"3. The Declaration of Rights of the Soldiers must be revised and supplemented by a declaration of their duties.

"4. Discipline in the army must be strengthened and enforced by the most stringent measures.

"5. The rear and the front are one whole ensuring the fighting capacity of the army, and all essential measures for enforcing discipline at the front must be applied in the rear as well.

"6. The disciplinary rights of officers must be restored, the leaders of the army must be invested with full powers."¹

Incidentally, in his speech Kaledin stressed the fact that the Cossacks—the Cossacks who were so often accused of counter-revolution—had saved the government during the events of July 3-5. With soldier-like bluntness, Kaledin blurted out at the Moscow Council of State that it was the "Socialist" Ministers who had summoned the aid of the Cossacks on July 3. And nobody ventured to refute Kaledin, nobody ventured to protest when he sneered at the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Exposed by the Cossack Ataman, the compromisers cowered and held their peace.

"The Cossack general spat in their faces, and they wiped themselves, saying, 'Divine dew!'"² Lenin wrote in reference to Kaledin's speech.

¹ Central Archives, "The Council of State," Moscow, 1930, p. 75.

² Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary," "Collected Works" (Russ. Ed. Vol., XXI p. 125.

Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Plekhanov spoke at the Council and advocated the old recipes of the compromisers. Kornilov, Kaledin and Rodzyanko were preparing to drown the revolution in the blood of the proletariat, but the compromisers continued to call for a coalition with the grave diggers of the revolution. Tsereteli shook hands with the capitalist Bublikov on the platform, the generals and merchants applauded the fall of the "Socialist," and greeted the alliance between the Mensheviks and the Kornilovites.

Both on the eve of the Moscow Council of State and at the Council itself, the bourgeoisie carried on back-stage negotiations with Kornilov in preparation for the abolition of the Provisional Government and the seizure of power by the bourgeoisie. But the strike of the Moscow workers showed the reactionaries that immediate action against the revolution would be premature. Milyukov went to see Kornilov on August 13 and proposed that action be delayed. He made the same proposal to Kaledin. Both generals agreed.

The council of State did not justify the hopes placed in it by its promoters. The plot for a *coup d'état* failed. The people proved to be on the alert. The reactionaries decided to undertake a more comprehensive and efficient mobilisation of their forces.

THE BOURGEOISIE STARTS CIVIL WAR

Kornilov left for General Headquarters, which henceforward became the centre of every counter-revolutionary plot and conspiracy. Representatives of the old regime flocked from all parts to General Headquarters, promising the generals money and support. To Kornilov came the agents of the Entente, who had already realised that they had not preserved the Russian army for themselves by their participation in the February palace conspiracy. They now hoped to keep the Russian army at the front for the further prosecution of the war by taking a hand in the Kornilov plot.

Kornilov's conspiracy was reaching maturity, and preparations were made openly. In order to divert attention, the rumour was spread that the Bolsheviks were plotting an insurrection. The columns of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois newspapers were filled with hints and "reports" of a Bolshevik conspiracy. "Rech," the Cadet newspaper, even named the day of action—August 27, the half-year anniversary of the revolution. While conniving at the Kornilov conspiracy, the Provisional Government, led by Kerensky, concentrated its blows on the Bolsheviks. A plan of provocation was drawn up. It was expected that demonstrations would be held in connection with the half-year anniversary of the revolution. But in case they were not held, Ataman Dutov and his Cossacks were to "stage" a Bolshevik uprising. The government would give orders for the suppression of this "Bolshevik" revolt. Troops mustered by Kornilov in advance, would enter Petrograd, smash the Bolshevik Party to begin with and destroy the Soviets and the revolutionary democratic organisations generally.

Kornilov had the list of members of his new government all prepared.

This is what he subsequently said, under examination, about the final composition of the proposed government:

"On August 26, at the conclusion of a conference of Commissars of the Front, Filonenko, V. S. Zavoiko and A. F. Aladin met in my office. . . . A project for a 'Council of National Defence' was drawn up, to consist of the Supreme Commander as Premier and A. F. Kerensky as Vice-Premier, B. Savinkov, General Alexeyev, Admiral Kolchak and M. Filonenko. **This Council of Defence was to exercise a collective dictatorship, since the dictator-**

ship of a single person was admittedly undesirable. Other Ministers proposed were: S. G. Takhtamyshev, Tretyakov, Pokrovsky, Count Ignatyev, Aladin, Plekhanov, G. E. Lvov, and Zavoiko."¹

In order to lull the vigilance of the workers and peasants, two demagogic decrees were drafted by the conspirators. One provided for an increase in the wages of railwaymen and postal servants, the object being to ensure their neutrality, if only temporarily; the other dealt with the land question—land was promised to soldiers on active service in the war against Germany.

Preparing for decisive action, the Kornilovites made every effort to flood Petrograd with their own men, chiefly officers. It was decided to send a special detachment of troops against Petrograd to occupy the city at the proper moment. On August 13 General Krymov, Commander of the III Cavalry Corps, who had taken part in the "palace conspiracy" on the eve of the February Revolution, arrived in Moghilev. Kornilov placed Krymov in command of the expedition against the revolutionary capital. On the first news of action by the "Bolsheviks," Krymov was to occupy Petrograd, proclaim a state of siege, disarm the garrison, disperse the Soviets, arrest their members, disarm Kronstadt, and so forth.

On August 19 the threat to which Kornilov had referred at the Council of State materialised. Riga was surrendered to the Germans and the approaches to Petrograd were left unguarded. Kornilov's General Staff, of course, laid the whole blame on the soldiers. But the city was surrendered by the generals. This is incontestably borne out by a telegram sent by Diamandi, the Rumanian Ambassador in Petrograd, to Bratianu, the Rumanian Premier.

Reporting a conversation with Kornilov, the Ambassador says:

"The general added that the troops abandoned Riga at his orders and retreated because he preferred to lose territory rather than lose the army. General Kornilov is also calculating that the impression which the capture of Riga will produce on public opinion will permit the immediate restoration of discipline in the Russian army."²

And as a matter of fact, the fall of Riga did enable Kornilov once more to demand that the Provisional Government should fulfil the programme which had been outlined a long time before. In particular, the general de-

¹ "Explanatory Memorandum of General Kornilov," "Obshecheye Delo (Common Cause)," No. 6, October, 2, 1917.

² "Kornilov Admits He Surrendered Riga Deliberately," "Pravda," No. 208, December 1, 1917.

mandated that the Petrograd Military Area should be placed under his direct charge. The Provisional Government conceded these demands, with the proviso however, that Petrograd and its environs should be taken out of the control of General Headquarters and placed under the direct control of the Minister of War. Kerensky particularly insisted on this point. On August 24 Savinkov arrived at General Headquarters and informed Kornilov that the Provisional Government had accepted the general's "memorandum." Savinkov confirmed the necessity of transferring the III Cavalry Corps to Petrograd in view of "possible" complications. The III Cavalry Corps, which included the "Savage Division," proceeded to the capital.

Events moved swiftly. The revolution was in danger.

On August 25 a wire was sent from General Headquarters to Ataman Kaledin in Novocherkassk ordering him to dispatch a mounted Cossack division to Finland via Moscow, while the I Caucasian Cavalry Corps, which was quartered in Finland, was ordered to move on Petrograd.

About 3,000 officers were hurriedly summoned from the front to General Headquarters on the pretext of receiving instruction in new types of mine-throwers and mortars. Directions were given to send reliable and, as far as possible, regular officers. When the officers arrived they were informed that they had been summoned not to undergo instruction, but because an uprising of the Bolsheviks was expected in Petrograd; they were told that, with Kerensky's consent, Kornilov had dispatched Cossack units to the capital, and that it was possible that Kornilov might be obliged to proclaim himself temporary dictator. The officers were promised that five or ten junkers would be attached to each of them. They were issued allowances and dispatched to Petrograd "to restore order." On August 27 instructions were given to General Krymov's III Cavalry Corps that if the railway line should be damaged they were to proceed to Petrograd on foot.

The revolutionary capital was hemmed in on all sides. Everything, it would seem, had been foreseen. General Headquarters counted on rapid success. It was believed that nobody would rise in defence of the Provisional Government.

"Nobody will defend Kerensky. This is nothing but a promenade. All preparations have been made."¹ This is how General Krasnov subsequently described the opinion that prevailed at General Headquarters at the time of the Kornilov revolt.

¹ Krasnov, "On the Internal Front,"—"Archiv Russkoi, Revolutsii" Vol. I, Paris, p. 115.

The Provisional Government was fully informed of the preparations being made by the Supreme Commander. Kerensky satisfied all Kornilov's demands without delay, thus facilitating his preparations. General Alexeyev, an eye-witness, confirmed this circumstance in a letter to Milyukov:

"Kornilov's action was no secret to the members of the government. This question had been discussed with Savinkov and Filonenko, and through them with—Kerensky."¹

But the scale of the movement scared Kornilov's accomplice. Kerensky realised that if Kornilov moved, an explosion among the masses would result, and the army and the peasantry would rise against the counter-revolutionaries. Kerensky, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks had a presentiment that the tide of revolution would sweep away all the compromisers, together with Kornilov. That is why, when he received news of Kornilov's action, Kerensky effected an abrupt change of front and decided to take measures against the "mutineer." The political scheme of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik traitors was clear, namely, to pretend that Kornilov was marching on Petrograd against their wishes, to assure the workers that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were defending the revolution, to pose as revolutionaries and thus to retrieve their reputations.

Kerensky was also guided by purely personal motives. He knew that "the country sought a name," and considered that his own "name" was a suitable one in every respect. He had for some time been regarding Kornilov's promotion with suspicion, and had even endeavoured to dismiss him, but had encountered the resistance of the bourgeois organisations. The British Ambassador hit off the rivalry between the two candidates for the dictatorship when he wrote in his diary on September 3:

"Kerensky, whose head has been somewhat turned of late and who has been nicknamed 'the little Napoleon,' did his best to act up to this new role by posing in several of Napoleon's favourite attitudes and by making his two *aides-de-camp* stand behind him during the whole of the proceedings. There is little love, I imagine, lost between the two men [Kerensky and Kornilov—*Ed.*] but our chief safeguard lies in the fact that, for the moment at any rate, neither can get on without the other. Kerensky cannot hope to retrieve the military situation without Kornilov, who is the only man capable of controlling the

¹ "The Conspiracy of General Kornilov, Alexeyev, Milyukov, Putilov and Co. General Alexeyev's Letter to Milyukov,"—"Pravda," No. 212, December 12, 1917.

army; while Kornilov cannot dispense with Kerensky, who, in spite of his waning popularity, is the man best fitted to appeal to the masses and to secure their acceptance of the drastic measures which must be taken in the rear if the army is to face a fourth winter campaign.”¹

Kornilov himself was of the opinion that Kerensky had to be reckoned with for the time being. It was not without good reason that the general had included Kerensky in his list of members of the new government. Kornilov's political advisers—Zavoiko, Savinkov and Filonenko—assured him that joint action with Kerensky was possible.

Kerensky heard of the conspiracy being hatched at General Headquarters, but could not get to know the details. V. N. Lvov, a former member of the government, came to see him on August 22 and told him that “certain public groups” recommended a reorganisation of the Cabinet. When Kerensky asked to whom he was referring, Lvov hinted at General Headquarters.

Kerensky realised that through Lvov he could get to know the details of the conspiracy, and decided to employ him as an intermediary. On August 24 Lvov visited Kornilov and gave him to understand that he had come at the instance of the Prime Minister, and that Kerensky would like to know the general's opinion of the state of affairs in the country. Kornilov requested Lvov to come and see him on Tuesday, August 25. The next morning the Supreme Commander received Lvov and set forth the following demands:

1. Martial law to be proclaimed in Petrograd.

2. All Ministers to resign, not excepting the Prime Minister, and charge of the government departments to be temporarily entrusted to the Assistant-Ministers until such time as a cabinet was formed by the Supreme Commander.

At 7 p.m. on August 26, Lvov was received by Kerensky in the Winter Palace. Kerensky refused to believe Lvov's account and induced him to set forth Kornilov's demands in writing. At 8-30 p.m. Kerensky summoned Kornilov on the direct wire and invited Lvov to be present at the conversation. Lvov was late, and Kerensky decided to speak with Kornilov in the name both of himself and of the absent Lvov.

“Good-day, General. V. N. Lvov and Kerensky at the apparatus. We beg you to confirm the statement that Kerensky is to act according to the communication made to him by V. N.’

“Good day, Alexander Feodorovich [Kerensky—*Trans.*]; good day, V.N. [Lvov—*Trans.*]. Confirming again the

¹ Sir George Buchanan, “My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs,” London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 172.

description I gave V.N. of the present situation of the country and the army as it appears to me, I declare again that the events of the past days and of those that I can see coming imperatively demand a definite decision in the shortest possible time.'

"I, V.N., ask you whether it is necessary to act on that definite decision which you asked me to communicate privately to Kerensky, as he is hesitating to give his full confidence without your personal confirmation.'

"Yes, I confirm that I asked you to convey to Alexander Feodorovich my urgent demand that he should come to Moghilev."

"I, Alexander Feodorovich, understand your answer as confirmation of the words conveyed to me by V.N. To do that to-day and start from here is impossible. I hope to start to-morrow. Is it necessary for Savinkov to go?"

"I beg urgently that Boris Victorovich [Savinkov—*Trans.*] shall come with you. Everything I said to V.N. refers in equal degree to Savinkov. I beg you earnestly not to put off your departure later than to-morrow. Believe me, only my recognition of the responsibility of the moment urges me to persist in my request.'

"Shall we come only in case of an outbreak, of which there are rumours, or in any case?"

"In any case."

"Good day. Soon we shall see each other."

"Good day."¹

When this conversation was over, Kerensky met Lvov on the staircase and invited him into his office. Balavinsky, the Assistant Chief of Militia, was concealed in the adjoining room. Kerensky got Lvov to repeat his statement in the hearing of the concealed witness. Having by this ruse obtained corroboration of Kornilov's proposals, Kerensky unexpectedly declared Lvov arrested and himself hurried to a meeting of the Provisional Government. There the Prime Minister reported Lvov's conduct, produced all the telegraph tape records of the conversation and demanded emergency powers for himself to combat the Kornilov revolt. Kerensky's action was a bolt from the blue for the Cadet Ministers. They all knew of the conspiracy; they were all waiting and preparing for the action. And suddenly the head of the government calls off. The Cadets hastened to smooth over the conflict "without publicity and scandal". Milyukov tried to convince Kerensky that the real power was on the side of Kornilov, who was acting patriotically and deserved the support of "all the vital forces of the country."

¹ A. F. Kerensky, "The Prelude to Bolshevism—The Kornilov Rebellion," London, Fisher, 1919, pp. 169-70.

In conversation with the Prime Minister, Milyukov and General Alexeyev exerted themselves to the utmost to remove the "misunderstanding" and to patch up an agreement between Kerensky and Kornilov. The Cadet Ministers—Kokoshkin, Yurenev, Oldenburg and Kartashov—again resigned, thus making it easier for Kornilov to carry out his plans.

An editorial in the Cadet newspaper "Rech" of August 29 obviously took the side of Kornilov and endeavoured to pass off the whole affair as a sheer misunderstanding. On August 30 "Rech" appeared with blank columns. An editorial in which the Cadets had frankly expressed their solidarity with Kornilov had to be thrown out at the last minute, when the hopelessness of the Kornilov revolt became clear. The text of the editorial, however, has been preserved in the archives. In this editorial the Cadets asked:

"What answer can be made to the charge that qualifies the events that are taking place as a conspiracy against the revolution with the aim of putting a stop to the rule of democracy? General Kornilov is not a reactionary, his aims have nothing in common with the aims of counter-revolution; this is clear from his definite statement, than the simplicity of which there can be no better evidence of the ingenuousness of mind and heart of the soldier. General Kornilov is seeking a means of leading Russia to victory over the enemy and to an expression of the popular will in the future structure of the Constituent Assembly. It is all the easier for us to associate ourselves with this formulation of national aims because we expressed ourselves in exactly similar terms long before General Kornilov . . . We have no hesitation in declaring that General Kornilov has been pursuing the aims which we too consider essential for the salvation of the country."¹

This editorial entirely justifies the epithet Lenin applied to the Cadets: "Kornilovites."

Attempts to reconcile the two candidates for post of the dictatorship were also made by the Allied diplomats. Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador was aware of the conspiracy and supported Kornilov. With Buchanan's knowledge, British armoured cars accompanied the III Corps on its way to Petrograd.

"All my sympathies were with Kornilov,"² the British

1 "The All-Russian Democratic Council,"—"Rabochny Put (Workers' Way)," No. 14, October 2, 1917.

2 Sir George Buchanan, "My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memoirs," London, Cassell & Co., 1923, Vol. II, p. 185.

Ambassador admits in his memoirs. The British press anxiously endeavoured to conceal the fact that British armoured cars had taken part in the Kornilov rebellion. "The Times" of October 3, 1917, indignantly declared that the story about the armoured cars was a malicious slander. At the instance of the British Ambassador, the Provisional Government even had libel proceedings instituted against the editor of the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper, the "Sotsial-Demokrat." A document is now available which fully corroborates the connection between the British and the Kornilovites. It is an urgent telegram sent on August 28 by General Romanovsky, a prominent Kornilovite, which runs:

"General Quartermaster 7. Immediately instruct the commander of the British armoured car division to dispatch all fighting machines including the Fiats, together with all officers and crews, to Brevari to Lieutenant-Commander Soames. Dispatch to the same place the machines located at the Dubrovka manor 6429."¹

The imperialists were subsequently obliged to make a public admission of their complicity in the Kornilov revolt. In a controversy with British officers, American officers revealed what the former were anxious to conceal. As the proverb says when thieves fall out honest men come into their own. Colonel Robbins, an American, has made public a conversation he had with the Britisher, General Knox. The conversation took place in Petrograd shortly after the collapse of the Kornilov revolt. Colonel Robbins stated:

"He (General Knox) continued: 'You ought to have been with Kornilov.' I said, 'Well, General, you were with Kornilov'; and he flushed, because he knew that I knew that English officers had been put in Russian uniforms in some of the English tanks to follow up the Kornilov advance, and very nearly opened fire on the Kornilov forces when they refused to advance from Pskov..."²

At the time of the Kornilov affair, General Knox, the representative of the British General Staff attached to the Provisional Government, did everything he could to ensure the success of the military *coup d'etat*. And if the Kornilov rebellion failed, the British general is least of all to blame.

Kerensky, supported by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, endeavoured to organise the defence of Petrograd. But the only people who could put up any effective resistance to Kornilov were the Bolsheviks.

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records 9, "Extraordinary Commission to Investigate the Case of General Kornilov and His Accomplices," Vol. I, Register 2, File No. 6, Folio 56.

² From Judiciary Committee (Senate) Hearings, 65 Cong., 3 Sess., 1919. "Bolshevik Propaganda," p. 780. folio 56.

THE REVOLT OF THE GENERALS CRUSHED

The Bolshevik Party had been watching the Kornilovite preparations for some time. Forced underground by the Government of Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, it nevertheless kept warning the workers that a plot was being hatched and, on the first news of the revolt, sounded the alarm. Knowing that the government was implicated in the counter-revolutionary plot, the Party appealed to the masses to take action, not, however, in defence of Kerensky, but in defence of the revolution against Kornilov and his bands.

The Bolshevik Party mustered all its forces against the Kornilovites.

On August 27 an extraordinary meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided that the members of the Committee should maintain night-and-day watch duty in rotation, and that similar watch duty should be instituted by the members of the district committees of the Party and representatives of the factory Party organisations. Party speakers were mobilised in all the city districts. The Party called upon the workers to resist.

The call of the Party was answered by the entire working class of Petrograd, which had become convinced that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were playing a treacherous game. Until then the organisation and training of the Red Guard had been carried on secretly; now they were carried on openly.

The Bolsheviks joined the People's Committee for Combating Counter-revolution set up by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, but only on condition that the workers were armed and that all persons arrested for participation in the July demonstration were released. These demands were immediately conceded.

A similar situation prevailed in Moscow and the provinces, which responded to the call to resist the counter-revolutionary generals. Armed squads of workers were formed everywhere. Revolutionary committees were set up in a number of places. The workers demanded the liberation of the arrested Bolsheviks and the transfer of the entire power to the Soviets.

Detachments of the Red Guard were hurled against the Kornilovites. Trenches were dug and defences thrown up around Petrograd. Arms were hastily procured and companies formed. Leaflets were printed in millions of copies.

The Bolsheviks also called upon the Petrograd garrison to resist. In response, the regiments of the garrison expelled their Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Commissars and replaced them by Bolsheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks learnt to their horror that the Bolsheviks had the support not only of the Petrograd garrison but also of the majority of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. Sensing the danger, Kerensky pathetically announced that he placed himself under the protection of the Bolsheviks, to which the Bolsheviks replied that they had more important business to attend to.

Propaganda was started among Kornilov's troops.

The railwaymen demolished the track and took every possible measure to prevent Kornilov's troop-trains from proceeding to Petrograd. Near Luga, whence it was intended that the Kornilovites should march on Petrograd by foot, a delay occurred. The Luga Soviet rejected General Krymov's ultimatum and demanded that his Cossacks should avoid Luga in their march on Petrograd.

The vigorous resistance put up by the workers started a process of disintegration among the troops of the conspirators. On August 30, Cossacks from the Don Division came to the Luga Soviet and proposed to arrest General Krymov and to submit to the orders of the Provisional Government. The Corps Commander was saved from arrest only by the arrival of a representative from Kerensky, with whom Krymov immediately left for Petrograd. Convinced that the soldiers absolutely refused to act against the revolutionary detachments, Krymov blew out his brains in despair.

"The advance of the "Savage Division" ended in exactly the same way as the advance of the Cossack regiments. A Moslem delegation was sent to meet the "Savage Division."

The idea of sending a Moslem delegation was conceived by S. M. Kirov, who in 1917 was active in Vladikavkaz. In August 1917 Kirov went to Petrograd on the instructions of the Bolshevik organisation and of the Soviet Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Vladikavkaz. He was in Moscow when the Kornilov revolt broke out. Learning that the "Savage Division," which contained regiments of Caucasian mountaineers, was participating in the Kornilov revolt, Kirov suggested to the Moscow Soviet that steps should be taken to have a delegation sent to the "Savage Division" from the Central Committee of the Mountain Peoples in Vladikavkaz. The Moscow Soviet got in touch by telegraph with Vladikavkaz.

The delegation arrived and set out to explain to the soldiers sent by Kornilov what the real intentions of their commanders were. This was sufficient to render the "Savage Division" absolutely harmless to the revolution.

Failure dogged the Kornilovites in Petrograd. The officers who had been sent there in advance indulged in orgies in public restaurants, dissipating the money assigned for organising the revolt. Denikin writes in his memoirs.

"Colonel S., the Chief of the Petrograd military organisation, was searched for diligently but unsuccessfully. It turned out later that from fear of arrest he had taken refuge in Finland, carrying away with him the last remnants of the organisation's funds, some 150,000 roubles."¹

Another Kornilovite, the Cadet Milyukov, tells the same story.

Complete disintegration set in at General Headquarters.

It was now isolated and uneasily awaiting the end. Even the St. George Battalion refused to support Kornilov. At the front and at General Headquarters, Generals Denikin, Markov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky and others who had openly supported Kornilov were arrested by order of the army committees.

The end of the Kornilov revolt was in sight. On August 30 the Provisional Government dismissed Kornilov from his post of Supreme Commander and had him charged with mutiny. The post of Supreme Commander was assumed by Kerensky. General Alexeyev, a former Chief of Staff under the tsar, the man who at the time of the Council of State had discussed with Kornilov who should be the dictator, was appointed Chief of Staff.

The Kornilov revolt collapsed. The landlords and the bourgeoisie failed to smash the revolution. But the civil war begun by the generals caused a distinct change in the balance of forces.

Summing up the result of the Kornilov affair, Lenin wrote :

"The historic significance of the Kornilov revolt is that it opened the eyes of the masses of the people with extraordinary force to the truth that had been and still is hidden under the compromising phrases of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, namely, that the landlords and the bourgeoisie, headed by the Cadet Party, and the generals and officers who are on their side have organised themselves, and that they are now ready to commit, and are committing, the most outrageous crimes, such as surrendering Riga (and afterwards Petrograd) to the

¹ A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt," Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 65.

Germans, laying the war front open, putting Bolshevik regiments under fire, starting a mutiny, leading troops against the capital with the 'Savage Division' at their head, etc.—all in order to seize power and place it in the hands of the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the power of the landlords in the villages and to drench the country in the blood of workers and peasants."¹

The rank and file of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were carried away by the general fervour. The petty-bourgeois leaders fussed about, trying to conceal their connection with the Kornilovites. They tried by their activity to assure the people that the compromising parties were also helping to fight counter-revolution. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders joined the committees which were preparing to resist Kornilov, passed thunderous resolutions and vowed their fidelity to the revolution.

But the struggle proceeded without the compromisers and in spite of them. The Soviets once again became fighting mass organisations of the workers and peasants as in the days of the February Revolution. The Soviets revived and began to develop. Might once more proved to be on the side of the Soviets; the workers once again obtained possession of arms. A situation had again arisen in which it proved possible to a certain degree to apply the old, pre-July tactics. Lenin wrote in the press proposing to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks that the Soviets should take over the whole power, on condition, however, that the Bolsheviks be allowed complete freedom of agitation and that new elections to the Soviets be freely held.

However, the return to the old tactics aiming at a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets proved possible only for a very brief period. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks rapidly recovered from the intoxicating fumes of revolution. They were too closely bound to the bourgeois government, and after the defeat of the Kornilov revolt they again slunk back into the bourgeois kennel.

The government of the country was temporarily entrusted to a Directory consisting of A. F. Kerensky, M. I. Tereshchenko, A. I. Verkhevsky, who had recently been appointed Minister, of War, D. N. Verderevsky, Minister of Marine, and A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Post and Telegraph.

The last attempt of the Bolsheviks to secure the peaceful transfer of the whole power to the Soviets by peaceful means proved unsuccessful. But this attempt once more showed that power could be secured **only by an insurrection** against the bourgeois government and the petty-bourgeois

¹ Lenin, "Draft Resolution on the Political Situation,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XX I, pp. 138-39.

bloc. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" once again came to the fore. But it had now acquired a different meaning, because the Soviets themselves were different.

"The slogan 'All Power to the Soviets!' was again put forward. But now this slogan no longer signified what it did in the first stage. Its content had been radically changed. Now this slogan meant a complete rupture with imperialism and the passing of power to the Bolsheviks, for the majority in the Soviets were already Bolshevik. Now this slogan meant that the revolution must march directly towards the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of insurrection. More than that this slogan now signified the organisation and fashioning of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a State."¹

¹ J. Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,"—"Leninism" (Eng. ed., 1935), Vol. I, p. 128.

CHAPTER X

ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

1

CAPITALIST SABOTAGE

THE Kornilov plot had failed. But thanks to the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks the power remained in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Not daring to come out openly, the capitalists adopted Ryabushinsky's precept and conducted their offensive against the working class by striving to bring about a famine.

Disaster menaced the country. The railway system was falling to pieces. The extraction of fuel declined. The supply of food to the cities diminished. War aggravated the general state of disorganisation. A collapse was inevitable. But far from adopting emergency measures to combat famine, the government engineered what was obviously Kornilovism in the economic sphere. The members of the government talked a great deal about the control and regulation of industry. But in actual fact they ignored their own "measures," delayed decisions and set up unwieldy bureaucratic organisations, which were placed under the complete control of the capitalists.

In opening the inaugural session of the recently formed Economic Council on July 21, Kerensky optimistically defined the aims of the new institution as being

"to draw up a plan for gradually regulating the entire economic and financial life of the country on the principle of subordinating all interests to the interests of the state."¹

A Chief Economic Committee was set up at the same time to act as the executive body of the Economic Council, but the instructions governing the Chief Economic Committee virtually made it an independent organisation. Its decisions could be rescinded only by the Provisional Government. At a meeting of the Economic Council held on August 9, N. N. Savin, Vice-Chairman of the Committee and a prominent figure in industrial circles, admitted that he

¹ "Verbatim Report of the Sitzings of the Economic Council of the Provisional Government, July 21, 22, 24, 26 and 31, August 3, 9 and 10, 1917," Petrograd, 1917, p. 1.

did not know "what the Economic Committee is to do."¹ On September 12 the members of the Chief Economic Committee declared in their turn that the Economic Council only hindered the work of the Committee, and N. I. Rakitnikov, the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, bluntly declared that both the Council and the consultative body of the Committee were unbusinesslike organisations.

The confusion was heightened by the preservation of the "Special Councils" that had been created under the tsar. The Special Defence Council, which was invested with emergency powers, decided important questions affecting the economic life of the country. Its chairman was P. I. Palchinsky, an engineer, who in the past had worked in the gold industry and on railway construction. Palchinsky was at one and the same time Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, Chairman of the Special Defence Council and Chief Agent for Metal and Fuel Supply. In all three capacities he was equally emphatic in his opposition to the revolution.

Lenin wrote of him :

"By this struggle, Palchinsky acquired a sad notoriety and became known all over Russia. He acted behind the screen of the government, without openly appearing before the people (in the very same way as the Cadets generally preferred to act, willingly putting forward Tsereteli 'for the people's sake,' while they themselves manipulated all the important affairs on the quiet). Palchinsky thwarted and destroyed every serious measure taken by the spontaneous democratic organisations. For not a single measure could go through without a 'dent' in the immense profits and the self-willed rule of the Kit Kityches."¹

The Provisional Government did not venture to destroy the old tsarist bureaucratic Council of Defence, but on the other hand it took vigorous measures against the democratic organisations, the various local committees of supply and food committees of the Soviets, which were endeavouring to combat famine from below. It was by directly rescinding the orders of the democratic organisations that Palchinsky acquired notoriety. In other words, while doing nothing themselves, they prevented the toilers from trying to avert the catastrophe.

The "republican" government permitted only an insignificant number of workers to serve on its regulating

¹ "Verbatim Report of the Sitzings of the Economic Council of the Provisional Government, July 21, 22, 24, 26 and 31, August 3, 9 and 17, 1910, Petrograd, 1917." p. 26.

² Lenin, "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It,"—"Collected Works," (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 180.

bodies. In the Economic Council there were ten representatives of the Provisional Government, twelve representatives of bourgeois organisations (the Union of Cities, Union of the Congresses of Representatives of Commerce and Industry, etc.), and six professors, but only nine representatives of the Soviets and the trade unions. As a business body, the Economic Committee consisted of representatives of the Ministries appointed by the government; its Chairman was the Prime Minister. It was quite impossible to secure the appointment of representatives of the working population to the Committee. They were allowed only on the consultative organ set up by the Chief Committee. But even here, while there were ten representatives from the Economic Council, six from bourgeois organisations, fourteen from government institutions, thirteen state purchasing agents and a number of private persons appointed by the Committee, there were only three representatives from the Soviets and the trade unions. These three workers were to mask the complete absence of representatives of the people on the Chief Committee. A band of old bureaucratic die-hards against three representatives of the toiling population—such was the balance of forces in the bodies set up by the Provisional Government. In discussing the regulations governing the District Economic Councils, the Chief Committee devoted particular attention to the composition of these bodies, and a dozen or so sittings were devoted to the consideration of this question. The Chairman of the Committee reported that representatives of the democratic bodies demanded half the seats, but this was impossible because the industrialists would boycott such councils. He asserted that the best way would be to borrow the principle of distributing seats adopted by the Chief Economic Council, that is to say, the representatives of the democratic bodies should receive one-fourth of the total number of seats. Fearing the sabotage of the capitalists the Committee adopted the proposal of its Chairman.

The Economic Council, the Chief Economic Committee and the District Economic Councils were designed by the Provisional Government to serve as general staffs of Kornilovism in the economic sphere.

While the "regulating" bodies were discussing the composition of their committees and commissions and fooling the people by promises to introduce control and accountability, the bourgeoisie engaged in unrestricted profiteering. Commodities disappeared from the market. Working people stood in lines for hours on end in order to secure a starvation ration, while surreptitiously any commodity

could be obtained in any quantity. The capitalists speculated and grew rich on the shares of industrial enterprises, which for the most part were fictitious and existed only on the stock exchange lists. In the first nine months of 1916, 150 joint stock companies were formed with an aggregate share capital of 209,530,000 roubles; in the four months, March-June 1917, fifty-two companies were formed with an aggregate share capital of 138,650,000 roubles, and in August 1917 alone sixty-two companies were formed, with an aggregate share capital of 205,350,000 roubles. There was an unparalleled increase in September, when 303 companies were formed with an aggregate share capital of 800,000,000 roubles. The number of applications for permission to form companies was enormous. In the first nine months of 1917 sanction was given for the formation of new companies with aggregate share issues of 1,900,000,000 roubles—six and a half times as much as in 1913. Sanction was given to existing companies to issue additional shares to an aggregate value of 1,500,000,000 roubles—six times as much as in 1913. Russia exceeded even Great Britain in share issues. The bulk of the permits were granted between July and September. If it is borne in mind that the registered capital of the companies formed in 1917 totalled 469,519,000 roubles, and that they sought permission to issue shares to an amount of nearly 2,000,000,000 roubles, the gigantic scale on which the capitalists hoped to speculate will be clear.

This is what the "Den", which openly supported the bourgeoisie, wrote on August 6:

"While the whole of industry is on the verge of collapse and factories are being closed down or are passing under the control of the government owing to exorbitant expenditures... on the stock exchange the shares of these or similar factories are without rhyme or reason being forced up tens and hundreds of roubles, and the difference, amounting to millions of roubles, is daily pocketed by bankers, shady promoters (former illicit stock-brokers) and the speculating public."¹

Speculation was dragging the shattered economy of the country into the abyss.

The Soviets, the factory committees and the food committees combated profiteering and speculation, but the government pretended to know nothing about it. At a meeting of the Economic Council held on July 24, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was asked:

"Is there any surveillance...over the development of

1 "The Stock Exchange Boom,"—"Den," No. 128, August 6, 1917.

speculative trade, and what is the result of this surveillance?"¹

V. E. Varzar, the representative of the Ministry, a prominent member of the firm of Siemens-Schuckert and at the same time chief of one of departments of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, nonchalantly replied :

"I must say that we consider it impossible to exercise surveillance over every trifling detail of life."²

That the people were starving was a trifling detail in the eyes of the capitalist government. No measures against profiteering were taken, although they were being demanded even by the petty-bourgeois press. Apart from Article 29, which empowered the courts to impose fines, and then only in rare cases of patent violation of the law, the criminal law contained no provisions against profiteering. If the courts acted at all, it was only against the small fry ; the big stock exchange sharks were, of course, left unmolested. When, however, the labour organisations displayed initiative in endeavouring to impose control over the operations of the capitalists, the government raised an outcry and accused the working class of "anarchy."

Profiteering soon assumed such huge dimensions that even Konovalov grew alarmed.

On October 3, while Minister of Commerce and Industry in the last government, he wrote a letter to N. N. Savin on the concealment of stocks by oil firms. The firm of Nobel, which was in a position to consign 150,000,000 poods, had declared 82,000,000 poods for consignment, and actually consigned 65,000,000 poods. The Mazut Company, with stocks of 54,000,000 poods, declared 47,000,000 poods for consignment, and actually consigned 37,000,000 poods. There was a shortage of fuel, factories were coming to a standstill, but the oil speculators concealed nearly half their stocks despite the introduction of an oil monopoly. Instead of coming down heavily on the saboteurs who were creating a fuel shortage in the country Konovalov modestly requested Savin

"to take measures to get the oil firms to increase consignments of oil from Astrakhan at least to Nizhni Novgorod."³

¹ "Verbatim Report of the Sitzings of the Economic Council of the Provisional Government, July 21, 22, 24, 26 and 31, August 3, 9 and 10, 1917, Petrograd, 1917 p. 27.

² Ibid., p. 27.

³ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—3, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, File No. 6, folio 142.

But the firm of Nobel jeered at the government and its monopoly and bluntly informed the Moscow Fuel Department that they

"were not in a position to release oil for the Moscow area, even for the first category factories."¹

In exactly the same way the capitalists sabotaged the coal monopoly introduced by the government on August 1.

On August 12, Prokopovich, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, admitted at the Council of State that "the monopoly is still not functioning quite properly," but, he confidently added, "by the middle of August we shall nevertheless succeed in organising the coal monopoly."²

The Minister was applauded, but the capitalists continued to pursue their own course. Prokopovich hoped and waited, but the profiteers concealed the coal. On October 20, the newspaper "Izvestia Yuga", stated:

"We have before us a table showing existing stocks of coal at the mines of the Novenki district alone, where not more than 5,000 workers are employed at thirteen collieries, but where the stocks of coal amount to 10,000,000 poods. ... And these stocks are not being consigned simply because the industrialists do not want to consign them."³

It should be added that scores of collieries in the Donetz coalfield were piling up stocks against a rainy day, and that therefore scores of millions of poods of coal were lying unconsigned, so as to force up prices for profiteering purposes.

It was not, as the capitalists complained, a reduction in the productivity of labour that disrupted the supply of fuel to industry and to the population. **The chief reason was the sabotage of the capitalists.**

The government set out to meet the wishes of the coal profiteers. Placing a premium on sabotage, it steadily raised the price of coal: 7 copecks per pood were added in July and 14 copecks in September. The increase as compared with pre-war prices was 100 per cent and more in two months. The country's finances were collapsing, yet the government generously awarded the employers. On the one hand it wrote resolutions introducing monopolies and voted for fixed prices, while on the other it sanctioned increases in prices in the interests of the capitalists.

Not content with profiteering and forcing up prices, the employers conducted an offensive against the working

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—3, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, File No. 6, folio 142.

2 Central Archives, The Council of State, Moscow, 1930, p. 31.

3 "Who is To Blame?"—"Izvestia Yuga (Southern Gazette)," No. 186, October 20, 1917, Kharkov.

class in the form of lock-outs. "Promyshlennost i Torgovlya" stated on the basis of preliminary and very incomplete reports that in August and September 231 factories were closed down and 61,000 workers flung on to the streets. These measures were taken by the employers in protest against the attempts of the government to regulate industry. But most frequently of all the capitalists justified lock-outs on the grounds that the workers were making excessive demands. Thus, in one of its declarations to the Provisional Government, the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Commerce and Industry frankly declared:

"The closing down of mills and factories is an act of natural death due to excessive loss of blood."¹

Characteristic in this respect was the conduct of the owners of the Nevsky Stearine Factory in Petrograd. The output of the factory declined from day to day. The workers demanded an explanation from the factory-management, and received the reply:

"There is a shortage of raw material . . . a Zeppelin raid on Petrograd is expected and consignments of raw material are therefore out of the question."²

As a matter of fact, the saboteurs were consigning stearine—the principal raw materials used in the factory to—Moscow and Finland.

The capitalists in the South of Russia, in particular, discarded all restraint. At a conference held in September 1917, they addressed a stern ultimatum to the Provisional Government:

"The representatives of the coal, anthracite, iron-ore, metallurgical and manufacturing industries of the South of Russia deem it necessary categorically to declare to the Provisional Government once more that if the local authorities are unable or unwilling to guarantee the safety and personal inviolability of the members of the factory managements, the firms will be unable to work in such an atmosphere and will have to close down."³

Here, too, the government met the wishes of the capitalists. At a meeting of the chief Economic Committee on September 22 a resolution was adopted on the motion of Palchinsky which was designed as a programme of action for the government. The chief point in the resolution stated:

¹ Archives of National Economy, Records 151, "Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Commerce, 1905-1918," File No. 373, folios 5-6.

² Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—472. "Central Council of Factory Committees," File No. 32, folio 65.

³ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records, 3 "Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government," File No. 82, folio 189.

"In the event of violation of the agreement by the workers, factories may be closed down in whole or in part and all or part of the personnel discharged."¹

Thus the government intended to make lockouts the basis of its labour policy. Instructions were given to draft a bill to this effect in short order.

At a meeting of the Special Defence Council on September 23, Varzar, another prominent representative of industry, advanced the following thesis in defence of the absolute legitimacy and necessity of lockouts:

"No authority exists in the factories, and therefore the only way in which the manufacturers can combat the workers is to close down the factories."²

Varzar even objected to the clause in the bill which stipulated that industrialists could close down factories only with the consent of the government, for in his opinion this restriction would hamper the owners in resisting excessive demands of the workers.

The mine owners threatened a general lockout in the Donbas. By the beginning of October forty factories had been closed down in Petrograd. In October the Moscow manufacturers wanted to declare a lockout of 300,000 workers. Fifty per cent of the factories in the Urals were closed down. On the eve of the October Revolution 50,000 workers had been thrown on to the streets in Ekaterinoslav. The lockouts became country-wide.

The Menshevik Ministers supported the avowed Kornilovites. As far back as July 26, P. N. Kolokolnikov, the Assistant Minister of Labour and a member of the same party as the Menshevik Gvozdyev, had openly declared at a meeting of the Economic Council that the Ministry of Labour recognised the right of employers to resort to lockouts.

The offensive against the social gains won by the working class in the revolution proceeded apace. At the beginning of September the Chief Committee of United Industry—one of the most important organs and economic centres of the bourgeoisie—resolved not to pay members of Soviets, factory committees and shop stewards' councils for time spent at meetings of these bodies. This blow at the working-class organisations was the culmination of a series of vigorous measures adopted by the Menshevik Skobelev. Not long prior to this, soon after he became the Minister of Labour, Skobelev had demagogically threatened to de-

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Record, 3 "Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government," File No. 82, folio 88.

² Central Archive of Military History, Special Council of Defence, File No. 420-24, folio 123.

prive the capitalists of 100 per cent of their profits. But as a matter of fact, Skobelev tried to deprive the workers of 100 per cent of their gains. On August 28 and 29 the Minister of Labour forbade the factory committees to meet during working hours or to interfere in the hiring and dismissal of workers. This was tantamount to abolishing the factory committees. Thus the "Socialist" Minister, having shaken his fist at the bourgeoisie, brought it down on the head of the working class.

The sabotage of the capitalists very soon resulted in a marked decline of production. In the metallurgical industry, forty-two blast furnaces were operating in the second quarter of the year, forty-one in the third quarter, and only thirty-three by the end of October. The decline in production was particularly severe in the period July-October. There was also a disastrous fall in the output of coal; 119,000,000 poods of coal were extracted in July, 115,000,000 poods in August and 110,000,000 poods in September.

Productivity of labour was most of all affected by mobilisation. It was in the regions where the number of women, adolescents and prisoners of war had increased most among the workers (the Donbas and the Urals) that the decline of productivity was greatest. The capitalists themselves admitted that the efficiency of prisoners of war was half the normal efficiency, and in the Urals and the Donbas more than one-third of the workers were prisoners of war. The irregular supply of fuel and raw material, and the deterioration in their quality, the worn-out condition of machinery, the failure to carry out necessary repairs, and the lowered skill of the workers were all factors that unfavourably affected productivity of labour. The closing down of factories only crowned the disruption of the normal course of production. It is noteworthy that in the case of factories which passed under the control of the workers even before the October Revolution, as, for, instance, the Guvjon Metal Works in Moscow, productivity of labour steadily rose.

But what most affected productivity of labour was the deterioration in the workers' food. In September and October the workers of Moscow and Petrograd received less than one half-pound of bread a day, while in some districts they simply starved. According to information supplied by the Ministry of Labour, wages in Moscow increased during the war by 515 per cent, while prices of staple food-stuffs increased during this same period by

836 per cent, and prices of consumers' goods by as much as 1,109 per cent. In Petrograd the average hourly wage of a metal worker increased between March and May by 57.8 copecks, and between May and August by only 8.2 copecks. The rate of increase of wages declined after the July events and was practically reduced to zero by the bourgeois offensive against the working class. Prices, on the other hand, increased extraordinarily in the period May-August. The price index in Russia increased from 4.20 to 7.25, that is to say, almost doubled, which implied a drop in real wages by nearly 50 per cent. Average real wages in 1917 were only 57.4 per cent of real wages in 1913. The working class therefore became thoroughly impoverished during the war, and especially during the eight months of the bourgeois regime. The workers were worse nourished and clothed than before. And this semi-starved or starved condition of the workers had a disastrous effect on productivity of labour.

Lenin summed up the activities of the industrialists as follows:

"The capitalists are deliberately and consistently sabotaging (damaging, stopping, disrupting, hampering) production, hoping that a terrible catastrophe may mean the collapse of the republic and democracy, of the Soviets and the proletarian and peasants' unions generally, thus facilitating the return to a monarchy and the restoration of the full power of the bourgeoisie and landlords."¹

Kornilovism in industry assumed ever large proportions and spread to other spheres of economic life.

¹ Lenin, "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 159.

FINANCIAL COLLAPSE

The financial problem assumed menacing proportions for the government. In July and August the war devoured the tremendous sum of 66,600,000 roubles daily. According to the calculations of the capitalist Publikov, at the beginning of July anticipated expenditures of from 12,000,000,000 to 14,000,000,000 roubles had no "definite cover."¹ The exchange value of the rouble rapidly declined. During Kerensky's administration the rouble fell twice as rapidly as in 1916. It depreciated 25 per cent in five months. Bank deposits diminished by over 1,000,000,000 roubles. Beginning with April the influx of deposits practically ceased. Amounting to 3,050,000,000 roubles on March 1, they dropped to 1,630,000,000 roubles on October 1. Whereas in 1916 paper money had been issued to the amount of 1,500,000,000 roubles, during five months of existence of the Provisional Government paper money was issued to an amount of 4,500,000,000 roubles. The country was swamped by a flood of currency notes—"Kerenkies"—as they were called. The financial system was being rent and shattered like a ship caught in the ice. The financial policy of the government, which sought salvation in printing paper money, aroused the indignation even of Ryabushinsky. He regarded it—and quite rightly—as a continuation of the policy of the old regime and declared that it would "win favour" with nobody.

The falling rouble was driving industry, and economic life generally, into the abyss of a new crisis. The government sought to avert financial collapse, but could think of nothing better to do than to speed up the printing presses. In a fit of desperation, the bourgeois professor, Tugan-Baranovsky, proposed levying a compulsory loan on the capitalists. Professor Ganzel calculated that the loan might yield 10,000,000,000 roubles. But the bourgeois press came down on these reckless daredevils and compelled them to hold their peace. A conference summoned by the Ministry of Finance expressed hostility to such a loan on the grounds that "existing direct taxation was heavy enough." Having defeated the attempt at taxing the bourgeoisie indirectly by means of a loan, the bourgeois press proposed that indirect taxation on the working population be increased. On August 3, the "Torgovo-Promy-

¹ "The Bourgeoisie and the Landlords in 1917. Private Conferences of Members of the State Duma", Moscow, 1932, p. 138.

shlennaya Gazeta"—the organ of the manufacturers and mill-owners—declared that the important thing in the new stage was not direct but indirect taxation.

"A new stage in fiscal reform is beginning: energetic efforts must be devoted to excise and monopoly. One may be opposed to indirect taxation in principle, but the inevitability of an increase in indirect taxation must be admitted."¹

Pointing to the queues in front of the shops, the author of the article declared that the population was prepared to pay, "because it had plenty of money to spare."² As a matter of fact, the population had no money to spare—there was simply a shortage of foodstuffs and goods and the workers were driven to sell everything they had to avoid starvation.

The "Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta" bluntly declared on August 3:

"The increase in the scales of indirect taxation by no means corresponds to the increased nominal purchasing power of the population, especially of the working class."³

And the newspaper demanded of the government that:

"The attention of the Ministry of Finance must be directed to the necessity of increasing excise duties and instituting new fiscal monopolies."⁴

The government immediately responded to this demand of the bourgeoisie. On August 6 "Rech" published an interview with N. V. Nekrasov, the Minister of Finance, in which the latter declared:

"In view of the huge expenditures it will prove necessary to increase "indirect" taxation. Furthermore the institution of new State monopolies, on sugar, matches and tea, is unavoidable."⁵

In a report he made to the Council of State, Nekrasov broadly developed his proposals. In reference to direct taxes he said that "they must leave the economic apparatus of industry intact,"⁶ that is to say, that if anything they ought to be reduced; but as regards indirect taxation, the Minister had something entirely different to say:

"Without an increase—a serious and considerable increase—in indirect taxation we shall at present get nowhere."⁷

¹ Editorial article in "Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta", No. 166, August 3 1917.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "A Financial Plan" Rech, No. 183, August 6, 1917.

⁶ Central Archives, "The Council of State," Moscow, 1930, p. 40.

⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

Furthermore, the Minister made it clear to the bourgeoisie that in respect to the sugar and other monopolies :

"We regard these measures as definitely fiscal and deem it necessary to adopt them for the purpose of a better and more complete procurement of revenues, and we by no means regard them as a systematic endeavour to resist private business initiative."¹

Nekrasov explicitly stated that the monopolies on articles of general consumption were intended to regulate the incomes of the toilers and not those of the capitalists. This was a regular programme of Kornilovism in the sphere of financial policy. The representatives of the "revolutionary democracy" on the Council of State, in the person of the "Socialist" Chkheidze, endorsed the Minister's arguments on indirect taxation.

An appeal issued by the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies also declared that it was necessary for the whole population to make serious sacrifices in order to avert financial disaster.

Every promise of the Minister of Finance was faithfully observed by the government. In September, the Ministry of Finance submitted a bill postponing the levy to 1918 and reducing income tax. These measures met with the full approval of the government. In addition, the Special Council of Defence moved to issue advances to the capitalists in anticipation of a future increase of prices. In September a sugar monopoly was instituted and railway freight rates were increased many times over. A government declaration of September 25 stressed the importance of indirect taxes and the necessity of increasing them. In the middle of October the Ministry of Finance submitted proposals for the introduction of several other monopolies: on matches, cheap tobacco (makhorka), coffee and tea. Thus it was articles of general consumption which were selected for these monopolies. The intention being to plunder the working population. The tea monopoly used to net a profit of 150,000,000 or 160,000,000 roubles, but now the government planned to secure 740,000,000 roubles from it. The government expected to squeeze a net 207,000,000 roubles from the working people on matches alone.

The increase of prices made at the instance of the capitalists had another consequence—a steady increase in the issue of paper money. Paper money to an amount of 476,000,000 roubles was issued in April and to an amount of 1,954,400,000 roubles in September, an increase of over 300 per cent. In October, paper currency in circulation in-

¹ Central Archives, "The Council of States," Moscow, 1930, p. 41.

creased by another 1,933,500,000 roubles. The very appearance of the notes issued by the Provisional Government, the "Kerenkies," was an eloquent commentary on the financial policy of the bourgeoisie. They were small oblongs of paper with the inscription "20 rubles" or "40 rubles" and bore no signature, date, or number. As a result of the feverish activity of the printing press, the rouble lost 37 per cent of its value in the period August-October, or half as much again as during the first five months of the revolution. The workers were paid wages in "falling roubles"—money that simply melted away in their hands. By October the dollar exchange of the rouble had dropped 53 per cent. The depreciation of the currency went into a "tail spin," dragging the rouble down at headlong speed. The purchasing power of the rouble barely amounted to ten pre-war copecks. The steady issue of paper money encouraged profiteering and enabled the capitalists to earn huge profits. From month to month, the real value of wages was forced down by this flood of paper money, while indirect taxation consumed what was left. The fiscal policy of the Provisional Government left the bourgeoisie unscathed, but sapped the last ounce of strength out of the masses. The government tried to localize the financial crisis by a stream of paper money. But just as you cannot extinguish a burning house by pouring oil on it, so the financial collapse could not be averted by the printing press. The financial crisis accelerated the economic collapse. The government was leading the country to disaster.

TRANSPORT DISORGANISATION

As in industry so on the railways, the growing dislocation was counteracted only by the revolutionary initiative of the workers.

After the July events, and especially in August, the government launched an open offensive against the railway workers. The new policy put an end to the "Nekrasov spring"—the name given to the period when the Minister of Transport, the "Left" Cadet Nekrasov, was still constrained to reckon with the sentiment of the masses and to introduce Kornilovism on the railways. After the July days the Cadet Party issued a sharp protest against Nekrasov's Circular No. 6321. This circular had been sent out on May 27 and recognised the railwaymen's trade unions and the railway committees, which were even empowered to exercise control over the work of the railways. The ensuing period was known on the railways as the "Nekrasov spring." The Cadets declared that the experiment in Russian railway affairs was an unfortunate one. The Special Transport Council demanded the withdrawal of Circular No. 6321, increased responsibility of officials, the abolition of all functions of control on the part of the workers and employees and the right to issue compulsory orders, for violation of which the railway disciplinary courts were to have summary powers to commit offenders to prison.

It was stated at a meeting of the Russo-American Committee, in the presence of a "high authority," a "distinguished foreigner," Stevens, the Chairman of an American railway commission in Russia, that

"a firm hand is required in railway affairs. The participation of employees in the administration of the railways is intolerable."¹

The Council of Private Railways openly demanded the complete and unconditional restoration of the pre-revolutionary conditions of labour on the railways. At a Moscow "Conference of Public Men" held on August 8 the question of militarising the railways was raised. N. D. Baidak, the Chairman of the Council of Private Railways, stated in an interview to the press that "a state of emergency must be immediately proclaimed on the railways."²

The militarization of the railways was one of the "innovations" which Kornilov himself had announced in

1 "Our Railways,"—"Rech." No. 181, August 4, 1917.

2 "The Position on the Railways,"—"Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta," No. 191, September 3, 1917.

his programme. On the eve of his revolt, the general had declared: "A military regime must be proclaimed on the railway."¹

But the bourgeoisie considered Nekrasov far too mild a man for a Kornilov campaign against the working class. A firm hand was required. It was not essential that the Candidate should be a Cadet, and still less that he should be even more to the Right. On the contrary, best of all would be a "Socialist" who would carry out the will of the bourgeoisie as honestly as the Mensheviks Skobelev and Nikitin, or the Socialist-Revolutionaries, S. Maslov and Chernov. Such a Kornilov for the railways was found. The chiefs of the various railways proposed the Socialist-Revolutionary, S. G. Takhtamyshev, the man whom Kornilov had included in the list of members of his dictatorial government. The very first measures of the new Minister fully justified the confidence placed in him by the bourgeoisie. Speaking on July 16 at the First Railway Congress, he endeavoured to gild the Kornilov pill he proposed to administer to the seriously ailing railways by describing the happy lot of the worker aristocracy in England:

"What happiness the British worker must experience! I visited workers' homes: they have three rooms, a kitchen, a piano. ... The time is not far off when the Russian worker, like the British worker, will come home to a bright and tastefully furnished apartment of three or four rooms and will hear an excellent domestic concert; his daughter will play the piano and his son the fiddle."²

Then, passing from a description of the paradise of the future to the reality of the present, he informed the Congress that

"the administrative and executive authority on the railways belongs to the organs of government. No interference with the orders of these organs can be tolerated."³

After this speech Takhtamyshev was known to the workers on the Kazan Railway as the "fiddle" and the members of the Provisional Government as the "fiddlers." Takhtamyshev's speech was the signal for a wide campaign by the railway administration against the railwaymen's committees: they were evicted from their quarters and their members were dismissed from work and prosecuted by law.

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—9, "Extraordinary Commission to Investigate the Case of General Kornilov and His Accomplices," Register 1, File No. 18, folio 89.

² A. Tanyayev, "Sketches of the Railwaymen's Movement in the 1917 Revolution" (February-October), Moscow, 1925, pp. 85-86.

³ "The All-Russian Railway Congress,"—"Golos Zheleznodorozhnika (The Railwayman's Voice)," No. 17, July 21, 1917.

This zealous Socialist-Revolutionary Minister was succeeded by a Cadet, P. N. Yurenev. The latter announced his complete solidarity with Takhtamyshev's policy. Yurenev expanded the latter's programme of action in a speech he made at the all-Russian Railway Congress on August 1:

"I consider interference in the executive functions of the administration by private persons and organisations not empowered by the government to do so, interference which tends to dislocate traffic, which is accompanied by the arbitrary dismissal of responsible persons and, as a result, creates an impossible situation in the technical side of railway operation at a time when the situation at the front is what it is, at a time of military defeats and extreme danger to the State—I consider such interference a crime against the State! And the government must react with the full weight of its authority against such attempts as sheer anti-State manifestations."¹

Yurenev vigorously opposed the workers' demands for an increase in wages. He met the demand of the workers in the Moscow railway shops with the curt reply: "No money!" And this was the stereotyped reply he made to all such demands.

The Kornilovites on the railways had the whole-hearted support of the compromisers. Orekhov, a Right Socialist-Revolutionary, Chairman at the Inaugural Congress of the Railwaymen's Union (July-August) and the first Chairman of the Vikzhel—the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Union—spoke in the name of the railwaymen at the Council of State. This "Socialist" declared:

"Order, sacrifice and defence—such is the government's appeal to us in these days. Order, sacrifice and defence—these are the words inscribed on the banner of the all-Russian Railwaymen's Union."²

The railways were one of those many "bewitched" things with which the Provisional Government seemed able to do nothing. Minister succeeded Minister, but the railways continued to fall to pieces. Yurenev was replaced by Leverovsky. Like Yurenev, he expressed his solidarity with the policy of his predecessor, and like him he resorted to repressive measures and refused to increase wages. The managements of certain of the railways endeavoured to disorganise the food supply of the workers and employees.

1 "The Minister of Ways of Communication at the Railway Congress," *Vestnik Yekaterinskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi* (The Yekaterininskaya Railway Messenger), Yekaterinoslav, 1917, No. 131. p. 12.

2 Central Archives, "The Council of State," Moscow, 1930, p. 168.

The director of the Kazan Railway, von Mekk—who later, under the Soviet Government, was an instigator of wrecking activities on the railways—withheld urgent credits for the purchase of goods and endeavoured in this way to dislocate the food supply. Similar actions by the government and its agents in the various localities were leading to the inevitable collapse of the railways. This was aggravated by such new phenomena as wholesale desertions from the front and the spread of bag-trading resulting from the food shortage and profiteering. The amount of freight carried was 200,000 carloads below requirements in July and 248,000 carloads below requirement in August. Average daily freight carried in nine months was 19,500 carloads, or 22 per cent less than in 1916. Daily freight carried in October averaged 16,627 carloads, or 34 per cent less than in 1916. Complete paralysis menaced the railways and, consequently, the whole economic life of the country. Even the bourgeoisie made no secret of this. A prominent engineer by the name of Landsberg declared at a meeting of the Transport Council that “in the approaching winter months complete collapse is inevitable.”¹

¹ “Collapse of the Railways,” *Vestnik Yekaterininskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi, Ekaterinoslav*, 1917, No. 31, p. 11.

SPREAD OF THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENT

The character of the economic policy of the Provisional Government was forcefully expressed in its handling of the agrarian question. Here its policy was directly associated with the name of General Kornilov.

At the beginning of July N. N. Lvov, Chairman of the Alliance of Landed Proprietors, called upon the Landowners "to abandon passivity." "We must assume the offensive," he said.¹ General Kornilov was one of the first to respond to this call. Long before he entered "big politics" the general had tested his strength in agrarian affairs. On July 8, 1917, Kornilov issued a compulsory order entitled "On Gathering the Harvest," in which he stated:

"The whole crop . . . must be harvested, and harvested rapidly. It is therefore forbidden . . . forcibly to seize standing crops or gathered crops . . . or to hinder the harvesting of the crop in any way..."²

Kornilov threatened that peasants who violated this order would be condemned to "the house of correction for a term of up to three years."³ This order was put into effect immediately. The Land Committee of Poltava was prosecuted for violating Kornilov's order. A big accumulation of court cases was foreseen. The military authorities issued instructions that such cases should be given priority. Resort to military force was recommended if court proceedings failed to pacify the peasants.

Kornilov's order applied only to the region of the South-Western Front. "The Socialist" Ministers, Chernov, Tsereteli and Peshekhonov attempted to have the general's "law" extended to the whole country. On July 16, Chernov, the Minister of Agriculture, sent out instructions to the Land Committees advising the peasants to pay rent to the landowners in accordance with scales to be fixed by conciliation boards. Chernov even deemed it feasible that uncultivated land should be placed under the charge of the Land Committees . . . but only with the consent of the Food Committees. These muddled and "complicit" instructions, as the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves called them, occupied a definite place in the general plan for a Kornilov offensive against the peasants.

1 "The Congress of Landed Proprietors,"—"Rech," No. 158, July 8, 1917.

2 "A Compulsory Order,"—"Kievskaya Mysl (Kiev Thought)," No. 170, July 13, 1917.

3 Ibid.

They were to serve as a liberal background to the Kornilovite actions of the two other "Socialist" Ministers—Tsereteli and Peshekhonov.

On July 18, on the heels of Chernov's instructions, Tsereteli, the Minister of the Interior, issued his own circular, which stated:

"The population is seizing, ploughing and sowing the land of others, removing workers and making impossible economic demands on the agriculturists."¹

Having pointed out that incitement to the seizure of land must be prosecuted with the full rigour of the law, the Minister proposed that the provincial Commissars

"should take early and vigorous measures to put a stop to all unauthorized acts in the sphere of land relations."²

Tsereteli went further than Kornilov: this "Socialist" Minister declared even "incitement to seizure" impermissible.

A similar circular was issued by Peshekhonov, the Minister of Food.

Having enumerated the "criminal" acts of the peasants in detail, he ordered:

"A stop must be put to such actions immediately...

Criminal proceedings must be immediately started against persons guilty of such acts."³

The Kornilovite circulars of the "Socialist" Ministers were crowned by an ordinance of General Kornilov himself, who had now become supreme Commander. This new ordinance extended the scope of Kornilov's compulsory order "to the whole theatre of war."⁴

Directed by the Kornilovites, the government machine proceeded to give effect to these various instructions, circulars and ordinances. Proceedings began to be taken against the "land-usurpers". The Socialist-Revolutionary Provincial Commissars set about the business with great energy.

At a meeting of the Chief Land Committee held in August, a representative from the Tula Province reported that about sixty members of Land Committees, members of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and "plain peasants" had been arrested in that province in July and the first half of August. In the Smolensk Province, members of fourteen rural district committees were arrested in the Elninsk district alone.

¹ Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 415.

² *Ibid.*, p. 415.

³ "Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and Other Peasant Organisations", Vol. I, part 2, Moscow, 1929, pp. 336-37.

⁴ Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 416.

The All-Russian Peasant Soviet, which was controlled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, had nothing more to say to this than that "the arrests and repressions are formally based on certain articles of the criminal code,"¹ which were introduced by the Stolypin government for the suppression of the agrarian movement after the 1905 Revolution.

Troops loyal to the government were dispatched to the villages on the heels of the Kornilov and Tsereteli circulars. In July and August there were twenty-two cases of armed suppression of peasant outbreaks in the eleven provinces where the agrarian movement was strongest (in the Central Black Earth Region and the Middle Volga Region). But this was only a drop in the ocean of peasant unrest. There were 1,122 cases of "agrarian offences"² in July alone. The landlords realised that the storm might burst at any moment and had no intention of standing with arms folded in expectation of a Constituent Assembly.

The landlords endeavoured to apply the old Stolypin policy in the new conditions. The conciliation boards, on which one landlord had more influence than 300 peasants, were built on typical Stolypin lines. On Stolypin lines too was the attempt to redistribute rentable land to the rich peasants at the expense of the poor peasants. Of a similar character was the policy of encouraging the spread of kulak farms. At the beginning of July a resolution was adopted by an All-Russian Congress of Landowners to the effect that land should be granted from the domain of the State and the royal family and from the estates of private persons to peasants who possessed little land. The land should be granted, the resolution went on to say, as private property. The landowners were anxious to retain their land at the cost of a few small concessions.

M. Boborykin, writing from the Petrograd Province to Rodzyanko, former President of the Duma, said:

"I am a landlord. My mind somehow cannot even conceive that I might be deprived of my land. and, what is more, for the most incredible reason: for the sake of an experiment in Socialist doctrines. If anywhere on earth, or even in Mars, there existed that ideal system for the sake of which it is proposed to have me surrender (not to say plainly—to rob me of) my property, without compensation—I would be ready to sacrifice even my last shirt... Leaving exalted maxims for the future... I, as a person who was brought up in the countryside and who knows

1 "The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies to the Provisional Government,"—"Izvestia of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies," No. 93, August 25, 1917.

2 Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, Appendix.

the real life of the Russian cultivators and landowners, declare that the countryside needs an authority, a firm and strong authority, based on the masses and the law. Our muzhik is ignorant and coarse, and therein precisely lies the crime of the former ruling noble class. In many places the muzhik has already seized the landed estates; the rough division, so to speak, is almost complete, and all that is required now is the experienced and capable hand of the Socialist-Revolutionary."¹

This landlord then went on to set forth his own plan of agrarian reform. He recommended the Provisional Government to meet "the spontaneous strivings of the peasants and to distribute part of the landed estates among the 'toiling people' even before the Constituent Assembly."²—not without compensation, of course.

The landowners endeavoured to create "mass support" for themselves in the countryside by winning over the kulaks. "Alliances of Peasant Owners" began to be formed, fostered by the Alliance of Landowners. The majority of them openly adopted the programme of the Cadets. The programme of one of the alliances in the Southern Ukraine stated:

"The Alliance will widely participate in the political life of the State, and strive for the establishment of a democratic republican system in accordance with the principles proclaimed by the National Freedom Party."³

The programme went on to condemn "all seizures and agrarian disorders" and proposed "on the principle of private ownership" to alienate the privately-owned estates "at a fair valuation."

The Stolypin orientation on "the strong peasants" was supplemented by a deliberate policy of destroying agriculture, which had already been severely undermined by the war. The rural Ryabushinskys vied with the urban Ryabushinskys in strangling the revolution with the help of the gaunt hand of famine. The landlords deliberately refrained from sowing their fields, turned cattle to graze on the growing crops, destroyed their grain and slaughtered their livestock. The "Izvestia of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies" reported in the middle of July that Esmon, a landlord in the Starobykhovsk District, was grazing cattle on his rye-fields. When a militiaman ordered him to stop this, the landlord declared, "Until the Constituent Assembly

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—4, Chancellery of the President of the State Duma, File No. 78, folio 9.

² Ibid., folio 6.

³ Ibid., folio 6.

meets I am the master of my land, and therefore I will do as I please." When asked how he intended to harvest the rye, the landlord answered, "The rye will remain in the field unharvested. . . . This is nobody's business, since the rye is my property."¹ At the Second Session of the Chief Land Committee, a delegate from the Moghilev Province stated that Sipailo, a landlord, was

"systematically destroying his estate. He is secretly selling off all his pedigree stock, twelve or fourteen cows every night. He is selling his farm implements to anybody that comes along; he is turning cattle to graze in his grain and hay fields."²

The land council of the Balashov district reported at the end of July that

"the landlords are not moving the hay or harvesting the grain, and they sometimes set fire to them or have them trampled down by cattle."³

This destructive policy provoked the peasants to put up an even fiercer fight against the landlords. The Committee of Landowners of the South of Russia sent the following telegram to Kerensky:

"The laws passed by the Provisional Government with the object of putting a stop to anarchy, and the ordinance of the Supreme Commander of July 31 of this year are being totally ignored and the peasants are living, acting and guiding themselves by the orders of local, self-appointed organisations. . . . This situation will lead to the complete collapse of agriculture with all its fatal consequences. The Chief Committee of the Alliance of Landowners requests the Provisional Government, in the interests of the State, to take urgent measures to put a stop to the disastrous activities of the Land Committees . . . and to protect the persons and property of the landowners."⁴

This description of the state of affairs in the rural districts was written three days before the Kornilov revolt. It was now no longer a question of land only; the very lives of the landlords and their entire property had to be protected. This could be achieved only by the Kornilovite policy adopted by the government in July.

On September 8 the government decided to subordinate

¹ "A Refractory Landlord,"—"Izvestia of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies," No. 54, August 11, 1917.

² "Proceedings of the Second Session of the Chief Land Committee, Sitzings of July 1 and 2, 1917", Petrograd, 1917, p. 47.

³ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records 3, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, File No. 58b, folio 4.

⁴ Ibid., File No. 80, folios 11-14.

the Land Committee and Food Committees to the courts for administrative affairs. The peasant organisations again found themselves under the heel of the landlords, who controlled the administrative machine. That very same day, September 8, Kerensky, the Chairman of the Directory and the Supreme Commander, having "defeated" Kornilov, hastened to prove his loyalty to the defeated general. Kerensky issued Order No. 911, which supplemented and endorsed Kornilov's order of July 31. Making no claim to originality, the new Supreme Commander literally repeated Kornilov's order and stated:

"I categorically forbid (1) the forcible seizure of crops or of harvested grain...(2) the seizure of livestock or farm implements by forcible and illegal means."¹

At the same time, the government continued its old policy of hoodwinking the peasantry. Chernov, the "muzhik Minister," was replaced by Semyon Maslov, a Socialist-Revolutionary. A namesake of the latter, Pyotr Maslov, the Menshevik theoretician on agrarian questions, hastened to give a summary of the effects of Chernov's activities.

"The muzhik policy," he wrote in the "Den" "...is in the long run harmful to the peasants themselves...The provisional Government has evidently somewhat smoothed out and neutralised the partisan character of the measures taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. Thanks to this, and owing to Chernov's wise flexibility, the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture have had no evil consequences."²

This appreciation contained the whole programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik bloc. And the fact that right down to the October Revolution the landowners felt no "evil consequences" from the peasant movement was entirely due to the "wise flexibility" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks.

In pursuance of its policy of duping the peasants, the government announced in a declaration of September 27 that:

"The direct regulation of land relations should be entrusted to the Land Committees, to which, in a manner to be defined by special law, but without violating existing forms of land ownership, may be transferred the control of arable land ... in order to save the economic life of the country from utter collapse."³

1 Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 420

2 P. Maslov, "The Muzhik Minister," Den, No. 152, September 1, 1917.

3 "From the Provisional Government,"—"Vyestnik (Provisional Government)," Supplement to No. 162, September 27, 1917.

This declaration was a prelude to a crafty manoeuvre on Kerensky's part. In view of the growing revolt of the peasants, the economic life of the "country," i.e. of the landlords, could be saved "without violating existing forms of land ownership" only by transferring the landed estates to the provincial land Committees. The provincial Land Committees were headed and controlled by landowners. If this manoeuvre succeeded, the land would fall into reliable hands. But the position of the landlords was not very secure even on the provincial Land Committees. Before deciding on this risky step, the Provisional Government set about reinforcing "local authority." At its meeting on September 29 the Government decided that

"it is necessary in the provinces in which agrarian disorders are rife to set up special committees, whose function it would be to take urgent measures to remove misunderstandings arising locally and to maintain law and order in the sphere of agrarian relations."¹

The second point in this decision defined the composition of the "special committees." The members of these agrarian courts martial were to consist of the local representatives of the central government and

"representatives of local government bodies ... which are directly concerned with questions affecting agrarian relations."²

It was only the landlords, of course, who were "directly concerned" with agrarian relations. And it was into their charge that the "special committees" were delivered as a method of dealing with the peasantry. The Provincial Commissars and military authorities were instructed to act in conjunction with the special committees and not to hesitate to resort to armed force in suppressing disorders.

The machine was set in motion. In September and October the Provisional Government began more and more frequently to resort to armed force in dealing with the peasant movement. There were seventeen cases of armed suppression of revolt in the period March to June, thirty-nine in July and August, and 105 in September and October. Some of the landlords even began to cherish the illusion that Kerensky was consolidating his position. He must be strong if he can suppress the muzhiks by armed force, they reasoned. In the more disturbed districts martial law was proclaimed. A detachment under the command of Captain Mironovich was sent to the Tambov Province. The detach-

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—6, "Chancellery of the Provisional Government," File No. 343, folio 2.

² Ibid.

ment was accompanied by Court Prosecutor A. F. Staal, a member of the Chief Committee of the Peasant Alliance, who had come from Moscow. How difficult it was for these gentlemen to "pacify" the peasants can be judged by the measures to which they resorted. Cavalry, Cossacks and even armoured cars were dispatched to the villages. Protected by the armoured cars brought by the member of the Chief Committee of the Peasant Alliance, the landlords began to raise their heads. An emergency assembly of the nobility of the Tambov Province demanded the return of land seized by the peasants, an increase in rents and, chiefly, the adoption of vigorous measures.

In September a force of 2,775 soldiers was dispatched to the Kazan Province. But it was soon reported:

"Certain squads are absolutely unreliable: thus in the Kozmodemyansk district the soldiers fled when the women started a riot."¹

Even the force most loyal to the bourgeois, i.e., inherited by Kerensky from the old regime, refused to serve.

"In the Gressk rural district," it was reported from the Minsk Province in October, "Cossacks dispatched thither to restore order fled when the peasants threatened to stone them."²

Even where order was superficially established with the help of gun-fire, the situation remained very tense.

"As long as questions of a general nature are dealt with," the bourgeois "Russkiye Vedomosti" stated in reference to the situation in the countryside, "the peasants are restrained and calm and listen attentively; but as soon as the speaker refers to a local question, the calmness and restraint at once disappear."³

The illusions of the landlords were soon dissipated. Having failed to crush the peasant movement in July and August, the government proved helpless in face of the peasant revolt in September and October. Under the circumstances, the landlords were obliged to consent to a dangerous manoeuvre, namely, to make a show of handing over the land to the peasants. They made the attempt to place the land under the control of the semi-landlord (Socialist-Revolutionary) Land Committees, and thus to preserve their strength in order to crush the peasant revolt.

The Chairman of a congress of rural district, district and provincial Zemstvos of the Saratov Province sent the following telegram to the Ministry for the Interior on October 5:

¹ Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow 1927, p. 278.

² Ibid., p. 351.

³ "An Object Lesson,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti", No. 102, May 7. 1917.

"The only measure capable of halting the development of the disorders is to immediately place all privately-owned land under the control of the Land Committees."¹

On October 13 the Nizhni-Novgorod Provincial Commissar of the Provisional Government, the provincial Land Committee and the Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, sent a wire insisting that all land be placed under the control of the Land Committees in order to save the modern farms and to pacify the population."² Just as in the preceding stage the peasants had been duped by the promises of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the speeches of Chernov, so now this honourable task was entrusted to the new Minister of Agriculture, the Right Socialist-Revolutionary S. Maslov. Maslov had already displayed uncommon Ministerial abilities in July. Speaking at the Second Session of the Chief Land Committee, he was shrewd enough, while actually defending the interests of the landowners, to make a show of standing "above" the aspirations of the various classes.

"This requires," the future Minister said, "that all land relations in the localities should be in the charge of some supreme body, some supreme justice, some supreme standard, which would hold in check the landlords on the one hand, and the peasants, on the other, and would regulate their mutual relations."³

Such a Minister was a real godsend to the landlords. When he replaced Chernov, S. Maslov hastened to announce that he would continue the policy of his predecessor. In the early part of October this prolific and energetic Minister submitted a number of bills to the government dealing with the regulation of agrarian relations, the leasable land reserve, disputes arising over leases, and so forth. These bills were submitted to the government "at the right time."

At a meeting of the Chief Council of the Alliance of Landowners held on October 1, to which twenty-five representatives of its provincial organisations were invited, the following vivid description of the situation in the localities was given:

"The agrarian disorders are spreading to all parts of the country, are becoming more savage and destructive in character, are being increasingly accompanied by violence and murder, and the victims of the disorders are now not

1 "Anarchy," *Volga Naroda* (Peoples' Will), No. 137, October 6, 1917.

2 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—406, Chief Department of the Militia, Section 2, File No. 17, Part 44, Vol. II, folio 26.

3 "Proceedings of the Second Session of the Chief Land Committee, Sitzings of July 1 and 2, 1917", Petrograd 1917, p. 142.

only the landowners but also the more prosperous part of the peasantry. Rural Russia is perishing materially and she is perishing morally and spiritually. ..."¹

In this heated atmosphere, greater attention was paid to Maslov's proposals than had been paid to Chernov's. The present Minister of Agriculture displayed even greater flexibility than the "flexible" Chernov. On October 16, at a meeting of the Chief Land Committee held behind closed doors, Maslov reported on his bill for placing the land under the control of Land Committees before the Constituent Assembly was convened. According to this bill a land lease reserve was to be set up under the control of the Land Committees, and the lands of the State and the monasteries were to be included in this reserve. As to the landed estates, only such of their lands were to be included in this reserve as used formerly to be leased out by their owners, and for these lands the latter were to receive rent. True, the landlords were also recommended to hand over land to the reserve voluntarily.

Lenin exposed this bill in the following terms :

"Instead of the confiscation of landed property, we have its **consolidation**. . . . The Cadets are pretending that the bill of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is extraordinarily 'revolutionary.' All the bourgeois papers are raising an outcry against the bill. . . . All this is a farce, a game, the bid of a haggling merchant, who sees the spinelessness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and hopes to drive a better bargain. The fact is that S. L. Maslov's bill is a 'landlords' bill, a bill written for the **purpose** of reaching a compromise with the landlords and saving them."²

On October 17 the government decided that the bill should be given a supplementary examination, for which purpose a special commission was appointed. The commission clipped the bill still more. It was again discussed by the Provisional Government on October 24.

For all the crafty manoeuvres of the Cadets, neither Kerensky nor Maslov was now able to save the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The agrarian question, like the questions of industrial regulation and improving of the work of the railways, remained unsettled.

¹ "The Bourgeoisie and the Provisional Government,"—"Proletarskaya Revoliutsia", 1926, No. 16 (57), p. 247.

² Lenin, "A New Fraud Practised on the Peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party,"—"Selected Works", (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 395.

APPROACHING FAMINE

The supply of foodstuffs to the cities declined from day to day. During the four months of Peshekhonov's administration, the general amount of goods carried by the railways dropped to one-third and the amount of food, in particular, to two-fifths. The Ministry of Food was practically inactive.

"The struggle against the catastrophe," Lenin wrote, "began to be waged by self-appointed democratic organisations—committees of supply and food committees... of all sorts."¹

The grain monopoly was attacked by the landlords and kulaks from all sides. Public organisations, and above all the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd and Moscow, demanded that the government should take severe measures against grain profiteers. But the "Popular Socialist" Peshekhonov took no measures whatever. At a meeting of the National Food Committee held on August 24, a report was heard on the subject of "a temporary addition to the price of products purchased with credits granted by the Ministry of Food in accordance with the decision of the Provisional Government of May 19, 1917."² The Food Committee unanimously decided to make a temporary addition of 7 per cent on the prices of all food products. Of course, 7 per cent was considerably less than the 100 per cent addition made by the government. But even 7 per cent forced a breach in the fixed prices, a breach that could be widened indefinitely. By voting in favour of this 7 per cent increase, the representatives of the democracy themselves helped the government to destroy the fixed prices.

Nevertheless, when the government abolished the fixed prices, Peshekhonov resigned. The reason he gave was that this measure would increase government expenditures by two billion roubles. He was replaced by Prokopovich, the former Minister of Commerce and Industry, who, it was considered, would display greater firmness in his stand against the workers. Comparing Prokopovich to Peshekhonov, Rokhovitch, a representative of the bourgeoisie, said:

"And one can picture the position of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, whose function it is to develop

¹ Lenin, "The Threatening Catastrophe and How To Fight It,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 180.

² "Regulation of Prices of Agricultural Implements,"—"Prodovolstvennoye Delo" (Food Affairs), 1917, No. 23-24, pp. 12-13.

trade in the country, when another member of the government [Peshekhonov—*Ed.*] opposes him and takes measures tending to destroy trade completely.”¹

Prokopovich stood for freedom of trade and seemed to be the proper man for the job of abolishing the grain monopoly.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, like their protege Peshekhonov, put up only a verbal resistance to the government's offensive against the working classes. Instead of appealing to the masses and demanding Kerensky's impeachment, they confined themselves to sterile oratory. Lenin described their position in the following terms:

“The government violates the law by adopting in the interests of the rich, the landowners and capitalists a measure which ruins the whole work of control, food supply and salvaging the extremely shaky finances, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks continue to talk about reaching an understanding with commercial and industrial circles, continue to attend conferences with Tereshchenko, continue to spare Kerensky, and confine themselves to a paper resolution of protest, which the government very calmly pigeon-holes!”²

The doubling of grain prices was equivalent to an enormous tax on the working population. By one stroke of the pen the government made a present of two billion roubles to the landlords and kulaks at the expense of the workers and poor peasants. The doubling of grain prices undermined the State grain purchases, gave a free hand to the profiteers, disturbed finances still more and aggravated the famine and the state of economic disruption. In September the newspapers reported:

“Intense profiteering is going on in the provinces at the present time owing to the discrepancy between prices of agricultural produce and prices of manufactured goods. Instead of bringing their grain to the market and selling it at the fixed prices, the peasants load it into sacks and, by fair means or foul, consign it as baggage to the large cities and sell it at a higher price. In trains and at railway stations you see profiteers laden with sacks who with the help of soldiers or of ordinary bystanders pile sacks crammed with grain into passenger cars or heated freight cars for sale in the large cities.”³

1 “The Second All-Russian Congress of Commerce and Industry. Verbatim Report and Resolutions”, Moscow, 1917, p. 19.

2 Lenin, “The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It,”—“Collected Works” (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 182.

3 “The Food Collapse,”—“Izvestia of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies”, No. 102, September 5, 1917.

The illicit distilling of spirits became widespread and, as the Ministry of Food admitted, destroyed grain in "frightful quantities." Profiteering became still more widespread. Kondratyev, a prominent bourgeois, wrote as follows:

"The fixed prices were doubled.... But in view of the rapidly rising prices in the open market, the new fixed prices and scales lag a long way behind them."¹

The doubling of prices not only stimulated profiteering in grain but also contributed to a general rise in prices. "The increase in grain prices by 100 per cent has had a staggering effect; the prices of certain staples have doubled,"² it was reported from the Taurida Province.

"There is to be observed a rising tendency in the prices of products which have only an extremely remote relation to grain,"³ it was reported from Kherson. A report from Kharkov stated that: "The economically well-placed peasants have hopes of a new increase in prices; confidence in a firm food policy on the part of the government has been destroyed."⁴ The government having increased prices once, the grain-owners were certain that it would increase them again. They began to hold back grain—"the currency of all currencies." Sabotage of the state grain purchases assumed even newer forms: grain was concealed or damaged, or the ploughing of fields for the next year's crop was performed in a deliberately negligent fashion. A government emissary reported from the Orel Province that sowing was being done on fields overrun with weeds, ploughing was being carelessly performed, and no manure was being used. A report to the Ministry of Food from the Moghilev Province stated that landlords were making obviously false returns of their grain stocks, and that one of them had been detected concealing 10,000 poods of grain. Grain was concealed for profiteering purposes or destroyed, so as to prevent it being dispatched to the working population of the cities.

A famine winter was approaching. Rations were everywhere reduced. Food disorders were rife from the Dnieper to the Amur.

At a meeting of the Council of the Republic held on October 6, Prokopovich, the Food Minister, reporting on the one and a half months of his administration, boasted that the doubling of prices had had a beneficial effect on state purchases. But this was not the case. "The doubling of

1 N. D. Kondratyev. "The Grain Market and Its Regulation During the War and Revolution", Moscow, 1922, p. 158.

2 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—1944, The People's Commissariat of Food, Register 24, File No. 101, 1917, folio 12.

3 Ibid., folio 14.

4 Ibid., folio 14.

the fixed prices has not resulted in any increase in grain deliveries,"¹ it was reported from Astrakhan. "Deliveries of foodstuffs have diminished by one-third,"² it was stated from Kursk. "With the doubling of the fixed prices grain consignments have diminished,"³ it was wired from Tula. This was the true story of Prokopovich's "achievements." The summaries of state food purchases confirmed these reports and gave the lie to Prokopovich's statements. The September state grain purchases were a failure, the plan being fulfilled only 31.3 per cent. It is true that 46,730,000 poods of grain were purchased as compared with 19,760,000 poods in August, but this was due to the usual seasonal increase in purchases. Furthermore, fearing that their estate might be wrecked, the landlords hastened to sell their grain. The October plan was fulfilled only 19 per cent, 27,380,000 poods of grain having been purchased as compared with 48,950,000 poods in October 1916. These figures clearly gave the lie to Prokopovich.

State purchases of grain became increasingly difficult. Even the Ministry of Food was forced to admit:

"The system of compulsory alienation of grain . . . continues to be the most effective way of exercising the grain monopoly."⁴

The dispatch of military detachments to help procure grain became more and more frequent. The deterioration in the food situation became so obvious that even non-revolutionary organisations in the provinces demanded a return to the old system. Public organisations in the Yenisei Province petitioned that the order doubling prices be rescinded on the grounds that it was superfluous in that province. It was reported from Omsk: "The Food Council protests against the unexpected and inexpedient increase in the fixed prices."⁵ The Kherson Provincial Food Committee declared that it was "a senseless and absolutely unjustified measure."⁶

Some organisations not only protested against the decision of the government, but sabotaged it. The Astrakhan "Committee for the Salvation of the Revolution" resolved: "to sell grain at former prices."⁷ The public organisations of thirteen out of the twenty-five provinces opposed the increase in prices in one form or another.

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—1944. The People's Commissariat of Food, Register 24, File No. 101, 1917, folio 12.

2 Ibid., folio 4.

3 Ibid., folio 11.

4 Ibid., folio 15.

5 Ibid., folio 12.

6 Ibid., folio 14.

7 Ibid., folio 1.

The rulers grew alarmed. At a secret meeting of the Defence Commission of the Provisional Government summoned on October 10 to discuss the growing food shortage in the army, General Dukhonin himself spoke of "the necessity for reducing the numerical strength of the army."¹ The government clutched at measures that only tended to hasten the catastrophe. Towards the end of September the Food Minister issued a circular on grain requisitions. He threatened to use military force against those who sabotaged the food policy of the government. But these threats were directed only against the working peasants. Nothing stronger than persuasion was used towards landlords and kulaks who concealed, destroyed and profiteered in grain. The landlords were coaxed but the peasants were coerced into surrendering grain.

The organisations which might have helped the government to avert a famine were not allowed any hand in food affairs. At the beginning of September Prokopovich suspended the sittings of the National Food Committee without the slightest regard for the wishes of its members, and announced that the sittings would be resumed only after he had made a personal tour of Russia. The "Novaya Zhizn" of October 5 published an interesting letter from a delegation of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which declared:

"The delegation regards the policy of the Ministry of Food not only as a direct violation of the law, but also as a deliberate attempt to bar the National Food Committee, which represents the opinions of the revolutionary democracy and of social groups, from exercising any influence on food affairs. The delegation of the Central Executive Committee considers this policy a return to the worst days of the old regime, with its contempt for public forces and public initiative."²

Even the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries "revolted." The government decided to abolish all the various committees of public organisation and to replace them by official agents of the bureaucracy. This was Prokopovich's last card in the "effort" to avert famine. It was illustrative of the government's offensive against the working class on the eve of the October Revolution. The government proposed to procure grain with the help of reactionaries.

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—1239. The Provisional Council of the Republic (Pre-parliament), File No. 26, 1917, folio 3.

2 "Delegation of the Central Executive Committee on Prokopovich's Policy," —"Novaya Zhizn", No. 145, October 5, 1917.

At a meeting of the Council of the Republic on October 16, Prokopovich declared:

"We must stop being persuaders, we must stop being the persuaders-in-chief. We must create organs of government in all the localities."¹

In order to create such a strong government authority in the localities, the Ministry revived the old system of agents and special agents. They replaced all the various democratic organisations. The agents were appointed from among people endowed with authority. For example, the notorious counter-revolutionary Dutov, Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, Chairman of the Council of the Union of Cossacks and an active participant in the Kornilov conspiracy, was invited to be special agent of the Orenburg district. The system of appointing special agents of the type of Dutov was not a bad way of mobilising the forces of counter-revolution in the localities. It enabled them to gain control of one of the most important instruments for fighting the revolution—food. It was almost exclusively private food merchants, worthy associates of the new agents, who were almost exclusively invited to take part in the work of food control. The agents coped with their task magnificently. At the Second Congress of Food Emissaries of the Orenburg Province and the Turgai Region, a detailed portrait was drawn of one of the most prominent of these agents—Dutov.

"In particular," the Chief Emissary stated in his report on the Congress, "with regard to the appointment to the post of Chief Agents for the Orenburg Province and the Turgai Region of Cossack Ataman Dutov, a person who because of his political utterances is not popular among the toiling population of the territory, who has absolutely no knowledge of food affairs and who does not agree with the principles of the food monopoly, and, moreover, bearing in mind a number of the orders on food questions he issued when special agent, which disorganised the machinery that was gradually being set up (increased purchases in the open market, introduction of free-at-granary prices, complete contempt for the generally-recognised local food bodies, pursuit of a policy definitely favouring the interests of the Cossacks, etc.), the Congress particularly stresses the fact that his policy is being carried out exclusively by specially invited former agents, grain merchants and provincial rulers who were swept away in the first days of the revolution, and that such a policy completely discredits the entire food organisation in the

¹ Y. P.—v. "The Food Reform,"—"Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta", No. 227, October 18, 1917.

provinces. The Congress considers that his activities are absolutely harmful to food affairs.”¹

The emissary was mistaken in only one respect: Dutov knew perfectly well how to act in food matters in the new state so as to further the interests of the bourgeoisie and the landlords. Restoring the pre-revolutionary food machinery, sanctioning purchases in the open market (which was tantamount to destroying the monopoly) and completely ignoring the public food organisations was just the way to carry out the government's latest instructions. The emissaries had nothing to teach Ataman Dutov in the art of counter-revolution. Dutov proved to be an “exemplary” agent, because his activities were an example of how approaching revolution should be combated on the food front. The other agents took the cue from him. Such were the measures the government took to “avert” famine. The fact is that they only helped to aggravate the famine with the object of facilitating the mobilisation of the forces of counter-revolution for a more successful struggle against the proletarian revolution, which was already knocking at the gate.

The country was irresistibly moving towards disaster. The bourgeoisie blamed everything on the revolution. Lenin wrote:

“The Cadets are full of malicious glee: the revolution, they say, has suffered collapse; the revolution has been unable to cope either with the war or with economic ruin.

“This is not true. It is the **Cadets**, the **Socialist-Revolutionaries** and the **Mensheviks** who have suffered collapse, for this bloc has ruled Russia for half a year, only to increase the economic ruin and entangle and aggravate the military situation.

“The more complete the collapse of the union of the bourgeoisie with the **Socialist-Revolutionaries** and **Mensheviks**, the sooner will the people learn their lesson, and the easier will they find the correct way out, namely, a union of the poor peasantry, i.e., the majority of the peasantry, with the proletariat.”²

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—2025, The All-Russian Military Food Committee, Register 47, File No. 685, folio 13.

² Lenin, “The Threatening Catastrophe and How To Fight It,”—“Collected Works” (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 192.

CHAPTERS IX

THE ECONOMIC PLATFORM OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY ON THE EVE OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

I

BOLSHEVIK SLOGANS

THE economic platform of the Bolshevik Party was a sharp contrast to the programme of all the other parties, the purpose of which was to preserve the capitalist system. The Bolshevik Party exposed the principle that underlay all of them, namely, to perpetuate the exploitation of the toilers.

The programmes of the bourgeois parties were designed to assist the capitalists to emerge from the crisis by making concessions in partial matters while preserving capitalism as a whole. The Bolshevik platform sought a way out of the impasse by adopting a number of far-reaching measures tending to undermine and finally to abolish the entire capitalist system.

The Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were incapable of finding a solution for the existing difficulties. On the contrary, their policy tended to extend and aggravate economic chaos in the country. Lenin at the time stated that to leave power in the hands of the representatives of the bourgeoisie would mean

“to throw the door wide open to famine and inevitable economic catastrophe on the one hand, which the capitalists are intentionally accelerating and intensifying, and to a military catastrophe on the other. . . .”¹

The only way in which the impending collapse could be averted was by a proletarian revolution.

The economic platform of the Bolsheviks expressed the interests and aims of the working class and the working peasantry. The Bolsheviks called upon the proletarians and the working peasants to seize the landed estates immediately, to nationalise all the land, the industrial trusts and the banks, to institute workers' control over production and distribution, etc.

Every point in the economic platform of the Bolsheviks, whether it was the nationalisation of the land, or workers'

¹ Lenin, “The Aims of the Revolution,”—“Selected Works” (Eng. ed.), V^o. VI, p. 242.

control over industry, or the nationalisation of the banks and trusts, was a **fighting** slogan, used by the Bolsheviks to rally the masses and to create that political army without which the conquest of power by the working class and the poor peasants would have been impossible. Every demand in the Bolshevik platform concerned some urgent question of the day, every one of its clauses was comprehensible, every one of its slogans was understood by wide sections of the workers and the working peasants. The precise and definite slogans and the self-sacrificing fight of the Party showed that a proletarian government would not cringe to the capitalists, would stop at no measure against the bourgeoisie, would smash every attempt at resistance on the part of the capitalists and landlords and would bring about an immediate improvement in the condition of the working masses.

But each slogan, each practical proposal was only part of a general platform, of an integral and harmonious plan, the whole meaning and purpose of which was the establishment of the **dictatorship of the proletariat**.

The demands contained in the programme of the Bolshevik Party could be realised only by a dictatorship of the proletariat, only by destroying the power of the capitalists and landlords, and only by setting up a Soviet government.

And when every worker, every unemployed person, every cook, every poor peasant saw with his own eyes how the proletarian government fought the capitalists, when he saw that the land was being handed over to the working peasants and the mills and factories placed under the control of the workers

"then," Lenin said, "no forces of the capitalists...no forces of international finance capital, which manipulates hundreds of billions of money, will be able to defeat the people's revolution. On the contrary, the people's revolution will conquer the whole world, for in every country the Socialist revolution is ripening."¹

The basis of the economic platform of the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the October Revolution was Lenin's fundamental thesis that the victory of Socialism was possible in one country alone. The economic development of Russia down to 1917 had created every possibility for the advance of Socialism. The political gains won by the working class in the interval between the February Revolution and the October Revolution created every condition necessary for transforming these possibilities into reality. In his historic article, "The Threatening Catastrophe and

¹ Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"—"Selected Works" (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 288.

How To Fight It," Lenin said:

"it is **impossible** to advance in the Russia of the twentieth century, a Russia that has won a republic and a democracy in a revolutionary way, without **advancing** towards Socialism, without taking steps towards it..."¹

This was the thesis on which the economic platform drawn up by the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party was based.

The resolutions adopted by the Sixth Congress plainly declared that improvement in the economic situation could begin only after a revolution, only after the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie had been abolished and the power transferred to the proletariat, to Bolshevik Soviets.

What were the revolutionary measures which under a dictatorship of the proletariat would save the country from catastrophe?

The Congress pointed out that what was first of all required was

"intervention in the sphere of production, with the object of systematically regulating production and distribution, and also . . . the nationalisation and centralisation of banking and the nationalisation of a number of trustified enterprises (e.g., oil, coal, sugar, metallurgy and transport)."²

The nationalisation of the large enterprises and the nationalisation of the land would create a basis for the inauguration of a planned economy by the organs of the proletarian dictatorship. This would cut the ground from under the feet of the capitalists and landlords.

The Congress went on to state that it was necessary "properly to organise exchange between town and country, through the co-operatives and the food committees, with the object of supplying the towns with necessary agricultural produce and the countryside with necessary manufactured articles, agricultural implements and machines, etc."³

The Sixth Congress devoted particular attention to the question of workers' control over industry, outlining both its forms of organisation and its methods of operation.

The resolution then went on to outline measures for averting financial collapse and for the rational distribution of labour power (the transfer of workers engaged in war industries to industries engaged in satisfying the needs of the country).

¹ Lenin,—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 187.

² "The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August, 1917", Moscow, 1934, p. 199.

³ Ibid., p. 199.

NATIONALISATION OF THE LAND

The peasants of old Russia were ground down by the exploitation of the landlords and capitalists. They were burdened with excessive taxation and decimated by recurrent famine. The government of the landlords condemned the peasants to darkness and ignorance. Driven by land hunger, nearly half a million peasant families annually migrated to other parts of Russia, chiefly to Siberia. Official statistics show that 30 or 35 per cent. of the peasants possessed no draught animals; about 4 per cent had no land at all. On an average, one landlord had as much land as 300 peasant households. The land-starved peasants were barred from the land by the landlords, capitalists and kulaks. They were obliged to rent land on terms that practically reduced them to a state of bondage. After the February Revolution the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Provisional Government, deceived the peasants by promising that the Constituent Assembly would give them land. Every attempt on the part of the peasants to seize land was vigorously suppressed by the Provisional Government. Of all the parties, the Bolshevik Party alone demanded that the land should be handed over to the peasants immediately and without compensation to the landlords.

"As we know," Lenin said in the report he delivered on the agrarian question at the April All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party, "the petty-bourgeois defencist parties want to have the settlement of the land question postponed until the Constituent Assembly meets. We are for the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, which should be effected in the most organised manner possible. We are absolutely opposed to anarchistic seizures. You propose that the peasants should enter into agreements with the landlords. We say that the land should be taken over immediately and sown, in order to avert famine and in order to save the country from the crash which is moving on us with such fearful rapidity."¹

The confiscation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of all land would strike at private property in land, which was the foundation of the landlords' power. Nationalisation of the land would not only mean completing

¹ Lenin, "Report on the Agrarian Question,"—"Selected Works" (Eng. ed.) Vol. VI, p. 342.

the bourgeois revolution—which the Russian bourgeoisie itself was incapable of doing, just as it was incapable either of continuing the war or ending it—but would also, given the dictatorship of the proletariat, be a definite and important step towards Socialism. Nationalisation of the land would hit not only the landed nobility but also the new kulak landlords whom the Stolypin regime had fostered.¹ Being a blow at one of the chief forms of private property, nationalisation of the lands would be a serious blow to private property in general.

The demand for the nationalisation of the land naturally evoked the savage fury of the Provisional Government, the Menshevik Party and the kulak Socialist-Revolutionary Party. But this demand was in accordance with the urgent needs and fervent wishes of the peasants.

The peasants were in revolt all over the country, demanding the abolition of the landed estates. The landlords, in whose memories the sinister glow of burning manors was still fresh, recalled with horror the old peasant cry: "Cut us off land from your estate, or we will cut your throat!"

Here are a few extracts from the dry official reports on the peasant agrarian movement on the eve of the October Revolution:

"Tanbov, September 14. An expeditionary force dispatched from Moscow to suppress the riots has arrived—accompanied by representatives of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. According to the latter, news has been received of the outbreak of disorders in another locality, forty versts from Kozlov, to which a part of the expeditionary force was immediately dispatched. The village of Yaroslavka is in flames."²

"Saratov, September 25. In view of the agrarian disorders in the Sardobak district, troops have been dispatched. The Provincial Commissar has appealed to civic sentiments, pointing out that resort to military force is inevitable."³

"Zhitomir, September 29. The Provincial Commissar has received a number of reports of outbreaks of disorder in the province. Forests and crops are being destroyed. Troops have been dispatched to quell the disorders."⁴

1 The reference is to a series of laws initiated by Stolypin, the tsar's Prime Minister after the 1905 Revolution, designed to encourage the growth of a class of rich peasants, kulaks, as a bulwark for the tsarist regime.—Trans.

2 "Late News,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti", No. 211, September 16, 1917.

3 "Agrarian Disorders,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti", No. 220, September 27, 1917.

4 "Riot and Destruction,"—"Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta", No. 213, October 1, 1917.

"Saratov, September 29. In the Serdobsk district the farms of rich peasant farmers are being wrecked and burnt down. Large estates belonging to Dekonskaya, Saburov, Shirinkina and Nenarokomov have been wrecked and also the village of Pavlovsky."¹

"Voronezh, October 7. In the neighbourhood of the village of Zhivotinnoye, in the Zadonsk district, the peasants have partially destroyed the manors of Chertkov and other landlords. Over 60,000 poods of wheat and other grain have been burnt."²

"Penza, October 13, Eight manors have been destroyed in the Narovchat district. Cavalry has been sent to quell the disorders. The Lebedeva manor in the Krasnoslobodsk district and the Andronov manor in the Insar district have been plundered."³

"Nizhni Novgorod, October 13. Reports are to hand from the Lukoyanov, Ardatov and Sergach districts stating that wholesale destruction of forests and the burning of farms have begun, in some places accompanied by violence against the owners. The movement is particularly serious in the Lukoyanov district, where four farms have been burnt down....A detachment of troops has been dispatched."⁴

Burning manors and kulak farms were not only a vivid illustration of the Bolshevik slogan in practice, but also illuminated the path of victory of the proletariat in alliance with the semi-proletarians of the countryside. It was the slogan demanding the confiscation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of all land which roused the peasantry against the landlords and kulaks in the various parts of the country. It was this slogan that in September 1917 secured for the Bolsheviks a majority in the Soviets on the land question.

The peasants were destroying the basis of the landlord regime, but the Provisional Government, in its declaration of September 25, 1917, implored them to regulate land relations "without violating existing forms of land ownership."⁵ Nationalisation of the land would destroy the foundation of the landlord regime, but the bloc of Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks endeavoured to bolster up this collapsing system.

¹ "Anarchy in the Country,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti", No. 223, September 30, 1917.

² "Agrarian Disorders,"—"Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta", No. 220, October 10, 1917.

³ "Riots,"—"Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta," No. 225, October 15, 1917.

⁴ Ibid, No. 223, October 13, 1917.

⁵ "Declaration of the Provisional Government,"—"Den", No. 174. September 27, 1917.

Confiscation of the land, followed by the nationalisation of the land, would completely eliminate the land hunger which kept the peasant under the yoke of the landlord; it would put an end to the state of affairs in which the peasants had not enough land "to keep a chicken on," as Tolstoy put it. This alone would be of tremendous revolutionary significance.

But the Bolshevik Party aimed much farther than this. Consistent nationalisation of the land, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, would serve as a basis for the reconstruction of agriculture on new, Socialist lines. By abolishing private property in land, nationalisation would destroy the age-old proprietary instincts which kept the peasants so firmly bound to the soil. The road would be cleared for new forms of agriculture, replacing the ancient feudal methods which held the small peasant in perpetual bondage on his beggarly strip of land. Stalin, speaking at a conference of Marxist agrarian scientists in 1929, summed up the results of the nationalisation of the land carried out by the Soviet government as follows:

" Just because there is no private ownership of land in this country, there is not the slavish attachment of the peasant to the land which exists in the West. And this fact cannot but facilitate the placing of the small-peasant farm on the lines of collective farming.

"This is one of the reasons why the **large-scale** enterprises in the countryside, the collective farms, are able so easily in our country, where the land is nationalised, to demonstrate their advantages over the **small** peasant farm.

"Herein lies the great revolutionary significance of the Soviet agrarian laws, which have done away with absolute rent, which have abolished private ownership of land, and which have established the nationalisation of land,"¹

¹ J. Stalin, "Questions of Agrarian Policy in the Soviet Union,"—"Leninism" (Eng. ed., 1933), Vol II, p. 188.

WORKERS' CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION

Workers' control over production was one of the most important demands in the platform of the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the October Revolution. Its importance was all the greater at a time when capitalist economy was in a state of complete bankruptcy and the employers were resorting to a policy of sabotage, lockouts and dislocation of production. Like the other demands in the economic platform, workers' control was a slogan of the fight for power. The Bolsheviks never regarded it apart from the fundamental thing: the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In his historic article "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" Lenin stresses the fact that "when we say 'workers' control,' we do so 'always associating that slogan with the dictatorship of the proletariat, and always putting it after the latter.'"¹

The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries were bitterly hostile to workers' control. Their newspapers declared that it would only lead to anarchy and that the worker was incapable of controlling economic life. They asserted everywhere that if control was necessary at all, it should be State control, and since the power of the State (before the October Revolution) was in the hands of the bourgeoisie, this in practice meant surrendering control to the latter. On this, as on other questions, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries opposed the working class and defended the capitalists.

A conference of employees was held in Moscow at the beginning of July. It passed a resolution calling for the adoption of every possible measure to prevent the passing of Socialist legislation and especially to resist interference by the workers in the management of production.

This decision was confirmed by a second conference of employers. The Provincial Government and its organs, like the organisations of the employers and the capitalists themselves, vigorously resisted workers' control. But this Bolshevik slogan, like the others, met with the ardent support of the workers. Workers' control would be exercised by the workers and employers themselves through their representatives elected at general meetings. Without the consent of the workers' control commissions production could not be interrupted or output reduced. The workers' control commissions would examine the books and records of the

¹ Lenin,—"Selected Works" (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 285.

firms, bring to light the speculative manipulations of the owners and keep a check on stocks of raw materials, products and other articles. The commissions would form armed squads to protect the factories from the destructive activities of the capitalists, from the attempts of the latter to destroy their own property with the sole object of preventing it from falling into the hands of the new master—the working class.

“Workers’ control,” the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party ran, “must be developed by means of gradual measures into the complete regulation of production.

“In order to establish control, the following preliminary measures must be adopted: commercial secrets must be abolished and the books of merchants, industrialists and banks made available to control. Concealment of documents must be proclaimed punishable as a criminal offence. Periodical inventories of stocks must be taken and the amount of stocks published, indicating the firm possessing the stocks.”¹

Workers’ control would be a blow at capitalist methods of production. It would leave no room for commercial secrets, which were instruments of plunder. The resolution of the Sixth Congress stated:

“In order to combat open and secret lockouts, a law must be passed forbidding the closing down of factories or the curtailment of production except with the permission of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, the trade unions and the central factory committees.”²

After the victory of the proletariat the workers’ control bodies could be developed into organs for the management of industry. Exercised on a wide scale, workers’ control would train the workers to manage industry and would promote thousands of excellent organisers and executives from the ranks of the working class.

1 “The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August, 1917”, Moscow, 1934, p. 243.

2 “The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks), August 1917”, Moscow 1934, p. 243.

NATIONALISATION OF THE BANKS AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS

The Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party pointed out that the systematic regulation of production and distribution would require the nationalisation and centralisation of the banks and of a number of trusts. The industrialists were hostile not only to the nationalisation of industry but even to compulsory trustification—amalgamation into large enterprises. The Provisional Government had timidly proposed such trustification, but dared not insist on it, and, owing to the pressure of the manufacturers and industrialists, very soon withdrew the proposal.

Only a dictatorship of the proletariat could put nationalisation into effect. The nationalisation of banks and businesses would destroy the foundations of capitalist rule. At the same time, the taking over of the banks, large industries and transport by the dictatorship of the proletariat would create a basis for planned Socialist economy.

Lenin attributed great importance to the nationalisation of the banks. The banks were the centres of capitalist economic life. A blow at the banks would be fatal to the entire capitalist system. In his article "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It," Lenin explained to the working people in detail the advantages to be derived from the realisation of this point in the Bolshevik programme:

"The advantages from the nationalisation of the banks to the whole people, and not especially to the workers (for the workers have little to do with banks), but to the mass of peasants and small industrialists, would be enormous. The saving of labour would be gigantic, and assuming that the State would retain the former number of bank employees, nationalisation would signify a highly important step towards making the use of the banks universal, towards increasing the number of their branches, the accessibility of their operations, etc. etc. The accessibility and the easy terms of credit, particularly for small owners, for the peasantry, would increase immensely. The State would for the first time be in a position first to survey all the chief monetary operations, which would be unconcealed, then to control them, then to regulate economic life, and finally to obtain millions and billions for large State transactions, without paying the capitalist gentlemen sky-high 'commissions' for their 'services.'"¹

¹ Lenin, "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 166.

The nationalisation of the banks would facilitate the nationalisation of the insurance business. The centralisation of the insurance business would also help tremendously to improve the position of the working population. Insurance rates would be reduced and a number of conveniences and facilities provided for the insured.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks advanced a host of objections to the nationalisation of the banks and other enterprises, believing that the proletariat was incapable of administering the economic life of the country. But the nationalisation of the banks and the large enterprises was in every respect a timely step towards Socialism. It was immediately carried into effect by the proletarian dictatorship after the October Revolution.

The profoundly vital Bolshevik slogans, dealing as they did with the daily material interests of the working population in the towns and the poor peasants in the countryside, were couched in clear and simple form and were easily assimilated by the people. In the fight for the realisation of these slogans, the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary windbags, who did not lift a finger to alleviate the lot of the masses, were completely exposed.

CHAPTER XII

THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS GROWS

1

A NEW WAVE OF ECONOMIC AND REVOLUTIONARY STRIKES

THE rise in the tide of revolution which had been foretold by Stalin at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, and for which the Bolsheviks had persistently and stubbornly worked, became a fact after the suppression of the Kornilov conspiracy. The Kornilov affair served as clear and palpable proof to the people that the bourgeoisie and the landlords would go to any length and commit any crime to restore and retain their full power over the toiling people, and that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were prepared to commit any act of treachery to preserve their coalition with the bourgeoisie.

The civil war started by the capitalists in the Kornilov revolt caused strong repercussions among the masses. The working class was the first to be stirred into movement.

The action of the bourgeoisie was countered by a powerful strike movement, which gained in intensity daily, embracing increasing numbers of workers and spreading to the most out-of-the-way places, places which had not been affected even by the high tide of the strike movement in the Revolution of 1905.

The metal workers took the lead. Their heroic struggle showed how much energy the proletariat was capable of developing when led by so staunch a party ideologically as the Bolshevik Party, the party of Leninist, revolutionary Marxism. Until July 23 the Petrograd metal workers had still refrained from striking. After that they decided to start a general fight for the revision of wage agreements. The metal workers were confronted by a solid front of the employers, organised and led by the Chief Committee of United Industry.

The manufacturers were supported by the Provisional Government, which intervened every time the conflict assumed an acute form. But the concerted and organised onslaught of the metal workers broke the united front of the industrialists and in August compelled them to sign a new wage agreement.

The example of the Petrograd metal workers, and of the metal workers of Moscow, who took action almost at the same time, evoked a response all over the country. The metal-workers organised in the Urals, the Ukraine, the Donbas and Siberia. Experience had taught them that the revolutionary struggle was the only way to escape the crisis and the famine which the bourgeoisie was deliberately fostering.

The metal-workers were followed by the textile workers. At the linen mills of A. A. Lokalov in Gavrilovo-Yamskaya in the Yaroslavl Province, over 3,000 weavers demanded an increase in wages and the sale of goods by the factory truck shop at fixed prices. The Menshevik Minister of Labour, Gvozdyev, intervened. This defender of the bourgeoisie proposed that the dispute should be submitted to a court of arbitration consisting of three representatives from the trade union, three from the factory administration and one person appointed by the Ministry of Labour. The court opened on September 27. The arbitrators dragged out the proceedings, and it was not until the middle of October that they at last gave their decision, a decision in favour of the workers. But even then the manufacturers would not concede.

In the country town of Likino in the Orekhovo-Zuyevo district, 4,000 workers, driven by starvation, for two months put up a solid resistance to the sabotage of the employer, who in August had closed down the factory on the pretext that there was no fuel. On September 2 the management proposed that the workers should take their discharge tickets. The workers refused. They sent delegates to Gvozdyev. They visited the Moscow Commissar of Labour. The reply was always the same: there is starvation everywhere, we cannot help. And it was not an isolated manufacturer with whom the workers had to deal in this case. Smirnov, the mill owner, was also Chairman of the Moscow War Industry Committee and an important official of the Provisional Government. Smirnov refused to make any concessions to the workers, even though the Moscow Soviet intervened in the conflict. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which was anxious to prevent the dispute from assuming an acute character, called upon Smirnov to concede, but the manufacturer obstinately continued to sabotage.

The workers of many other mills of Orekhovo-Zuyevo went on strike at the same time as the Likino workers. Separate strikes and conflicts developed into a big strike of textile workers in the whole Ivanovo-Kineshma district, where, in response to the call of the central strike commit-

tee, as many as 40,000 weavers downed tools on October 20.

The leather workers of Moscow began a strike on August 16 which lasted two and a half months. They forced a breach in the united front of the employers and compelled them to negotiate separately.

The movement assumed wide proportions among the printers. The Petrograd printers won their strike on September 15 and the Moscow printers on the eve of the October Revolution. The printers of Petrograd and Moscow were followed by those of Ekaterinburg, Ekaterinoslav; Minsk, Baku, Astrakhan and Vologda.

The struggle assumed a stormy character among the miners of the Donbas. The strike movement spread from pit to pit, grew daily in dimensions and finally embraced the entire proletariat of the Donbas.

The strike movement spread to the railwaymen. The Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Union (abbreviated, *Vikzhel*), consisting largely of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, made every effort to prevent the railwaymen from taking action. The leaders of the *Vikzhel* were mostly railway officials hence their bourgeois sympathies. The *Vikzhel* leaders promised to secure wage increases without a conflict by appealing to the bourgeois government. The Kornilov revolt convinced the railwaymen that delay only reduced the chances of an improvement in their conditions and made it easier for the bourgeoisie to consolidate its forces. The movement among the railwaymen, stimulated by the Kornilov affair, grew rapidly, as though the workers were anxious to make up for lost time.

The scared members of the *Vikzhel* on the Syzran-Vyazma Railway complained:

"It is extremely difficult, and in places impossible, to restrain the railwaymen from action. Partial actions break out spontaneously."¹

How strong was the pressure of the railwaymen can be judged from the fact that the *Vikzhel*, whose name was synonymous with servile fidelity to the capitalists, agreed to call a general strike on the railways on September 23. True, these "revolutionaries of the hour and of necessity"—revolutionary, that is to say, because of the pressure of the masses and not from innate class convictions—managed to stifle the strike within two days; but they could not switch the movement on to lines of compromise. The railwaymen's organisations, especially the lower ones, protested against the treachery of the leaders and remained out on strike. And

¹ Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—6, Chancellery of the Provisional Government, Register 1, File No. 281, folios 55-56.

on the eve of the October Revolution there began an unanimous movement among the railway workers which, in October, smashed the sabotage of the Vikzhel when the latter tried to save the Provisional Government.

In a word, the strike movement swept through the whole country. Millions of proletarians rose up against the bourgeoisie.

What did this exceptionally widespread strike movement show?

It showed, firstly, that the various sections of the proletarians were being drawn into the struggle unevenly. The metal workers, who formed the core of the working class, were in the forefront. The struggle in their case was begun by the "Bolshevik" factories, the big plants of Petrograd and Moscow, where the leading forces of the Party were centred. The proletarian vanguard of Moscow and Petrograd drew the main body of the workers into the movement, stirred up the provinces and brought the laggards into line.

It showed, secondly, that since the Kornilov revolt the movement of the proletariat had become much more organised. After a period of respite and accumulation of strength, a vast number of trade unions were created.

By July there were 976 trade unions in Russia, with a membership of one and a half million, among them:¹

Metal-workers' unions	over 400,000 members
Textile workers' unions	178,560 "
Printers' unions	55,291 "
Needle workers' unions	51,545 "
Woodworkers' unions	28,601 "
Commercial and industrial employees' unions	45,981 "

By October the membership of the trade unions had grown to over two million workers, of which Petrograd and Moscow accounted for one million. To the trade unions should be added the factory committees in the factories themselves. The trade unions and factory committees served as transmission belts for the Bolshevik Party by which it maintained contact with the worker masses. And in "workers' control" it had a succinct and effective slogan which pointed to the immediate aim of the struggle of the proletariat.

The high state of organisation of the workers was accompanied by a high level of class consciousness and class solidarity. When the hungry workers of Likino came to demonstrate in Orekhovo-Zuyevo on September 19,

¹ Central Archives, "The Labour Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1926, p. 85.

the factories in the latter city stopped work and at a meeting the workers decided that each of them should feed one of the guests from Likino at his own home. An eye-witness of this demonstration of class solidarity writes:

"The visitors from Likino were assigned in the space of a few minutes. For some time afterwards many kept seeking for workers from Likino, but they had already all left for the homes and dormitories of the workers."¹

At a meeting held that same day the workers decided to contribute one day's earnings for the support of the hungry comrades and to organise collections.

After a strike lasting three months, the printers of Ekaterinburg sent a letter to their Moscow comrades in which they said:

"The strike has ended in a victory for the workers. ... Once more, comrades of Moscow, we thank you for your support, which helped us to emerge victorious."²

The printers of Kharkov also sent their thanks to the printers of Moscow for financial assistance rendered:

"In greeting you, comrades of Moscow, the strike committee expresses its confidence that, with a united proletariat, we shall defeat capital."³

And everywhere in the provinces the labour movement at that period furnished striking evidence of the ability of the Bolshevik Party to combine partial demands with the general aims of the movement.

True to Lenin's precept—always with the masses and at the head of the masses, never running ahead, but never lagging behind—the Bolshevik Party defended the everyday demands of the workers for higher wages, improved working conditions and food supply, control over the hiring and dismissal of workers, and the protection of female labour. The Bolsheviks acted boldly and energetically, not only as organisers of political campaigns but also as leaders of the disputes and strikes of individual groups of workers. They went among all grades of workers, took a hand in every form of the struggle and linked it up with the general aims of the movement. The Party regarded the partial demands of the workers as a sort of ladder by which the various groups of workers could mount from small, local problems to the general problems of revolutionary policy.

The majority of the strike began with economic demands: higher wages, revision of wage agreements etc. But the workers very soon realised that success could be achieved

1 "A Hunger March." Rabochy Put, No. 25, October 1, 1917.

2 Central Archives, "The Labour Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1926, p. 194.

3 Ibid., p. 194.

only by passing from economic demands to political demands. The fight waged by the workers after the Kornilov-Kerensky attempt to crush the proletariat was one more proof of the law established by Lenin as a result of a study of the strikes of 1905, namely, that unless economic strikes were closely bound up with political strikes there could be no extensive mass movement.

"At the beginning of the movement," Lenin wrote, "and when new strata are being drawn into it, the purely economic strike predominates, but, on the other hand, the political strike arouses and stirs up the backward, lends a general character to and extends the movement, and raises it to a higher level."¹

But the chief feature of the labour movement in Russia in the days prior to the October Revolution was the change in the forms of the struggle.

Lenin demanded that these forms should not be artificially invented, but that use should be made of those that arise of themselves in the course of events. Lenin taught that every form of the struggle should be regarded historically, and that at any particular moment the method should be selected that best corresponded to the aims of the Party. Flexibility has always been one of the indications of the strength of the Bolshevik Party. Demonstrations and strikes—economic and political—had been the chief forms of struggle of the proletariat even before the Kornilov revolt, but now new elements appeared in the movement. An extensive strike movement swept over the Donbas in October. The Government dispatched Cossacks, whose appearance only served to intensify the revolutionary indignation. The miners demanded the withdrawal of the punitive expeditions, threatening to start a general strike on October 10. Three days later, Ataman Kaledin wired the Minister of War:

"At the mines the entire power has been seized by various self-appointed organisations which recognise no other authority but their own."²

The miners removed managers, arrested recalcitrants and took the administration of production into their own hands.

In their fight against the employers, the workers began to resort more and more to arresting and removing managers. On September 18 the metal workers of Kharkov arrested the managing directors of the General Electric

¹ Lenin, "Strike Statistics in Russia,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XV, p. 44.

² "The Donetz Basin. General Kaledin's Measures,"—"Russkoye Slovo", No. 235, October 14, 1917.

Company and placed them under the custody of the Red Guard. A conference of industrialists of South Russia held in Kharkov addressed the following complaint to the Minister of Labour:

"In view of the fact that criminal elements are going entirely unpunished, the conduct of the workers, at the factory of the General Electric Company has been imitated at the factory of Gerlach and Pulst, where the management was also kept under arrest for twenty hours. To-day, September 20, the directors of the Kharkov Locomotive Works have been arrested in the same way."¹

It was not, of course, a question of imitation; it was rather that the old form of struggle was no longer adequate and could not be adapted to the new aims: **the movement was directly faced with the problem of government power and the administration of industry.**

This new form of struggle was to be observed also in the case of the leather workers of Moscow. The strike of the Moscow leather workers lasted over two months. The employers would not give way. The workers demanded the adoption of more vigorous measures. A meeting of leather worker delegates proposed that the managers should be removed and those factories whose owners evaded satisfying the demands of the workers should be immediately seized. The delegate meeting adopted a resolution demanding the transfer of government power to the Soviets and insisted on the immediate confiscation of factories where agreement had not been reached between the workers and the employers.

By way of emphasising that this resolution was not an empty threat, the meeting added the following significant clause:

"After the 18th the factory committees will immediately proceed to adopt practical measures in preparation for sequestration, such as taking an inventory of goods, machinery and so forth."²

In a number of factories the workers began to institute workers' control by decree of the factory committees or the Soviets. It was in this way that workers' control was introduced in the Tryokhgorka factory in Moscow.

When capitalists shut down their enterprises, the workers would refuse to submit and would continue to work. In September the management of the Helferich-Sade works, Kharkov, ordered the plant to be closed down. In response

¹ Central Archives, "The Labour Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1926, p. 222.

² "The Leather Workers' Strike," *Izvestia of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies*, No. 191, October 19, 1917.

the factory committee called upon the men to continue work on their own accord and entrusted the management of the plant to a special committee. This was the case in many other plants all over the country.

The workers' movement was clearly assuming the character and form of an open revolutionary struggle.

The most obvious sign of the new revolutionary crisis was the rapid process of Bolshevisation of the Soviets, factory committees and other organisations. The workers were entrusting the leadership to those who by their persistent, day-to-day efforts were proving their ability to further the revolution. The control of the Petrograd Soviet passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks on August 31, and the Moscow Soviet adopted a Bolshevik resolution for the first time on September 5. In the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of Workers' Deputies the Bolsheviks proved to be in the majority.

Every hour brought new victories to the Bolshevik Party. On September 1 alone, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets received demands from 126 Soviets in the provinces insisting that it take over power.

On September 3, a delegate meeting of the Textile Workers' Union was held in Moscow, attended by 300 delegates representing 175,000 workers. The meeting adopted a resolution moved by the Bolsheviks demanding the transfer of power to the Soviets.

On September 5 a Congress of Soviets of Central Siberia opened in Krasnoyarsk at which Bolshevik resolutions were adopted by delegates representing 110,000 workers and 90,000 peasants.

On September 10 began the Third Regional Congress of Soviets of Finland at which the influence of the Bolsheviks was supreme.

New elections to the Saratov Soviet on September 30 resulted in a Bolshevik majority: the Bolsheviks secured 300 seats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries 90 and the Mensheviks 53.

Demands for the transfer of power to the Soviets poured in from all over the country—from the Far North, from distant Siberia, from the shores of the Black Sea, from the Ukraine, and from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The newspapers of the period literally bristle with items, reports and resolutions indicative of the steady increase of Bolshevik influence among the masses.

A vivid example of the prevailing sentiment is furnished by a resolution passed by the 4,000 workers of the car and locomotive shops of the Alexandrov works in Petrograd:

"1. The government in power, far from doing anything to satisfy the urgent needs of the working class and the peasantry, far from adopting indispensable measures to end the war and improve the food situation, is wholly concerned in defending the interests of the capitalists and landlords, is leaving the settlement of the question of war and peace to the imperialist annexationists, and is 'tackling' the food shortage by raising the price of bread.

"2. Such a government can count on only one thing from us—the most determined resistance. We consider the immediate removal of the government an urgent aim, for it is ruining the cause of the revolution and has ranged itself under the banner of counter-revolution.

"3. The revolution will perish if the government is not taken over by the workers, the soldiers and peasants through the Soviets. We therefore demand that the forthcoming Congress of Soviets should proclaim the power of the Soviets.

"4. Realising that the revolution is passing through a terrible period, we declare that in the fight for power and for the victory of the revolution, the Soviets may count on our unreserved and determined support."¹

Under the pressure of the workers, the lower organs dissolve and appointed new elections, which resulted in majorities for the Bolsheviks. The factory committee of the Tryokhgornaya Textile Mills in Moscow resolved to resign, and the new presidium of the factory committee immediately declared that it "considered a strike struggle for the power of the Soviets essential."²

The proletarian masses learnt by bitter experience that what the Bolshevik Party taught was true, namely, that the revolution could be saved only by a determined and self-sacrificing struggle for the overthrow of the manufacturers' and landlords' government headed by Kerensky.

¹ "At the Alexandrov Works,"—"Rabochy Put", No. 43, October 22, 1917.

² "Minutes of the Factory Committee of the Tryokhgornaya Textile Mills," "History of the Proletariat in the U.S.S.R.", 1932, No. 9, p. 160.

PEASANT REVOLTS AND THE SPREAD OF THE NATIONAL EMANCIPATION MOVEMENT

The Kornilov affair had opened the eyes of large numbers of peasants as well. To them Kornilov's action was an obvious attempt to reinstate the landlords in the old "nobles' nests" and meant the destruction of all hopes of receiving land from the Provisional Government. As it was, very little of an encouraging nature was to be heard about the land, and here was the old class enemy again active, the enemy at whose hands the peasantry—to use a phrase current at the time—had been "Kornilised and Kerenised" for half a year. In response to the attempt of the landlords to take a firmer hold on the land, the peasants rose up in revolt all over the country.

The files of Kerensky's militia contain detailed reports illustrative of the stormy rise of the peasant movement. The reports as a rule contain only the most outstanding facts, and those chiefly which occurred in districts not very remote from the centre. But even so, they present a vivid picture of the character of the movement. The number of peasant actions (such as arbitrarily felling timber, trampling down fields, harvesting crops, seizing estates, etc.), varied from month to month as follows:¹

May	June	July	August	September
259	577	1,122	691	629

At a first glance, it might appear that after the July days the peasant movement had tended to subside. And this, in fact, was the conclusion drawn from these figures by those figure-jugglers, the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders. They tried to prove that the peasants were quieting down and were prepared to defer "discussing the land question" until "the arrival of the master," i.e., until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

Apart from the fact that Kerensky's militia was unscrupulous in its selection of data, it presented them in its reports in an utterly dishonest way. The bourgeois statisticians excluded the most acute form of the agrarian struggle—the wrecking and burning of manors and the seizure of land and farm property—from the group of agrarian crimes and included them in the group of "crimes of destruction and seizure," where the seizure of estates was combined under one heading with common murder and

¹ Central Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, Appendix.

robbery. But even this unscrupulous trick could not conceal the truth about the peasant movement. While the general total of peasant actions declined, the number of cases of destruction and seizure of landed estates rapidly rose:¹

	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.
Crimes of destruction and seizure	152	112	387	440	958

The peasant movement radically changed its form. The trampling down of landlords' fields, the seizure of their crops, and economic conflicts gave place to "smoking out" the landlords from their nests: the peasants began to wreck and burn manors, to seize the land and to divide up the farms. Reports of fresh revolts in the countryside were a common feature at the meetings of the Provisional Government. On September 27, Vice-Premier Konovalov reported that the destruction of manors in the Saratov Province had become widespread; on October 3 it was reported that manors were being destroyed in the Volhynia Province; on October 4 news was received of the seizure and division of estates in the Provinces of Kursk, Penza and Ryazan; on October 6 a report was made on the spread of the movement in the Vladikavkaz, Minsk, Kharkov and Volhynia Provinces. The peasant movement spread like wildfire from region to region and steadily approached the war front, where millions of soldiers greedily drank in all rumours of the seizure of landed estates.

The approach of the wave of peasant revolts to the front, where feeling was already tense, induced the Provisional Government to launch another counter revolutionary plan.

On October 15 the Ministry of the Interior, on the plausible pretext of improving the food supply of the army, proposed that the cavalry should be withdrawn from the front to the interior. The plan was to distribute the cavalry over as many districts as possible, but almost exclusively in such where peasant revolts were rife: Ryazan, Tambov, Penza, Saratov, Kursk, Orel, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Novgorod, Perm, etc. That the intention was indeed to launch a huge punitive expedition, in which the whole cavalry was to be employed to wreak vengeance on the peasantry, is borne out by telegrams exchanged between the Minister of the Interior, Nikitin (a member of the Menshevik Party), and General Dukhonin. Requesting the dispatch of cavalry, Nikitin pointed out that

"for foraging purposes and with advantage from the

¹ Centra l Archives, "The Peasant Movement in 1917", Moscow, 1927, Appendix.

standpoint of the restoration of order, the cavalry divisions may be redistributed urgently. . . ."¹

And then follows a list of areas where revolt was rife—about twenty provinces or more than one-third of European Russia!

The Menshevik Minister proposed to chastise a good third of the peasants by the hand of their own soldier sons.

Dukhonin replied to this zealous defender of the landlords:

"War conditions and the robbery and brigandage which have recently become prevalent in the immediate rear make it impossible just now to withdraw the cavalry from the front and to dispatch it far into the interior. . . . The maintenance of order within the country should be entrusted to a properly organised militia consisting of selected and reliable men retired from active service because of age."²

With soldier-like bluntness, General Dukhonin blurted out the truth about the plan: the cavalry was to be withdrawn not for foraging purposes, but solely to crush the peasant movement. The plan did not come off: there was a shortage of reliable cavalry regiments, because such as were sent soon became hotbeds of revolutionary ideas themselves. But the fact that the plan had been conceived, showed that the landlord and bourgeois government was prepared to drench the country in blood in order to smash the resistance of the peasants.

The punitive expeditions into the rural districts added fuel to the flames: the last hopes were dissipated—peasant revolt flared up all over the country, surrounding the provincial capitals in rings of fire.

"The crucial point of the revolution in Russia has undoubtedly arrived," Lenin wrote at this period. "In a peasant country, and under a revolutionary, republican government, which enjoys the support of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, parties that only recently dominated the petty-bourgeois democracy, a peasant revolt is developing.

"It is incredible, but it is a fact."³

A vigorous movement also began among the oppressed nationalities of Russia.

The bourgeois nationalist organisations began to regard Kornilov and his chauvinist, Great-Russian policy as a serious menace to their existence, and hastened to condemn the action of the counter-revolutionaries.

¹ Central Archives, "Disintegration of the Army in 1917", Moscow, 1925, p. 184.

² Ibid., p. 185.

³ Lenin, "The Crisis Has Matured,"—"Selected Works" (Eng.ed.), Vol. VI, p. 225.

"It would be a serious disaster," an appeal of the Ukrainian Central Rada stated, "if General Kornilov succeeded in turning the people and the army against the government. . . . The peasants and workers would be utterly ruined and would be condemned to their former slavery to the nobles and the tsar. . . . The Ukrainian Central Rada appeals to the population of the Ukrainian land not to obey the orders of Kornilov and the other enemies of the revolution. The Ukrainian Central Rada proclaims to all citizens of the villages and cities of the Ukraine that the only lawful government in Russia is the Russian Provisional Government, and in the Ukraine the Ukrainian Central Rada and its General Secretariat."¹

Even an All-Russian Congress of Mullahs held in Kazan, which joined the general Moslem Congress, called upon the vast Mohammedan population of Russia

"to link its destinies with the power and the organs of democracy which ever since the revolution have been the bulwark of the liberties won."²

In Transcaucasia the local bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois parties issued a call to resist Kornilov. In Buryatia and Turkestan the native bourgeoisie passed resolutions protesting against the Kornilov revolt.

But the scope of the mass movement frightened the native bourgeois and their Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik lackeys.

The continuation of the imperialist war, the growing famine, and what was virtually a direct refusal to settle the national question, convinced the masses of the oppressed nationalities that not only the Great-Russian bourgeoisie, but even their own bourgeoisie was incapable of leading the fight for emancipation.

After the dispersal of the Finnish Diet by the provisional Government, the leaders of the Diet decided to restore it without official sanction. But on September 15 the Governor-General of Finland, the Constitutional Democrat Nekrasov, sealed the doors of the hall in which the deputies met. The Helsingfors Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, led by the Bolsheviks, supported the Diet. "The Diet will meet under the protection of our bayonets," the representatives of the Soviet declared to the Governor-General. The Provisional Government gave orders to withdraw the revolutionary troops from Finland in order to smash the resistance of the working population. It became

1 "Appeal of the Central Rada,"—"Kievskaya Mysl", No. 210, August 29, 1917.

2 "Appeal to Mohammedans,"—"Izvestia of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies", No. 151, August 31, 1917.

clear to the proletariat and the people of Finland generally that only a Soviet government could bring them liberty.

In the Crimea the Tatar working population compelled a Congress of Crimean Mohammedans, held on October 8 in Simferopol, to demand the summoning of a Crimean Moslem Diet before the Constituent Assembly met. The oppressed population of the Crimea had no faith in the promises of the Provisional Government and endeavoured to take the settlement of the national question into their own hands.

Collisions between government Commissars and local organisations became frequent in all the regions inhabited by non-Russian nationalities. Every attempt at national self-determination, every slightest move towards political independence was vigorously resisted by the Russian Provisional Government. On the other hand, the workers and peasants of the oppressed nations demanded that the nationalist organisations, which in the early stage of the revolution had assumed the lead of the bourgeois national liberation movement, should adopt a vigorous policy and demand the cessation of the war, the confiscation of the landed estates and the abolition of national inequality.

The situation grew more and more acute as the revolution took firmer hold: the workers and peasants exercised pressure from below, while the repressive machinery of the Provisional Government exercised pressure from above. The conviction gained ground among the people that only by a simultaneous fight against imperialism and their own native bourgeoisie, only by a fight for the power of the Soviets, could their emancipation be achieved.

Writing of the national struggle of that period, Stalin said:

"Since the 'national' institutions in the border regions displayed a tendency to political independence, they encountered the insuperable hostility of the imperialist government of Russia. Since, on the other hand, while establishing the power of the national bourgeoisie, they remained deaf to the vital interests of their 'own' workers and peasants, they evoked grumbling and discontent among the latter. . . .

"It became obvious that the emancipation of the toiling masses of the oppressed nationalities and the abolition of national oppression were inconceivable without a break with imperialism, without the overthrow by each nationality of its 'own' national bourgeoisie and the assumption of power by the toiling masses themselves."¹

1 J. Stalin, "The October Revolution and the National Question,"—"Marxism and the National and Colonial Question" (Eng. ed. 1935), pp. 69-70.

The process of social differentiation within the united national movement proceeded with more or less intensity among all the nationalities, depending on the degree of organisation and class consciousness of the proletariat. The process is illustrated by the fight waged by the poor of Uzbekistan for control of the Samarkand City Duma at the end of August 1917. The national bourgeoisie put forward a united list of Mohammedan candidates in the elections, consisting exclusively of bais, mullahs and merchants. When the workers and poor of Samarkand demanded that ten of their representatives should be included in this list, they were refused and told to content themselves with two candidates. The poor of Samarkand, organised in the Union of Tolling Mohammedans, rejected this proposal.

The Union issued the following leaflet addressed to the working population:

"Is it fair that of a total of seventy-five members of the City Duma, seventy-three should represent the bais, mullahs and intellectuals, who do not constitute even one-tenth of the population of the city, while we, the poor and workers, who constitute the majority of the population should have only two representatives? That is why we rejected the terms proposed by the Shura [the bourgeois nationalist organisation—*Ed.*].

"But this same Shura," the leaflet went on to say, "which refused us ten representatives—do you know what it has done? It has joined with a Russian alliance known as the Society of Houseowners and has included twenty-five Russians in its list. On hearing this, we said: 'Very well!' And, trusting in God, we drew up our own list made up of one representative from every group of workers in our city. Certain people are very much alarmed at our action, because they are afraid that if we secure the election of our poor to the City Duma no seats will be left for them. . . . Workers, do not be heedless of your own interests, do not let yourselves be deceived!"¹

This document vividly reflects the new feature in the national movement that inevitably appeared as the revolution progressed from the bourgeois-democratic phase to the Socialist phase. Even the most backward sections of the proletariat of the non-Russian nationalities were taught by experience that their "own" exploiters and the Russian exploiters were united by class interests. It was not without reason that the native bourgeois feared that "no seats will be left for them."

¹ "To the Tolling Mohammedans of the City of Samarkand," *Khurriyat*, No. 33, August 25, 1917 (In Uzbek).

The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities endeavoured to check this process of differentiation within the national movement. This could be done only by fencing themselves off from Russia, from which the revolutionary infection of Bolshevism was irresistibly spreading.

"Russia is at present in a state of disintegration and disseverance, and is ceaselessly writhing in the throes of revolution," the Finnish bourgeois newspaper "Hufvudstadsbladet" stated. "The Russian people are possessed by a spirit of unbridled anarchy and self-destruction. That being the case, ought we not to endeavour as far as possible to separate ourselves from this chaos, so as not to be dragged to destruction ourselves?"¹

The Finnish bourgeoisie very frankly expressed the secret wishes of the bourgeoisie of all the oppressed nationalities. But their cherished ambitions became more and more obvious. After the suppression of the Kornilov revolt, the bourgeoisie grew more anxious than ever to fence themselves off from the revolutionary centres. This desire was fostered not only by the imperialist policy of the Provisional Government, but also by fear of the activities of their "own" workers and peasants.

In many of the regions inhabited by non-Russian nationalities class conflicts began to assume the form of an armed struggle. The peasant movement was most intense in the national regions: in September there were only thirteen peasant outbreaks in the Vladimir Province in Central Russia, but there were fifty-one outbreaks in the Kazan Province, fifty-seven in the Minsk Province, and thirty-nine in the Kiev Province. In some places the movement of the peasants of the oppressed nationalities began to merge with the strike movement of the workers, which created an extremely tense situation in these national regions. At a meeting of the Provisional Government held on October 4, the Minister of the Interior, the Menshevik Nikitin, reported that the peasants were waging an armed struggle in the Grozny, Vedensk and Khasav-Yurt districts of the Terek Region. What alarmed the Minister most of all was the fact that at this period a strike had broken out in the Grozny oilfields. How terrified the government was of a union of the revolutionary national movement with the workers' revolution can be judged from the fact that the government hastened by telegram to proclaim martial law in the districts mentioned.

The workers' revolution and the peasants' revolt were joined by the war of national liberation.

¹ "Finnish Affairs,"—"Ryech", No. 226, September 26, 1917.

"The national and agrarian questions," Lenin wrote, "are questions of fundamental importance for the petty-bourgeois masses of the population of Russia at the present time. That is indisputable. And with regard to both these questions the proletariat is a long way from being 'isolated.' It has the majority of the people behind it. It **alone** is capable of pursuing a bold and truly 'revolutionary-democratic' policy on both these questions, such as would immediately assure a proletarian government not only the support of the majority of the population, but also a veritable outburst of revolutionary enthusiasm on the part of the masses."¹

¹ "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?"—"Selected Works", Eng. Ed.), Vol. VI, p. 258.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ARMY AND NAVY ON THE EVE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT

THE Kornilov revolt had accentuated the antagonism and intensified the conflict between the officers and private soldiers. The last remnants of confidence in the officers had been undermined by their direct participation in the counter-revolutionary conspiracy or the open sympathy they showed it. Contact between the officers and the units under their command became more and more shaky. The class struggle in the army entered a new phase.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Committee of the Twelfth Army sent the following telegram to Chkheidze:

"The Kornilov plot has left a profound impression. The masses are losing faith in everybody. Distrust in the officers caused by the retreat is being intensified by the Kornilov affair."¹

Reports on the state of feeling in the army on the Western Front described the situation in the following terms:

"The action of General Kornilov has almost everywhere destroyed the good relations which had been established between the officers and the rank and file. Agitation against the officers has become more active, particularly where the soldiers had information that some of their officers belonged to the Officers' Alliance."²

Many of the regiments insisted on the dissolution of the Officers' Alliance. The soldiers expressed open indignation at the privileges enjoyed by Kornilov and his accomplices while under arrest. They demanded an early trial.

"You, dear comrades, write in the newspapers about Sukhomlinov and about Kornilov," soldiers on active service wrote to the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Soldiers' Executive Committee of the Twelfth Army, File No. 412-700, Folio 58.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-097, folios 365-70.

leaders in the middle of September, "that certain witnesses or other are exonerating them. How long you are dragging out this trial, dear comrades! For six months, if we are not mistaken, Sukhomlinov has been awaiting trial, the same is true of Kornilov, and it is clear that they are guilty and that there is no crime with which they could not be charged: they have betrayed us, they have shed our blood. You try them in this way—in twenty-four hours, just as they did to us under the old regime. Yet you, dear comrades, are even allowing them a trial. All the trial they deserve is to have their heads cut off—and let the worms eat them, the swine. And you are fussing with them! Don't fuss with them, dear comrades."¹

The rank and file soldiers were beginning to realise the treacherous role played by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, that they were siding with the bourgeoisie. The soldiers fought the Kornilovites in their own way. They began to drive officers out of the regiments immediately it became known that they had any connection with Kornilov. Commanders were called upon to show proof that they had not supported the revolt. The officers were deprived of their weapons. In certain cases—for instance, in Helsingfors, on the battleship "Petropavlovsk" and in Vyborg—the soldiers and sailors wreaked summary justice on known counter-revolutionary officers. Eleven officers were killed in Vyborg.

At the same time the process of disintegration spread at the front, which stretched in an almost unbroken line of trenches from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Persian frontier. The fifteen armies located between the Baltic and the Black Sea were concentrated along the main lines of operation into groups of three or four armies, each under a single command, and these constituted the various fronts. The most important from the strategic standpoint, especially after the fall of Riga, was the Northern Front, which held the approaches to Petrograd. At this period the Western and South-Western Fronts were of secondary importance, because there could no longer be any question of the offensive for which they were intended to serve as the jumping-off ground. But the left flank, the most southern sector, what was known as the Rumanian front, was also of great importance, because it covered Odessa and the other Black Sea ports.

According to available data, on the eve of the October Revolution there was a total on all the fronts of not more than two million men—but this figure must be regarded as

¹ "Soldiers' Letters of 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 119.

only approximate. The front was losing thousands of men daily as a result of spontaneous self-demobilisation, which at that time had become rife even in the staunchest of the regiments. It is impossible to establish the actual number of soldiers at the front at this period. Verkhovsky, the Minister of War in Kerensky's Cabinet, who resigned a few days before the October Revolution, speaks of the numerical strength of the armies at the front at the beginning of October as follows:

"It was not until the conference at General Headquarters, that I was able for the first time to obtain exact figures as to the size of the army. The figures I had been given at various times fluctuated from seven million to twelve million. Now, at last, the figures are more or less exact. The army along the whole line of the front, stretching 1,800 versts, consists of 1,500,000 infantrymen and 500,000 men in the artillery and other special military units, such as the sappers, aviation, etc.; it is reckoned that there are 3,500,000 in the army establishments in the rear, such as the artillery depots, supply columns, bakeries and so on. In various kinds of organisations—like the Red Cross, the auxiliaries of the Union of Cities and the Union of Zemstvos, and on the building of roads, trenches, etc.—there are 2,900,000 men, and there are another 1,500,000 men in the military areas in the rear, of whom only about 400,000 men are enrolled in the reinforcement companies, i.e., are fit to be dispatched to the front. In all, there are nearly ten million men under arms, of which only two million are on active service at the front, all the remainder serving them in one form or another. In other words, for every actual fighter there are nearly four men serving him in the rear."¹

But even these two million men, stretched out in a thin line along the immense front, were totally unfit to fight. The general war fatigue and the disinclination to continue the war, the distrust of the commanders, and the desertions had reached an extreme. In addition, the army was suffering from a grave food shortage and was approaching a state of utter collapse. As Lenin later said, it was becoming a "diseased organism." Attempts were made to lay the whole blame for this at the door of the Bolsheviks.

"It is they who are chiefly to blame for our defeats," howled the bourgeois press, seconded by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary press, which launched an incredible campaign of slander against the Bolsheviks. This cry also formed the burden of the reports submitted by the military Commissars of the Provisional Government. Lieutenant

¹ A. I. Verkhovsky, "Russia at Golgotha", Petrograd, 1918, p. 123.

Dolgoplov, Assistant Commissar of the Fifth Army on the Northern Front, stated in his report to the Political administration of the Ministry of War on October 19:

"The morale of the army is steadily deteriorating owing to the vigorous agitation of Bolshevism, and heroic measures will have to be adopted to restore the fighting capacity of the army. A fight—and a ruthless fight—must be waged against irresponsible demagogues."¹

And, concluding his report, he reiterated:

"Irresponsible demagoguery is fatally affecting the state of the army, and a ruthless fight, must be waged against such actions."²

Richenko, Chairman of the Committee of the 126th Division of the Special Army on the South-Western Front, stated in a report dated October 17:

"The reason why military orders are not obeyed lies in the disintegration of the army caused by the spread of impracticable slogans among the masses."³

Surguchov, the Commissar of the Seventh Army on the South-Western Front, stated in a report dated October 15:

"The situation in the army at the present moment is extremely grave. . . . And a not unimportant part in this is played by Bolshevik agitation, which it is becoming more and more difficult to combat."⁴

The outcry against Bolshevik machinations was raised even on fronts where the activities of the Bolsheviks were fairly weak, such as the Rumanian Front. In a secret report dated October 29, Tiesenhausen, the Commissar of the Rumanian Front, describing the situation as it existed on that front just before the October Revolution, said:

"The yearning for peace at all costs, which is growing and spreading in an irresistible wave, has begun to sweep more and more insistently over the front, causing nervousness and instability in the life of the troops. This has been contributed to very largely by the activities of the champions of Zimmerwald and Kienthal ideas, people who know the weak strings of the mob and who unscrupulously play on these strings and prate about peace."⁵

Such assertions, which can be quoted endlessly, only testify to the complete dismay of those who regarded themselves as the leaders of the army and to their refusal to

1 Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Ministry of War, File No. 1932, folios 64-67.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., File No. 1876, folio 44.

4 Ibid., folio 45.

5 Ibid., File No. 1957, folio 27.

acknowledge the real cause of the collapse. The army was undergoing the same process of disruption as was to be observed in every other branch of national life. In the last analysis, this state of disruption was a vivid testimony to the complete collapse of the bourgeois and landlord system in the country, and to blame the Bolsheviks for it was simply to confuse cause and effect. This was repeatedly pointed out by Lenin.

"All those slanders," he said, "which were hurled at us by the bourgeois press and the parties that helped them or were hostile to the Soviet power, asserting that the Bolsheviks demoralised the troops, were nonsense."¹

Similar nonsense was the assertion that disintegration was greatest in the Bolshevik regiment, or rather in the regiments where the Bolshevik organisation had the support of the mass of the soldiers. The contrary, in fact, was the case. During the fighting at Riga, which strikingly revealed the total inability of the command and the compromising army committees to lead the soldiers, the most stubborn resistance was put up by the Lettish regiments, which were almost completely Bolshevik.

It was the Bolshevik sailors who distinguished themselves by their staunchness during the operations on the Oesel and Dago Islands. The Bolshevik-minded units stood their ground when all the rest fled in panic, including the artillery, which was considered most immune from the "Bolshevik contagion." The same was true on many other parts of the front.

This "Bolshevik contagion" in every instance acted as a creative and organising force, as was in several cases admitted even by enemies of the Bolsheviks. Savitsky, the Assistant Commissar of the Northern Front, stated in a report to the Minister of War.

"The 1st Lettish Brigade is working satisfactorily, but there have been complaints of bad footwear and clothes and of insufficient food. The vanguard has fought successful engagements and has advanced, capturing in the week over 150 prisoners and ten machine-guns; the Kornilov conspiracy has affected the soldiers' confidence in the officers. In the 1st Lettish Brigade the distrust extends also to the Provisional Government and the Prime Minister, who is being accused of a desire to seize power. The influence of the newspaper, "Latyshsky strelok" ["Lettish Rifleman" —*Trans.*] is marked."²

¹ Lenin, "Speech at a Meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee February 23, 1918."—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXII, p. 280.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1932, folio 158.

Another witness from the same camp—Stankevich, Supreme Commissar of the Provisional Government—frankly states in his reminiscences:

"It must be admitted that the finest and best-disciplined army, not only on the Northern Front but perhaps on all the Russian fronts—the Fifth Army—was the first to elect a Bolshevik army committee."¹

All this goes to show that the Bolsheviks were by no means the disorganisers that the bourgeoisie and its devoted friends, the compromising parties, represented them to be. If the front was disintegrating, it was due to other causes, the chief of which were the home and foreign policies of the Provisional Government, policies treasonable to the interests of the working people. The front was languishing under the burden of an exhausting war, but in the rear, the bourgeois and landlord classes were indulging in a life of pleasure, unbridled speculation and money-making.

"In the rear one perceives no general concern that the army of the free people should be supplied and cared for better than was the case in former years," Stankevich declared in a telegram dated October 20. "And this is not because the rear has itself become poverty-stricken—after all, the streets of the cities are filled with idle crowds and the theatres and cinemas are crammed to capacity."²

The profiteers, merchants, manufacturers and industrialists were making fabulous fortunes on military supplies and were demanding a "war to a victorious finish." Everywhere the millions earned so easily were being recklessly dissipated. But at the front the barefoot and hungry soldiers were rotting alive in the mud of the trenches, devoured by vermin, and tensely listening for all news of the situation in the rear. A fierce hatred for those who compelled them to continue the war smouldered in their breasts. The situation essentially remained what it had been before the February Revolution, the only difference being that the soldiers at the front were now more hungry and exhausted than before because of the shortage of supplies and the growing disorganisation in the rear. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the front should steadily collapse. The class character of the war, the selfishness of the ruling classes, and the fidelity of the officers to the ruling classes were becoming increasingly evident to the soldiers.

1 V. B. Stankevich, "Reminiscences", 1914-19, Berlin, 1920, p. 246.

2 Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1745, folio 32.

The steady deterioration in the supply of food and clothing to the army began at length to assume disastrous proportions. On the eve of the October Revolution certain regiments were suffering from actual starvation, being left without bread, meat or cereals.

Reports from Commissars and commanders from all fronts clamoured about the impending catastrophe.

Alexeyevsky, the Commissar of the Fourth Army, reported on October 5:

"In connection with the question of food and clothing, the spirit of the soldiers is growing worse and in places is assuming an alarming character."¹

Posnikov, the Commissar of the Third Army, reported on October 7:

"There is a shortage not only of warm clothes, but even of ordinary covering. Lentils and herrings; a short ration of bread. Heroic measures must be taken to improve the supply of food, clothing and footwear."²

Pechkurov, the Assistant Commissar of the Ninth Army, stated in his report that for the period October 7-11:

"The chief cause of discontent is the acute shortage of clothing. The soldiers are clad in summer uniform, the rainy weather has set in and the temperature at night drops to zero. ... The 166th Division is demanding clothing, because not only are there no shirts, breeches and greatcoats (winter), but even the summer clothing is beyond repair. Whole companies do not appear for drill because their clothing is so threadbare."³

The Commissar of the Ninth Army reported again on October 16:

"There is a shortage of food, footwear, linen and uniforms; in the 37th and 43rd Infantry Divisions there is a high percentage of barefoot soldiers, and in the 37th Division a high percentage of soldiers who have no underwear whatever."⁴

On October 23, Nakoryakov, the Commissar of the Twelfth Army, telegraphed to the Supreme Commissar:

"The situation is growing rapidly worse, especially with regard to bread. If the supplies of biscuit under way are reckoned, the army has enough provisions to last three or four days. No flour is being delivered from the rear.

1 Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1745, folio 129.

2 Ibid., File No. 1820, folios 14 and 18.

3 Ibid., File No. 1764, folios 45, 46, 48.

4 Ibid., folio 13.

Under such circumstances, unprecedented excesses are possible."¹

The situation grew steadily worse. News of the refusal of regiments and divisions at the front to obey orders and instructions became increasingly frequent. Reports of the Political Department of the Staff of the Supreme Commander on excesses committed in the army during the period October 1-30 present the following picture. During this period there were fifty-three cases of fraternisation, nine attempts forcibly to prevent military action against the enemy and against fraternisers, seven cases of arbitrary desertion of positions, 104 cases of refusal to obey military orders, twenty-four demands for the dismissal of officers, sixty-seven cases of insult to officers, sometimes accompanied by assault and murder, over a hundred cases of refusal to drill or perform work, twenty-two demands for the immediate conclusion of peace, eight cases of insult to Commissars of the Provisional Government and members of army committees, accompanied by assault, etc.

Insubordinate regiments and divisions were disbanded, although the attempt to disband them did not always succeed. Some of the "ringleaders" were tried by court-martial. But this did not help to improve the situation at the front.

On October 12, Sobolev, the Assistant Commissar of the Northern Front, reported to the Minister of War:

"As I have already reported, before the expiration of the ultimatum announced by me, three regiments surrendered their weapons, after which I demanded the surrender of the ringleaders and instigators, who have now been sent for revolutionary court-martial. In view of extenuating circumstances, the 4th Regiment has not yet been disbanded, but its ringleaders have also been sent for court-martial. Measures have been taken for the protection of the court and for the maintenance of order. The case of the 116th Division may be regarded as entirely liquidated."²

But he was obliged to add:

"It is my moral duty to say—and I cannot refrain from saying—that a sinister denouement is approaching, and what it will bring the country and the revolution must be clear to everybody who does not fear to look the truth in the face. To-day we have almost no army; to-morrow we will have no army at all."³

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 2211, folio 1.

² Central Archives of the October Revolution, Records—1285, The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Series D 4, No. 179, 1917, folios 185-86.

³ *Ibid.*, folios 185-86.

On October 18, Grodsky, the Commissar of the Second Army, reported:

"The mood is very tense and is growing tenser from hour to hour; it may end in an ominous refusal to obey orders. . . . The soldiers say that if peace is not concluded within the next few days they will quit the front. Most persistent rumours are circulating about quitting the front."¹

Chekotilo, the Commissar of the Eleventh Army on the South-Western Front, reported:

"Everybody is selling boots, greatcoats and underwear, the idea being that without clothing it will be impossible to fight, and that in this way the soldiers will expedite peace."²

And, finally, on October 22, Zhdanov, the Commissar of the Western Front, summed up the situation in his weekly report as follows:

"The tenseness in the army is growing daily; violations of discipline are spreading from regiment to regiment. The propaganda of the Bolsheviks predominates and is very popular. . . . Confidence in the committees is declining, the men refuse to listen to them, disperse them and beat them up. The scared members of the committees resign without awaiting new elections. Hatred of the officers is growing owing to the widespread conviction that they are dragging out the war. The spirit among the troops at the front is deteriorating. The committees, officers and commanders, oppressed by the disastrous number of violations of discipline, are in a panicky mood. They feel impotent. The collapse is reaching a limit."³

The collapse of the front in the long run marked the breakdown of the entire landlord and capitalist system in the country, of which the old army was a reflection. Created as an instrument of the annexationist ambitions of the ruling classes and for the protection of their privileges, it collapsed with the fall of these classes.

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1876, folio 128.

² Ibid, folio 84.

³ S. Agurski, "October in Belorussia, Articles and Documents", Book I, Minsk, 1927, p. 369.

THE NAVY ON THE EVE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The Kornilov revolt left its impression on the navy as well. It fired the political passions of the sailors and intensified their distrust of the officers. Crews on vessels lying at Helsingfors demanded that the officers should make written statements of their attitude towards Kornilov. The indignant sailors in some cases wreaked summary vengeance on the officers. In accordance with a decision of a joint meeting of the Helsingfors Soviet and the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, known as the Centrobatt, a Revolutionary Committee was set up which appointed its Commissars to the ships, the telegraph station, the telephone exchange, the post office and other institutions.

At the meetings of the Helsingfors Soviet, and especially at the meeting of its Sailors' Section, the demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a Soviet power was raised more and more frequently. In September, the crews of nineteen vessels of the Baltic Fleet adopted a resolution of protest against the decree of the Provisional Government which proclaimed Russia simply a "republic" without the qualifying word "democratic." The sailors began to speak more and more frequently of the necessity for armed insurrection.

In a telegram to the Commissar of the Northern Front dated October 1, Kerensky referred to the "dangerous" spirit prevailing among the Kronstadt sailors.

"The Kronstadt sailors have already caused a state of affairs in which, at this critical juncture, not all the means of defence are in a state of readiness. . . ."¹

Influenced by the spread of the revolutionary spirit among the sailors, the Centrobatt began rapidly to shake off the defencist illusions it had still to some extent cherished in August. At the end of September the sailors of the Baltic Fleet began to send reports vowing to the proletarian revolutionaries their complete readiness to take action on behalf of the power of the Soviets. This readiness was manifested at the Second Congress of the Baltic Fleet which opened in Helsingfors on September 25.

On October 3 the Second Congress of the Baltic Fleet issued an appeal to the soldiers and sailors to prepare to fight for the revolution. Replies poured in from all parts of the country expressing readiness to support the prole-

1 I. I. Kolbin, "The Baltic Fleet on the Eve of the October Revolution,"—*"Krasny Flot"* ("Red Fleet"), 1927, No. 20, p. 24.

tarian revolution. The sailors of the Black Sea Fleet declared:

"We join our voices to your ardent appeal, we are prepared to stand side by side with you in the last fight on the barricades."¹

The soldiers on the Rumanian Front offered their support to the revolutionary sailors:

"Comrades, much now depends on you. Let nothing daunt you. We are always prepared to stand side by side with you."²

The decisions of the Congress were directly guided by the Bolsheviks. The Congress of the Baltic Fleet vigorously protested against the malicious slanders of the press which accused the sailors of deserting the front.

"To you, Bonaparte-Kerensky, who have betrayed the revolution, we send our curses at this time when our comrades are perishing from bullet and shell and drowning in the waves of the sea, calling for the defence of the revolution. And when we all, like one man, lay down our lives for freedom, land and liberty, we shall be perishing in an honest fight in the struggle against the foreign foe and on the barricades against the internal foe, sending you, Kerensky, and your companions curses for the appeals by which you endeavoured to split the forces of the fleet in the hour of peril for the country and the revolution."³

This resolution clearly expressed the readiness of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet to wage an irreconcilable revolutionary struggle for the power of the Soviets. Resolutions like this are possible only when insurrection is imminent. The statement of the Baltic sailors that they were prepared to lay down their lives on the barricades was not an empty phrase. They proved this in the great battles of the October Revolution.

The Baltic Fleet was strongly influenced by the Bolshevik Party and its leader, Lenin. The Baltic sailors were among the first to draw up a definite programme of preparation for the seizure of power. In the Black Sea Fleet, where the influence of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries was strong, the process of Bolshevisation encountered greater obstacles. Unlike the crews of the Baltic Fleet, which were recruited almost entirely from the industrial workers, the crews of the Black Sea Fleet were

¹ I. Kolbin, "The Baltic Fleet on the Eve of the October Revolution," Krasny Flot (Red Fleet), 1927, No. 20, p. 27.

² Ibid., p. 27.

³ "The Baltic Fleet to Kerensky,"—"Rabochy Put," No. 34, October 12, 1917.

largely drawn from the more or less prosperous sections of the Ukrainian peasantry. This circumstance, coupled with the remoteness of the Black Sea Fleet from the revolutionary centres, explains why the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries preponderated for a time in the Black Sea Fleet.

There was a period when the Black Sea Fleet was a centre of attraction for the forces of counter-revolution. The foes of the revolution hastened to utilise it for their purposes. In the summer of 1917, Admiral Kolchak, the Commander of the Fleet, and subsequently, after the October Revolution, leader of the counter-revolutionary forces in Siberia, formed a puppet delegation headed by a bogus sailor named Batkin. The delegation travelled through Russia pretending to represent the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and carried on propaganda in Petrograd, the provinces and at the front in favour of a military offensive. The impostor Batkin, supported by the compromisers—the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—tried to gain a foothold in the Baltic Fleet, but was exposed. Having suffered a complete fiasco in Helsingfors, this admiral's emissary did not risk appearing in Kronstadt. The Sevastopol Soviet, under pressure of the sailors, very soon withdrew the mandates of the entire delegation.

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party devoted particular attention to the Black Sea Fleet. The Bolshevik organisations near the Black Sea coast were instructed to send experienced propagandists to the fleet. Propagandists were also sent from Petrograd. Among them were sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

The Bolsheviks in the Black Sea coastal towns developed extensive activities on the battleships, where they formed Party nuclei. They steadily won the firm and determined support of the sailors. Borisov, the Acting Commissar-General of the Black Sea Fleet, telegraphed Naval Headquarters on August 24:

"During my short period of absence, Sevastopol has become a city of Bolsheviks. Great excitement, continuous meetings, at which only the Bolsheviks are allowed to speak, excited groups at every street corner. The mood has become tense in the organisations as well. The masses are stirred up by fantastic rumours of counter-revolutionary plots and of the arrival of Cossacks. Certain of the units have already seized possession of arms. Good agitators have appeared among the Bolsheviks. To cap all this, a delegation arrived yesterday from the Baltic Fleet to agitate for support of the ultimatum

of the Baltic Fleet demanding an increase in pay. At my orders, four of them were not allowed to enter Sevastopol. Two of them, who had mandates from the Central Fleet Committee, were allowed through, but after a conversation with the Executive Committee, they were sent back the same day. It has been impossible to adopt vigorous measures against the agitation of the Bolsheviks and against the holdings of meetings because there is nobody to rely on. They refuse even to listen to the Black Sea delegation. It has lost all prestige."¹

In August, Sevastopol could not yet be called "a city of Bolsheviks." The Socialist-Revolutionary organisation in Sevastopol had a membership of 20,000, whereas the Bolshevik organisation had a membership of only 250. All the leading elected bodies were still under the Control of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. But in his panicky telegram, Borisov gave a correct picture of the course of events. The ground was steadily slipping from under the feet of the compromisers, while the position of the Bolsheviks was growing stronger every day.

There were 145 members of the Sevastopol Soviet. In July the Bolshevik fraction on the Soviet consisted of only twelve members, whereas by October it had grown to fifty. The Bolshevisation of the Sevastopol Soviet was chiefly due to the growing revolutionary spirit among the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet guided by the Bolsheviks.

Side by side with the Sevastopol Soviet, a Central Committee of the Black Sea Fleet was set up, consisting overwhelmingly of non-party men or members of the compromising parties. Nevertheless, on a number of questions it adopted a more Left attitude than the Sevastopol Soviet. And the further it moved to the Left, the more its authority and influence grew.

On September 7 a meeting representing twenty ships and coastal garrisons was held on the battleship "Rostislav", at which a decision was taken to demand the transfer of power to the Socialists. On September 9 another meeting was held on the Rostislav, this time representing forty vessels and coastal garrisons, at which a sharp protest was adopted against an order which had been issued establishing guarantees for the counter-revolutionary officers and forbidding political activities within the army and navy. This was quite rightly regarded as a violation of the elementary civil rights of the soldiers and sailors.

On September 15 the Central Fleet Committee, in pursuance of a decision of a delegate meeting, resolved tem-

¹ "The Black Sea Sailors in the October Revolution,"—"Morskoi Sbornik" ("Naval Miscellany"), 1933, No. 11, p. 103.

porarily to fly the red flag on all the vessels of the Black Sea Fleet together with the signal "Long Live the Russian Democratic Republic!" When this demonstration was over, the majority of the crews categorically refused to lower the red flags. Under pressure of the sailors, the Central Fleet Committee decided to leave the question of the flag open until the Constituent Assembly met.

The Ukrainian bourgeoisie, taking advantage of the Kerensky government to settle the national question, endeavoured to spread bourgeois nationalism in the Black Sea Fleet and to Ukrainise it. But this met with very little success, only one cruiser, "Pamyat Merkuria" replacing the red flag by the Ukrainian flag.

In the middle of October the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party dispatched two delegates to Sevastopol to reinforce Party work. One of them was a Kronstadt sailor. They were told by J. M. Sverdlov that the seizure of power by the proletariat was a question of the next few days. The proletarian forces were already ripe enough in all the big cities. But the situation was bad in the South, especially in the Crimea. There the social-compromisers held complete sway. This was all the more regrettable in view of the importance of Sevastopol as a naval port. Their task, Sverdlov said, was to transform Sevastopol into the revolutionary base of the Black Sea Coast. Sevastopol must become the Kronstadt of the South.

By the time of the October Revolution, the compromising Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders entrenched on the Central Fleet Committee in the Admiralty had lost the last remnants of their influence over the sailors. Even after the Provisional Government decided to abolish the Central Fleet Committee, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries on the Committee continued their servile support of the government.

In face of the Bolshevisation of the navy and of the Petrograd garrison, the Provisional Government on the eve of the October Revolution attempted to disarm Kronstadt and Petrograd and to dismantle the guns from some of the forts on the pretext that they were to be dispatched to the front. But the revolutionary sailors, supported by the workers and soldiers, prevented this action.

BOLSHEVISATION OF THE ARMY

The Bolshevik Party carried on its activities in the army under extremely difficult circumstances. Agitation and propaganda were hampered by the lies and slanders of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois press. The persecution of the Bolshevik newspapers and the fact that they were banned from the front constituted a severe handicap to the work of the Bolsheviks.

"We have only the medium of the word at our disposal," Lenin wrote.

"And of this medium of the word they want to deprive us. . . .

"The 'Pravda' is not permitted to reach the front. The 'agents' in Kiev have decided not to distribute the 'Pravda'. The 'Union of Zemstvos' is not selling the 'Pravda' on its stands. Now, finally, we are being promised a 'systematic struggle against Leninist propaganda . . .' ('Izvestia of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'). On the other hand, every elemental protest, every excess, no matter where it occurs, is blamed on us."¹

But despite all hindrances, the Bolshevik newspapers found their way into the barracks and the trenches and on to the vessels of the navy. They met with a sympathetic response among the soldiers and sailors and inspired them with keen revolutionary feeling.

"Today a class-conscious newsboy and toiler brought the newspaper that ought to be read, the fair paper, the 'Soldat' ['Soldier']—*Trans.*, soldiers of the Petrograd Reserve Regiment wrote to their fellow villagers. "To-day proletarian newspapers were to be seen on the hands of our soldiers: the 'Soldat' and the 'Rabochy Put'. But as a rule a sad sight is to be witnessed: all our soldier comrades reading the bourgeois newspapers which lay all the blame on the just leaders and insolently lie and in this way mislead the people."²

If it was difficult for Bolshevik newspapers to find their way into the Petrograd barracks, it was still more difficult for them to find their way to the front, to the army on active service. But even here Bolshevik ideas

¹ Lenin, "Bolshevism and the 'Disintegration' of the Army",—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 469.

² "A Cheering Event,"—"Soldat", No. 26, September 14, 1917.

roused the soldiers, clarified their class consciousness and taught them the methods of revolutionary struggle. The tremendous work performed by the Bolshevik press aroused the enthusiastic approval of the soldiers.

"Comrade editor," a soldier named Kozlov wrote from the front to the "Soldat", "I and many comrades are keenly interested in your paper, which gives good advice. This paper fell into our hands by chance. We see from it that we must demand and insist that the capitalists should not be allowed to have power, because, as you write, they try to sow dissension between the soldiers and workers because of our ignorance. But we want to follow your example and we shall always support you and strive for our rights in accordance with your programme."¹

A great impression was produced on the soldiers by Lenin's clear and vivid articles and speeches.

"In particular, I thank you for the speech of Comrade Lenin, for which I thirsted and longed so much," a soldier wrote from the front. "Now I will in my turn make Comrade Lenin's speech known to my soldier comrades, especially those who in their stupidity used to undermine confidence but now regret it, because Comrade Lenin was maliciously attacked and slandered."²

The growing class-consciousness of the soldiers and their increasing support of the Bolsheviks had to be consolidated organisationally. Tens of thousands of advanced and politically enlightened workers, having been mobilised for the army, rapidly established close contacts with the centres of political life and formed strong nuclei of the Bolshevik organisation. A big part was played by the regiments of the Petrograd garrison which were disbanded after the July events. Among the thousands of soldiers who had passed through the school of revolution in the capital and who were now sent to the front, there were bound to be many active Bolshevik supporters. Soldiers' letters seized by the censor after the July events reflect the increase in the number of organisers. They already begin to express a lack of confidence in the Soviets controlled by the compromisers.

"Even before I was never convinced of their sincere desire to meet the needs of the enslaved and oppressed masses," one soldier wrote in reference to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, "and now I am becoming

1 "A Letter from the 'Front,'"—"Soldat", No. 35, September" 26, 1917.

2 E. Romas, "The Spirit in the Army," in "February to October", Part 1, Moscow, 1923, p. 82.

more and more convinced that their words are fair and diplomatic, but their ideas are foul and capitalistic."¹

Another soldier wrote, addressing the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks: "Don't reckon any more on support from the army."²

While throwing off the control of the commanders, the army at the same time threw off the influence of the petty-bourgeois parties and ceased to trust them. The Bolsheviks began to gain complete sway over the minds of the soldiers.

A widely ramified network of Bolshevik organisations spread throughout the army and extended its influence over the mass organisations of the soldiers. The Bolshevik Party did not at first possess a political force at the front. It was only gradually, by constant and persistent effort, that the Party extended its influence over the masses. It demonstrated the superiority of its programme and tactics in practice and dissipated the counter-revolutionary illusions fostered by the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On the eve of the October Revolution the military organisation of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party became a military staff in the true sense of the word. Under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, it united and organised large numbers of the soldiers and trained them for the fight for power.

The Bolsheviks at that period devoted their attention chiefly to winning over the lower organisations of the soldiers. The regimental, company and similar committees, which directly reflected the mood of the masses gradually came over to the side of the Bolsheviks. The committees steadily freed themselves of their petty-bourgeois incrustation and took up their stand beneath the banner of the Bolsheviks. The following instance is illustrative of the process going on at the front.

In the 12th Turkestan Rifle Regiment of the III Siberian Corps of the Second Army there was a small joint Social-Democratic organisation of Mensheviks, Internationalists and Bolsheviks. The latter were headed by Vice-Colonel Kamenshchikov, the young commander of the 2nd Battalion, who subsequently became the first elected Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front.

At the beginning of August Kamenshchikov proposed that the Bolsheviks should leave the joint organisation and create an independent Bolshevik nucleus. Desiring to enlist

1 "Soldiers' Letters of 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 80.

2 Ibid., p. 118.

as large a number of followers as possible, the Bolsheviks raised the question at an open meeting of the members of the whole organisation. Kamenshchikov was the chief speaker and his speech evoked a heated discussion. The Internationalists—a surgeon by the name of Begoon and a corporal—were particularly insistent that the “united” organisation should be preserved. Incidentally, at this very meeting, when the split was already decided on, the corporal joined the Bolsheviks. Kamenshchikov was elected chairman of the new committee and Sergeant Korolyev secretary.

The Bolsheviks were not dismayed by the fact that at first the new organisation had only eighteen or twenty members. The committee soon managed to find a shack for its headquarters, which immediately began to attract the soldiers by its books and newspapers, but chiefly by the lively discussions that were held there. The work subsequently became so extensive that the committee was transformed into a district committee and placed in charge of work in the 12th, 24th and 25th Turkestan Rifle Regiments of the same division, and of the work among the artillerymen, storm troops and other units. A group was even formed to carry on Party work among the peasants of the nearby township of Rubyazhevichi.

By October the holding of new elections to the soldiers' committees had become widespread at the front.

“It is becoming impossible to continue our activities,” the chairman of the committee of the 107th Regiment said, “because of the hostile attitude of the regiment, which is insistently demanding that a new committee be elected. Irritation at the activities of the committee is growing among the soldiers. ... I deem it necessary to propose that the whole committee should resign.”¹

The secret report of the Commissar of the Western Front for the week October 14-21 stated:

“Arbitrary elections of new committees have become characteristic, and only Bolsheviks are elected to the committees. Arbitrary elections of new committees have been held in the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Grenadier Regiments.”²

The way these “arbitrary elections of new committees” were held, may be judged from the case of one of the regiments mentioned—the 6th Grenadiers.

The Bolshevik organisation in this regiment had been formed in August. It later became possible to form Bolshevik nuclei in nearly every one of the companies. At the

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Western Front, File No. 157-792, folio 246.

² Ibid., folio 126.

beginning of October two general regimental meetings were held, at which the proposals of the Bolsheviks were adopted by big majorities. Only two sub-lieutenants among the officers and only one Socialist-Revolutionary, old Roginsky, a volunteer, had the courage to speak.

Such being the state of feeling in the regiment, the continued existence of the old, compromising regimental committee had obviously become absurd, and the Bolsheviks carried on a vigorous campaign in favour of new elections. Candidates were nominated and the success of the Bolsheviks was beyond question.

However, systematic preparations for the new elections could not be completed. On October 12 instructions were received by the regiment from the army committee of the Second Army to appoint a delegate to an army conference to be held on October 16. Knowing that its days were numbered, the regimental committee hastened to elect as its delegate the Socialist-Revolutionary Roginsky.

Learning of this, the Bolsheviks decided to hold the new elections immediately. That a Bolshevik regiment should be represented by a Socialist-Revolutionary was something that could not be allowed. Agitators were at once sent to the companies and the whole regiment roused. The regimental officer on duty made a feeble attempt to forbid the meeting, but nobody heeded him.

The Bolsheviks gained a complete victory. The new regimental committee, consisting entirely of Bolsheviks, met the very next morning and its first decision was to deprive Roginsky of his mandate to the army conference. A Bolshevik was elected in his place.

The widespread holding of new elections to the regimental committees instilled dismay and consternation into the petty-bourgeois compromisers and the other supporters of the Provisional Government. And, indeed, it was difficult not to be dismayed by such demands as that contained, for instance, in the resolution of a congress of the XXV Army Corps of the Third Army on the Western Front, held on October 11. This resolution stated:

"We, the delegates at a congress of the XXV Army Corps, demand that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, appointed for October 20, should take power into its own hands and publish the secret treaties concluded by the Allied governments, immediately announce democratic terms of peace and immediately conclude an armistice on all fronts."¹

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the General Headquarters of the Western Front File No. 157-792, folio 247.

The workers and soldiers exchanged permanent representatives. Mutual relations and support were set up between the factories and the regiments which subsequently, in the October Revolution, pre-determined the success of the uprising. Here is a letter which the workers of the Putilov works sent to the soldiers of the Izmailovsky Regiment, who had thanked the workers for assistance rendered at the time of the Kornilov affair:

"In reference to the letter of the Regimental Committees of September 13, No. 634, in which thanks are conveyed to the factory committee for the presentation of a field kitchen to the regiment at the time of the Kornilov revolt, we inform you that the committee of the Putilov works will always be glad to share with their dear comrades of the Izmailovsky Regiment both field kitchens and other, more serious, war equipment in the event of action on the part of any of the numerous counter-revolutionary adventurers among the generals who are dreaming of an autocracy and the enslavement of the people. The factory committee conveys to you its comradely greetings and hopes that the hearts of the soldiers of the Izmailovsky Regiment are fired with the same revolutionary spirit as burns in the hearts of the Putilov workers, and that these hearts will, at the moment of danger to the revolutionary people, form one single and mighty heart of flame."¹

How great was the influence of the workers of the industrial centres on the soldiers can be judged by a report made by the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet to the Supreme Commander on September 26.

"The 45th Infantry Reserve Regiment, quartered in the city of Nikolayev," the Commander of the Fleet complained, "is at the present moment utterly undisciplined and cannot be utilised for the protection of the port and the factories. . . . Large numbers of soldiers are taking an active part in the life of the citizens of the city of Nikolayev and are constantly holding large meetings in the streets of the city."²

And such was the state of affairs in the majority of industrial centres.

In preparing for the proletarian revolution, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party devoted exceptional attention to work among the armed forces. The Central Committee at its meetings constantly discussed questions of

¹ "The Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison. Materials and Documents," Leningrad, 1932, p. 264.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-Generals' Office, File No. 80-097, folio 191.

work among the soldiers, studied the mood of the soldiers and estimated the forces of revolution and counter-revolution. The military organisation of the Bolsheviks established close contacts with the rank-and-file soldiers. It directed the Party work in the army at the front and in the rear. It supplied the soldiers with literature, sent instructors and agitators, and convened conferences.

A meeting of Bolsheviks of the region and the front was held in Minsk from September 1 to 3 at which 3,651 Party members in the army and 2,410 Party members in the region were represented. The meeting did not deem it possible to proclaim itself a Party conference owing to the fact that the primary organisations were inadequately represented.

Two weeks after this meeting, the First North-Western Regional Bolshevik Conference was held in Minsk from September 15 to 18, attended by 88 delegates, 61 representing the army and 27 the region. The delegates from the army now represented 4,111 Party members and 1,564 sympathisers. Half the army delegates came from the Second Army, which was the most revolutionary army on the Western Front.

Ten days after this conference the First Bolshevik Conference of the Second Army was held in the town of Nesvizh from September 27 to 29. It was attended by 137 delegates representing 5,124 organised Party members and about 12,000 sympathisers.

Finally, on October 5, twenty days before the outbreak of the October Revolution, the Second Regional Bolshevik Conference was held in Minsk, this time attended by 353 delegates representing 28,501 Party members and 27,855 sympathisers.

The work of the Bolsheviks on the other sections of the front developed in a similar way.

As it became Bolshevised, the army put forward political demands with increasing persistence and determination. At a joint meeting of the committees of the 712th Salytkovo-Nevsky Infantry Regiment held in September, a resolution highly characteristic of the mood of the soldiers at the time was adopted:

"The six months of collaboration in the government between the democracy and the bourgeoisie have only resulted in dragging out the war, in delaying the consolidation of the liberties won, in postponing the Constituent Assembly, in the waging of a ruthless struggle against the revolutionary democracy—both against individual persons and against its press—and in every manifestation of a

counter-revolutionary character, the culminating point of which was the Kornilov revolt; and, consequently, the meeting finds that in the interests of the gains of the revolution and of the struggle for the International, further collaboration between the democracy and the bourgeoisie in the government is impermissible."¹

The Bolshevik character of the demands was even more pronounced in other resolutions. The resolution of a general meeting of the men of the Brigitovka air station in the vicinity of Reval insisted on the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, the conclusion of peace, the handing over of the land to the peasants, the organisation of control over production and the arming of the workers.

In the course of October the demand for the transfer of power to the Soviets grew more and more popular in the army. Resolution after resolution was passed by infantry, cavalry, artillery, sapper and medical units expressing lack of confidence in the Kerensky government and un-animously and insistently demanding the transfer of power to the proletarian and peasant Soviets.

A highly characteristic symptom of the growing revolutionary spirit in the army was the adoption of a new method against the officers. Soldiers refused to obey officers, imprisoned them, and killed the more reactionary of them. But all this had happened before. The new feature was that when the officers were removed new commanders were elected from the ranks. The army made a big stride towards the development of the revolution by resorting to the election of its commanders. By this form of struggle the soldiers were deciding the question of power in the army. Reports from the generals stated in great alarm:

"In the 4th Cycle Battalion (of the Special Army) the commander of Company 3 and the quartermaster were removed and soldiers elected in their place; in the 648th Detachment the Commissar was elected commander; the committee of the aviation base of the 3rd Guards' Division removed the chief and took possession of the entire property; the committee of an ambulance train removed the chief surgeon, the quartermaster and the nurses and elected new persons in their place (Eleventh Army); in the 5th Caucasian Division the quartermaster sergeant was removed for refusing to issue a few pens, which was interpreted as a desire on his part to hinder the elections to the Constituent Assembly (Twelfth Army); in the 74th Division of the XLI Corps a resolution was passed abolish-

¹ "The 712th Saltykovo-Nevsky Infantry Regiment,"—"Soldat," No. 35, September 26, 1917.

ing the posts of the Divisional Commissary and quartermaster and entrusting their functions to special commissions (Seventh Army); the 53rd Siberian Rifle Regiment refused to accept the commander who arrived after evacuation; the committee of the headquarter troops of the Eleventh Army resolved to requisition the officers' own horses, to search officers about to leave and deprive them of their weapons, and to transfer the offices to the barracks."¹

The revolutionary movement in the army merged with the peasant movement in the war area. Schumann, the Chief of Militia in the Wolmar district, after a personal tour of the south-western part of his district, reported on October 10 that in the Posendorf rural district "harvested oats, wheat, clover and hay have been taken from the landowners near the highroad,"² In the Katwar rural district "nearly all the farms and estates near the highroads suffered during the retreat."³

Manors were destroyed by the soldiers and the peasants in nearly all the regions adjacent to the front, from the Northern Front to the Rumanian Front. The soldiers acted as armed representatives of the wishes of the peasants, and their actions reflected the elemental hatred of the peasants for the landlords and kulaks.

In addition to taking part in the fight against the landlords in the war area, the soldiers, in their letters home, stimulated the development of the agrarian revolution all over the country. Here is one of many letters sent by soldiers at the front to their relatives:

"I ask you, without any by-your-leave, to send the cattle to graze on the land of the landlords. And plough up the land without asking them, the fat-bellied dogs. They have drunk our blood enough. See to it that you take everything into your hands at once, and we here will not lay down our arms until we have done everything and will return home with our rifles."⁴

These soldiers' letters were regarded in the villages as instructions and exercised a tremendous influence on the course of the revolution.

The army was in fact launching into a determined revolutionary struggle against the exploiters. The Bolshevik Party enjoyed great success. This was clearly expressed

¹ Central Archives, "Disintegration of the Army in 1917", Moscow, 1925, p. 145.

² Ibid., p. 124.

³ Ibid., p. 124.

⁴ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Northern Front, File No. 222-554, folio 238.

in the following brief lines contained in a report by the Commander of the 18th Siberian Rifle Division.

"The Commander of the 70th Rifle Regiment," he stated "has reported to me the complete disorganisation of the regiment. Bolshevik ideas have become law."¹

And by the time of the decisive battles for the proletarian revolution the Bolshevik ideas had indeed become law for vast numbers of men under arms.

Subsequently, analysing the result of the elections to the Constituent Assembly, Lenin wrote:

"...In the army...the Bolsheviks in November 1917 already possessed the political 'striking force' which guaranteed them an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment. Since the Bolsheviks had the overwhelming superiority on the Northern and Western Fronts, while on the other fronts, more remote from the centre, the Bolsheviks had both the time and the opportunity to win the peasants away from the Socialist-Revolutionary Party... the possibility of the army's opposing the October Revolution of the proletariat and the seizure of political power by the proletariat was out of the question."²

The revolutionary impatience of the soldiers when they had come to realise their own interests prompted them to try to hasten the establishment of the power of the Soviets.

"Comrades, pay not attention to Kerensky," the soldiers of the Third Army wrote to the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies. "He is leading us into an abyss, so that we shall all perish. Comrades, soldiers, try to hasten peace. We cannot hold the front any longer. Comrades, soldiers, only think, our families at home are dying of starvation! They are our parents, our wives and children—not dogs. Let us not listen to the bourgeoisie, but down with the war, long live the Constituent Assembly and long live our comrades, the Bolsheviks!"³

The cry, "Long live our comrades the Bolsheviks!" was raised more and more frequently in the army. It is met with in one form or another in numerous soldiers' letters.

"We request their honours, the Bolsheviks, to turn their attention to Mr. Kerensky—to hang him from one hook with Kornilov," a group of wounded soldiers wrote. "We request that the government should be turned over im-

1 Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Soldiers' Executive Committee of the Twelfth Army, File No. 412-641, folio 50.

2 Lenin, "The Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."—"Selected Works" (Eng. ed.), Vol. VI, p. 471.

3 "Soldiers' Letters of 1917", Moscow, 1927, p. 137.

mediately to the people—the Soviet of Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. Down with the Provisional Government! Long live the government of the people! Comrades, workers and soldiers, take care of your weapons, let us march on Petrograd to trounce, beat and hang the bourgeois and the coalition government. The patience of the tormented soldiers in the trenches is exhausted.”¹

And, indeed, the patience of the tormented soldiers in the trenches was exhausted! The front was ready to assist in overthrowing the hated Kerensky government.

¹ “Soldiers’ Letters of 1917,” Moscow, 1927, p. 141.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MANOEUVRES OF THE COMPROMISERS AND THE PLANS OF THE BOURGEOISIE IN FACE OF THE IMPENDING REVOLUTION

1

THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES AND MENSHEVIKS—THE LAST BUTTRESS OF THE BOURGEOISIE

THE rapid spread of the revolutionary spirit among the proletarians and working peasants helped to undermine and destroy the social foundation on which the petty-bourgeois parties rested.

After the suppression of the Kornilov revolt the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders, driven by the general rise of the revolutionary movement, appeared at the Winter Palace and demanded in the name of their parties that the Cadets should be removed from the government. But the mass movement had already gone beyond the bounds of what was acceptable to the petty-bourgeois parties: the expulsion of the Cadets from the government could not stop the rise of the revolution, which demanded "All Power to the Soviets!" The organising force of this slogan was firmly uniting the masses. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks decided hurriedly to build another dam to check the revolutionary movement and later to divert it into a safer channel.

On September 1 a joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies was held. The leaders of the petty-bourgeois parties, scared by the revolution, countered the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" by the demand for a general democratic congress.

"To take the entire power into our own hands would be a crime against the revolution."¹

The Menshevik leader Skobelev declared at the joint session, while Tsereteli, who only two hours earlier had demanded that Kerensky should remove the Cadets from

¹ "Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Deputies—Skobelev's Speech,"—"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee and the Petro-Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 160, September 2, 1917.

the government, once more spoke in defence of coalition with the bourgeoisie.

In his eagerness to dissociate himself from the revolution, Avksentyev, the Socialist-Revolutionary leader, attacked the commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which had summoned troops from Finland to fight Kornilov, and vigorously opposed the arming of the workers. In a fit of panic, Avksentyev blurted out the fact that the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries were training in the rear of the revolution and had taken part in the fight against Kornilov only because they were afraid of being left behind by the masses.

The session adopted a decision to summon a congress—"of all the organised democracy and the democratic organs of local government to settle the question of the formation of a government capable of leading the country to a Constituent Assembly."¹

A democratic congress—this was to be the dam which was to check the revolutionary tide, or to divert it.

This congress, or, as it was called, the Democratic Conference, met on September 14. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries did all they could to lessen the representation from the workers and peasants by increasing the number of delegates from the various petty-bourgeois and bourgeois organisations. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies sent 230 delegates, and almost as many mandates (200) were given to the non-democratic Zemstvos. The trade unions were granted 100 mandates, while the co-operative societies, which were entirely under the sway of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Cadets, received 120 mandates. The various organisations of the huge army at the front were allowed 83 mandates in all, while the reactionary Cossacks were given 36 mandates. Invitations to the Conference were extended to representatives of the officers, the priests and the "Inter-Party Alliance," whose very name betrayed it as a definitely reactionary group. In a word every possible method of shuffling the Democratic Conference was resorted to in order to ensure that the revolutionary elements would be in a minority.

But despite all the efforts of the "heroes of the swindle"—the term by which Lenin branded the Socialist-Revolu-

¹ "Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Deputies—Resolution of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries,"—"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 161, September 8, 1917.

tionaries and Mensheviks who had stacked the Conference—the dam did not prove strong enough. At the Conference 766 delegates voted in favour of coalition with the bourgeois parties, 688 delegates voted against, while 38 delegates abstained from voting.

Furthermore, two amendments on the subject of coalition were submitted:

1. "The coalition shall not include elements either of the Cadet Party or of the other parties who were implicated in the Kornilov conspiracy."

2. "The coalition shall not include the Party of National Freedom."¹

The adoption of the first amendment would have entirely precluded the possibility of a coalition with the bourgeoisie, because there was not a single bourgeois party which had not been in one way or another implicated in the Kornilov conspiracy. In search of a loophole, and to leave their hands free for future manoeuvres, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to vote for the second amendment. But the manoeuvre failed: an overwhelming majority of votes,—798—were cast in favour of the first amendment and 139 votes were cast against; there were 196 abstentions.

The Conference was obviously swinging towards the Left. When the resolution was voted as a whole, only 183 delegates voted in favour, 813 voted against, while 80 abstained from voting.

All the pettifogging manoeuvres were in vain: the mass of the people had moved so far to the Left that even the stacked Democratic Conference declared against coalition with the Cadets.

The politicians then decided to take the refractory Conference by siege.

Delegates were canvassed, coaxed, promised one thing and another, invited to agree to a compromise—only to drag some sort of concession from them. Finally, the presidium of the Democratic Conference held a meeting on September 20 together with representatives from the parties and groups, at which the political acrobats decided to put the crowning touch to their circus performance. But again, 60 votes were cast against coalition and only 50 votes for.

The delegates had to be canvassed all over again. The petty-bourgeois politicians staged one more "turn." The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks temporarily called off the attack over the question of coalition and proposed

¹ "The Progress of the Session,"—*Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies*, No. 176, September 20, 1917

instead that a permanent representative body should be appointed from among the delegates to the Democratic Conference to be known as the Democratic Council, to which the government was to be accountable. The meeting agreed to this. On the proposal of the Mensheviks, the presidium of the Democratic Conference decided by a majority vote that all the groups and parties should be represented on the new body on a proportional basis. Thereupon, the slick "Lieberdants"—as the workers called the Mensheviks after the names of two of their leaders, Lieber and Dan—submitted another amendment, to the effect that if bourgeois Ministers should be allowed in the new Provisional Government, then bourgeois parties should be allowed on the representative body—the Democratic Council. The trick of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks succeeded: the amendment was adopted by 56 delegates against 48, with 10 abstentions. That evening Tsereteli had this resolution passed at the Conference, gilding it for greater certainty by a third clause stipulating that the majority on the future body should be secured for the democratic elements.

The resolution was passed, true in a somewhat clipped form, but the lackeys had carried out the wishes of the bourgeoisie by getting the idea of a coalition endorsed, even if in a masked form. For the rest, the bosses had no misgivings as to the loyalty of their lackeys. Even while the Democratic Conference was in progress, Kerensky was conducting negotiations with prominent representatives of the bourgeois parties—Kishkin, Buryshkin, Konovalov and Tretyakov—and inviting them to join the government. These individuals demanded the formation of a "strong government."

The Central Committee of the Cadet Party, which stood behind the bargainers, instructed Kishkin and Konovalov to join the Cabinet on condition that the future representative body be **appointed** by the government and not elected by the Soviets and other public political bodies. The Provisional Government, convinced of the complete loyalty of the Democratic Conference, and before the resolution of the "Lieberdants" in favour of a coalition had even been passed, accepted the conditions laid down by the Cadets. At this very moment the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were promising the direct opposite in their resolution, which stated that the government was to be accountable to the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic, or the Pre-parliament, as the new body set up by the Democratic Conference was called. Upon receiving the

resolution on coalition which the "Lieberdians" had concocted with such great effort at the stacked Conference, the Provisional Government used it solely to further its own plans. Kerensky came to terms with the Cadets and supplemented the Provisional Government with the following persons: A. Konovalov—Minister of Commerce and Industry and Vice Premier; K. Gvozdyev (Menshevik)—Minister of Labour; P. Malyantovich (Menshevik)—Minister of Justice; S. Prokopovich—Minister of Food; Professor M. Bernatsky—Minister of Finance; S. Salazkin—Minister of Education; N. Kishkin (Cadet)—Minister of Poor Relief; S. Smirnov (Cadet)—Comptroller-General; A. Kartashov (Cadet)—Minister of Worship; A. Liverovsky—Minister of Ways of Communication; S. Tretyakov—Chairman of the Economic Council of the Provisional Government; S. Maslov (Socialist-Revolutionary)—Minister of Agriculture.

The government ordained that the Pre-parliament—
"shall consist of 555 members appointed to the Council by the Provisional Government on the nomination of public and political organisations."¹

The Pre-parliament was empowered to discuss only laws "on which the Provisional Government shall deem it necessary to secure the opinion"² of the Pre-parliament.

The result was that, carefully stacked though the Democratic Conference was, and subtle though the manoeuvres of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were, the Conference revealed the political impotence of the compromisers and their loss of all support among the masses: the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks proved to be isolated from the people.

But the movement of the masses towards the Left did not stop there. Mass desertions from the petty-bourgeois parties affected the composition of the parties themselves. A split began in the ranks of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. A stormy meeting of the Menshevik fraction was held on the very eve of the Democratic Conference, September 13. The bankrupt leaders accused each other of political mistakes, flagellated themselves for blunders committed, and argued and quarrelled over the causes of the collapse of Menshevism and the rapid spread of Bolshevik ideas. The Menshevik fraction represented not a united party but at least three groups, each sharply opposed to the others. After a discussion lasting two days, 75 members of the fraction voted against coalition and 65 for

¹ "Decisions of the Provisional Government—Statutes of the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic,"—"Vestnik of the Provisional Government," No. 167, October 3, 1917.

² Ibid.

coalition. Consequently, when Tsereteli officially spoke in favour of coalition at the Democratic Conference he did so in flagrant violation of the instructions of his party.

The dissension within the ranks of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was even more acute. At their Seventh Petrograd Provincial Conference, held on September 10, 1917, the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries criticised the work of the Central Committee of their party and, in the elections to the Provincial Committee, obtained a majority of seats.

The Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties were splitting into two parts: the rank and file were going over to the revolution, while the leaders openly avowed their loyalty to the bourgeoisie.

The worker and peasant members of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party began to desert it *en masse*. Discipline within the party rapidly declined. Whole groups refused to obey party instructions. The Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party demanded that Savinkov should appear before it and give an account of his relations with Kornilov. But Savinkov refused and was supported in this by a large group of Socialist-Revolutionaries headed by the notorious "revolutionary" Breshko-Breshkovskaya.

The Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionaries steadily gained strength. At the Third Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, held in May 1917, a small group of Lefts published a protest against the compromising policy of the majority. Without breaking with the party the Left wing virtually began from May onward to conduct a policy independent of the Central Committee. The Lefts were led by several prominent figures: Spiridonova, Kolegayev, Proshyan, Bitsenko, Natanson, Schreider and Kamkov.

The Left and Right wings of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party chiefly differed over the question of the Provisional Government and the land question. The Lefts were opposed to a coalition with the bourgeoisie, although they did not advance the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" They regarded the Soviets as controlling bodies, thereby sharing the error of the Left Mensheviks. They took up a more resolute position on the agrarian question, advocating the immediate break-up of the landed estates.

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party tried to conceal its state of utter disintegration and endeavoured in every way to retain those who were splitting away. When the Left wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary fraction in the Pre-parliament branded the policy of their party as treachery and withdrew from the meeting, the Central Committee of

the party declared that although the Lefts had withdrawn from the fraction they still remained members of the party. But this could not save Socialist Revolutionaries: their influence among the workers and peasants rapidly declined. The desertion of the masses from the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks was accelerated by the new elections to the Soviets, which as a rule ended in the compromisers being driven out and the Soviets going over to the Bolsheviks.

The manoeuvres of the compromisers were obviously doomed to failure.

BOURGEOIS EFFORTS TO STEM THE REVOLUTION

While the petty-bourgeois lackeys were doing their best to hoodwink the masses, the bourgeoisie and the landlords were feverishly mobilising their forces for a new blow at the revolution.

Lenin had long ago pointed out that the bourgeoisie employs two methods of combating the toilers:

"In every country," he wrote in 1910, "the bourgeoisie inevitably elaborates two systems of rule, two methods of fighting for its own interests and for the retention of its domination, and these two methods at times succeed each other and at times are woven together in various combinations. They are, firstly, the method of force, the method of refusing all concessions to the labour movement, the method of supporting all the old and moribund institutions, the method of relentlessly rejecting reforms. ... The second method is the method of 'liberalism,' of steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms, concessions and so forth."¹

The bourgeoisie has always resorted to the "knout and gingerbread" as these two methods are figuratively described. And it was to the "knout and gingerbread" that the Russian bourgeoisie resorted with great thoroughness on the eve of the October Revolution.

Under the direct influence of the defeat of Kornilov and the rapid spread of revolutionary sentiments, the bourgeoisie hastened to make a number of concession to the people. On September 1—six months after the overthrow of the autocracy—the Provisional Government at last proclaimed Russia a republic. How little importance was attached to this can be judged by the fact that none of the foreign governments were informed of the change in the form of government; the signboard, as it were, was repainted "for internal consumption" only, and with the sole purpose of temporarily pacifying the masses.

Having conceded what would anyhow have been swept away by the revolution sooner or later, the bourgeoisie once again devoted itself to the Bolsheviks, the leaders of the revolutionary masses. Accusations of espionage and treason were unscrupulously levelled against them right and left. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois newspapers launched a campaign of calumny against the leaders of the

¹ Lenin, "Differences Within the European Labour Movement,"—"Collected Works", (Russ. ed.), Vol. XV, p. 7.

Bolshevik Party. Fraudulent leaflets were distributed at the mills and factories calling on the proletariat, supposedly in the name of the Bolshevik Party, to overthrow the government immediately. Lenin wrote with reference to this savage campaign:

"Tsarism persecuted crudely, savagely, bestially. The republican bourgeoisie persecutes filthily, striving to besmirch the reputation of the hated proletarian revolutionary and internationalist by means of slander, lies, insinuations, defamation, rumours, etc., etc."¹

To the accompaniment of the vicious baying of the venal press and the hysterical squeals of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik newspapers, the bourgeoisie took several steps in preparation for an offensive. General Kornilov was still at liberty, but the "republican" Governor-General Palchinsky ordered the suppression of the Bolshevik newspaper "Rabochy" ("Worker"), which had demanded a fight to a finish against Kornilovism. The Bolsheviks arrested at the time of the July demonstration were still languishing in prison, but Kornilov's accomplices, the contributors to the unscrupulous monarchist organ, "Novoye Vremya," and Guchkov, the prominent instigator of the counter-revolutionaries, were released from the custody under which they had been placed by the soldiers and sailors.

The government grew bolder and bolder. On September 4 Kerensky ordered the dissolution of all the committees formed to combat Kornilov and the disarmament of all revolutionary detachments. Kerensky ordered a punitive expedition under the command of General Korovnichenko to be sent to Tashkent, where the Soviet had become the real governing power. Kerensky sent Korovnichenko the following telegram:

"You are instructed to set out with the greatest possible despatch. You are not to enter into negotiations with the rebels. Vacillation can no longer be tolerated. The most resolute measures must be taken."²

But neither "gingerbread" nor the "knout" were of any avail, and the ominous tide of revolution continued to sweep over the country.

It was clear that the Provisional Government could no longer cope with the growing revolution. While demanding a vigorous policy from its executive organ, the government, and while assisting it in every way, the bourgeoisie surreptitiously prepared to take other measures should the revolu-

¹ Lenin, "Political Blackmail,"—"Collected Works" (Russ. ed.), Vol. XXI, p 98.

² "Order by A. F. Kerensky,"—"Novaya Zhizn," No. 132, September 20, 1917.

tion succeed. It set about uniting and concentrating its forces, and at the same time disarming revolutionary Petrograd.

The bourgeoisie decided first of all to prepare the Cossacks for action. On October 3 a delegation from the Cossack Council visited Konovalov, the Vice-Premier, and proposed that in the elections to the Constituent Assembly the Cossacks should form a separate voting body. To this the Provisional Government agreed, realising that this measure would enable the commanders to retain control over the rank-and-file Cossacks.

But the revolutionary situation in Petrograd and the vigilance exercised by the masses, who carefully watched every step taken by the counter-revolutionaries, greatly hampered the work of preparation. The bourgeoisie resolved to expedite the line up of its forces in the Cossack regions.

On October 7 the Rada of the Kuban Cossacks resolved to form a South-Eastern Alliance, embracing the Cossack troops of the Kuban, Terek, Don and Astrakhan, the Gortsi (highlanders) of the Northern Caucasus and the steppe peoples of the Don Region and the Astrakhan Province. The Rada was fairly frank as to the motives and purpose of this decision. It was designed to protect the Cossack territories, "the healthy parts of the state," from the general disintegration, and to create a strong national power in Russia to combat both the foreign foe and "anarchy within the country." General Alexeyev, one of the counter-revolutionary leaders, frankly stated in the letter of instructions sent out by General Headquarters that the region selected "is an area where relative calm and a comparative state of order and stability reign... From here... as though from a spot of oil, a patch of the required character and value will begin to spread."¹

In pursuance of the plan of the bourgeoisie, the Provisional Government decided at a confidential meeting held on October 4 to flee from revolutionary Petrograd to Moscow, which was closer to the Cossack territories. Fearing, however, that the proletariat and the revolutionary garrison might prevent the flight, the government decided not to inform the Pre-parliament of its decision, but to prepare public opinion by means of preliminary negotiations. The question arose at this meeting whether the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets should be transferred to Moscow. The government decided that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was a private organi-

¹ "Letter from General M. V. Alexeyev, to Lieut-General M. K. Diederichs," — "The White Cause," Vol. I, Berlin, 1926, p. 77.

sation and that nobody would prevent its removal to Moscow, but that the government would under no circumstances assume responsibility for finding it quarters. The petty-bourgeois leaders of the Soviet had served their purpose, and their masters were ready to kick them out as superfluous menials.

The fears of the Provisional Government proved well-founded. The Bolshevik Party was on the alert. It explained to the masses that the purpose of the government's manoeuvre was to surrender the revolutionary capital to the German troops, just as Riga had recently been surrendered, to crush the revolution in Petrograd with the aid of German bayonets, and then to proceed to suppress the revolution all over the country.

That this actually was the plan of the bourgeoisie was blurted out by Rodzyanko. Speaking at the Congress of Public Men in Moscow, Rodzyanko proposed that Petrograd should be surrendered, and he justified this measure in the following way:

"It is feared that the central institutions in Petrograd will perish. To this I replied that I would be very pleased if all these institutions perished, because they have brought Russia nothing but evil.... After Riga was surrendered a state of order was established there such as had never been seen before: ten of the ringleaders were shot, the police were restored and the city is absolutely safe and is illuminated."¹

The revolutionary workers and soldiers of the capital vigorously protested, and under pressure of the masses the petty-bourgeois mediators again began to fuss and to persuade the government to abandon the plan of removing to Moscow.

The Provisional Government continued to manoeuvre, and offered another piece of "gingerbread." On October 6, when the movement of protest against the evacuation was at its height, the government decided to dissolve the Fourth Duma, which was a highly influential centre of counter-revolution. The workers had been demanding the dispersion of this hotbed of reaction from the very first days of the revolution.

Indignation at the conduct of the government reached such a pitch that on October 12 Kerensky was obliged to appear before the Defence Commission of the Pre-parliament and declare that, far from intending to leave Petrograd, he even proposed to convene the Constituent Assembly in that city. The Commission adopted a reassuring resolu-

¹ M. V. Rodzyanko, "The Current Situation,"—"Utro Rossii," No. 242, October 8, 1917.

tion, promising that the government would defend Petrograd to the last ditch, and advised Kerensky to issue a statement to the population to this effect.

While Kerensky in the Pre-parliament was beating his breast and vowing fidelity to the revolution, preparations for the flight from the capital were being continued behind the scenes. On this very day, the Chancellery of the Provisional Government had finished drawing up a plan of evacuation. If even the Chancellery was ready to leave, it can be judged how advanced the execution of the plan already was.

On the following day, October 13, Kerensky, this time at a meeting of the Pre-parliament itself, denied the rumours that the government was preparing to flee from Petrograd, and declared that the press had distorted the designs of the government, which, he asserted, had never even discussed "the possibility of surrendering Petrograd to the enemy."¹

Thus, in public, they lied and wriggled, spread slanders and issued assurances, while in secret they made persistent preparations to surrender the capital.

The counter-revolutionaries had grown insolent and openly announced their programme. On September 30 a meeting of the Council of the Conference of Public Men was held in Moscow. This body had been elected before the Kornilov adventure at the first Congress of Public Men, the purpose of which was to unite all the forces that were combating "anarchy." A new Congress of Public Men was appointed for October 12. M. Rodzyanko, one of the most active leaders of the Conference of Public Men, spoke of this Congress in the following terms:

"I attach the greatest significance to the Congress of Public Men to be held on October 12, which must openly, loudly and courageously speak of all that is going on. It must declare that the government cannot sit between two stools. Either the Bolsheviks, or a Ministry of Salvation!"²

Rodzyanko openly acknowledged that the prime purpose of the Conference of Public Men was to put an end to Bolshevism. This was the purpose that inspired all the proceedings of the second Congress of Public Men, at which Generals Brusilov and Ruzsky spoke. Both referred to the disintegration of the army and demanded vigorous measures.

General Brusilov called upon all who desired "order" to organise and unite:

¹ "The Provisional Council of the Republic,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 235 October 14, 1917.

² "The Conference of Public Men,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 320, October, 8, 1917.

"When you are organised and strong you will be respected and feared, and the order we all yearn for so passionately will be established."¹

This subject was also dealt with by the first speaker at the Congress, A. S. Belorussov. The subjects discussed amounted to a complete programme of counter revolution.

"The prime and principal aim," the speaker said, "is to improve the state of organisation of the elements represented in the Conference and to transform the germ that now exists into a close network covering the whole country and uniting all those who are concerned for the State and the national interests."²

The land question was dealt with by the representative of the All-Russian Landowners' Alliance, Dimitrenko, who demanded that the government should wage a determined fight against the peasant movement.

The counter-revolutionaries not only refused to agree to any settlement of the agrarian question, but insisted that the land should be left absolutely intact in the hands of the landlords. The Landowners' Alliance demanded:

1. That the Provisional Government should urgently pass a law compensating landlords for losses caused by the destructive activities of the peasants;

2. That the practice of electing Commissars should be discontinued and that Commissars to localities should be appointed from the centre and should be answerable only to the central government;

3. That Commissars should be in a position to protect the persons and property of citizens, and for this purpose effective forces should be placed at their disposal.

On the question of the army, the Congress put forward the same programme as Kornilov: the restoration of the authority of the generals and the abolition of the Commissars and army committees. The Congress demanded the immediate restoration of the military salute and of the disciplinary powers of officers of all ranks. The resolution demanded that the officer ranks should be purged

"of the element which is disgracing them and which has recently taken part in all soldiers' movements."³

The Congress delegates demanded that the Alliance of Officers of the Army and Navy should be accorded the status of a government institution. The counter-revolutionaries insisted that the Provisional Government should

1 "The Moscow Conference,"—"Novoye Vremya," No. 14897, October 14, 1917.

2 "The Conference of Public Men,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 234, October 13, 1917.

3 "The Moscow Conference,"—"Novoye Vremya," No. 14898, October 15, 1917.

reinstate the generals and officers who were dismissed after the February Revolution.

Thus, on the main questions of current policy, the Congress of Public Men adopted decisions which fully coincided with the proposals made by Kornilov.

The Congress not only revived Kornilov's programme, but also outlined the form of organisation necessary to ensure the fulfilment of this programme.

"There is only one solution," the speaker on the question of local government said at the Congress, "namely, to suspend the constitutional guarantees and temporarily to proclaim what is known as a state of emergency. The solution is a drastic one, but under present conditions it is unavoidable. But this state of martial law cannot, of course, be ushered in by local bodies, even though they call themselves Soviets of Workers' Deputies or other organs of so-called revolutionary democracy.... This state of emergency must be strictly regulated by law and exercised by one person."¹

A military dictatorship—this is what was to save the country from revolution.

Simultaneously with the Congress of Public Men, a congress of the Cadet Party, a congress of cities and a congress of co-operative societies were held in Moscow. Their delegates attended the Congress of Public Men, whose programme was adopted as the programme of all the counter-revolutionaries. The platform of the Cadets, drawn up by Milyukov, clearly shows what the enemies of the people demanded:

1. War to a victorious finish in agreement with the Allies. No anti-annexationist, democratic declarations to be made, even in the spirit of the demands of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

2. The restoration of the fighting capacity of the army, to be achieved by limiting the army committees to commissary and educational functions and by restoring the disciplinary powers of the commanders.

3. A government enjoying undivided power and independent of the Soviets.

4. A strong government of a military character.

5. The restoration of government authority in the provinces.

6. Independent courts of justice.

Having published their programme, the Kornilovites proceeded to withdraw the revolutionary troops from

¹ "The Conference of Public Men,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti," No. 236 October, 15, 1917.

Petrograd and to dispatch them to the front. Headquarters of the Petrograd Military Area ordered that the regiments of the Petrograd garrison should be re-formed and dispatched to the front on the plea of military urgency.

The attempt to flee from the revolutionary capital having failed, it was decided to clear the latter of revolutionary troops and to give a free hand to the counter-revolutionaries. That this precisely was the intention, and not the defence of the country, is borne out in correspondence between the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front.

"The initiative of sending troops from the Petrograd garrison," General Cheremisov, the Commander of the Northern Front, replied by secret wire to the Minister of War and to the Chief of Staff, General Dukhonin, "**was yours and not mine.** I replied to your proposal...in the affirmative and requested you to send me all regiments fit to fight. When it became clear that the regiments of the Petrograd garrison are unwilling to go to the front, i.e., are not fit to fight, I declared in private conversation with your representative—an officer—that in view of the unwillingness displayed by these units to go to the front they are not a military asset to us, because we would evidently have a lot of trouble with them...but in view of your express desire to dispatch them to the front, I did not refuse to take them, nor do I refuse to take them now, if you continue to regard their removal from Petrograd as essential."

The general to whom the troops had been consigned frankly admitted that they were of no value for military purposes, but that he accepted them solely because the government had to get rid of them.

This new action of the government was resisted by the people even more vigorously than its attempted flight from Petrograd. The regiments refused to obey the orders of the Staff, and some of them, as for instance the Finland Reserve Regiment of the Guards, expressed lack of confidence in the government and demanded the transfer of power to the Soviets.

The treacherous character of the compromisers was once more revealed in this fight against the provocative policy of the Provisional Government. Having but recently, during the preparations for the government's flight, been kicked, they crawled back like whipped curs to lick their master's boot. On October 9, the day the order for the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd was published, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was

held at which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks got a resolution passed (by 13 votes to 12) calling upon the garrison "actively to prepare, in the event of necessity, for the withdrawal of the regiments of the garrison from Petrograd for the defence of the approaches to the city."¹ The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks recommended that a Committee of Revolutionary Defence should be elected to organise the defence of the capital.

The meeting of the Executive Committee was immediately followed by a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. By an overwhelming majority, the delegates rejected the Menshevik resolution and adopted the resolution of the Bolsheviks:

"Kerensky's government is ruining the country.... The salvation of Petrograd and the country lies in the transfer of power to the Soviets."²

On October 12, at a meeting behind closed doors, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided against the dissenting votes of two Mensheviks, that the troops should not be removed from Petrograd and that a Revolutionary Military Committee of the Soviets should be set up. According to its statutes, confirmed at that same meeting, the functions of the Revolutionary Military Committee were to be to determine the minimum forces required for the defence of the capital, which forces were not to be withdrawn, to keep records and a register of the garrisons of Petrograd and its environs, to protect the city from counter-revolutionary riots, to maintain revolutionary discipline among the workers and soldiers and to arm the workers. The Revolutionary Military Committee was to consist of the presidiums of the Petrograd Soviet and of its Soldiers' Section and of representatives of a number of military, labour and party organisations. It was decided to organise a garrison conference under the auspices of the Revolutionary Military Committee for the purpose of establishing contact with the regiments. On October 13, by a majority of 283 to 1, with 23 abstentions, the Soldiers' Section of the Soviet endorsed the plan of organisation of the Revolutionary Military Committee.

Resisting the provocative attack of the counter revolutionaries, the revolution assumed the offensive. The arming of the workers and the creation of the Revolutionary Military Committee were preparations for an attack on the bourgeois government.

¹ "The Petrograd Executive Committee on the Defence of Petrograd."—"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," No. 193, October 10, 1917.

² "Resolutions of the Petrograd Soviet,"—"Rabochy Put," No. 32, October 23, 1917.

And this was just the way the Provisional Government understood it. At a meeting of the government held that same night, October 13, a report was made on the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee. Polkovnikov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, reported how the day had passed in the barracks and the working-class districts. It was decided to adopt a series of measures for the protection of the capital, to crush the action of the Bolsheviks by armed force, and to postpone Kerensky's departure for the front.

CHAPTER XV

DISPOSITION OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

1

BOURGEOIS SHOCK DETACHMENTS

THE Provisional Government mustered its fighting forces to crush the revolution. Although the generals were rapidly losing sway over the soldiers, the bourgeoisie never for a moment abandoned the attempt to utilise the army against the forces of revolution. The fate of the revolution was being decided by the army, in which about ten million workers and peasants were under arms. This was understood equally well by the bourgeoisie and by the Bolsheviks. That is why the counter-revolutionaries fought so stubbornly to retain control of the army both before and after the October Revolution.

The counter-revolutionaries recognised that the Northern Front and the Western Front were thoroughly affected by propaganda, and, recognising it, they of course did not remain idle. The generals still clutched at every opportunity to retain control of their troops. But the revolutionary process on the Northern and Western Fronts had already progressed so far that the Kerensky government and the military realised that here their cause was hopeless.

Almost as hopeless for the counter-revolutionaries was the position on the South-Western Front.

But this was not the case on the other fronts, especially the Rumanian Front. The Caucasian Front was of no great importance because it was isolated from the country.

The Rumanian Front lay a long way from the revolutionary and industrial centres. The soldiers on the Rumanian Front were surrounded by a population that did not speak Russian, and they therefore had to face their reactionary officers alone. Bolshevik newspapers were not allowed to reach the front, and the soldiers were fed exclusively on bourgeois "trash." I. I. Vasilyev, a soldier and member of one of the army delegations from Petrograd, describes the state of affairs as he saw it at the front as follows:

"On arriving at the Rumanian Front, we found that the officers and the compromisers were making feverish preparations for an offensive, organising shock battalions and death battalions. The old regime prevailed in the army: there was not a single Bolshevik paper, and a most rabid campaign of calumny was waged against the Bolsheviks. The campaign went to such lengths that the word 'Bolshevik' itself was explained as being derived from the word 'bolshak,' i.e., a rich peasant, a kulak, and it was said that the 'Bolsheviks' wanted to restore Nicholas II to the throne."¹

The fact that the armies on the Rumanian Front were isolated from the revolutionary environment made them a suitable tool for the counter-revolutionaries.

But this was not the chief thing.

Side by side with the Russian army, or rather in its rear, Rumanian regiments were quartered. Little influenced by the revolution, they were used, on the instructions of General Shcherbachov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Front, as a police cordon to prevent "suspects" making their way to the front. Jointly with the Cossacks, the Rumanians disarmed regiments which opposed their commanders. Not a few of the more revolutionary regiments were "brought to their senses," as General Shcherbachov cynically expressed it, by the threat of Rumanian machine-guns and cannon. The reactionary commanders dreamed of utilising the armies on the Rumanian Front to combat the revolution. It was a rallying ground for officers who had been driven from other fronts. Under the protection of the Rumanians, General Shcherbachov formed officers' shock battalions, some of which later fought in the Civil War on the side of the White Guards.

Nevertheless, even here the revolutionary movement made its influence felt. Bolshevik ideas were brought by troops that had been transferred from Siberia in August. The Kornilov revolt also played its part: it at once brought the antagonisms between the officers and the rank and file into sharp relief. Towards the end of September the periodical reports from the Rumanian Front began to reflect what had long been reflected in the reports from the other fronts. Here, for instance, is the report of Colonel Drozdovsky, who later served under Denikin, on the situation in one of the most "reliable" regiments on the front:

"Bolshevik slogans have begun to penetrate into the regiment through the "Priboi," the organ of the Helsing-

¹ I. I. Vasilyev, "The Insurrection of July 1917," Manuscript Records of the "History of the Civil War", No. 1389.

fors Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. I am unable to take measures to prevent the paper getting through, as it finds its way into the regiment secretly, by mail and in letters. . . . During the past week there have been several instances of individual insubordination and of attempts at wholesale insubordination; there were cases of incitement to disobey legitimate orders. Investigations into these cases have been instituted and the guilty men will be tried, but it is difficult to discover the ringleaders owing to the connivance and sympathy of the soldiers. Their prosecution arouses sullen discontent among the soldiers; every legitimate demand tending to restrict unbridled conduct, every demand for the observance of law and order they call 'old regime.' . . . Perverted by the fact that offences go unpunished and by the abolition of the forms of addressing superiors, the men, in conversation with the officers, go so far as insolently to accuse them of being in favour of the war because they receive big pay; the prevailing mood among the soldiers themselves is an unwillingness to fight, a failure to realise, or, rather, a refusal to realise, the necessity for continuing the war.¹

Reading this document, one might think that it refers not to the end of September but to the first months of the revolution. Such reports came from the Northern and Western Fronts even before the Kornilov revolt. At the end of September it was not so much a matter of "individual instances" on these fronts, or even of "attempts at wholesale insubordination," and of a complete collapse of discipline among the soldiers. But delaying the spread of the revolutionary spirit among the masses did not mean destroying that spirit. In spite of the conditions that favoured reaction, in spite of the artifices of the generals and the compromisers, the Rumanian Front went the way of the other fronts.

The measures applied in the army by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks were obviously ineffectual: the generals were rapidly losing control over the soldiers. Other measures had to be adopted to check this process. Without rejecting the services of the petty-bourgeois compromisers, the generals at the front decided to try a new method—to hold the rapidly disintegrating army together with the help of shock battalions.

In May, General Brusilov, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, had sent Colonel Yasnikov and

¹ "Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Caucasian Front", File No. 2075, folios 152-55.

the bogus sailor Batkin to Petrograd to request the formation of volunteer battalions to reinforce the front. The petty-bourgeois leaders came to the generals' aid; on May 16 a congress of committees of the South-Western Front adopted a resolution urging the necessity of reinforcing the army by volunteer battalions. General Brusilov immediately endorsed the resolution and that very same day sent a message to the delegation informing them that the idea had the support of the front. One may judge of the haste shown by the counter-revolutionaries from the fact that the delegation left before credentials could be issued to them.

Brusilov's proposal was quickly taken up by other commanders. On May 18 General Denikin, in his hurry to expedite the formation of shock battalions, wired the Minister of War requesting permission for a delegation from the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet to visit the reserve regiments of the Petrograd and Moscow garrisons in order

"after a passionate appeal, to call upon those who are willing to join these battalions.... It would be desirable to take action before the return of the Minister of War, because every day is valuable."¹

On May 20, only four days after the initiative was taken, General Brusilov reported to the Minister of War and the Supreme Commander that

"measures for the creation of shock groups at the front of the armies are already being adopted by me on a wide scale."²

The initiative taken by the generals at the front at first aroused certain misgivings in the mind of General Alexeyev, the Supreme Commander. Alexeyev doubted the value of the new battalions. But the doubts of the Supreme Commander were apparently soon set at rest, because the formation of the shock battalions proceeded rapidly. An All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the Organization of a Volunteer Army was formed in Petrograd and began to open branches in the large cities.

The shock battalions were at once singled out for special treatment in comparison with the rest of the army. They were better fed and better supplied. The volunteer shock troopers retained their former jobs and pay, and in the event of their death, pensions were paid to their families. Order No. 1 did not apply to the shock battalions, for which the army regulations were specially modified. The

¹ Central Archives, "Disintegration of the Army in 1917," Moscow 1925, p. 64.

² Ibid., p. 66.

shock battalions were assigned their own colours—black and red—red symbolising revolution and black readiness to die—not, of course, for the revolution, but for the commanding officers: the shock-trooper took an oath “to obey without question and without protest, on duty and in battle all the commands of my superiors.”

The rank-and-file soldiers rapidly divined the character of the new battalions, which were initiated and formed independently of the Soviets. A number of Soviets at the front expressed their opposition to the formation of the shock battalions. The reason for their objection was very clearly expressed in a resolution adopted by the Pskov Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies:

“... Both the method of recruiting the volunteers and their better material supply stipulated in the regulations, as compared with their comrades in the army, places the battalions in a privileged position; the regulations provide for an internal organisation of the battalions which is at variance with the Declaration of Rights of the Soldier-Citizen; the political and strategical purpose of the formation of the battalions, vaguely formulated in the regulations, may be interpreted in a way which does not harmonize with the aims of revolutionary democracy; owing to the isolation and specific purpose of the battalions, the danger is not precluded of their acting in ways which do not coincide with the prevailing tendencies in the army. . . .”¹

The class instinct of the soldiers did not deceive them: the generals very soon disclosed the secret of how General Alexeyev's doubts were set at rest. The day after the suppression of the July demonstration, Brusilov, who had by then been appointed Supreme Commander, wrote to Kornilov, Denikin, Shcherbachov and others informing them of what had happened and ending with the following words:

“Events are developing at lightning speed. Evidently, civil war is unavoidable and may break out at any minute....

“The time for energetic action has arrived. . . .

“In my opinion the most effective means for this is the formation, or, rather, the selection of troops tried and reliable from the standpoint of discipline, which might serve as a bulwark for the government, which would recognise the government and which would not strive for

¹ Central Archives, “Disintegration of the Army in 1917,” Moscow, 1925, p. 74.

personal rights, but would act for the salvation of the fatherland from anarchy and collapse. ...”¹

The shock battalions were formed not to fight the foreign enemy, but to combat “anarchy and collapse,” as the generals called the revolution.

The petty-bourgeois leaders also promised their support to the new measure. Stankevich, the Commissar of the Northern Front, added to Brusilov’s plan the proposal to organise in the rear a corps, if not a whole army, which would be thoroughly reliable from the standpoint of fighting capacity.

The future leaders of the counter-revolution quickly set about carrying the instructions of the Supreme Commander into effect. General Shcherbachov demanded the formation of a shock battalion in every regiment.

On being appointed Supreme Commander, General Kornilov took this matter in hand and demanded that the Central Executive Committee for the Formation of Shock Battalions should be transferred to General Headquarters. By the time of the Kornilov revolt, thirty-three shock battalions and one artillery battalion had already been formed on the various fronts: seven battalions on the Northern Front; fourteen battalions and one regiment (of three battalions) on the South-Western Front; seven battalions and one artillery battalion on the Western Front and two battalions on the Rumanian Front.

While demanding that the Red Guard should be disbanded and disarmed, the counter-revolutionaries were recruiting their White Guard.

At the front, the shock troopers terrorised the soldiers and disarmed regiments and battalions that refused to go into action. In the rear, they broke up demonstrations and smashed labour organisations. These class detachments of counter-revolution not infrequently assumed the functions of a political police. Internecine war was started within the army at the behest of the generals. On July 16, 1917, one of the shock battalions on the South-Western Front, without trial or investigation, shot two workers belonging to the Fifth Engineering Construction Squad, compelling the whole squad to witness the execution. The White Guard committed many acts of savage terrorism, summary execution and incredible brutality long before the civil war broke out.

The failure of the Kornilov revolt changed the form and character of the attempts to create a class military orga-

¹ Central Archives of Military History Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quarter master’s Department.

nisation for the support of counter-revolution. But the collapse of the Kornilov revolt did not stop, or even restrain for long, the feverish work of forming shock battalions. The counter-revolutionaries only restricted the scope of their activities for the time being and endeavoured above all to preserve the White Guard cadres. The shock battalions were transformed to other districts; they were temporarily merged with other regiments or attached to non-shock units, or else had their names changed. The "re-christening" was done with the blessing and direct support of the Provisional Government—another proof that the Kerensky government was no less entitled to be regarded as the general staff of counter-revolution than the Central Committee of the Cadet Party or General Headquarters. Literally on the very day of the defeat of the Kornilov revolt, General Alexeyev wired Kerensky:

"Among our armed forces is a Kornilov Shock Regiment consisting of three battalions, which in the short period of its existence succeeded in earning its honourable title by its valour in action. The name given the regiment, and its recent transfer to Moghilev [where General Headquarters were located—*Ed.*] place the regiment in an extremely difficult position, surrounded as it is by other army units which, it is to be feared, will regard this regiment with undeserved mistrust and suspicion. ...

"I would therefore consider it expedient not to disband this regiment, which is inspired with so firm a spirit, but to dispatch it either to France or to Salonika, or, at the worst, to the Caucasian Front. ..."¹

In response to General Alexeyev's request, Kerensky wired General Headquarters on September 6:

"I consider it necessary to *remove* the Kornilov Death Battalion from Moghilev at once. Please give the necessary orders."²

Kerensky did not even demand the disbandment of the Kornilov Regiment, but merely recommended that it should be removed from Moghilev. Relying on Kerensky, Alexeyev gave orders that the regiment should be re-christened the 1st Russian Shock Regiment and attached to the Czechoslovakian Division. It was this regiment, saved by Kerensky, which after the October Revolution made its way to the Don and became the core of the firmest division in the White Army—the Kornilov Division.

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 76-086, folio 208.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—The Coup d'Etat, and the State of the Army in Connection with the Coup, File No. 812, folio 73.

The suppression of the Kornilov revolt halted the formation of White cadres for only a very short time. Under the protection of the Provisional Government, the counter-revolutionaries once more resumed feverish activity. General Headquarters not only preserved the shock battalions, but even endeavoured to legitimate them by transforming the Central Executive Committee for the Formation of Shock Battalions from a nominally public organisation into a department of the General Staff.

The counter-revolutionaries endeavoured, under the protection of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, to create their military units even among the working class. At the end of September, General Bagratuni, Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military Area, informed General Headquarters of the Northern Front:

"A detachment has been formed in Petrograd consisting of volunteers from the Obukhov Works. An excellent unit, thoroughly welded and organised. . . . Considering it extremely desirable to preserve this thoroughly healthy unit, I request that it be dispatched to the war area for final formation. . . . The detachment consists of about one thousand men. . . ."¹

The workers' detachment was hastily removed from the revolutionary capital, for fear that the Bolsheviks would win it from the reactionaries. But at the front, in spite of the repeated assurances that the unit was "in an excellent and thoroughly healthy condition," fears were entertained that it might bring with it the charged atmosphere of the revolutionary capital. The Northern Front categorically refused to accept the workers' battalion and insisted that it be disbanded. As an extreme concession, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front offered to attach the workers' battalion to the Second Detachment of Disabled Warriors, one of the units which were regarded as loyal to the government. But while correspondence between the staffs was proceeding, the revolutionaries wrested the battalion from the hands of the reactionaries. When orders were received from General Headquarters to form a regiment of Obukhov workers, with the volunteer battalion as a nucleus, the gloomy reply was received: "It is to be presumed that by this time it has joined the Red Guard."² Revolutionary events developed at a rate which forestalled the measures of the counter-revolutionaries.

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Northern Front, File No. 222-917, folio 196.

² Ibid., File No. 224-314, folio 268.

The failure of the attempt made with the help of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to enlist the Obukhov workers in the shock battalions did not discourage the generals. The feverish formation of shock battalions continued; the counter-revolutionaries set up recruiting centres in eighty-five of the larger cities, not counting the war area. By the end of October the counter-revolutionaries had at their disposal forty shock battalions and one artillery battalion, or over 50,000 men, splendidly armed and equipped.

The shock battalions could easily be hurled against any section of the front, they could rapidly seize key positions and prevent the movement of revolutionary troops.

On a footing similar to that of the shock troops were the Battalions of St. George, consisting of soldiers who had been awarded the Cross of St. George for valour in action. The formation of these battalions began at about the same time as the formation of the shock battalions. Selected for their unquestioned fidelity to the Provisional Government, the St. George Battalions joined the shock battalions in disarming revolutionary regiments, drove regiments to the front from the rear and convoyed fresh drafts proceeding to the front. The formation of the St. George battalions was in charge of the Alliance of the Knights of St. George, which acted in concert with General Headquarters.

When Kornilov was appointed Supreme Commander, General Headquarters decided to form St. George battalions on a wide scale. On August 12, Kornilov instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the various fronts to form a reserve St. George Infantry Regiment on each front. St. George Regiments were stationed in Pskov, Minsk, Kiev and Odessa and were combined into one brigade, the commander of which was directly subordinate to General Kornilov. The headquarters of the brigade were located in Moghilev.

Like the shock battalions, the St. George Battalions were created to combat revolution. The battalion stationed in Moghilev took part in the Kornilov revolt, a number of other battalions were sent against the revolution in the decisive days of the October Revolution, while the Kiev St. George Battalion made its way to the Don, where, together with the Kornilov Regiment, it formed the nucleus of the Volunteer Army.

In their endeavours to muster a force against the revolution, the bourgeoisie and the social-compromisers even tried to form shock battalions of wounded soldiers and of women. A Women's Alliance for Assisting the Fatherland was formed in Petrograd in June. It appealed to women

to form "death battalions" for active service at the front. The bourgeois press took up the appeal and launched an energetic campaign on its behalf. About 300 women enrolled in the battalions in the first month. Kerensky's wife announced that she was leaving for the front as a nurse.

But the hullabaloo over the "women's death battalions" soon subsided, because their direct military value was insignificant. Neither the support of the bourgeois press and of the General Staff, nor the participation of prominent counter-revolutionaries in the movement were of any avail. All that resulted from the movement was the formation of a single women's battalion, and on October 17 the Supreme Directorate of the General Staff gave orders to discontinue the recruiting of women and to disband the detachments already formed.

The only women's battalion formed never reached the front, where a few small women's squads operated, and that not very successfully. On the other hand, it took part in the defence of the Winter Palace during the October Revolution.

The formation of battalions and regiments of wounded soldiers, or disabled warriors, as they styled themselves, proceeded with less fuss, but with no better success.

A few squads were formed. They took very little part in the fighting at the front, but, on the other hand, were made extensive use of by the counter-revolutionaries in the interior of the country.

THE OFFICERS' CORPS

The counter-revolutionaries regarded the shock battalions as a force which might prevent the disintegration of the army and which, if necessary, could be utilised against the revolution in the rear. Within the army itself, the reactionaries endeavoured above all to retain the support of the officers.

Under the immediate influence of the February Revolution the generals had tried to retain the support of the rank and file of the army by creating joint committees of officers and men.

But nothing came of this. Order No. 1 prescribed the creation of committees consisting solely of representatives of the lower ranks, and this served at once to undermine the position of the officers in the army.

The counter-revolutionaries found another way. A Chief Committee of the Alliance of Officers of the Army and Navy was formed at General Headquarters, ostensibly with the purpose of protecting the professional interests of the officers. In point of fact, the Alliance became one of the most important political organisations of the counter-revolutionaries. It heartened the officers, who had for a time lost their bearings in the stormy days of revolution, laid down a political line for them, and gave material support to officers who had been driven out of their regiments. The rules of the Alliance defined its chief purpose as being.

"to combat the propaganda of all persons and groups designed to disturb the foundations of the army and navy and to resist the actions of individuals and groups designed to disturb the foundations of the army and navy. ..."¹

The activities of the Alliance were centred on the fight against the Bolsheviks. The Chief Committee of the Officers' Alliance issued manifestos and resolutions in thousands of copies calling for a fight against "Bolshevik anarchy." Officers sympathetic to the Bolshevik Party were proclaimed enemies of the people and traitors and were blacklisted. The Chief Committee wired all the armies requesting to be supplied with the names of Bolshevik officers.

It should be noted that the Alliance, which was ostensibly a public organisation, addressed itself directly to the Chiefs of Staffs, and in doing so made no concealment of its

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the South-Western Front, File No. 142-220, folio 10.

political aims. The Chief Committee took it for granted that the persons it was addressing, because of their very position, shared the views of the Alliance. When, however, the staff of the Sixth Army appeared to have doubts as to this procedure, the Chief Committee passed strictures on it:

"The Chief Committee of the Alliance of Officers can only express its astonishment at your refusal to supply it with information regarding officers who have disgraced themselves by their Bolshevik activities."¹

The Chief Committee sent a copy of this stricture to General Headquarters so as to draw the attention of the higher authorities to the refractory State of the Sixth Army.

In general, the Alliance enjoyed exceptional influence at General Headquarters. Not a single political document was issued from General Headquarters before the Chief Committee had given its opinion on it. Thus, the Committee of the Twelfth Army—which was by no means Bolshevik—wired General Headquarters:

"According to information at our disposal, all projects which are in the least degree democratic in spirit, when submitted to General Headquarters emerge therefrom in a mutilated condition under the immediate influence of the Officers' Alliance."²

The Chief Committee became the legislative body of General Headquarters. It was not for nothing that the chairman of the Alliance was General Alexeyev, former Chief of Staff under Nicholas II.

The Alliance terrorised officers and threatened to boycott those who refused to become members. In this way it managed to enrol a large number of officers and to function as an important organ of counter-revolution. Not a single reactionary measure was taken either in the army or in the rear in which the Officers' Alliance did not have an active hand. For instance, when the question of restoring the death penalty was mooted, the Alliance issued a veritable flood of telegrams, threats, petitions, reports and letters insisting on the immediate introduction of the death penalty. When it was necessary to create a name for the general who was destined for the post of dictator, the Alliance acted as his publicity agent, circulated a biography of the general, sent him telegrams of greeting and promised him every possible support. And all this was done in the name of all

1 Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Rumanian Front, File No. 320-423, folio 119.

2 Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Executive Committee of the South-Western Front, File No. 56-883, folio 269.

the officers, although a section of them did not approve of the reactionary policy of the Alliance, and some of them had long ago parted way even with the compromisers.

The Officers' Alliance developed an intensive campaign in connection with the preparations for the Kornilov revolt and took a most active part in the conspiracy of the generals. The Alliance negotiated with the Cossack commanders, sent representatives to the Alliance of the Knights of St. George and established contact with the reactionary bourgeois organisations in Petrograd and Moscow. Some idea of its activities may be gathered from a resolution adopted at an extraordinary joint meeting of the Chief Committee and a conference of Knights of St. George on August 10, 1917:

"At the very outbreak of the Russian revolution, certain persons unknown to the fatherland, led by 'friends' coming from Germany, made the proposal to extend a 'fraternal' hand to the camp of our mortal enemies—the Austro-Germans. Our enemies, their hands stained in Russian blood, grasped the extended fratricidal hand, and crossing into the land of our fathers, trampled down the graves of millions of warriors who had honourably fallen in Russia's cause. For five months our fatherland has suffered in the fratricidal fire and has become the laughing-stock of the whole world. ..."¹

And so on, and so forth, in this same jingoistic, pogromist strain. The resolution ended with a vow the officers took to fight

"until Russia, protected by our powerful Alliance, arises in honour from her shame, victorious from her defeat, imperishable in her greatness and freedom."²

This resolution was dispatched from General Headquarters to all the armies. The incompetent generals, who had led the army from defeat to defeat, swore to be victorious, if only they were permitted to restore the old feudal system and regime in the army. Corrupt commissaries, thieves who had robbed the soldiers, swore to restore the honour of the army, if only they were once more allowed uncontrolled disposal of the soldiers' rations.

The collapse of the Kornilov revolt exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the Officers' Alliance; it revealed that this "democratic" organisation was controlled by the generals. A wave of protest swept through the army, which had long been anxiously watching the activities of the

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of Headquarters of the Third Army, File No. 311-314, folio 808.

² Ibid., folio 809.

Alliance. Numerous resolutions demanded that this nest of generals should be dispersed and that the ringleaders should be put into the dock together with Kornilov.

The Provisional Government, however, had no intention of dissolving the Alliance. It knew that the flood of resolutions from the army committees could not injure the organisation, and that it would hold its ground. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who vacillated between the command of the army and its rank and file, and who feared the former more than the latter, often adopted resolutions under the pressure of the masses. One had to sit tight and wait until the paper torrent subsided. But such was not the case with the spontaneous explosion of hatred of the soldiers against the Officers' Alliance. At times the protest of the soldiers went to the length of lynch law on the officers. Scores were shot by the soldiers, and in particular the sailors shot scores of the more detested officers.

But here the Government came to the assistance of the Chief Committee of the Officers' Alliance. The records contain an extremely interesting minute of a conversation which took place over the direct wire between Baranovsky, Chief of Chancellery of the Minister of War, and General Lukomsky, a prominent counter-revolutionary leader. Baranovsky admonished General Lukomsky:

"I consider it necessary to add in my own name that, knowing the work of the Officers' Alliance, I am convinced that **Kerensky and the Committee of the Officers' Alliance are following the same road**, but the methods of traversing this road differ profoundly, and, in particular, the way chosen by the Committees is absolutely impossible and impermissible, because it only complicates the situation and places difficulties in the way of Kerensky's activities; and it spoils things for itself, because the impression is created in Petrograd, not only in democratic bodies but in all circles, that the Committee of the Alliance is playing a strange game and is a nest of reaction. ..."¹

It appears, then, that Kerensky, the leader of "revolutionary democracy," and the Committee of the Officers' Alliance were "following absolutely the same road." All that displeased Baranovsky was that the Chief Committee was too headlong in its preparations for a dictatorship, thereby placing "difficulties in the way of Kerensky's activities."

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 1588S, folio 30.

The government could not and would not consent to the dissolution of the Alliance. Such an act might alienate the generals, who regarded Kerensky with suspicion as it was. The Officers' Alliance was left unmolested. Its leaders discontinued recruiting new cadres for the time being, hoping soon to play a big part in political affairs. The Officers' Alliance, operating at General Headquarters under the protection of the government, became transformed into a sort of recruiting and dispatching centre for counter-revolutionary forces. The Chairman of the Alliance, General Alexeyev, actively organised the muster and dispatch of White Guards to the Don and the Kuban, where they were placed under the command of the Cossack Ataman, General Kaledin. Delegates from the Alliance sent on the pretext of official business, visited the armies.

As the tide of revolution rose, the activities of the Alliance became more and more energetic and unconcealed. Recovering from their recent defeat, officers in places began to advocate Kornilovite demands. Officers' congresses were held in a number of armies. Commanders demanded more effective measures against the Bolsheviks and the cessation of the campaign against the officers. How bold the members of the Alliance became may be judged from a resolution adopted at a congress of officers of the Tenth Army:

"Since the chief cause of the general disintegration in the army is distrust of the officers sown among the soldiers, the Provisional Government must clearly and definitely, in a special statement, once more declare its confidence in the officers, who are honestly performing their duty to the fatherland and the revolution. . . . The officers are not enemies of the soldier, but friends of the Russian revolution. **There should be no political struggle within the ranks of the army, but members of society are free to belong to any political party they please. . . .** We appeal to the Provisional Government to help us by carrying out the above-mentioned measures and by **waging an effective fight against Bolshevism, utilising for this purpose the army units which have not lost their fighting capacity.** Otherwise even this new feat of the officers will not achieve its purpose."¹

Sensing the imminence of a decisive conflict, the officers began to speak in the language of the man who had recently inspired them, General Kornilov.

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quartermaster's Department, File No. 2066, folios 2-3.

Particular mention should be made of the work of the Officers' Alliance in the junkers' schools and ensign schools. There were twenty-six junker schools in the old army. The majority of them were located in the large cities—eight in Petrograd, four in Kiev, two in Moscow and two in Odessa. It is difficult to establish the actual number of junkers owing to its frequent fluctuations. But, in general, the schools turned out over 3,000 officers at each graduation.

There were thirty-eight ensign schools. They were located in the same towns as the junker schools or in the vicinity. Nearly 19,000 ensigns were turned out by these schools at each graduation.

Isolated as they were from the revolutionary influence of the soldiers, the junker and ensign schools offered a very favourable field for the activities of the Officers' Alliance.

Having first recruited the instructors of these schools, the reactionaries rapidly won over the junkers themselves. Counter-revolutionary sentiments predominated in these schools. Even the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, constituted a minority, and as to the Bolsheviks, there were only individuals here and there. The junkers had no need to conceal their views behind the screen of the "Socialist parties." The junkers formed the most reliable shock battalions of counter-revolution and were the first to take up arms against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

BOURGEOIS NATIONAL REGIMENTS

Feverishly though the formation of shock battalions proceeded, a few score reliable detachments were no longer enough to halt the swift march of revolution, all the more since the revolutionary spirit often found its way even into the most carefully picked White battalions. In the records of General Headquarters are to be found lists of units ordered to be excluded from the death battalions for having "disgraced themselves" by refusing to go into action at the front or to obey military orders. Even shock units are sometimes mentioned in these lists.

Large military forces were needed to combat the revolution. The reactionaries endeavoured to use the bourgeois national regiments for this purpose. However, the Great Russian reactionaries did not approve of all the regiments recruited from the formerly oppressed nationalities, but only of those which constituted no direct menace to the integrity of the colonial empire. Poland, for example, was occupied by the German armies. The formation of Polish regiments provided the Russian bourgeoisie with an additional weapon against Germany: by exploiting national sentiment, it might be possible to launch the Poles against the German invaders. The attitude to the various national regiments therefore differed: the Ukrainians were interfered with, especially at first, while the Poles were supported and encouraged in every way. But in both cases the reactionaries tried to retain control of the national regiments by carefully selecting the officers.

The Polish units operating at the front in July were:

1. A Polish Rifle Division consisting of four regiments of three battalions each.
2. A regiment of Uhlans consisting of four squadrons.
3. A Polish Reserve Infantry Regiment.
4. An Engineers' Company.

All these formed part of the Seventh Army, with the exception of the Reserve Regiment, which was stationed at Belgorod in the Kursk Province. The Ministry of War proposed to recruit the Polish Division to normal strength, a second Polish division, to give them artillery and to form them into a Polish Corps. The formation of the corps encountered considerable difficulties. The proletarians and peasants of Poland proved to be no less affected by the revolutionary movement than the proletarians and peasants of Russia. The Polish bourgeois, who had seized control

of the formation of these units, were opposed by the revolutionary elements. As early as April, when the Polish bourgeoisie had issued the slogan, "A Separate Polish Army in Russia!" the Petrograd group of Polish internationalists had declared that the slogan, "A Separate Polish Army in Russia!"¹ was one that could not be supported by the Polish workers and soldiers.

The Polish Bolsheviks led the fight against the bourgeois parties, endeavouring to dissipate the heady fumes of nationalism and to expose the class nature of the policy pursued by the leaders of the Polish Corps. Unrest broke out in the Polish Reserve Regiment, where on July 27 the revolutionary soldiers drove out Colonel Winicki and elected Sub-Lieutenant Jackiewicz commander. Kornilov ordered the immediate suppression of the movement and wired Kerensky:

"Relative to the measures to put a stop to the disorders in the Polish Reserve Regiment quartered in Belgorod, I consider it necessary to entrust them to the Polish Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General Dowbor-Musnicki and to place an armed force at his disposal."²

The Commander of the Corps adopted vigorous measures to purge the regiment. Over 400 soldiers were dispatched to the front, ostensibly for having refused to serve in the Polish Corps. Soldiers sympathetic to the Bolsheviks were arrested and tried for "disobeying military orders."

These tsarist punitive measures aroused indignation even in petty-bourgeois circles. Even Savinkov, who was at that time in charge of the Ministry of War, asked Kornilov whether it was wise to retain Dowbor-Musnicki as Commander of the Corps. But the vigour with which Dowbor-Musnicki acted was an excellent testimony to his political reliability. Kornilov replied to Savinkov:

"The Polish Corps is formed of volunteers, and can therefore consist only of officers and men who are prepared to carry out the demands made on them by General Dowbor-Musnicki. I highly esteem this general as a man of firm character and as an excellent military leader and consider him highly desirable as Commander of the Polish Volunteer Corps."³

By October the corps consisted of 17,000 men, including 1,200 officers and officials. This number does not include

1 Central Archives of the October Revolution Records—1235, The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Series D/1, File No. 76, folio 28.

2 Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-242, folio 74.

3 Ibid., folio 87.

the Reserve Regiment, which at times consisted of as many as 16,000 men.

The Polish Corps held an honourable place in the schemes of the counter-revolutionaries. "The Poles have promised to send their corps. It will most likely arrive,"¹ is what, according to Krasnov, Kerensky said, urging the counter-revolutionary detachments to move as soon as possible against revolutionary Petrograd when the latter was in the flames of revolt.

Of the other national units which the counter-revolutionaries counted among their forces, mention should be made of the "Savage Division," which had been formed into a corps at the time of the Kornilov revolt. The division consisted of Caucasian Mountaineers to the number of approximately 1,500 men.

The revolution had hardly affected the national regiments that had existed under the tsarist government. There were either no regimental committees at all in the "Savage Division," or, where they did exist, they confined themselves to keeping a check on the quarter-masters. The authority of the commanders was based on the law of the clan. Ruthless discipline was maintained, the officers often physically assaulting their men. A group of soldiers who had deserted from the "Savage Division" were interrogated by the Soviet and related a story of tyranny and tribal enmity such as was known only in the tsarist army.

The failure of the Kornilov revolt made the Caucasian regiments accessible to revolutionary ideas. The reactionaries decided to return them to their home territory, in the belief that the native bourgeoisie would be able to halt the spread of revolutionary ideas among the men.

The first Ukrainian—Haidamak—regiments began to form spontaneously at the time of the February Revolution. During March and April, in the rear of the South-Western Front, and in all the large garrison towns, such as Petrograd, Moscow and Kazan, Ukrainian regiments were spontaneously formed. They adopted the colours yellow and blue for their flag and cockade. A Ukrainian regiment known as the Bogdan Khmel'nitsky Regiment was formed in Kiev and was joined by large numbers of soldiers from the army on active service.

Despite the fact that the first Ukrainian regiment—the Bogdan Khmel'nitsky Regiment—had passed a vote of confidence in the Provisional Government, the latter nevertheless deemed it advisable to put a stop to the move-

¹ P. N. Krasnov, "On the Home Front,"—"Archives of the Russian Revolution", Vol. I, Berlin, p. 170.

ment. General Brusilov, Commander of the South-Western Front, demanded by wire that the flood of Ukrainian soldiers from the front to Kiev should be stopped immediately, that "the regiment should be disbanded" in the event of disobedience, and that the "disorders" that had broken out should be suppressed even by force of arms.¹

But the growth of the revolutionary movement in May and June compelled the Provisional Government to make a number of concessions to the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. When preparing the army for an offensive on the Galician Front, the Kerensky government made the first attempt to utilise the Ukrainian regiments to combat the revolutionary movement and Bolshevism.

The public prayers and religious processions of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev, the great influence wielded over them by their officers, the close relations established between the Ukrainians and the Don Cossacks and, what was most important, the high percentage of kulaks in the first Ukrainian regiments, permitted the Provisional Government to hope that the Ukrainian regiments would prove obedient tools of the bourgeoisie.

On May 10 a Ukrainian delegation from the All-Russian Army Committee travelled in the same train as Kerensky to the South-Western Front to visit General Brusilov. Both the War Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front were fully in favour of forming Ukrainian regiments. The War Minister gave his endorsement to the setting up of a Ukrainian Army Committee and sanctioned the formation of the 1st Bogdan Khmel'nitsky Ukrainian Cossack Regiment. General Brusilov, for his part, promised to set up three special corps at the front and to replenish them exclusively with Ukrainians.

The wide offensive of the Russian bourgeoisie against the conquests of the February Revolution, the spread of Great Russian sentiments in the capital and the provinces—sentiments which were hostile even to the most moderate national demands—induced the Provisional Government to retard the formation of the Ukrainian regiments. In the new conflict that broke out between the Provisional Government and the Central Rada, the Ukrainian regiments became a dangerous force. Accordingly, in addition to refusing to sanction the formation of any new regiments, in August and September 1917 the military command attempted to dispatch the Ukrainian regiments already formed to the front. The Government hoped by this measure to

1 "Brusilov's Telegram,"—"Kievskaya Mysl", No 101, April 21, 1917.

disarm the Central Rada and to render its supporters impotent.

That is why neither Kornilov nor General Headquarters made any attempt to utilise the Ukrainian regiments to combat revolution, and relied mostly on the Cossacks and partly on the Poles, but most of all on the shock troops and junkers.

It was only on the eve of the October Revolution that, spurred by mortal danger, the Russian bourgeoisie sought the aid—although not very successfully—of those very Ukrainian regiments the creation of which the bourgeois government had so recently hampered in every way.

The reactionaries attached great importance to the Czecho-Slovakian regiments. Their formation from Austrian prisoners of war and deserters was begun by the tsarist government. But very little progress was made before the revolution. A decision of the Hague International Court forbade the recruiting of prisoners of war. But the Hague Court had also forbidden the use of poison gas, yet nobody paid any attention to the prohibition. In the case in question, the tsarist government feared that Germany might retaliate by forming an army from Polish prisoners of war. Furthermore, the British and French frowned on the formation of Czecho-Slovakian detachments. The "Allies," having promised to establish an independent Czecho-Slovakian Republic, feared that the tsarist government might exercise too great an influence in the affairs of the new state.

The formation of Czecho-Slovakian units proceeded more rapidly after the February Revolution. The Entente generals hoped to use the Czecho-Slovakians to combat revolution in Russia.

The formation of Czecho-Slovakian detachments from Austrian prisoners of war was sanctioned by the Military Council on March 24, 1917.

The speed of formation of Czecho-Slovakian regiments varied directly with the speed of disintegration of the army: whereas only detachments were formed in April, whole corps began to be formed in August. Professor Masaryk, Chairman of the Czecho-Slovakian National Council, requested General Headquarters to expedite the the formation of the regiments. Masaryk requested that permanent representatives of the Council should be attached for this purpose to General Headquarters and to the higher command of the Czecho-Slovakian Corps. With the active support of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik compromisers and the financial assistance of the Entente,

the National Council started an extensive recruiting campaign among the prisoners of war. By August 23 the corps, consisting of the First and Second Czecho-Slovakian Divisions, numbered 25,000 men, not counting artillery.

French military regulations were introduced in the Czecho-Slovakian Corps and the officers ranked with the officers of the Russian army.

The formation of the corps was greatly accelerated after the suppression of the Kornilov revolt. General Kornilov had planned to dispatch the Czecho-Slovakians against Petrograd and Moscow together with the Kornilov Regiment. Later it was attempted to use the Czecho-Slovakians against the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution. We know from a letter written by General Alexeyev that on November 8 (November 21, New Style)—two weeks after the outbreak of the October Revolution (November 7, New Style)—it was planned to bring the Czecho-Slovakian regiments nearer to the Don for a joint offensive with the Cossacks against the Bolsheviks.

What hopes were placed by the counter-revolutionaries in the Czecho-Slovakians may be judged from a letter written by General Kornilov which is quoted in General Denikin's memoirs. On hearing of the revolution in Petrograd, General Kornilov, who was confined in the prison of Bykhovo at the time, sent the following "command" to Dukhonin at General Headquarters:

"Foreseeing the further course of events," wrote Kornilov, setting forth his plan, "I think it necessary that you should urgently adopt such measures as would definitely ensure the safety of General Headquarters and at the same time create favourable conditions for the organisation of the fight against the approaching anarchy.

"I consider these measures to be the following:

"1. The immediate transfer of one of the Czecho-Slovakian regiments and the Polish Uhlan regiment to Moghilev.

"2. The occupation of Orsha, Smolensk, Zhlobin and Gomel by units of the Polish Corps, the divisions of the latter being reinforced by artillery taken from the Cossack batteries at the front.

"3. The concentration along the Orsha-Moghilev-Zhlobin line of all units of the Czecho-Slovakian Corps and the Kornilov Regiment, on the pretext of transferring them to Petrograd and Moscow, and one or two of the more reliable Cossack divisions.

"4. The concentration in the same area of all the British and Belgian armoured cars, their crews being replaced exclusively by officers.

"5. The concentration, under reliable guard, in Moghilev and at one of adjacent points of a stock of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, automatic rifles and hand grenades, for distribution among the officers and volunteers who undoubtedly will assemble in the area mentioned.

"6. The establishment of close contact and a precise agreement with the Atamans of the Don, Terek and Kuban Cossacks and with the Polish and Czecho-Slovakian Committees. . . .

"Such are the considerations which I deemed it necessary to lay before you, adding that a decision must be arrived at without delay."¹

As we see, from the very outbreak of the Civil War, the counter-revolutionaries placed great hopes in the bourgeois national regiments. It was intended that the first blow should be struck by them.

Incidentally, the tsarist generals at once resorted to foreign intervention against the revolution, seeking the support of foreign troops—Entente armoured cars and the Czecho-Slovakian Corps. This was only the germ—the civil war was still in its inception. Foreign intervention was later to play a prominent part in the Civil War in Russia.

1 A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt", Vol. II, Paris, pp. 137-38

THE COSSACKS

The Cossack regiments, headed by the Council of the Alliance of Cossack Troops, were regarded by the counter-revolutionaries as their most reliable support.

At the time of the Kornilov revolt, Dutov, Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, had been instructed to stage a "Bolshevik rebellion" in Petrograd and to use this provocative act to smash the Bolshevik Party. Simultaneously, Kaledin, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, was to strike at Moscow by way of the Donbas.

When the Kornilov revolt collapsed, the Provisional Government hastened to cover up its tracks and gave orders for the arrest and trial of Kaledin for complicity in the Kornilov conspiracy.

A preliminary conference of the Cossack Grand Council, which met in Novocherkassk on September 3, resolved not to surrender the Ataman. Kerensky immediately came to heel and agreed to revoke the order for his arrest, but demanded that Kaledin should appear at General Headquarters and testify before the Investigation Commission. The ease with which Kerensky switched from rage to clemency only served to show that the stern words and "revolutionary" gesture of the Provisional Government were mere camouflage. On September 5 the Cossack Grand Council accorded Kaledin an ovation and resolved to hear his speech standing. The Grand Council characterised the accusation brought against Kaledin as "the fruit of the disturbed imagination of cowards."¹

Kaledin was supported by all the counter-revolutionary organisations. A Cossack delegation visited Kerensky and members of the cabinet and insisted on Kaledin's complete exoneration. A delegation from the Don Cossacks and representatives from the Council of the Cossack Alliance even visited the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan. The Ambassador informed the delegation that Great Britain valued the services of the Cossacks very highly.

The bourgeoisie designed Kaledin for a new dictator. "Kaledin is the Man of the Hour," declared the "New York Times," expressing the general hope of the counter-revolutionaries.

On the eve of the October Revolution the Commission appointed by the government to investigate the Kornilov

¹ "Ataman Kaledin, Resolution of the Cossack Grand Council. Ataman's Plume Presented to General Kaledin,"—"Utro Rossii", No. 220, September 12, 1917.

affair announced that Kaledin was absolutely innocent of all complicity in the revolt.

The proposed dictator was left entirely free to devote himself to the organisation of the forces of counter-revolution. A new state was set up under his leadership, known as the South-Eastern Alliance of the Cossacks of the Kuban, Terek, Don and Astrakhan, the Gortsi of the North Caucasus and the steppe peoples of the Don Region and Astrakhan Province.

Kerensky was immediately informed that the Land Committees were not acceptable to the Cossack regions. The Cossack leaders demanded that the formation of Land Committees should be discontinued and that the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in Novocherkassk should be recalled to Petrograd. At the same time, the non-Cossack population of the region was promised that its representatives would be invited into the new administration.

On the pretext that cavalry could not be maintained in the war area owing to the shortage of fodder, the Cossack and Gortsi troops were transferred from the front to the Don and the Kuban. On the other hand, the reserve infantry regiments, whose revolutionary sentiments hampered the preparations for a counter-revolution, were removed from the Cossack regions.

General Headquarters, in its preparations to crush the revolution, bared whole sections of the front.

The Provisional Government willingly supported the measures of the counter-revolutionaries in the Don region. The head of the government wired Dukhonin in reference to the reserve infantry regiments:

"I request you to give instructions to evacuate the reserve infantry regiments from the Cossack regions and to inform the Cossack administration and the Cossack units at the front of this, and especially the scouts, so that they may perform their duties with an easy mind."¹

Thus Kerensky directly admitted that the reserve regiments were being withdrawn from the Cossack regions in order to reassure the Cossacks.

Even General Dukhonin, who cannot be accused of even the slightest trace of liberalism, hesitated to transmit Kerensky's telegram in full. Dukhonin conveyed the instructions of the head of the government in the following terms:

"In view of the proposed reduction of reserve units, the Supreme Commander requests the immediate withdrawal

¹ Central Archives of Military Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-097, folio 139.

of the reserve infantry regiments from the Cossack regions.”¹

The “conscience-stricken” general only slightly veiled the garrulous frankness of the over-zealous protector of the counter-revolutionaries by giving a reduction of reserve units as a reason for the withdrawal. But he himself was very energetic in clearing the Cossack territories and in helping to concentrate counter-revolutionary forces in the Don Region. Cossack troops were moved into the Don and Kuban Regions, and thither too officers implicated in the Kornilov affair were smuggled and tens of thousands of rifles and whole trainloads of artillery consigned.

As the industrial areas of Central Russia grew to be centres of revolution, the Cossack territories became nests of counter-revolution.

“At the very beginning of the October Revolution,” Stalin says, “a certain geographical demarcation between revolution and counter-revolution was to be observed. As the Civil War developed, the regions of revolution and counter-revolution became fully defined. Inferior Russia, with its industrial, cultural and political centres (Moscow and Petrograd), with its nationally homogeneous population, consisting principally of Russians, became the base of revolution. The border regions of Russia, on the other hand, chiefly the southern and eastern border regions, which have no important industrial, cultural and political centres, whose population is nationally heterogeneous to a high degree, consisting of privileged Cossack colonisers, on the one hand, and unfranchised Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz (in the east), Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingushes and other Mohammedan peoples, on the other, became the base of counter-revolution.

“It should not be difficult to understand that there is nothing unnatural in such a geographical division of the warring forces of Russia. For, indeed, who should serve as the base of the Soviet government if not the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow? Who else should be the bulwark of the Denikin-Kolchak counter-revolution if not the age-long weapon of Russian imperialism, privileged and organised into a military caste—the Cossacks—who had long exploited the non-Russian peoples?”²

¹ Central Archives of Military History Records of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-097, folio 140.

² J. Stalin, “The Military Situation in South Russia,”—“Pravda”, No. 293, December 28, 1919.

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES INCITE THE FRONT AGAINST THE REAR

The formation of counter-revolutionary units at the front and in the Cossack Provinces had inspired the generals with a certain hope of success. But these hopes were dashed by the spread of the revolution. A flood of revolutionary literature poured into the war area from the rear; reinforcements arrived and brought with them the charged atmosphere of the revolutionary centres. Delegations of workers came from the industrial cities, bringing the ardent slogans of revolution. The counter-revolutionaries could consolidate their temporary successes at the front only by isolating the front from the rear.

For a long time, ever since the outbreak of the revolution, attempts had been made to incite the army against the workers. The bourgeois Press waged a furious campaign against the introduction of the eight-hour day. The workers were accused of treason. The soldiers at the front, who, it was declared, were sacrificing everything for the fatherland, were held up as an example to them. The idea was instilled into the soldiers that the workers were earning piles of money and profiting by the shortage of labour. The economic dislocation, the food shortage and the inadequate supply of munitions to the front were ascribed to the unwillingness of the proletarians to work more than eight hours a day.

In places the attempt to incite the soldiers against the workers succeeded. Soldiers' delegations came to Petrograd from the front with resolutions insisting that the workers should abandon their "excessive demands." But when the soldiers' delegations appeared in the factories, when the soldiers came into contact with the proletarians, they were soon convinced of the provocative nature of the bourgeois policy. The delegates would return to the front in an entirely different frame of mind. With the object of refuting the bourgeois calumnies, the workers in their turn began to demand that soldiers' delegations should be sent to Petrograd. Thousands of soldiers from the Petrograd garrison, after having been at the factories, were sent by the military organisation of the Bolsheviks to the front, where they exposed the provocative character of the campaign.

The slanderous attacks of the bourgeoisie had the very opposite effect. Instead of inciting the front against

the rear, they knit the soldiers and the workers in a united front against counter-revolution.

"In reply to your hypocritical cries, 'Soldiers to the trenches, workers to the bench!'" the Grenadier Guards wrote, "we say, 'And you, Messieurs the capitalists, to your money chests! Open them! The people have been giving their blood and sweat; now you give your money for the liquidation of the frightful world war which you started!'"¹

The more shaky the ground under the feet of the bourgeoisie became, the more feverishly did they strive to create a gulf between the front and the rear. The Cadet press howled in fury that the cause of all the misfortunes lay in the rear. This malicious refrain was monotonously repeated by 150 bourgeois, Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik army newspapers.

The units attached to the various military headquarters, in which the sons of the bourgeoisie had taken refuge; the personnel of the innumerable organisations operating in the war area; the hospitals and dressing stations, in which former lawyers, state officials and Zemstvo officials had found an asylum; the staffs, stores departments and supply organisations—all delivered themselves of protest resolutions and false accusations against the rear. These resolutions were copied from the army newspapers by the bourgeois press in Petrograd and Moscow and were printed under the heading: "The Voice of the Front."

Here is one such resolution from the "front":

"A general meeting of the Headquarters Committee of the N. Infantry Division, the adjutants' company and the headquarters auxiliary squads passed a resolution stating that the meeting considers all insubordination to the will of the revolutionary government, to the will of the majority of the democracy, as represented by its Central Committees, treason to the revolution and as a direct menace to the fatherland. The fatherland is in danger not only here, at the front, but also, and still more, in the rear. It is from the rear alone that the disintegration in the army emanates. The army has been perverted by the traitors in the rear. Let the rear, like the army, observe iron revolutionary discipline. Let the traitors and betrayers of the common cause, whether soldiers or not, be tried in the rear by the same laws as at the front."²

The campaign spread, its outcry became deafening. The

¹ Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison.—Materials and Documents, Lenin-grad, 1932, p. 65.

² "Army and Navy,"—"Ryech", No. 169, July 21, 1917.

extent and vociferousness of the campaign indicated that the reactionaries were raising this noise as a screen for more serious preparations. This soon became obvious. At the Council of State held in Moscow, General Alexeyev made a speech attacking the rear, in which he said:

"Those in the rear have not been made to perform useful work. They are all idling. . . . They have not been trained in the rudiments of the soldiers' business. Not so long ago they were a solid unit, cemented by one thing—love of the fatherland . . . and by the realisation that the war must be fought to a finish."¹

The general attributed all the disorders in the army to the influence of agitators from the rear. He related the case of a soldier of one of the regiments who had been sent to a school for agitators in the rear and who on his return organised a demonstration against the officers.

This manoeuvre on the part of General Alexeyev, one of the most active organisers of counter-revolution, was supported by the "Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," as the Socialist-Revolutionaries called Breshko-Breshkovskaya, who actually was one of the most active abettors of counter-revolution.

"The misfortune of our army," she said, seconding Alexeyev, "lies not so much at the front as in the rear. Our rear has been idle for nearly three years. It is bored, it is putrefying. And those people who have been made wise by experience and who have been on various Soviets in Petrograd and Moscow and know what is going on in the army—one-half of them, a good half of them should proceed immediately to the rear and organize it, otherwise we shall get nowhere."²

This Socialist-Revolutionary old lady blurted out what the more experienced general had left unsaid. The rear was to be bridled by the army, the front was to supply the people to bridle the rear. This contrasting of the front and the rear was needed to screen and justify the preparations for the Kornilov affair.

The suppression of the Kornilov revolt was a serious blow to the campaign for inciting the front against the rear. It became impossible to continue the campaign in its old form: the revolution had exposed its true character. The counter-revolutionaries, however, did not abandon their purpose of inciting the front against the rear, but now attempted to achieve it in a different way.

1 "The Council of State in Moscow," *Ryech*, No. 191, August 16, 1917.

2 *Ibid*.

The garrisons of reserve regiments in the cities constituted one of the decisive supports of the revolution. These regiments counted about one and a half million men. The garrisons in the rear consisted of second category reserve men of the 1896 class or of the 1894 class, or else of young men recently conscripted. Part of the garrisons consisted of convalescent soldiers. The composition of the reserve regiments made them receptive to revolutionary propaganda. The young soldiers, recently conscripted, and the fathers of families of forty years of age and over who had been torn from their work, were very receptive material and expected big changes in their lives from the revolution. But, of course, it was not so much the composition of these regiments as their surroundings that counted. The garrisons, especially the garrisons of Petrograd, Moscow and other large cities, were under the constant influence of the Bolshevik newspapers and the revolutionary proletariat. The reservists like the workers, attended meetings, processions and demonstrations against the government. The Bolsheviks carried on intensive propaganda among the reserve regiments.

From the reserve regiments, the revolutionary influence spread to the front through the reinforcements consigned to the army on active service. The reserve regiments in the cities constituted an armed support of the revolution and an agitational force. They supplied the workers with military instructors, and often also with arms. From among the reserve regiments the Bolshevik Party recruited members and agitators for work at the front.

If the counter-revolutionaries succeeded in winning over the garrisons, the revolution in the rear would be undermined and the front would be protected from the revolutionary influence. The fight to win the garrisons in the rear became for the bourgeoisie the chief part of the fight for the support of the army and of the fight against the revolution. The plan of the generals was to transfer the most revolutionary regiments from the large cities to the front and to replace them by "reliable" regiments. As though in response to a signal, requests for reinforcements began to pour into General Headquarters. Even the Caucasian Front, where hostilities had practically ceased, sent telegram after telegram:

"The Caucasian Front requests the earliest possible dispatch of 100,000 effectives. Among this number, please send as early as possible 20,000 third-category men from the Petrograd garrison, and in addition, 30,000 men from the

reserve regiments in the interior areas, either in whole reserve regiments or in companies. . . ."¹

This telegram plainly states where the reinforcements were to be taken from: from Petrograd, the most revolutionary of the garrisons, 20,000 men, and from other cities whose regiments. In spite of the collapse of the June offensive and the almost complete lull in hostilities, there was a steady flow of drafts to the front. A large number of the reinforcements deserted *en route*, but the aim of the counter-revolutionaries was being attained: the garrisons in the rear began to melt away and, as a result, the base of the revolution was to a certain extent undermined.

It was not only by the dispatch of companies to the front that the garrisons in the rear were depleted. Reserve regiments were withdrawn from the cities on every possible pretext. For instance, on the complaint of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet that discipline in the 45th Reserve Infantry Regiment in Nikolayev had completely broken down, General Dukhonin ordered:

"It is desirable that the 45th Reserve Regiment be withdrawn from Nikolayev immediately. . . ."²

The reserve regiments were withdrawn in the first place from cities where the revolutionary spirit was strong, or where the revolutionary influence of the soldiers hindered the concentration of reactionary forces, as, for instance, in the Don Region. The counter-revolutionary activities of the generals soon received government sanction; the Ministry of War prepared the draft of an order providing for the systematic reduction of the reserve regiments in the rear, and while this order was being examined in appropriate quarters, the reserve regiments were drawn closer to the front on the pretext of improving their fighting capacity.

The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik committees in the army worked hand in hand with the reactionaries.

"Experience shows," wrote the Commander of the XVIII Army Corps to the Commander of the Ninth Army on August 20, 1917, "that the reserve regiments quartered in the big cities have an inordinately large number of men without a proportionate number of officers, who, in addition, are often very inexperienced. All this tends to undermine order and discipline within these regiments and results in their unsatisfactory state of train-

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-097, folio 42.

² *Ibid.*, folio 191.

ing, which, in its turn, reacts unfavourably on the regiments for which they are recruited. Accordingly, I fully endorse the resolution of the Divisional Committee of the 37th Infantry Division (the committee consisted of Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—*Ed.*), which has been endorsed by the Chief of Division, and request the following:

"As practice has shown that the bringing of regiments from the rear into closer proximity to the army on active service at the front undoubtedly helps to create a more healthy spirit among them, kindly transfer the 1st Reserve Regiment from Petrograd to some point behind the Rumanian Front to reinforce the 37th Infantry Division."¹

On the other hand, reliable men, Knights of St. George, shock-troopers, reactionary officers, non-commissioned officers and picked and tried soldiers, were sent from the front to the reserve regiments. The Petrograd Military Area informed the Adjutant-General at General Headquarters:

"Work in the reserve regiments can be resumed only with the help of healthy and reliable cadres, without which the army runs the risk of being entirely deprived of decent reinforcements."²

Protected by the Provisional Government, the counter-revolutionary generals developed intense activity. Thousands of soldiers from the reserve regiments were dispatched from the industrial centres to the front. The more active members of the soldiers' committees were sent on furlough before they were entitled to it. Officers who sympathised with the masses were removed from the reserve regiments on every possible pretext and dispatched to the front. The officers of the Reserve Grenadier Regiment decided to get rid of Sub-Lieutenant Nikonov on the grounds that he was "noxious" to soldiers and officers, whereas it appears from the protest of the soldiers that Nikonov had been extremely active in combating the Kornilov conspiracy.

The press launched a widespread campaign designed to incite the front against the rear. The initiative this time was taken by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

"Where is the inspiration of the democracy?"—the "Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," which was controlled by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, indig-

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 80-097, folio 26.

² *Ibid.*, folio 48.

nantly inquired on October 3. "The peasants bury their grain and let it rot, only not to send it to the army, there the bread ration is often short. The soldiers of the garrisons on the rear are better clad and shod and often better fed than the soldiers in the trenches."¹

"The position in the rear at present is far from satisfactory," the "Izvestia" wrote on October 6. "And this nourishes and accentuates the hostility to the rear. And this hostility cannot be overcome merely by refuting lies, but by actually removing what is justified in these accusations."²

The Cadet "Ryech" slyly seconded the slanders of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and maliciously enlarged upon them in its columns.

"The people of the reaction are not talkers," Marx wrote of the counter-revolutionaries in 1848. The Cadets knew very well how feverishly and persistently the counter-revolutionaries were working to gain control of the regiments in the rear. Superfluous talk might only injure the persistent and expeditious work of the counter-revolutionaries. The petty-bourgeois compromisers zealously screened and justified the preparations for a counter-revolutionary offensive.

¹ "Are We at War or Not?" Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, No. 187, October 3, 1917.

² "The Front's Opinion of the Rear," Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, No. 190, October 6, 1917.

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE

As has already been stated, the revolution ripened at a speed which outstripped the counter-measures taken by the bourgeoisie and the landlords. The revolution gained the support of the masses, penetrating to all parts of the front, spreading far into the interior of the country, to the backward regions, and making its way to the very heart of counter-revolution—the Cossack regions.

Regiments which had only recently vowed their allegiance to the black and red flag of the bourgeois shock battalions, now refused to obey their commanders.

The regimental committee of the Semyonovsky Guards Regiment—which had gained notoriety for its ruthless suppression of the uprising of the Moscow workers in 1905 boasted that “the whole regiment would assume the lead of the storm troops”¹; but a few days later the Semyonovsky Guards refused to go into the trenches.

The regiments of the II Corps of Guards at first expressed a wish to be counted as storm regiments, but later whole regiments refused to obey orders.

In reference to the Polish Uhlan Regiment and the Czech regiments, which Kornilov proposed should be the first to be launched against the revolution, Dukhonin gloomily made the following notation on Kornilov's memorandum: “General Headquarters do not consider them absolutely reliable.”²

There was suppressed unrest among the Cossacks at the front, who resented having to perform police duties. Ataman Bogayevsky reported that the Cossacks at the front had sent a protest against the decision of the Cossack Grand Council to form an alliance with the Cadets in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Representatives of the Cossacks at the front sharply protested against the decision of the Kuban Cossack Rada to proclaim the Kuban an independent republic.

The conflict between Cossack commanders and men at times assumed an acute form. A resolution adopted by the Omsk Soviet of Cossack Deputies on the night of October 4 proclaimed the Grand and Minor Councils of the Siberian Cossacks counter-revolutionary; their Chairmen were arrested and a guard was placed over the headquarters of

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the South-Western Front, File No. 142-004, folio 414.

² Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—Adjutant-General's Office, File No. 76-084, folio 366.

the Councils. "The Cossacks have adopted an irreconcilable attitude—they refuse to fight the Bolsheviks,"¹ is the way General Dukhonin summed up the spread of the revolutionary spirit among the Cossacks.

There was a danger that the last fighting forces of the counter-revolutionaries might slip from their hands. Sensing that a crisis was approaching, they decided to assume the offensive. This was openly admitted by General Brusilov at the Congress of Public Men in Moscow:

"Everybody is talking about a strong government. But a strong government will appear only when the majority of the people and the soldiers realise the full depths of the country's decline and when they say: 'Enough of disorganisation; we want order, we want to enjoy our liberty, we do not want anarchy.' When this occurs a strong government will appear."²

Brusilov's appeal to resort to open action against the revolution was supported by Ilyin, another delegate. Asserting that there were now only two parties—the party of disruption, headed by the Bolsheviks, and the party of order, headed by Kornilov—Ilyin insolently declared:

"We are the party of order. If the revolution consists in everybody grabbing what he can, then we are counter-revolutionary."³

Kornilov was again becoming the ideal of the counter-revolutionaries.

"We regard the name of Kornilov," Struve, that out-and-out reactionary, declared at a meeting of the Pre-parliament, "as an absolutely honest one, and for this honest name we are prepared to lay down our lives."⁴

Struve's statement was greeted by stormy applause in the Pre-Parliament, the body which, according to the plans of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik traitors, was to represent the will of the people until the Constituent Assembly met.

The continuation of the war bound the government hand and foot in its fight against revolution; and the Provisional Government took the path of the tsarist Ministers who before the February Revolution had endeavoured to arrange a separate peace with the Germans. At a confidential meeting of the government held on October 11,

1 A. I. Denikin, "Sketches of the Russian Revolt", Vol. II, Paris, 1922, p. 188.

2 "The Conference of Public Men,"—"Russkiye Vedomosti", No. 235, October 14, 1917.

3 "The Second Moscow Conference," Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, No. 197, October 14, 1917.

4 "The Council of the Republic—P. B. Struve's Speech,"—"Dyelo Naroda" No. 186, October 21, 1917.

Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, advanced a new slogan—"War As Long as the Army is in a Condition to Fight!"—in place of the slogan, "War to a Victorious Finish!"¹ The new slogan would render Russia's participation in the war purely conditional: at any moment it might be proclaimed that the army was not in a condition to fight, and Russia would withdraw from the war.

But the preparation of public opinion did not stop there. On October 21 Burtsev, the editor of a yellow sheet, "Obshcheye Dyelo," announced that the question of concluding a separate peace with the Germans had been discussed at a meeting of a commission of the Pre-Parliament on October 20. The paper was immediately suppressed on Kerensky's orders, not for libellous statements, however, but for—publishing information about a confidential meeting of the Commission.

The government was anxious to conclude peace and to start an offensive against the revolution. Almost simultaneously, on October 9, the Menshevik Nikitin, the Minister of the Interior, sent out—an order instructing that special committees should be formed under the aegis of the Provincial Commissars of the Provisional Government, consisting of representatives of local government bodies and of the judicial and military authorities. The purpose of the committees was to muster the local forces that were prepared to support the Provisional Government. The committees were endowed with plenary powers.

On October 11, the Minister of War issued an order that the army should be enlisted "in the fight against anarchy." Armed forces were thus placed at the disposal of the counter-revolutionary Committees.

The Mensheviks seconded the efforts of the bourgeoisie. On October 15 they submitted to the Pre-Parliament a draft of "Provisional Regulations for Combating the Pogrom Movement." The draft provided for the creation in all localities of plenipotentiary Committees of Public Safety consisting of representatives of various organisations and of the military and judicial authorities. The Pre-Parliament, to which were submitted the proposal of the Mensheviks and that of the Menshevik Minister, Nikitin, for the creation of committees under the Provincial Commissars, endorsed the draft proposed by the Mensheviks, for in that guise the counter-revolutionary nature of the committees would be less obvious. It was the Mensheviks who were responsible for creating the Committees of Public Safety.

1 "In the Provisional Government."—"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", No. 195, October 12, 1917.

which assumed the leadership of the counter-revolutionary forces immediately after the October Revolution broke out.

Cavalry units were hastily transferred to the rear from the front. On October 4, on the orders of the Ministry of War, a cavalry division was dispatched to the Donbas from the Rumanian Front. The purpose of this transfer was precisely defined in a telegram sent by General Dukhonin to General Shcherbachov on October 12:

"For the purpose of maintaining order in the Donetsk district, urgently [the word 'urgently' was inserted by Dukhonin when he signed the telegram—*Ed.*] dispatch a mounted division to be placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Odessa Military Area at a point to be designated by him."¹

The division was dispatched, notwithstanding that the front had been almost stripped bare, and notwithstanding the objections of General Shcherbachov, the Commander of the Rumanian Front.

While transferring troops to such disturbed areas as the Donbas, the reactionaries also sent reliable troops to reinforce the garrisons in the large key cities. Thus, on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front, a Don Cossack infantry brigade was hastily transferred to Kiev. A previous order for the withdrawal of the 17th Don Cossack Regiment from the city was countermanded at the request of the local authorities.

Reinforcements were sent to such important key cities as Bryansk and Smolensk. The 4th Siberian Cossack Regiment was hastily dispatched to Smolensk.

Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the garrison in Moghilev, where General Headquarters were located. The latter, insisting on the reinforcement of the garrison in Moghilev, sent the following demand to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front:

"Send us the 1st Orenburg Regiment. It is recommended by the Petrograd Cossack Congress. October 19."² This it was which determined the political reliability of the regiments!

The whole area in the neighbourhood of the front was inundated with cavalry, which was furnished with a definite plan of action. An idea of this plan can be obtained from the following document sent from the South-Western Front:

"For the protection of the rear there have been placed at the disposal of the chief of supply of the Army on the

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quarter master's Department, File No. 673, folio 142.

² *Ibid.*, folio 186.

South-Western Front the 6th and 7th [a mistake in the text; apparently the 5th is meant—*Ed.*] Don Cossack divisions and the 1st Regiments of the 1st Horse Guards Division. The entire 6th Cossack Division has been quartered in the area west of the Dnieper, and of the 5th Cossack Division 1½ regiments east and 2½ west of the Dnieper, 1½ in Kiev and 1 in Vinnitsa; a regiment of the Horse Guards Division has been quartered east of the Dnieper. The whole rear area has been divided into regimental protection sectors. The Commander of the 6th Cossack Division has been appointed commander of all the troops designated for the protection of the area west of the Dnieper, and the Commander of the 5th Cossack Division has been appointed commander of all the troops designated for protection of the Kiev area and the area east of the Dnieper. The commanders of both divisions have been subordinated to the Chief of Supply of the Army on the South-Western Front through the Commander of the Kiev Military Area. In addition, there has been placed at the disposal of the Chief of Transport of the Army on the South-Western Front three regiments of the 1st Horse Guards Division and six separate squadrons for the protection of the railway. No. 2659086/793. Stogov.”¹

More careful military measures were taken against the internal foe than against the external foe. At the front, hastily-formed units were driven into action, often without plan and without any regard for the fighting spirit of the soldiers. But in the rear, the plan was worked out in every detail. Areas were divided into sectors. Every commander received precise instructions beforehand. The troops were carefully selected; they were passed through several filters.

The reactionaries devoted particular attention to Moscow. When new preparations for an offensive against the revolution were undertaken, General Headquarters decided to dispatch a cavalry division to Moscow. On October 2 Dukhonin wired the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front:

“The Supreme Commander has given orders for the immediate transfer by rail of one of the regular cavalry divisions to be placed at the disposal of the Commander of the Moscow Military Area as he shall instruct. Please wire which cavalry division is assigned.”²

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander—General Quartermasters' Department, File No. 673, folios 156-57.

² *Ibid.*, folio 105.

In connection with the dispatch of the division, orders were given to withdraw the 7th Cossack Regiment from Moscow, but the Moscow authorities decided that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. Colonel Ryabtsev, the Commander of the Moscow Military Area, urgently requested that the regiment be allowed to remain in Moscow. General Headquarters consented. Furthermore, it ordered the transfer of the 4th Siberian Cossack Regiment to Kaluga, in closer proximity to Moscow.

But revolutionary events developed with such speed that even these forces proved inadequate. Moscow kept asking from day to day when the division would arrive, and on October 20 the following telegram was sent to General Headquarters:

"The resolution adopted by the Bolshevik Soviet on the immediate seizure of the factories, and the decree anticipated in connection therewith, render action by the Bolsheviks and the seizure of government and public institutions in Moscow highly probable in the immediate future, perhaps to-day. There is information that Moscow will be the centre of the revolt. For the preservation of order in Moscow the forces at my disposal are adequate ... but in the area, where similar action is anticipated at many points, it is possible that your assistance will be required, chiefly in the form of cavalry and horse artillery, of which the Minister of War has been informed. Acting Commander of the Moscow Military Area, Colonel Kravchuk.¹

The Moscow counter-revolutionaries apparently know of the letter in which Lenin stated that the insurrection might start in Moscow. The reactionaries did not wait for the insurrection and took precautionary measures. This casts light on the subsequent events in Moscow, where the insurrection dragged on for several days: the Moscow counter-revolutionaries had managed to accumulate considerable forces.

Dukhonin made the following notation on the telegram signed by Colonel Kravchuk:

"Preparations should be made to dispatch, if not a division, at least a brigade with horse artillery. Dukhonin."²

That same day, October 20, General Headquarters informed Moscow:

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander—General-Quartermasters' Department, File No. 673, folio 198.

² Ibid., folio 200.

"Orders have been given to prepare a mounted brigade and a battery for dispatch to you from the South-Western Front on receipt of intimation from you that they are required."¹

In the light of these facts, how groundless, how childish and naive is Trotsky's "theory" that the refusal to allow troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd pre-determined the issue of the October insurrection.

"The result of the insurrection of October 25," Trotsky says in his "Lessons of October," "was three-quarters pre-determined, if not more, at the time we resisted the withdrawal of the Petrograd garrison, set up the Revolutionary Military Committee (October 16), appointed our commissar to all military units and institutions, and thereby completely isolated not only the staff of the Petrograd Military Area but also the government. This was virtually the armed insurrection. . . . The insurrection of October 25 bore only a supplementary character."²

In the light of the above documents, this treacherous legend melts away like snow in the sun. The refusal to allow the regiments to be withdrawn from Petrograd was nothing but a challenge to the counter-revolutionaries cast by the revolutionaries. And it was after this that the counter-revolutionaries developed such feverish activity in their attempt to forestall the impending insurrection. If the Bolshevik Party had believed even for a single moment that the refusal to allow the garrison to be withdrawn from Petrograd was "virtually the armed insurrection," the success of which was rendered certain by this refusal, it would have fallen into the trap set by the counter-revolutionaries. What Trotsky's "lawful," and "peaceful insurrection" would have led to was that the counter-revolutionaries, having mustered their forces, would have crushed the "peaceful" victims.

And this was completely borne out by the subsequent course of events.

The counter-revolutionaries completed their preparations: general staffs for crushing the revolution were set up in the various localities, in the shape of the notorious Committees of Public Safety; these committees were endowed with plenary powers; reliable troops were summoned from the front; the detachments which had long been held in readiness in the rear were now brought to a state of mili-

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-General-Quartermasters' Department, File No. 673, folio 200.

² L. Trotsky, "Lessons of October,"—"Collected Works", Vol. III, Part I Moscow, pp. xlix-1.

tary preparedness; large reinforcements were sent to important points and to the big industrial cities, while in Petrograd itself all measures were taken for the suppression of an armed uprising.

On October 14, the day after the plenary meeting of the Petrograd Soviet had sanctioned the formation of a Revolutionary Military Committee and had instructed it to assume its function immediately, Kerensky summoned a meeting of members of the Provisional Government. General Bagratuni, Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military Area, informed the Meeting of the measures taken to deal with a possible uprising. The Provisional Government, which did not believe that the impending uprising would be a "peaceful" one, endorsed these measures and gave instructions that the defence of the city should be entrusted to the Military Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. The following day, Polkovnikov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area, forbade all demonstrations, meetings and processions, no matter by whom they were arranged. His order ended with the words:

"I hereby give warning that I shall adopt the most extreme measures to suppress any attempt to disturb order in Petrograd."¹

At a confidential meeting of the Provisional Government held on October 16, Polkovnikov reported on the preparations being made to deliver a counter-blow. Polkovnikov stated that the junker schools in the neighbourhood of Petrograd had been summoned to the capital and that part of an armoured car battalion had been quartered at the Winter Palace. Endorsing the measures proposed, the government considered it necessary to transfer the control of the militia from the district Dumas of the city directly to the government. The armed forces of the capital were brought under centralised control.

Another meeting of the Provisional Government was held the following day. Reports were made by Kerensky, Verkhovsky, the Minister of War, and Nikitin, the Minister of the Interior, who had all just returned from the front. Kerensky announced that all necessary measures had already been taken: the guard at the Winter Palace and Mariinsky Palace, the seats of the government and the Pre-parliament respectively, had been reinforced; two ensign schools had been summoned from Oranienbaum near Petrograd to protect the post-office, telegraph office and telephone station; an armoured train and a number of military

¹ "Announcement,"—"Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies", No. 199, October 17, 1917.

units had been summoned from the Rumanian Front; the militia had been reinforced. In a word, Kerensky assured the meeting the available military forces were quite adequate.

How preparations were proceeding within Petrograd itself may be judged from the following facts.

On October 3 unreliable companies of the 1st Reserve Brigade of Guards, which formed part of the garrison of the Fortress of Peter and Paul, were replaced by four companies of a cycle battalion. On October 10 the First Oranienbaum Ensign School arrived in Petrograd to guard the Winter Palace. On October 16 the Second Oranienbaum Ensign School arrived. On October 17 orders were given to place at the disposal of the Commander of the Petrograd Military Area sixteen Fiat armoured cars and one Harford armoured car for the protection of the Winter Palace and government buildings.

The decisive moment was at hand: the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries faced each other in battle array.

The first blow was struck by the counter-revolutionaries. Believing that the Bolsheviks would raise the standard of revolt on October 20, the date originally proposed for the opening of the Second Congress of Soviets, the Provisional Governments, on the day before the opening, i.e., October 19, again issued orders for Lenin's arrest. The government prosecutor instructed all authorities to make a search for Lenin, to arrest him and to deliver him to P. A. Alexandrov, Court Investigator on Important Cases.

That same day, a government Commissar named Galin, arrived in Kaluga with the Cossacks, issued an ultimatum to the Kaluga Soviet demanding that its Soldiers' Section should be dissolved and the garrison disarmed. A punitive detachment surrounded the Palace of Liberty—where all the sections of the Soviet held their sessions—fired on the building, wrecked the headquarters of the Soviet and arrested the Bolshevik deputies. The Cossacks who wrecked the Soviet said that they had been instructed to disperse another twelve Soviets which held Bolshevik views, including the Moscow Soviet.

In Kazan, the Commander of the Military Area ordered the disarming of an artillery battalion which supported the Bolsheviks.

In Tashkent, General Korovnichenko had the barracks, which were occupied by revolutionary-minded soldiers, surrounded by Cossacks and junkers supported by two armoured cars.

In Petrograd, the streets were picketed by strong detachments of junkers and Cossacks, while reserves were concealed in various parts of the city, ready to go into action at a moment's notice. The militia was ordered to hold itself in readiness; half the force was constantly kept on duty at headquarters. The city was heavily patrolled by Cossacks.

A secret order was issued to the Petrograd garrison:

"In view of the fact that the principal objects of seizure will be the Winter Palace, the Smolny Institute, the Mariinsky Palace, the Taurida Palace, the staff headquarters of the Military Area, the State Bank, the Treasury Printing Office, the Post and Telegraph Office and the Central Telephone Station, all efforts must be directed towards retaining these institutions in our hands. This entails occupying the line of the River Neva on one side and the line of the Obvodny Canal and the Fontanka on the other, thus preventing the rebels from gaining access to the central part of the city. ..."¹

Then followed detailed instructions as to how the regiments should act in the event of armed action by the workers.

This order was intercepted by the Commissar of the Finland Reserve Regiment and delivered to the Revolutionary Military Committee.

As we know, the insurrection did not take place on the 20th; nor was the Congress of Soviets held that day. The Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik traitors manoeuvred, and at the last moment decided to postpone the Congress for another five days, hoping in the meantime to increase the number of their supporters among the delegates. A not unimportant motive was the desire to defeat the plans of the Bolsheviks at the last moment. The petty-bourgeois politicians also believed that the insurrection had been planned to coincide with the Congress and by postponing the Congress they hoped to postpone the insurrection.

But, having taken the offensive, the counter-revolutionaries persisted in the execution of their plans.

On October 20 the Second Peterhof Ensign School was summoned to Petrograd to replace the First Oranienbaum School at the Winter Palace. On October 21 the First Peterhof Ensign School arrived in the capital and occupied the Anichkov Palace.

On October 23 the Staff of the Petrograd Military Area was instructed to transfer to the city a shock battalion from Tsarskoye Syelo, the artillery of the Guards from Pavlovsk

¹ Central Archives of Military History, Records of the Chancellery of the Minister of War, File No. 2003s, Folio 46.

and a number of units from the Northern Front. On October 24 a company of the 1st Petrograd Women's Battalion arrived to reinforce the garrison at the Winter-Palace. The Third Peterhof Ensign School and the Ensign School of the Northern Front, each man supplied with 100 cartridges, were due to arrive in Petrograd on October 25.

As we see, the Provisional Government did not trust the army. The core of the troops transferred to the capital was made up of the military schools—"the bourgeois guard," as Lenin called them. The class instinct of the government did not err: even some of the picked units, as, for example, the Colt Machine-Gun Battalion and the Cycle Battalion, not only failed to give armed support to the Provisional Government, but even joined the insurrectionary Petrograd workers.

Finally, the government armed the sections of the population whose support it thought it could rely on.

On October 18 the Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military Area gave orders that "20 revolvers and 400 cartridges be issued to Drankin, Commander of the Students' Motor-Cycle Detachment."¹ On October 20 orders were given to issue 100 revolvers and rifles and 3,000 cartridges to the Bank Employees' Committee. On October 24 orders were given to issue arms to "a company of maimed and wounded soldiers, escaped prisoners of war,"² organised by V. Orlovich. On October 24 a similar detachment was formed and armed by Ensign Frolov. On October 24 a machine-gun was issued to the sailor Chaikin, Chairman of a Petrograd regional Volunteer recruiting committee.

Attention was principally devoted to the defence of the Winter Palace—the headquarters of the Provisional Government. The selection of a mixed detachment to serve as the garrison of the palace proceeded from October 10 to October 23. The selection was made with the greatest care. The main body of the detachment consisted of the military schools with picked students. When rank-and-file soldiers were asked for, it was with the reservation that they must be "reliable men." Thus, an order was given on October 17 to the commander of a machine-gun battalion to send "reliable" machine-gunners to man the two Colt guns and two Maxim guns in the palace. Other orders were of a similar tenor.

¹ A. Dregen. "The Petrograd Garrison in October,"—"Krasnaya Letopis", 1927, No. 2 (28), p. 113.

² "The Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison Materials and Documents" Leningrad, 1932, p. 387.

The composition and arms of the detachment assigned to guard the Winter Palace were as follows (on October 21):¹

Unit	Officers	Junkers	Soldiers	Armoured Guns	Machine- Cars	guns
Second Peterhof Ensign School	10	300	6	—	—	—
Second Oranienbaum Ensign School	22	330	—	—	—	9
Mikhailovsky Artillery School	2	66	—	6	—	—
Armoured Car Battalion	2	—	15	—	5	10
4th Company, 1st Cycle Battalion	1	—	54	—	—	—
	37	696	75	6	5	19

In the course of the next few days the mixed detachment was reinforced by shock troops from Tsarskoye Syelo, a company of the 1st Petrograd Women's Battalion, junkers from the Ensign School of the Northern Front, three companies of Cossacks, junkers from the Engineers' School, and several other units, a total strength of 1,600.

From October 16 to October 24 junker detachments gradually occupied the government buildings and the most important strategic points in the city.

On October 16 cyclist observation posts were placed "until further notice" on Millionnaya Street and the Politseisky Bridge and in the Alexandrovsky park opposite Gorckhovaya Street and the Vozhcsensky Prospect.

On October 17, junkers were sent to reinforce the guard of the Kresty Prison, the Second City Railway Ticket office and other places. That same day armoured cars were stationed at the Treasury Printing Office, the State Bank, the Central Post Office, the Central Railway Telegraph Office and the Nikolayevsky Station. Orders were given that all the armoured cars were to have twelve belts of machine-gun cartridges.

On October 20 the non-commissioned officers' training company of the Izmailovsky Reserve Regiment arrived to guard the Nikolayevsky Station. On October 24 junkers occupied the Central Telegraph Office, the Central Telephone Station, all the railway stations, the Chief Railway Ticket Office and the government buildings. That same day junker pickets were posted at the corners of the larger streets and began to stop and direct to the Winter Palace all automobiles not provided with proper passes.

¹ I. A. Drezen, "The Petrograd Garrison in October,"—"Krasnaya Letopis" 1927, No. 2 (28), p. 115.

On October 24 junkers occupied the bridges across the Neva.

On October 24, too, the troops from the front were expected in Petrograd.

"At my orders," Kerensky subsequently wrote, "troops were urgently to be sent from the front to St. Petersburg, and the first troop trains from the Northern Front were to arrive in the capital on October 24."¹

It was on this day, too—October 24, the day before the Congress of Soviets opened—that the last, decisive blow was to be delivered—the Smolny was to be attacked and occupied.

"Immediately after the meeting of the government," Kerensky relates in reference to the meeting in the Winter Palace at 11 p.m. on October 23, "the Commander of the Military Area and his Chief of Staff came to see me. They proposed that an expeditionary force should be formed from all the troops remaining faithful to the Provisional Government, including the Cossacks, to seize the Smolny Institute—the headquarters of the Bolsheviks. Evidently, this plan received my immediate approval and I insisted on its being put into effect at once."²

¹ A. F. Kerensky, "From Afar", Paris, p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, p. 300.

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT RUSSIAN EVENTS¹

1917

January 5th (18th N.S.)

Numerous meetings of workers held on the Vyborg Side, Petrograd, at which the Bolsheviks call for a one-day strike on January 9.

January 6th (19th N.S.)

Publication of the ukase of Nicholas II suspending the State Duma and the Privy Council until February 14.

January 7th (20th N.S.)

The Petrograd and Moscow Committees of the Bolshevik Party issue an appeal for a strike and anti-war demonstration on January 9.

January 9th (22nd N.S.)

Lenin delivers a Lecture on the Revolution of 1905 to Young Socialists in Zurich, Switzerland.

Huge demonstrations, meetings and strikes held in Petrograd, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod and other cities, led by the Bolsheviks.

January 18th (31st N.S.)

Germany proclaims unrestricted submarine warfare.

Political strike in the Baku oilfields.

January 27th (February 9th N.S.)

Tsarist Government arrests eleven members of the labour group on the Central War Industry Committee (the Mensheviks Gvozdyev, Broido, and others).

February 1st (14th N.S.)

Secret treaty on war aims concluded between Russia and France.

February 6th (19th N.S.)

The Petrograd Military Area separated from the Northern Front and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Khabalov.

The Bolshevik Central Committee calls for a demonstration on February 10—the anniversary of the trial of the Bolshevik members of the Fourth Duma.

February 10th (23rd N.S.)

The Bolshevik Central Committee resolves to organise a demonstration under Bolshevik slogans on the opening of the Duma on February 14.

¹ All dates are Old Style.

February 14th (27th N.S.)

Opening of the Duma. In response to the call of the Bolshevik Central Committee, a political strike embracing about sixty factories held in Petrograd. Processions in support of the Bolshevik slogans, "Down with the Autocracy!" and "Down with the War!" held in various parts of the city.

February 18th (March 3rd N.S.)

Strike begins at the Putilov Works, Petrograd.

February 22nd (March 7th N.S.)

Lockout of employees of the Putilov Works declared. About 20,000 employees of the works demonstrate.

Nicholas II leaves Tsarskoye Syelo for General Headquarters.

February 23rd (March 8th N.S.)

International Women's Day. About 90,000 workers down tools in response to the call of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Huge workers' demonstrations held. Collisions with the police. The Bolshevik Committee of the Vyborg Side resolve that evening to continue the strike and to make it a general strike.

February 24th (March 9th N.S.)

About 200,000 workers on strike in Petrograd. The demonstrations grow in dimensions, demanding: "Give us Bread!" and "Down with the Tsar!" Cases of insubordination among the troops.

The Bolshevik Central Committee resolves to draw the soldiers into the active struggle.

February 25th (March 10th N.S.)

General strike in Petrograd.

Five members of the Bolshevik Petrograd Committee arrested. Leadership of the struggle passes to the Bolshevik Committee of the Vyborg Side.

February 26th (March 11th N.S.)

Tsar issues ukase dissolving the Duma.

Petrograd Bolshevik Committee publishes manifesto calling for the formation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government.

The Bolsheviks call for the formation of factory and district Soviets.

February 27th (March 12th N.S.)

The autocracy overthrown. Troops join the insurgents *en masse*. Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies formed. Provisional Executive Committee of the Duma set up.

February 28th (March 13th N.S.)

Tsar leaves General Headquarters for Tsarskoye Syelo.

Tsarist Ministers arrested.

General political strike in Moscow.

The Moscow Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee issues a proclamation calling for support of the revolution.

Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies formed.

March 1st (14th N.S.)

First joint session of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies held.

Petrograd Soviet issues Order No. 1.

Garrisons in Tver and Nizhni-Novgorod join the workers.

Joint meeting of the Provisional Committee of the Duma and representatives of the Petrograd Soviet to discuss the formation of a government.

March 2nd (15th N.S.)

Provisional Government set up with Prince Lvov as Prime Minister.

Provisional Government commissions A. I. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin to visit Nicholas II in Pskov to persuade him to abdicate in favour of his son Alexei.

Nicholas II appoints Grand Duke Nicholas Supreme Commander.

Nicholas II abdicates in favour of his brother, Michael.

March 3rd (16th N.S.)

Michael Romanov abdicates.

March 4th (17th N.S.)

Lenin draws up his "Draft Theses" analysing the prospective development of the Russian revolution and the tasks of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolshevik Central Committee resolves to resume publication of the newspaper *Pravda*.

The sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the soldiers at Kronstadt, Sveaborg and Helsingfors join the revolution. Admirals Viren and Nepenin killed.

March 5th (18th N.S.)

First number of the Bolshevik newspaper, *Pravda*, appears.

March 7th (20th N.S.)

Lenin writes the first of his "Letters from Afar."

Provisional Government orders the arrest of Nicholas Romanov.

First issue of the Bolshevik newspaper, *Sotsial-democrat*, appears in Moscow.

First Congress of the nationalist organisations of Byelorussia.

March 8th (21st N.S.)

Nicholas II arrested.

March 9th (22nd N.S.)

Provisional Government recognised by U.S.A.

Provisional Government announces decision to bring criminal proceedings against the peasants of the Kazan Province for agrarian disorders.

March 10th (23rd N.S.)

The Petrograd Bolshevik Committee sets up a commission to form Bolshevik organisations within the armed forces.

March 11th (24th N.S.)

Provisional Government recognised by France, Great Britain and Italy.

March 12th (25th N.S.)

Stalin returns from exile to Petrograd.

Provisional Government decrees abolition of the death penalty.

March 14th (27th N.S.)

Article by Stalin entitled "The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" appears in *Pravda*, No. 8.

Lenin delivers a lecture on "The Tasks of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Russian Revolution" to a meeting of Swiss workers in Zurich.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies issues its manifesto, "To the Peoples of the World."

March 15th (28th N.S.)

Bolshevik Central Committee publicly protests against the campaign of calumny waged in the bourgeois Press against *Pravda*.

Pravda, No. 9, announces that Stalin has joined its editorial board.

Strikes in Moscow for an eight-hour day.

March 16th (29th N.S.)

Article by Stalin entitled "The War" appears in *Pravda*, No. 10.

Milyukov sends a telegram to the Russian diplomatic representatives abroad proclaiming the purpose of the Russian revolution to be to fight the war to a victorious finish.

The Bolshevik fraction on the Moscow Soviet proposes that the workers should adopt the eight-hour day without awaiting official sanction.

A Coalition Government of bourgeois parties and Socialists formed in Finland.

March 17th (30th N.S.)

Provisional Government publicly appeals to the peasants not to resort to arbitrary seizures of landed estates.

March 18th (31st N.S.)

Article by Stalin entitled "The Conditions for the Victory of the Russian Revolution" appears in *Pravda*.

March 19th (April 1st N.S.)

The Bolshevik members of the Fourth Duma return to Petrograd from exile in Siberia.

The First All-Russian Commercial and Industrial Congress opens in Moscow.

March 21st (April 3rd N.S.)

Russian defeat on the Western Front near the River Stokhod.

Peasants' constituent assembly of the Moscow Province proposes the immediate prohibition of the sale and purchase of land.

March 23rd (April 5th N.S.)

First All-Russian Cossack Congress held in Petrograd.

Agrarian disorders break out in Simbirsk, Bessarabia and other provinces.

March 24th (April 6th N.S.)

U.S.A. declares war on Germany.

March 26th (April 8th N.S.)

The Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee publishes its resolution on the Provisional Government, the war and peace.

March 27th (April 9th N.S.)

Provisional Government declares its readiness to stand by the Allies in fighting the war to a victorious finish.

March 29th (April 11th N.S.)

Finnish Diet holds its first session in Helsingfors.

All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opens in Petrograd.

March 31st (April 13th N.S.)

Moutet, Cachin and Lafond, French Socialists, and James O'Grady and Will Thorne, members of the British Labour Party, arrive in Petrograd.

April 2nd (15th N.S.)

General Alexeyev appointed Supreme Commander.

April 3rd (16th N.S.)

Lenin arrives in Petrograd from abroad and makes his first public speech in Russia on the square of the Finnish Railway Station.

Beginning of French offensive on the Western Front near the River Aisne under General Nivelle, ending in defeat and huge losses for the French Army.

All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies closes.

Strike of 300,000 munition workers in Berlin and Leipzig.

April 3rd-4th (16th-17th N.S.)

First Moscow City Conference of the Bolshevik Party. Resolution in favour of forming an "armed national militia" passed.

April 4th (17th N.S.)

Lenin delivers his report on "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (containing the "April Theses") at a meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

April 5th (18th N.S.)

Strike of metal workers in Helsingfors.

April 6th (19th N.S.)

Central Rada formed at a Ukrainian National Congress in Kiev.

April 7th (20th N.S.)

Lenin's "April Theses" published in *Pravda*.

A congress of army and workers' deputies opens on the Western Front.

The First Provincial Congress of Peasants' Deputies opens in Minsk under the chairmanship of M. V. Frunze.

April 8th (21st N.S.)

Albert Thomas, French Minister of Labour, visits Russia.

Prince Lvov, Prime Minister in the Provisional Government, orders the suppression of peasant disorders by military force.

April 10th (23rd N.S.)

Lenin speaks at a meeting of soldiers of the Izmailovsky Regiment.

April 11th (24th N.S.)

Provisional Government publishes a law entitled "Protecting the Crops" designed to safeguard the land and crops of the landlords.

April 14th (27th N.S.)

Article by Stalin entitled "The Land to the Peasants" appears in *Pravda*, No. 32.

The Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens. Lenin makes the report on the current situation.

The Petrograd District Committee of the Bolshevik Party passes a resolution calling for the immediate formation of a Red Guard.

The Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party resolves to form a Red Guard.

April 15th (28th N.S.)

First issue of the *Soldatskaya Pravda (Soldiers' Truth)* appears.

Second Moscow City Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens.

Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party adopts a resolution proposed by Lenin on policy towards the Provisional Government.

April 16th (29th N.S.)

A demonstration of soldiers and sailors in Petrograd protests against the persecution of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

April 17th (30th N.S.)

Finnish Regional Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies opens in Vyborg.

First Moscow District Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens.

April 18th (May 1st N.S.)

Milyukov sends a note to the Allies announcing the readiness of the Provisional Government to fight the war to a victorious finish.

April 19th (May 2nd N.S.)

First Conference of Bolsheviks of the Central Industrial Region opens in Moscow.

April 20th (May 3rd N.S.)

Meetings and demonstrations protest against Milyukov's note and demand his resignation.

April 21st (May 4th N.S.)

Provisional Government publishes regulations governing the Land Committees.

April 22nd (May 5th N.S.)

First "private conference" of members of the State Duma held.

April 23rd (May 6th N.S.)

Provisional Government publishes regulations governing the formation of workers' committees in industrial enterprises.

Preliminary conference of delegates to the All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party.

Negotiations begin for summoning an international Socialist conference in Stockholm.

April 24th (May 7th N.S.)

All-Russian (April) Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens in Petrograd. Lenin reports on the current situation. Stalin speaks in the discussion.

April 25th (May 8th N.S.)

On Lenin's proposal, the April Conference resolves not to participate in the international Socialist conference in Stockholm.

April 27th (May 10th N.S.)

April Conference. Lenin reports on the war. Resolutions on the war and on policy towards the Provisional Government adopted.

The Third Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Council of Congresses of Commodity Market Trade and Agriculture opens in Moscow.

Prince Lvov writes to Chkhaidze inviting representatives from the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to join the cabinet.

April 28th (May 11th N.S.)

April Conference. Lenin reports on the agrarian question.

Conference of representatives of eighty-two Petrograd factories and twenty-six Bolshevik Party organisations discusses the formation of armed workers' detachments.

The Vyborg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies resolves to transform the militia into a Workers' Guard.

April 29th (May 12th N.S.)

April Conference. Stalin reports on the national question. Lenin makes the closing speech of the conference.

"Draft Regulations of the Workers' Guard" published in *Pravda*.

April 30th (May 13th N.S.)

Guchkov, Minister of War, resigns.

May 1st (14th N.S.)

The Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies resolves to delegate four of its representatives to the cabinet.

First Congress of Soviets of the Far East opens.

All-Russian Moslem Congress opens in Moscow.

May 2nd (15th N.S.)

Negotiations started between representatives of the compromising parties on the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government for the formation of a coalition government.

May 3rd (16th N.S.)

Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigns.

Tereshchenko, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, sends a note on war aims to the Allies.

All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies opens in Petrograd.

May 5th (18th N.S.)

Coalition Provisional Government formed.

Provisional Government informs the Allies that it will not conclude a separate peace.

The first Ukrainian Army Congress opens in Kiev.

May 7th (20th N.S.)

Lenin sends an open letter to the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

An all-Russian Menshevik conference resolves to give complete and unreserved support to the Provisional Government.

Petrograd City Conference of the United Social-Democrats ("Inter-Regionalists") adopts a resolution expressing opposition to the coalition government.

All-Russian Officers' Congress opens in Petrograd.

May 9th (22nd N.S.)

Eighth Congress of the Cadet Party opens in Petrograd.

May 11th (24th N.S.)

Great Britain replies to Tereshchenko's note of May 3.

May 12th (25th N.S.)

U.S.A. replies to Tereshchenko's note of May 3.

May 13th (26th N.S.)

France replies to Tereshchenko's note of May 3.

May 15th (28th N.S.)

First number of the Bolshevik newspaper, *Okopnaya Pravda* (*Trench Truth*) issued on the Northern Front.

May 16th (29th N.S.)

A congress of commissars of the South-Western Front passes a resolution proposing that the front be reinforced by volunteer units.

U.S.A. grants a loan of 100,000,000 dollars to the Provisional Government.

May 18th (31st N.S.)

General Denikin proposes the formation of shock battalions.

May 20th (June 2nd N.S.)

Inaugural meeting of the All-Russian Alliance of Landed Proprietors held in Moscow.

May 21st (June 3rd N.S.)

Conference of Socialist parties, trade union bodies and shop stewards' committees in Leeds, England, adopts a resolution in favour of Councils of Workers and Soldiers and a peace without annexations or indemnities.

May 22nd (June 4th N.S.)

Lenin reports on the agrarian question at the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

General Brusilov appointed Supreme Commander in place of General Alexeyev.

May 25th (June 7th N.S.)

Third All-Russian Congress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party opens in Moscow.

May 28th (June 10th N.S.)

All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress opens in Kiev.

May 31st (June 13th N.S.)

Bolshevik Central Committee adopts a resolution advocating "All Power to the Soviets."

A Petrograd conference of factory and workshop committees adopts the resolution proposed by Lenin on measures for combating economic disruption.

June 3rd (16th N.S.)

First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opens.

June 4th (17th N.S.)

Lenin speaks at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on policy towards the Provisional Government.

June 6th (19th N.S.)

Second All-Ukrainian Army Congress opens in Kiev.

Meeting of delegates of the crews of the Black Sea Fleet demands the resignation of Admiral Kolchak, Commander of the Fleet.

June 7th (20th N.S.)

All-Russian Cossack Congress opens in Petrograd.

June 9th (22nd N.S.)

Lenin speaks on the subject of the war at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

First All-Russian Congress of Soviets vetoes the peaceful demonstration appointed by the Bolsheviks for June 10.

June 13th (26th N.S.)

An article by Stalin entitled "The Crisis of the Revolution" appears in *Soldatskaya Pravda*.

June 15th (28th N.S.)

Two of the most revolutionary regiments quartered in Kazan dispatched to the front.

A General Secretariat—the executive organ of the Ukrainian Central Rada—set up.

June 16th (29th N.S.)

Kerensky orders the army and navy to take the offensive.

An all-Russian conference of Bolshevik organisations in the army at the front and in the rear opens in Petrograd.

June 18th (July 1st N.S.)

Russian offensive begins. Mass demonstrations held in Petrograd, Moscow and other cities under the Bolshevik slogans : "Down with the Capitalist Ministers !" and "All Power to the Soviets !"

June 19th (July 2nd N.S.)

Kaledin elected Ataman of the Don Cossacks.

Bourgeois demonstrations in Petrograd in connection with the Russian offensive.

June 21st (July 4th N.S.)

An Economic Council and Chief Economic Committee of the Provisional Government set up.

June 22nd (July 5th N.S.)

A joint meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, Petrograd Committee and the organisation in the army decide against an immediate armed insurrection.

June 26th (July 9th N.S.)

Provisional Government resolves to ration grainstuffs.

Skobelev, Minister of Labour, appeals to the workers to refrain from "arbitrary actions."

July 1st (14th N.S.)

Second Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens.

A delegation from the Provisional Government, consisting of Kerensky, Tsereteli and Tereshchenko, sign a treaty with the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kiev.

July 2nd (15th N.S.)

Cadet Ministers resign from the Provisional Government.

July 3rd (16th N.S.)

A joint meeting of company committees and the regimental committee of the First Machine-Gun Regiment discusses the question of armed insurrection.

At a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, Stalin, in the name of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Conference of the Bolshevik Party, declares that the Bolsheviks are opposed to immediate armed action.

Strikes and huge demonstrations of workers and soldiers take place in Petrograd in support of the Bolshevik slogans.

About 10 p.m. a meeting of delegates of the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party, members of the Bolshevik Central Committee and representatives of army units and factories resolve to participate in a peaceful demonstration on July 4 in support of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets !"

July 4th (17th N.S.)

Huge demonstrations of workers, army units and sailors from Kronstadt held in Petrograd in support of the Bolshevik slogans.

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in Petrograd, demands the restoration of the death penalty and the punishment of the participants in the July demonstration.

Demonstration of workers and part of the garrison takes place in Moscow.

Demonstrators in Petrograd are fired upon.

July 5th (18th N.S.)

The Bolshevik newspapers, *Pravda*, *Okopnaya Pravda* and *Soldatskaya Pravda*, closed down by the Provisional Government. Printshop and editorial offices of *Pravda* wrecked by junkers.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ivanovo-Voznesensk passes a resolution demanding the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

July 6th (19th N.S.)

Provisional Government orders Lenin's arrest.

Lenin goes into hiding.

Listok Pravdy, replacing *Pravda*, begins publication.

Huge demonstration of workers and soldiers of the garrison held in Ivanovo-Voznesensk.

Strike of metal workers in Moscow.

German counter-offensive against the Russians begins. Breach forced in the Russian front near Tarnopol.

July 7th (20th N.S.)

Provisional Government orders the disbandment of military units which took part in the demonstration of July 3-4.

Provisional Government orders the dissolution of the Central Executive Committee of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

Prince Lvov, Prime Minister, resigns.

July 8th (21st N.S.)

Provisional Government endorses Kerensky as Prime Minister.

July 9th (22nd N.S.)

Moscow District Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens.

July 11th (24th N.S.)

Tarnopol captured by the Germans.

July 12th (25th N.S.)

Provisional Government restores the death penalty at the front. Provisional Government passes a decree restricting transactions in land.

July 14th (27th N.S.)

All-Russian Congress of Landed Proprietors opens.

July 15th (28th N.S.)

First Railway Congress opens in Moscow.

July 16th (29th N.S.)

Extraordinary Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party held.

July 18th (31st N.S.)

Finnish Diet proclaims itself the supreme power in Finland. Provisional Government orders the dissolution of the Finnish Diet.

General Kornilov appointed Supreme Commander in place of General Brusilov.

July 21st (August 3rd N.S.)

Second Moscow Regional Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens.

A joint conference of the Provisional Government and the Central Committees of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties opens. Kerensky is empowered to form a cabinet and select members at his own discretion.

July 23rd (August 5th N.S.)

First issue of the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochii i Soldat* (Worker and Soldier) appears.

Ninth Congress of the Cadet Party opens.

July 24th (August 6th N.S.)

Rabochii i Soldat publishes an appeal of the Petrograd City Conference of the Bolshevik Party written by Stalin and entitled "To All Toilers and All Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd."

Second coalition Provisional Government formed with Kerensky as Prime Minister.

July 26th (August 8th N.S.)

Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party opens.

Economic Council meets. It endorses the right of employers to declare lockouts.

July 27th (August 9th N.S.)

Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party : Stalin presents the political report of the Central Committee.

A Polish Volunteer Corps commanded by General Dowbor-Musnicki formed by order of General Kornilov.

July 28th (August 10th N.S.)

Provisional Government empowers the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior to prohibit meetings and congresses.

July 30th (August 12th N.S.)

Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party : Stalin reports on the political situation.

July 31st (August 13th N.S.)

Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party : Stalin replies to the discussion of the report on the political situation.

All-Russian Congress of the Peasant Union opens in Moscow.

General strike begins in Spain.

August 1st (14th N.S.)

Nicholas Romanov and his family exiled to Tobolsk.
General strike in Helsingfors.

August 2nd (15th N.S.)

Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party : Party Rules adopted.

August 3rd (16th N.S.)

Kornilov submits his programme to Kerensky.

Second All-Russian Commercial and Industrial Congress opens in Moscow.

August 5th (18th N.S.)

First session of the Council of Nationalist Organisations of Byelorussia.

Central Executive Committee of the Soviets adopts a resolution favouring the postponement of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.

August 7th (20th N.S.)

General strike of rubber workers in Moscow.

Second Petrograd Conference of Factory and Workshop Committees opens.

August 9th (22nd N.S.)

Moscow District Committee of the Bolshevik Party resolves to organise a mass protest on the day of the opening of the Moscow Council of State.

August 10th (23rd N.S.)

Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochii i Soldat* prohibited.

August 11th (24th N.S.)

Mass protest of Moscow workers against the summoning of the Council of State.

Provisional Government adopts Kornilov's programme of August 3.

August 12th (25th N.S.)

Council of State opens in Moscow.

General strike in Moscow on the occasion of the opening of the Council of State.

One-day protest strikes against the Moscow Council of State held in Kiev, Kostroma and many other cities.

Kornilov gives orders for the formation of reserve regiments of Knights of St. George on each of the fronts.

August 13th (26th N.S.)

First issue of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletarii* (*Proletarian*) appears.

Manifesto of the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party published.

General Kornilov arrives in Moscow for the Council of State.

August 16th (29th N.S.)

Proletarii No. 3 prints a letter from Lenin severely criticising the opportunist speech made by Kamenev at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets on August 6 on the subject of the Stockholm Conference.

August 17th (30th N.S.)

An article by Stalin entitled "The Results of the Council of State" appears in *Proletarii*, No. 4.

August 18th (31st N.S.)

Two articles by Stalin, "Reasons for the July Defeat at the Front" and "The Truth About the Defeat at the Front" appear in *Proletarii*, No. 5.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies declares against the death penalty.

Conference held at General Headquarters on the subject of proclaiming a military dictatorship.

August 19th (September 1st N.S.)

Germans pierce the Russian front at Riga.

Joint congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Mensheviks, Unity group and "non-factionalists") opens in Petrograd.

August 20th (September 2nd N.S.)

General Headquarters orders the evacuation of the Riga area.

August 21st (September 3rd N.S.)

Kornilov surrenders Riga to the Germans.

August 23rd (September 5th N.S.)

"Third Zimmerwald" Conference opens in Stockholm.

General strike in Italy demanding "Bread and Peace." Bloody collisions between Italian workers and troops.

August 24th (September 6th N.S.)

Savinkov consults Kornilov on the question of dispatching a cavalry corps to Petrograd.

The Bolshevik paper *Proletarii* prohibited.

August 25th (September 7th N.S.)

First number of the Bolshevik paper *Rabochii (Worker)* appears. Kornilov troops begin to advance on Petrograd.

August 26th (September 8th N.S.)

Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party calls for the organisation of squads of armed workers in Petrograd, Moscow and other cities.

August 28th (September 10th N.S.)

Cadet Ministers resign.

August 30th (September 12th N.S.)

Lenin writes a letter to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on the tactics of the Party in connection with the Kornilov revolt.

General Krymov arrested. Kornilov revolt suppressed.

Savinkov resigns.

Kerensky appointed Supreme Commander.

August 31st (September 13th N.S.)

Petrograd Soviet adopts a Bolshevik resolution.

Minsk trade union organisations resolve to form a Red Guard.

"Committees for the Protection of the Revolution" formed in Vyatka, Lugansk and other cities.

General Krymov commits suicide.

September 1st (14th N.S.)

Directorate formed consisting of Kerensky, Nikitin, Tereshchenko, Verkhovsky and Verderevsky.

Provisional Government proclaims Russia a republic.

Conference of Bolsheviks from the region and the front opens in Minsk.

Kerensky issues an order to the army and navy prohibiting "self-formed" detachments on the pretext of combating counter-revolutionary actions.

Red Guard formed in Kronstadt.

September 3rd (16th N.S.)

The first number of the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochii Put (Workers' Way)* appears containing an article by Stalin, "The Crisis and the Directorate."

September 4th (17th N.S.)

The crew of the torpedo boat *Gnyevny* passes a resolution demanding the transfer of the entire power to the Soviets.

Kerensky orders the dissolution of the committees and organisations created to combat Kornilov.

September 5th (18th N.S.)

A congress of Soviets of Central Siberia opens in Krasnoyarsk and supports the Bolshevik slogans.

The Moscow Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies calls for the conquest of power by the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry. Decides to form a Red Guard.

Palchinsky publishes an order for the compulsory registration of all firearms by September 20.

September 8th (21st N.S.)

The workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies elects a Bolshevik presidium.

September 10th (23rd N.S.)

General Dukhonin appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme Commander.

Third Regional Congress of Soviets of Finland opens under Bolshevik leadership.

Third Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees held.

September 10th-14th (23rd-27th N.S.)

Lenin writes his pamphlet, *The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Combat It*.

September 12th (25th N.S.)

Tashkent Soviet begins revolutionary action against the Provisional Government.

September 12th-14th (25th-27th N.S.)

Lenin writes his letter to the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Moscow Committee of the Party known as "The Bolsheviks Must Take Power."

September 13th (26th N.S.)

Peasant revolts in the Kishinev Province.

September 13th-14th (26th-27th N.S.)

Lenin writes his letter to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party known as "Marxism and Insurrection."

September 14th (27th N.S.)

Peasant revolts in the Tambov Province. Punitive expedition sent from Moscow.

Formation of staffs of the Red Guard completed in all the districts of Petrograd.

The Democratic Conference opens in Petrograd.

September 15th (28th N.S.)

Unrest in the Orel garrison.

Kerensky wires Tashkent announcing the dispatch of a punitive expedition.

First North Western Regional Conference of the Bolshevik Party opens in Minsk.

September 17th (30th N.S.)

Lenin removes from Helsingfors to Vyborg in order to keep in closer touch with Petrograd.

An article by Stalin entitled "All Power to the Soviets!" appears in *Rabochii Put*, No. 13.

September 19th (October 2nd N.S.)

The Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies elects a Bolshevik Executive Committee.

Agrarian disorders in the Taganrog area.

September 21st (October 4th N.S.)

Democratic Conference decides to form a Pre-parliament.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies adopts a resolution expressing hostility to the Democratic Conference.

The Odessa Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies resolves to organise a Red Guard.

The Central Committee of the All-Russian Union of Railwaymen resolves to declare a general strike to begin at midnight on September 23.

September 22nd (October 5th N.S.)

The Democratic Conference closes.

The Central Strike Committee of the railwaymen's union proclaims a national strike of railwaymen.

Congress of the French Socialist Party opens in Bordeaux.

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the Democratic Conference, printed in *Rabochii Put*, No. 19.
Third Moscow District Conference of the Bolshevik Par

September 25th (October 8th N.S.)

Industrialists resolve to declare a general lockout in answer to demands of the workers.

and, and last, coalition government formed.

September 26th (October 9th N.S.)

Bolshevik Central Committee issues an appeal on the railway strike entitled "Help the Railwaymen!"

September 27th (October 10th N.S.)

General strike begins in the Baku oilfields.

August-September

Lenin writes his book, *The State and Revolution* (published in 1918)
October 1st (14th N.S.)

Lenin writes his pamphlet, *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power*

October 3rd (16th N.S.)

The Second Baltic Fleet agrees demands Kerensky's immediate removal from the Provisional Government.

Strike in various parts of the country.

October 4th (17th N.S.)

Peasant revolts in the Kuibyshev, Penza and Ryazan Provinces.

October 5th (18th N.S.)

A congress of the Lettish Republic of the Twelfth Army in Venden supported by a meeting of 5,000 soldiers and workers, resolves resolutely to combat the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government under the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!"

October 6th (19th N.S.)

A conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Petrograd Province, held in Kronstadt, resolves to refuse to support the Provisional Government and to fight for the power of the Soviets

October 7th (20th N.S.)

An article by Lenin, entitled "The State and Revolution," appears in *Rabochii Put*, No. 3.

October 8th (21st N.S.)

Lenin writes his article

October 9th (22nd N.S.)

A meeting of several demands the overthrow of the power of

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